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On bells
According to Viktor von Weizsäcker, a
German medical specialist and biologist,
things are not in time, but time is in things.2
K. Stockhausen
On time




Taking its starting point from the often repeated idea that music and time are related, and
that understanding time, in its multiple possibilities, depends on perceiving it rhythmi-
cally, this thesis proposes a new compositional concept, the rhythmic idea, which elabo-
rates musically the ways time becomes rhythm. This concept is developed mainly from
H. Bergson’s and G. Deleuze’s philosophies of time, both of post-Kantian transcendental
empiricist extraction, and elaborates the conception of musical idea informed by A.
Schoenberg’s and K. Stockhausen’s theories on the matter. In it, the qualifier rhythmic
does not necessarily denote pulse regularity nor a recursive ordering of diﬀerent impulses,
but their heterogeneity and complexity. All the same, idea does not denote identity but
dynamism and multiplicity. It is thus understood that the notion of rhythmic idea indi-
cates duration, in the perspective of Bergson’s durée réelle, a dynamic temporal flux that
is manifold in the experience of a musical piece, so that the piece’s temporal evolution
becomes in itself a mode of being. Additionally, now following Deleuze (and also
Bachelard on this specific matter) it is understood that the particular, unique cognitive
experience of a musical piece’s temporal complexity and heterogeneity also becomes a
mode of knowing. Thus musical composition is a twofold process: it is a privileged means
for the expression and interpretation of fluxes of temporal complexity forms, which al-
ways operate on the temporal orientation of both being and knowing simultaneously.
This orientation is rhythmic in both senses, as dynamism, and as complexity, that is, as
continuity and articulation. From this, emerges the notion that composing — which in
the perspective here presented includes both the expression and the interpretation of the
very compositional process by means of a musical piece — is accomplished according
to determinate rhythmic ideas that rhythmicalize functionally a given musical idea, as
being and as knowing. On this basis, it is argued that the functional rhythmicalization of
the musical idea comprises at least three qualitatively distinct but mutually influencing
compositional domains, of which this dissertation discusses chiefly the first: (1) the do-
main of musical times, composed by the rhythmical interpenetration of absolute funda-
mental temporal orientations, bound to the past or to the future; allowing for a future
development of further two domains:(2) that of musical temporalities, composed by the
rhythmical interpenetration of fluid, regular and irregular psychological impulses, in-
formed by distinct types of memory and imagination; and (3) that of musical temporal-
izations, composed by the rhythmical interpenetration of systemic (time-qualifying) and
metrical (time-ordering) operations. Rhythmicalization may imply either the creation of
original rhythmic ideas or the arrangement of conventional ones. In this, it reflects the
degree of social assimilation and, therefore, the degree of historical and cultural installa-
tion of rhythmic ideas. Furthermore, as the temporal complexity of a given musical idea
cannot be abstracted from the experience of its own flux and because this twofold expe-
rience is at last necessarily related to the quality or ‘reach’ of one’s experience of the dy-
namism and complexity of the world — both as perception and intellect —, it is suggested
that the rhythmic constitution of the musical idea stands not only as a fundamental and
necessary representational factor of music as Art but, more to the point, it stands essen-
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Introduction
1 Karlheinz Stockhausen, “Questions and Answers on ‘Four Criteria of Electronic Music’,” filmed by
Allied Artists, 1971, incorporated in the documentary “Tuning In,” directed by Barrie Gavin for the
BBC-TV “Omnibus” series, 1980, apud Robin Maconie, Other Planets: the music of Karlheinz Stock-
hausen (Oxford: Scarecrow Press, 2005), 2.
2 “To Rudolf Kolisch, Berlin, 27 July 1932,” in Arnold Schoenberg, Letters, ed. Erwin Stein, trans.
 Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), 164-165.
On the musical idea, 
answering to an analytic work
You have rightly worked out the series in my
string quartet. […] You must have gone to a
great deal of trouble, and I don’t think I’d
have had the patience to do it. But you think
one’s any better oﬀ for knowing it? … This
isn’t where the aesthetic qualities reveal
themselves, or, if they do, only incidentally. I
can’t utter too many warnings against over-
ratting these analyses, since after all they only
lead to what I have always been dead
against: seeing how it is done; whereas I have
always helped people to see: what it is! I have
repeatedly tried to make [Adorno]
understand this, and also Berg and Webern.
But they won’t believe me. I can’t say it often
enough: my works are twelve-note
compositions, not twelve-note
compositions. In this respect people go on
confusing me with Hauer, to whom
composition is only of secondary
importance.2
A. Schoenberg
On the music inside us
You are always referring to my music, my
music.  What does it mean my music? It’s
just something that has come into my mind
and I am working all the time and that’s it.
So: I am a myth, I am a name, and if I go
away then they just attach on something that
vibrates within yourself, where you are
confronted with this so-called music. 
It has a name so in order to identify it. 
That’s all. Like ‘Beethoven:’ — who was he?
He was a very miserable person, I must say,
as a human being. And he is a myth for
something that we are, that is within
ourselves. We are echoing. Beethoven is part
of us or he doesn’t exist. And in that sense I
think it [music] is only a means, it’s like a
spiritual food, and it will be used by certain
people who discover a certain identity of
what they are and what there is vibrating.
They choose more of it, they like it — liking
means, as I always say, remembering: when I
like something, then I discover something
that I have been before, that is profoundly




I – Problem and Delimitation
What I present here is a view of creativity in music as a temporal process.
In this view, the manifold aspects of musical creativity are seen as constituent powers,
mutually influential, of the compositional process. This is a lively and dynamic process
which is composed by innumerous creative impulses, in a complex, continually redone,
and multiple temporal dimension. A transcendent dimension, always deeper and richer
than it is possible to suppose from the analysis of material elements and proportions at
the surface of a piece of music.
This approach sprung from the perception that an important part of the time that is de-
voted to learning and practising musical composition revolves around two main issues:
(i) that of the origin, of the initial motivation of the creative flux (its thematics, its aﬀects,
etc.), including choices of technical matters, of modes of organisation and presentation
of the materials, and of the means for musical performance; and (ii) that of the reception
of this flux, now seen as an influx, as strength and meaning posited on the world. Many
times these issues are considered from the point of view of music education, music phi-
losophy, cognitive studies, etc. Here, however, the quest is for a properly compositional
manner, a dedicated manner of shedding light upon these problems taking into account
only what is specific to the domain of music creativity.
Doubtlessly, a usual manner is to consider these issues from the perspective of musical
elements as they are objectively presented in a piece of music, analysing, measuring, clas-
sifying, probing their proportions, evaluating them experimentally. A distinct option is
to consider them from the standpoint of the creative act in its relation to the musical piece,
an option permeated by multiplicities and ever-changing transformations, by the com-
plexity of becoming. This second option is what gives this thesis its orientation. 
It is possible to infer the creative routines that gave origin to a musical piece, by analysing
its elements and proportions. It is also feasible to borrow these routines and project them,
renewed or not, onto a new piece. By doing so, one promotes a kind of wandering com-
positional eﬀect, which allows, in a careful listening, recognition of the line of invariance
(of a certain formal design, of a melodic gesture, of a rhythmic impulse, of a mixture of
timbres) that links the new piece to the one composed before. Recall, for instance, the
compositional dialogues between the ostinatos in Bach’s Prelude nº 2 in c minor, and
Birtwistle’s Harrison’s Clocks; or between the arpeggios in Paganini’s and Sciarrino’s
Capricci nº. 1. From this stems an initial question: which is the way that leads to the cre-
ation of a fully new form of musical presentation? Also, isn’t it fair to ask what leads us to
our choices? This is a second question: what are the grounds for compositional choices,
in particular for making decisions towards more or less original choices?
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The line of approach to these questions taken here departs from issues initially posited
by Arnold Schoenberg in his own research about the nature of the musical idea and the
problem of its presentation.3 I expect to extend and expand upon those issues by taking
into account aspects of Schoenberg’s own theories on musical composition and, quite
tangentially, also of Karlheinz Stockhausen’s, and Olivier Messiaen’s; and by using theo-
retical works by Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, and also by Gaston Bachelard, on the
epistemological problem of time and representation (however framed by Immanuel
Kant’s critical approach). 
The decision to take Schoenberg’s intuitions as my point of departure was driven by the
compositional slant of my initial concerns. All the same, the choice of Schoenberg was
not gratuitous, as his own ideas are firmly related to Kant’s. As will be demonstrated, the
expansion I aim to propose of Schoenberg’s more general notion of musical idea will be
supported by Bergson’s developments of Kant, and also, via Bergson’s philosophy, by
Deleuze and Bachelard. 
Schoenberg’s musical idea shall not to be confused with the concept of theme and its de-
velopment, as apparent for example in the commentary by Dahlhaus, who says that “the
diﬃculties faced by composers after Beethoven were due in no small part to the brevity
of their musical ideas,”4 a concept of idea that originates in the “Baroque and Classical
tradition of understanding and describing a musical work in rhetorical terms.”5 For
Schoenberg, the musical idea transcends the technique of its presentation in a piece of
music. It is the musical thought itself, that, as thought, does not take place in a musical
piece outside its experience, but among the individuals that are related by means of the
piece: the idea is not a theme in itself, nor its variations and developments, but the con-
fluence of compositional factors and conditions that such technical devices project on
the musical piece. In other words, the musical idea involves both the expressive and the
interpretative forces that are established throughout its presentation.
Schoenberg’s approach is grounded upon Kant’s proposition of aesthetic idea. Kant de-
fines the aesthetic idea as 
that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the pos-
sibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e., concept, being adequate to it, and which lan-
guage, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible.
It is easily seen, that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which,
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3 Music, says Schoenberg “is not a kind of entertainment but a musical poet’s or thinker’s presentation
of musical ideas, ideas that are a part of what man can apperceive, reason, and express.” Arnold Schoen-
berg, The Musical Idea and The Logic, Technique and Art of its Presentation, ed. Patricia Carpenter &
Severine Neﬀ (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 1.
4 Carl Dahlhaus, Between Romanticism and Modernism: four studies in the music of the later nineteenth
century, trans. Mary Whitall. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 40.
5 Jack Boss, Schoenberg’s Twelve-tone Music: symmetry and the musical idea (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 10.
conversely, is a concept, to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be
adequate.6
This proposition had a profound influence on Schoenberg and may be understood 
as anticipating many of the features of Schoenberg’s musical idea […] particularly the sense
that it is an ineﬀable ‘something’ that generates the actual piece; yet despite its ineﬀability
it forms the basis for the listener’s comprehension of the piece (musical form being the
agent of that comprehensibility) and enables the listener to appreciate it as ‘beautiful.’7
In fact, Schoenberg dedicates practically all his life as a composer and teacher of compo-
sition to the problem of the ineﬀability of the musical idea, particularly in what concerns
its presentation. For him, it was indispensable to objectively — musically — define and
demonstrate the concept. Josef Rufer refers, for example, to a short comment by Schoen-
berg, dated 7 April 1929: “The question as to what a musical idea is has never been an-
swered up till now … I thought that I would be able to state this clearly today, I had it so
clearly in mind. But I must still wait. Perhaps, though, I shall come to it yet”.8
Later on, a 72 year-old Schoenberg gave, in New Music, Outmoded Music, Style and Idea,
a representational definition of musical idea: 
in its most common meaning, the term idea is used as a synonym for theme, melody, phrase,
or motive. I myself consider the totality of a piece as the idea: the idea which its creator
wanted to present. But, because of the lack of better terms, I am forced to define the term idea
in the following manner [my stress]: Every tone which is added to a beginning tone makes
the meaning of that tone doubtful. If, for instance, G follows after C, the ear may not be sure
whether this expresses C major or G major, or even F major or E minor; and the addition
of other tones may or may not clarify this problem. In this manner, there is produced a state
of unrest, of imbalance which grows throughout most of the piece, and is enforced further
by similar functions of the rhythm. The method by which balance is restored seems to me
the real idea of the composition.9
This image, consisting of three dialectic phases: uncertainty or ambiguity — imbalance
by increasing of uncertainty — resolution of imbalance, gave the impulse for further stud-
ies on the matter.10 However, as I see it, the tonal example of Schoenberg’s argument,
given “because of the lack of better terms,” should not be taken to the letter. Instead, it
implies a first expansion of the concept of musical idea: what is implicit in this passage is
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6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1952), 314.
7 Boss, Schoenberg’s Twelve-tone Music…, 14. See also Patricia Carpenter, “Musical Form and Musical
Idea: reflections on a theme of Schoenberg, Hanslick and Kant,” in Music and Civilization: Essays in
Honor of Paul Henry Lang, ed. Edmond Strainchamps and Maria Rika Maniates with Christopher
Hatch (New York: Norton, 1984), 407.
8 Josef Rufer, The Works of Arnold Schoenberg: a catalogue of his compositions, writings and paintings,
trans. Dika Newlin (London: Faber, 1962), 137.
9 Arnold Schoenberg, “New Music, Outmoded Music, Style and Idea (1946),” in Style and Idea, ed.
Leonard Stein (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), 122-123.
10 In his study on Schoenberg’s concept of musical idea, Jack Boss employs systematically this concept
of musical idea, as he declares: “I will interpret musical idea as an analytic framework: a process span-
the fact that the balance-imbalance of a musical form, tonal or otherwise, is potentially
established or broken (or even fluctuates), not just because of tonal relations between
pitches, but also because of several other factors, including rhythmics. It is certainly a
point intuitively shared by composers in general and mindfully presented by others, like
Messiaen in his Traité de Rythme, de Couleur, et d’Ornithologie, who says that
Gaston Bachelard concludes by saying, ‘The sonorous duration is dialectic in every sense,
in terms of the melody, in terms of the harmony, in its intensity, and in its timbres.’ This
statement is full of consequences. Let us give free reign to our imagination: we are going to
find — in replacing ‘rhythmic order’ with ‘rhythmic language,’ a richer term — not harmony,
as Bachelard has just suggested to us, but a number of diverse rhythmic languages that can
coexist in the same music. They are: (1) the rhythmic language of durations (long and short
durations – quantitative order); (2) the rhythmic language of intensities (loud and soft
sounds – crescendo and decrescendo – dynamic order); (3) the rhythmic language of den-
sities (thickness – number of simultaneous sounds – belonging also to dynamic order); (4)
the rhythmic language of pitches (high, low – changes of register); (5) the rhythmic lan-
guage of timbres (phonetic order); (6) the rhythmic language of attacks (legato, accented,
all types of staccato, sforzando, etc. — belonging also to phonetic order); (7) the language
of rhythmic movement (weak and strong beats – accentuation – cinematic order); (8) the
rhythmic language of tempi (rallentando and accellerando – diﬀerences of tempo – belonging
also to the cinematic order — extreme speeds, such as those practiced in ‘musique concrète,’
have an eﬀect of ‘transmutation,’ as Varése and Jolivet say, and completely change music and
timbre: this is one of the most interesting aspects of the dialectic of tempi); (9) the rhythmic
language of transpositions and durations (all possible permutations or transpositions: ret-
rograde movement, center to the extremes, extremes to the center, and the hundreds of mil-
lions of others…); (10) polyrhythmic language; (11) the rhythmic language resulting from
polyrhythm; (12) the rhythmic language of harmony (there can be a rhythm of chords:
Beethoven and Wagner practiced it in juxtaposing conventionally short harmonies with
very long held ones — in our day, we could give a particular and more complex rhythm to
simultaneous sounds, independent of the rhythm of pitches and of very short rhythms:
there would be thus rhythm of harmony, rhythm of melody, and rhythm of rhythm, if I may
be permitted this last redundancy…); (13) the rhythmic language of musical premises
(premise = modality, tonality, polymodality, polytonality, atonality, twelve-tone series, all
other types of series, etc. An opposition or mix of these diﬀerent places, assigning a partic-
ular duration to each one); and (14) the rhythmic language of silence.11
For sure, Schoenberg’s mature musical idea involves, like Messiaen’s, the interrelation and
control of several parameters — intensities, accelerations, superpositions, crossings —,
and gives rise to infinite compositional strategies. That is, the musical idea is not delin-
eated by the material as such, but by its relations. What matters, in his provisional defini-
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ning the whole piece in which some sort of opposition or conflict between musical elements is pre-
sented at the beginning, elaborated, and deepened through the course of the piece, and resolved at or
near the end. […] [I] endeavor to give a complete account of a piece from beginning to end, not pre-
senting the details measure by measure necessarily, but accounting for the processes that characterize
every section of a piece. I firmly believe there is no other way to account for ‘musical idea’ as Schoen-
berg seems to be characterizing it.” Jack Boss, Schoenberg’s Twelve-tone Music…, 1-2.
11 Olivier Messiaen, Traité de Rythme, de Couleur, et d’Ornitologie, trans. Melody Baggech, ‘An English
Translation of Olivier Messiaen’s Traité de Rythme, de Couleur, et d’Ornithologie Volume 1’ (Doctoral
diss., The University of Oklahoma, 1998), 59-60.
tion (oriented to the presentation of the idea), is the process, the becoming, which is com-
plex since it involves a two-fold temporal perspective inevitably, once, in its becoming, it
happens as doubt, as an interval between the continual unfolding of the sounds and the
continual existential unfolding of the one that experiences them. This second expansion
of the ordinary notion of musical idea is supported by Schoenberg himself, as he says
that
we are obviously as nature around us is, as the cosmos is. So that is also how our music is.
But then our music must also be as we are (if two magnitudes both equal a third ...). But
then from our nature alone I can deduce how our music is (bolder men than I would say,
“how the cosmos is!”)12
This is my point of departure.
Schoenberg’s musical idea reflects and intensifies a particular musical poetics (strictly
speaking, his own) and touches an important aspect of the compositional realm. However
his intuition of musical idea as noscentia — as knowledge — is very incipient. He con-
templates but does not develop it. To deepen the concept of musical idea as knowledge
brings us to the problem of musical time. In this, the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze,
as we shall see, are fundamental. On the one hand, Bergson’s notion of duration, and, on
the other hand, Deleuze’s notion of idea as multiplicity and diﬀerence, serve the purpose
of such intensification, which will be nuanced by Stockhausen’s compositional thought,
and by Bachelard’s critique of the concept of duration, as he elaborates a notion of in-
stant.
Notwithstanding that, Stockhausen’s compositional ideas are not placed against Schoen-
berg’s. Instead, they are interwoven in an ampler model of musical creativity that encom-
passes both the conscious search for formal balance and imbalance and even a desire for
a dialectical overcoming of these powers. The images of temporal complexity that are pre-
sented here emerge from this ampler model, to which Bachelard’s notion of instant as I
have mentioned above is also crucial. That is, however the idea may be described as mul-
tiplicity, and as such as a fluid and engaging, eternally renewed force, forever resignified
by the complexities of life, there are always temporal ruptures, absolutely new events: we
always resort to articulations of creativity. Bachelard
avers that there are lacunae in the process of duration, that rest or repose is a significant el-
ement in devenir, and that true duration is essentially polymorphic. The central paradox in
Bachelard’s description of temporality is that the phenomena of duration are constructed
out of rhythms or systémes d’instants and these rhythms are themselves founded upon a
uniform and regular temporal base. While sympathetic with Bergson’s equation of being
and becoming, Bachelard claims that the creative value of becoming is limited in Bergson’s
thought by the assumption of a fundamental continuity in which the present is construed
as uncreative. Against Bergson, it is held that there are, in the interstices of being, gaps and
real discontinuities. There is, Bachelard maintains, a basic heterogeneity in the heart of lived
introduction 18|
12 Arnold Schoenberg, “Hauer’s Theories (1923),” in Style and Idea..., 209–10.
duration, a complex rhythm of creation and destruction, action and negation, work and
 repose.13
This is the image of temporal complexity: a rupture, an articulation of the becoming. Thus
articulated, the becoming is rhythmicalized; the idea, which is pure duration, then also
encompasses the rhythm.
On these new grounds, in what concerns musical composition, we may well say finally
that the necessary expansion of the Schoenbergian musical idea will engage the contem-
plation of its articulations, of its internal rhythms. The compositional process may be thus
conceived of as a domain of musical creativity permeated by rhythmic ideas, which overlap
and mix in complex manners, each serving a determined purpose. In some cases, diverg-
ing goals.
I take as a point of departure the notion that everyone is provided with an elementary
musical sense,14 a primary musicality, which may or may not evolve in distinct manners,
depending on the circumstances, by means of manifold compositional processes. Musical
composition is therefore fundamentally temporal, and thus rhythmical, not only con-
cerning all possible musical developments it engenders but also in relation to itself, since
in order to be critical it has to work out the immanent conditions for this development.
On this, it will be initially useful to remember Deleuze’s commentaries on Boulez’s pre-
sentation at the 1978 IRCAM’s Conference on Musical Time. In it, Pierre Boulez
has chosen five works: the relations among these works are not relations of influence, de-
pendence, nor of progression or evolution from one work to the other either. There would
be virtual relations among these works, rather, which are only released in their confrontation.
And when these works confront one another in this way, in a sort of cycle, one specific con-
tour of musical time X rises up. So it’s not at all a method of abstraction which would go to-
wards a general concept of time in music. Boulez obviously could have chosen another
cycle: for example a work by Bartok, one by Stravinsky, one by Varèse, one by Berio. This
would then release another specific contour of time, or the specific contour of a variable
other than time. Then we could superimpose all these contours, make a veritable map of
variations, which would follow the musical singularities each time, instead of extracting a
generality on the basis of what are called examples.15
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15 Gilles Deleuze, “Conference Presentation on Musical Time,” IRCAM Conference, 1977. web-
deleuze.com, www.webdeleuze. com/textes/113.
Deleuze says that any musical compositional project informs us, “in between excess and
default,”16 with a specific temporal intensity that integrates, by confronting other temporal
intensities, a possible rhythmical order. Beyond that, I put forward, this implies that to
achieve the condition of significantly integrating a veritable map of temporal variation,
ideally a compositional project must aim at departing from the many by showing a unique
rhythmicality. Similarly, non-innovative musical works, by taking standardized creative
criteria, are thus anti-rhythmical in both these senses. To be stricter, this unique rhyth-
micality reflects the originality of the temporal arrangement that guides a whole compo-
sitional process, the totality of its expressive and interpretative powers. The rhythmical
element here belongs to the realm of composition, to its aesthetical scope and, as such, it
does not imply that the surface of music ought to be rhythmically complex. The anti-
rhythmical factor is devoid of difference, and points towards conformity; it is thus a force
of liquidation and of aesthetic submission, a force towards repetition, copy and the default
of expressive and interpretative contrasts between different creative projects.
By considering that the process of musical composition is essentially rhythmic in relation
to a given particular creative project and, once established, it is also rhythmic in relation
to all possible creative projects already accomplished in the past and yet to be achieved
in the future, I argue that the rhythmicality of this process is set functionally, that is, in a
dynamically creative unfolding, in response to the interpenetration of many distinct tem-
poral forces and satisfying distinct compositional domains. Broadly considered, this dis-
sertation is dedicated to explaining the essence and necessity of these forces and domains.
In doing so, I try to identify creative nodes, intersections, points of rhythmical convergence
in a composition, by segmenting the compositional process according to different facul-
ties (sensibility, memory, imagination, understanding, etc.). One must not misconceive
these domains as finished compositional models, but take them for what they are: no
more and no less than tentatively applied rhythmical hypotheses that may be efficient and
meaningful aids in creating such models both in theory and compositional practice. Ac-
tual compositional processes evolve heterogeneously and never exactly in the same way.
Obviously they may eventually be subjected to more or much less complex creative forces
than those here proposed. The crucial point here is rather to try to enlarge the scope of
the discussion of this evolution, by inferring the existence of a grounding rhythmical
order that utterly forms our musicality, than to delimit the evolution of a compositional
process by characterizing its creative forces.
The discussion about this fundamental rhythmical order also touches on the problem of
representation in music. I argue that the expressive and interpretative powers informed
by a given piece of music are mutually influenced. They constantly interact and exchange
their meanings, their creative necessities. Musical representation is here neither com-
mon-sense representation nor may it be mistaken for a ‘musical presentation’ — that is,
introduction 20|
16 Gilles Deleuze, Diﬀerence and Repetition, trans. P. Patton (New York: Continuum, 2004), 332, 342.
following Schoenberg’s arguments, be mistaken for musical presentation, the completion
of a compositional process in which the expressive powers of a given musical idea are at
last demonstrated. The substance of musical representation is not given once and for all,
in a generic way, by the composer to his ideal audiences, as if it were a seed to be set in-
diﬀerently somewhere and nowhere. It is in contrast particularly actualized in many diﬀer-
ent ways at each individual musical experience. In this view, a given compositional process
is always creatively open, ‘bridging’, so to say, by means of the musical piece, the clash of
manifold expressive and interpretative musical powers: the musical piece is thus never
finished; there is no seed to be set, but a creative musical domain to be shared. 
It is consequently argued here that the interpenetration of the many distinct temporal
forces that form the rhythmicality of the process of musical composition reflects not only
our specific aesthetic responses to musical time but, moreover, the foundation of our
broad temporal experiences. Because our experience of time in general is likewise rhyth-
mically composed by the interpenetration of virtually infinite senses and meanings, it
will be possible to suggest a direct, objective relation between this experience and the
experience of music. Both answer to a given level of temporal complexity; both may be
more or less determinate or indeterminate, either ruled and ordered or adventurous; both
may be more or less problematic or indisputable, questioning or apathetic, and so on.
Here, I point out that whereas, on the one hand, the experience of time in general may
be indeed insurmountable, the experience of musical time is otherwise inevitably com-
mitted to a given idea. The experience of musical time ideally construes the experience of
time in general, which is aesthetically remade, either richly or poorly, in any case, so as to
be shared and exchanged, to be used or contemplated. In this sense, the experience of
music testifies to the concreteness of life in a given place, period or culture. 
The study of musical composition and its representation are here thus considered as com-
pounding a complex creative process of temporal structuring, of rhythmicalization. Here
I investigate how this creative process imprints the piece of music, functionally, with ex-
pressive and interpretative musical forces,17 in accordance with the quality of its duration
and the level of its complexity, as a response to the mutual influence, or reach of one’s
sensibility (a perceptive power or capacity) and understanding (an intellectual capacity). 
All in all, I try to reinterpret Schoenberg’s notion of musical idea, which is not viewed
here exclusively as a function of thought, but as resulting necessarily from the interplay
of perception and thought. It results both from a musical sensibility which, emerging
from the presence and concreteness of life, progresses expressively by means of a ‘lyrical’
introduction 21|
17 These forces are considered here both from the perspective of the individual creative act and of
the historical development of musical composition as Art. Thus expressive and interpretative musical
forces are forces that respectively expand and contract a given musical domain or musical tradition.
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musicality; and from a musical understanding that, out of our power of generalization,
advances interpretatively by means of a ‘dramatic’ musicality. These distinct musicalities
are blended and form the rhythmicality of the musical piece. Since, conversely, it is only
by means of a musical piece that this rhythmicality may be represented, I argue that the
piece mirrors (according to the reach of musical representation) its very own composi-
tional process, becoming a complex temporal datum, as it were, that informs us, transcen-
dentally, about the nature of most comprehensive temporal experiences and conceptions. 
The research thus proceeds from three primary questions: (i) How does our musicality
— our musical sense — emerge, and on which basis? (ii) Considering the installation of
a given process of musical composition, and always in respect to the immanent conditions
of our musicality, how does this process receive its rhythmical form, that is, how is it
rhythmicalized? (iii) How do the expressive and interpretative rhythmical forces that
compose the designed rhythmicality of a given compositional process interpenetrate cre-
atively? Furthermore (taking as a point of departure from these questions) it could also
be asked (iv) how does this creative interpenetration impact the presentation and repre-
sentation of a given musical work? And, finally, (v) how might the inner qualities of a
given musical representation inform us about our general temporal conceptions and mis-
conceptions? 
A main premise of this discussion is that not only thought exists but also sensibility,18
perpetually exchanging their creative, vital powers, specially in the sense discussed by
Deleuze in Difference and Repetition and A Thousand Plateaus, and by Bergson in Time
and Free Will, Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution. Their creative powers are re-
sponsible for the manifestation, the emergence of a dynamic and heterogeneous temporal
field, the cause of our musicality. A second important premise is that even if the being
needs to be seen as an indivisible whole, throughout time, as Bergson says, its faculties
(memory, imagination, thinking, etc.) can be analysed, as Deleuze has done, as articulated
qualities of that indivisible whole. This is what Valentine Moulard-Leonard says, in Berg-
son-Deleuze Encounters, when she advocates that “these two thinkers share a more or less
explicit dedication to a revaluation of the transcendental conditions informing the Kan-
tian and phenomenological image of experience.”19 So is my own thesis, which, by raising
the problem of a necessary ontological and psychological integration and simultaneity
in us of temporal continuity and temporal articulation, leads to the notion of temporal
complexity here discussed. This is the work of the transversality I suggest: to justify the
temporal continuity of the self, between different faculties, by means of Bergson’s thought;
and the temporal articulation of the self, considered within different faculties, by means
of Deleuze’s thought.
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The thesis also has as a premise the fact that the interchanging of sensibility and under-
standing renders a deep rhythmicality responsible for the emergence of distinct rhythmic
ideas. This notion is based on Schoenberg’s considerations about central aspects of com-
positional practice, introduced in his posthumous The Musical Idea and The Logic, Tech-
nique and Art of its Presentation. I also touch, indirectly, the theories by Karlheinz
Stockhausen, presented in his articles “… How Time Passes …”, The Concept of Unity in
Electronic Music and Structure and Experiential Time and, although tangentially, some of
Ernst Kurth’s considerations of musical energetics, presented by Lee Rothfarb in Ernst
Kurth, selected writings. So I develop a distinction between (i) Schoenberg’s notion of the
musical idea, as he sees it as the source for the composition of the musical piece, which
should be approached as a necessary but subsidiary element of the compositional process,
and (ii) Stockhausen’s phenomenological insights about the perception of musical matter,
since he sees the musical piece as a force of determination for the composition20 of a mu-
sical idea. In other words, for Schoenberg, a musical piece gravitates around the musical
idea, while for Stockhausen it is the musical idea that gravitates around a musical piece.
Thus, for Schoenberg, musical time is a power induced by our musical conception
whereas, for Stockhausen, it is a power deduced from our musical perception. In this thesis,
otherwise, musical time is a result of a superior intuition about the mutual influences that
musical conceptions and perceptions may share functionally. 
Thus, there is a complex rhythmicalization process that forms the rhythmic idea. The
unfolding of this premise sets up the content of this thesis, in which significant new tem-
poral and rhythmical notions and a new terminology arise: (i) the notion of rhythm as a
complexity forming a heterogeneous musical time, (ii) the notion of non-determination,
determination, difference and repetition as the main rhythmical powers of musical time;
(iii) the notion of the implicitness of memory and imagination as factors that further
structure rhythmically and functionally the complex temporality of the musical idea; and
the notions, to be developed in future, of (iv) systemic and metric orders of rhythmical dis-
tribution that temporalize the musical idea, capturing it, so to say, within a field of musical
manifestation, the piece of music; and (v) that of musical representation; that represen-
tation in music exists by reflecting — subjectively and collectively — socially, culturally,
historically — determinate response-levels to the rhythmicality of a musical piece and,
consequently, of the musical idea engendered in its compositional process.
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II – THE GROUNDS
Schoenberg’s musical idea
Arnold Schoenberg proposed that
Composing is thinking in tones and rhythms. Every piece [of music] is the presentation of
a musical idea. Musical thinking is subject to the laws and conditions of all other thinking,
and beyond that, one must take into consideration the conditions resulting from the material.
All thinking consists essentially of bringing things [concepts, etc.] into relationship with
each other.21 An idea is the production of a relationship between things otherwise having
no relationship to one another, thinking therefore searches out the relationships between
things. Thus,22 every idea is based on relationships, but it is not considered here whether
the relationships between the things concerned would serve the presentation of a relation-
ship between these things.23
By postulating coherent thinking as the grounds for musical composition, the Schoen-
bergian compositional project entails, consequently and necessarily, a search for potential
links and hierarchies, to bring tones and rhythms otherwise unrelated into some relation-
ship. Schoenberg argues that the searching for and the creative establishment of tonal
and rhythmical relationships manifest, in any case, a determinate musical idea. Obviously,
diﬀerent classes of tonal and rhythmical relationships point to diﬀerent classes of musical
ideas, traditional or innovative, which are diﬀerentiated by the quality and complexity of
the relationship they comprise. Producing musical ideas is thus declared the main object
of musical composition but, beyond that, we additionally learn from Schoenberg that to
compose music may also mean to strive to communicate a given musical idea by means
of a musical piece. It follows that musical ideas, constituting as they do the essential sub-
stance of our musical thinking, are in fact virtual and must not be confused with the actual,
sonic means used to present them. Musical composition hence is finally set between two
creative problems: on the one hand, the problem of creating potential links and hierar-
chies between tones and rhythms that are, otherwise, unrelated and, on the other hand,
the problem of actually demonstrating these relations to someone else’s judgment by
means of musical pieces. 
There are important points here to consider. 
Certainly, we must agree, following Schoenberg’s arguments, that musical composition
as a form of thought goes beyond the concrete, audible musical level of sounds and
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musical idea)” manuscript no. 6 (1931), in Schoenberg, The Musical Idea…, 252.
rhythms. In line with Schoenberg’s initial arguments, I maintain that musical composition
must be understood as a form of thought, declaring however that thinking is actually
more than a sort of fundamental matrix of coherent operations. It is, as well, a vital force
or act that, conscious of itself, composes with other vital forces a general sense of freedom,
which is fundamental once we are investigating creative, artistic processes. It may also be
understood as a vital flow that surpasses the plain management of the concrete data that
spring from sensorial experience; as a ‘sense-continuity’ which is aware, in its own flow,
of the all-embracing transcendental process of which it is a part. For I believe that musical
composition, beyond a search and establishment of relationships between sounds and
rhythms, as Schoenberg suggests, results from a specific form of thought that also involves,
on the one hand, the capability of judging, of decision making, an active and free creative
consciousness, as well as, on the other hand, the capability of questioning the present cir-
cumstances, of conceptualizing and representing them in creative manners. Musical think-
ing must be thus considered among the problems that ground the complex extension of
the subject, including what is immanent to the senses and what transcends them meta-
physically. 
Secondly, there is in Schoenberg’s proposition a suggestion that a piece of music is a for-
mal structure which demonstrates a given musical idea. To deal with a piece of music as a
means of presentation for a given musical idea implies considering the piece of music as
an extension or unfolding of a virtual datum that one wants, or at least expects, to be rep-
resentable (and represented). However, considering that this virtual datum is not in fact
directly representable — because it is only representable by means of a piece of music
—, how could it be actually delimited? 
I argue that this delimitation would depend upon the power or reach, so to say, of its re-
sulting representation, more (if not totally) than upon the means of its presentation.
Schoenberg himself, as he hints in his writings about the notion of musical idea,24 declares
that the techniques of presentation of a musical piece (by development, chiefly in homo-
phonic contexts, or by unfolding, with regard to polyphonic textures, etc.) should ideally
serve this reach by resisting or enabling the representation of the musical idea. ‘Creative
resistance’ and its opposite would thus stand as main compositional strategies, informing
distinct musical cognitive trends, namely, musical forms. Form in music, in this particular
sense, flows in concert with two antagonistic forces, providing itself a sort of rhythmical-
ity: with an expressive compositional power, responsible for establishing cognitive zones
of superior resistance, that is, for concealing the interpretation of a given musical idea
and, otherwise, with an interpretative compositional power, which is indeed composi-
tional, once it is responsible for providing representational ways of delving ‘into the piece’
and, therefore, for allowing the discovery of its grounding ideal expressive impulses. There
are hence expressive and interpretative musical forms conveyed by expressive and inter-
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pretative compositional powers. In this context, I argue, still oriented by Schoenberg’s
point of view, that musical art would be circumscribed by the creative power of the mu-
sical idea (by its power of creating expressive and interpretative forms), in particular in
what relates to its originality and irreproducibility. By the same token, the compositional
work in presenting a musical idea should be understood as proper to a given applied tech-
nique only, and whatever applied technique should be seen more of a handicraft than of
an artistic concern, and so feasible of being systematized and imitated. 
But now we face another diﬃculty. How is it possible that a virtual datum, in itself not
representable and dependent upon a presentation technique, could be considered char-
acteristically musical, however devoid of the formal elements that we normally deem to
be necessary to constitute a musical piece? In other words, what that is characteristically
musical would remain in a given musical idea if it were possible to isolate it from all mu-
sical production that preceded and succeeded it? What that is characteristically musical
in a given musical idea means after all? From this derives the diﬃculty of actually under-
standing Schoenberg’s notion of musical idea, which many times is mixed, in his discourse,
with a diﬀuse sentiment of inspiration, of pure musical creativity.
Alternatively, we may tentatively suggest that this virtual datum, even if not characteris-
tically musical, would be so in retrospect, by the reach of an always dynamic musical un-
derstanding, which is cast over, and beyond, the concreteness of the piece of music during
its representation. This way, the musicality virtually envisaged during the representation
of a piece would answer to a given musical understanding, a given ‘musical education’
that reaches into a virtual datum transcendent to the musical piece itself — and not to
the musicalness intrinsic to this datum. There would not be, so it seems, the musical idea,
as Schoenberg understands it in principle, but rather only as a sort of ‘residual reflection,’
during representation, of a certain musical understanding, which persists virtualized,
notwithstanding the multiple formal transformations seen on the surface of a musical
piece in its flux. 
This alternative however is not enough of a solution for Schoenberg’s problem, because,
even considering the hypothesis that the idea were residually musicalized by a given mu-
sical understanding applied to a given musical piece, it would not be correct of course to
aﬃrm that the piece in itself would be completely void of musicalness, or rather, that this
musicalness would also depend totally on a given musical understanding. If it were so,
both the musical idea and the musical piece would be devoid of expressive factors, which
is diﬃcult to believe. 
When we consider that a musical piece possesses, or is intrinsically and objectively
charged with a certain musicalness that is presented to a given musical understanding,
we have to deal with, on the one hand, the questions of what in fact consists this musi-
calness and how is it present in there; and, on the other hand, the questions of how was
this understanding formed and what forms it in first place. In other words, what is the
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possible origin of the musicalness of a musical piece and of the understanding of it? If it
were ‘natural,’ one could say that it stems from the musicality of things and from our un-
derstanding of this. Even so, after Kant, it is known that at least apparently our experiences
of things are mediated by our subjectivity, by our ideas. It is thus only possible to exercise
our understanding of the musicality of things by means of a musicality that is already ‘re-
moved’ from them themselves, that is already virtual. 
Would it be possible to ascertain that the origin of the musicalness of a musical piece, as
well as the source of the musicalness of our understanding of it, lie in the musicalness of
the idea? It is surely a diﬃcult problem that easily makes us go round in circles. Schoen-
berg tries to solve this issue by saying that a piece of music presents a musical idea, but
unfortunately refrains from considering the fundamental question about the essence of
the musicalness of the idea and its expressive-interpretative power. That is, he says nothing
about the concrete relationship that may be compositionally established between this
musicalness and the musical forms perceived in a musical work. Additionally, he also re-
frains from directly considering the problem of musical representation.25
But then, as the philosophy of Deleuze has more recently demonstrated, it has been pos-
sible and necessary to extend the general discussion of the notion of idea, by involving it
dialectically in the more clearly cut discussion about the identity of the concept and there-
fore of representation. This implies a new debate about the transforming power of the
idea, about its multiplicity and creativity beyond a given particular understanding, includ-
ing a musical one. On the basis of this recent theoretical path, it is possible to reconsider
prior Schoenbergian intuitions of the problem of musical idea and its presentation, adding
new elements to it. We may now declare that a musical idea, as idea, is charged simulta-
neously, in a mutually advantageous relationship, by distinct musicalizing agents: that the
musicalness of the idea is granted, on the one hand, by the musicalizing agency of sensi-
bility in its convergence with the power of understanding; and, on the other hand, by the
musicalizing agency of understanding in its blending with the power of sensibility. It is
possible to propose that the musicalness of the idea is, in fact, a necessary source of the
compositional act, so that this musicalness may be reflected on the musical piece and
consequently in its representation. It is possible because, in this particular case, the power
of understanding is no longer placed, so to say, outside the domain of the idea, but com-
poses, with the power of sensibility, the very field of creativity — a virtual rhythmicality
— that cannot exist otherwise. 
I uphold here the centrality of the musical piece, in the sense that it neither exists as a
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means of presentation of a given musical idea to one’s representation, nor as a means of
musicalizing the idea in its representation, but as a formal concrete datum that simulta-
neously receives, according to innumerable levels of temporal, rhythmical complexity, the
musicalizing force of sensibility and that of understanding. 
This way, musical creativity always depends on that both musical understanding and mu-
sical sensibility reach towards one another.  It seems that these forces are formally fused
and confused in a piece of music: at each interpretative moment, interpretative composi-
tional data is projected over the musical piece, defying the piece’s expressive power; oth-
erwise, at each expressive moment, expressive compositional data is projected over the
musical piece, confronting the piece’s interpretability. So the piece may be considered a
time of intertwining of distinct musicalities and, thus, as time, more fully considered ac-
cording to its temporal attributes; more readily, every musicalness should be understood
as an attribute of musical time. A musical piece is rather a complex temporal form that
blends expressive and interpretative musical times one into another, as will be seen. To
approach musical pieces having in mind this interpenetration of musical times is very im-
portant. Furthermore, it is critical to build up rhythmical arguments in support of this
interpenetration, since it always seems to happen within the context of a given rhythmi-
cality, going unnoticed outside it. With this in mind, and as indicated above (cf. page 16),
this thesis aims to present a view of musical composition as a dynamic and complex temporal
process that is actually composed by a permanent interaction of innumerous creative impulses.
Thus the goals of this thesis are to discuss the compositional process as a process,  as
something that happens in time and so to discuss musical composition as an integral ex-
perience, that is, both as expressive and interpretative experiences (including both the
creative forces that generate and those that emanate from a piece of music); a discussion
that necessarily touches transcendental issues that surpass the immanent conditions of
musical presentation, namely the score or the musical performance, that usually dominate
the interests of traditional analytical studies.  A main goal is thus to build a net of struc-
tured reflections that would allow us to approach, to study and consequently to explain
the creative forces that motivate and sustain a musical compositional project.
Thirdly, I argue that Schoenberg partially points to this same direction by suggesting that
there is a form of thinking that is musically specialized. He suggests that musical thinking
would be ruled by the same laws and conditions of thinking in general. However, if mu-
sical thinking is actually managed by the same laws and conditions of thinking in general,
which benefit would we have distinguishing between one another forms of thought? Is
Schoenberg suggesting in fact that all forms of thinking are musical? It seems to me that
what he really intimates is that musical thinking depends upon a concrete modus operandi
of thought: on its power to project or to build — at diﬀerent times and places26 — bonds
between meanings, orientations, strategies, and behaviours, that put these in relationship
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and thus bring them closer; in a word, on its cohering power. Moreover, for Schoenberg,
musical thinking also responds to formal conditions that emerge directly from the musical
material, such as length forms, frequency forms, timbre forms, dynamic forms, articula-
tion forms, etc. For Schoenberg, according to himself, to think musically would not be
much more than casting a cohering force over such forms, while composing would be
the task of defining the best cohesion strategy in each case.27 But, would the musicalness
of our thinking be restricted to cohesiveness only? It seems that answering this question
is fundamental.
It is about the possibility and viability of a thought of greater breadth that the discussion
raised by Deleuze on the issue of “diﬀerence in itself ” in its relation to the identity of the
concept, that is, on the relationship between the concreteness and presentness of the
thing and its past and future generic forms, is presented here.28 It is viable because, as
Edward Campbell comments, 
Even with the limit example of the exact repetition of a musical motive, phrase, theme, sub-
ject or rhythm, it is widely accepted that a second enunciation can never be identical to the
first. At a structural level, the fact of its diﬀerent placing within the framework of a movement
and the particularity of its interpretation make it automatically unique and individual. This
may well be an area where Deleuzian diﬀerence calls us to give up all laziness in our listening
habits, the kind of listening which takes shortcuts and which thinks, ‘no need to listen to
this bit as it’s just the same as what went before’. As for dismantling notions of identity, it
may be diﬃcult to go further than Harrison Birtwistle, who is reported as having claimed
that he could have composed the same piece with entirely diﬀerent pitches, a statement
which perhaps raises the question of diﬀerence and identity more poignantly than any other.
[…] Perhaps the most identitarian category in music is that of ‘music’ itself, that impulse
which says ‘this is music, but that isn’t’. Again, this is an impulse which reduces all musics
to good and bad copies of an ideal of what music is. The Deleuzian alternative is ultimately
one in which all musics are actualities of music in its virtual state, a statement which for
some will be so bland as to be meaningless.29
To bring distinct times and places into relationship, to make them cohere, always depends
on voiding the real thing of its concreteness, on a generalizing eﬀort. Certainly, powers
of generalization and conceptualization underlie the cohesive force of thinking. But be-
yond or before, so to say, the process of producing a generalization, a concept, there is the
thing in itself — in the sense of the Kantian doctrine of the noumenon as a posited object
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or event that exists without sense or perception30 — a thing yet to be generalized, in its
absolute singularity and irreproducibility. It is on the grounds of this singularity that
thinking produces generalizations (not the opposite).  This considered, I argue that, in
its larger scope, musical thinking happens not only by the management of past and future
generic forms, of concepts, as Schoenberg apparently suggests, but also by the manage-
ment of the concreteness of the present, and, moreover, by the management of the com-
plex ontological process of transmutation of this concreteness into ‘deep or shallow’ forms
of memories and imaginations.31
However, is thinking really able to grasp it, to progress over the concept towards the sin-
gularity of presentness, of the experience time? Is this indeed a function of thinking? It
might be appropriate to say, with Schoenberg, that the force of cohesion that coexists in
musical thinking do belong to thought and thought only, resulting from its generalizing
power. But then, to enlarge this notion by suggesting that the concreteness of each expe-
rience indeed only arises to us by means of sensibility. This is a suggestion I have been
persistently favouring: that, beyond the Schoenbergian notion of a musical thinking that
is governed by the same rules and conditions of all other ways of thinking,32 we may con-
template as well, of necessity, the notion of a musical sensibility that is governed by the
same rules and conditions of sensibility, in general. 
Because the main attribute of sensibility is to retain from things something of their dura-
tion, as Bergson would say — or of their intensity, in Deleuze’s jargon —, thus it will be a
function of a musical sensibility to provide the musical idea creatively with favourable
conditions for a temporal expansion of musical thought, for giving birth to new musical
concepts. By the same token, it will be conversely a function of a musical thought to ex-
ercise, over the musical idea, temporally contractive representational structures that allow
for the notions of past and future, temporal structures that may be more or less innovative
or conforming and compliant, so that they continuously superimpose the uses and cos-
tumes of a given musical culture over the power of presentness of sensibility. Considering
for a moment our common musical practices, creation in music progresses exactly thus,
by temporal expansions and contractions, like a living organism, imitating, by the way,
our living experiences. New pieces of music are always, and everywhere, created; some
are innovative, thought-provoking and challenging because of their originality, while oth-
ers answer to a given control, to a given practice that is regulated by cultural and historical
traits. There are musical pieces strongly linked to the sensible, to the now, whereas there
are others that are part of our repertories, both as past forms that we revisit, remember
and refer to; and also as future, living forms that are still being developed. 
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Therefore, stemming from a critique of Schoenberg’s delimitation of the problem of mu-
sical idea, which in my point of view is quite narrow, this dissertation presents a view of
musical composition as something at the same time immanent and transcendent to
thought. It is a view that necessarily favours the centrality of the piece of music in its re-
lations to diﬀerent manifestations of our musicality. It suggests, all in all, that musical
ideas are a necessary means for these manifestations, as far as they are considered creative
forces that both problematize thinking — or rather, the power of understanding — in
response to the action of sensibility as it invests the drive for cohesion and articulation
of thinking with that of liberation and continuity; and the power of sensibility in response
to the action of understanding.
The rhythmic idea
I argue that musical composition is, therefore, a process by which sensibility and under-
standing are related by means of a determinate rhythmicality. This implies saying that
sensibility and understanding are not musical in principle but become musical during a
compositional process, which projects onto their temporal evolution a determinate rhyth-
mic complexity. Their musicality depends thus on the establishment of a heterogeneous
duration, which is always complex, rhythmic, ‘in-formed’ by the vital interaction of qual-
itatively diﬀerent intensities.  
The notion of intensity in Deleuze’s thought was developed initially from Spinoza’s “philo-
sophical ambition to view all of life as the expression of a fundamental striving or conatus,
so that the body becomes an ensemble consisting of those forces that it transmits and
those forces that it receives.”33 The notion was further developed in Deleuze’s work on
Nietzsche who follows Spinoza’s injunction: we think “in terms of speeds and slownesses,
of frozen catatonias and accelerated movements, unformed elements, nonsubjectified af-
fects..”34 As Deleuze sees it, primary in Nietzsche’s philosophy is his “method of drama-
tizing thought. In this staging of thought or dramatology, the speed and slowness with
which a concept is moved, the dynamism of its spatiotemporal determinations and the
intensity with which it interacts with adjacent entities in a system all become primary..”35
For Deleuze, Nietzsche in his writings on intensities tells us not to “trade intensities for
mere representations. The intensity refers neither to signifieds which would be the rep-
resentations of things, not to signifiers which would be the representations of words.”36
With this in mind, I argue that a direct product of that interaction, in music, is a composite
fundamental rhythmic virtuality I call rhythmic idea. Rhythmic ideas thus result or emerge
from a ‘virtual body,’ from a mixing of those vital forces this body transmits (that is, all
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possible products of understanding, such as intellectual experience, concepts, levels of
generalization, necessity and determination, analysis, articulation, etc.) and receives (the
products of sensibility: the sensible experience, the percept, levels of particularization,
indeterminacy and non-determination, insight, continuity, etc.). Rhythmic ideas may be
thought of as well in terms of speeds and slownesses, spatiotemporal determinations, all
that relates to dramatology. However, I add, they may be conceived of also in terms of
negative velocities — not of frozen catatonias, but of extremely concentrated lively
 presentnesses. 
I call dramatic temporal qualities those broad notions usually identified with the power
of understanding, such as determinability, linearity, repetition, etc.37 A dramatic quality,
in this specific Nietzschean sense, is motivated by a necessity of conquering unbalance
and unrest, or any kind of irregularity, of providing them with logical attributes, of ‘ab-
stracting’ from them some direction, levels of certainty and causal relationships, etc.
Speeds and slownesses are side eﬀects of this drive for temporal control — understanding
consists essentially in taking preponderantly into account a given resemblance. On the
other hand, I call lyrical temporal qualities, those wide-ranging notions commonly iden-
tified with the power of sensibility, such as indeterminateness, nonlinearity, diﬀerence,
etc. For a lyrical quality is thus motivated, in turn, by a necessity of giving free rein to un-
balance and unrest, of exploring their sense of uncertainty and vagueness, the here and
now, their irregularity and probable non-causal relationships, etc. — sensibility is essen-
tially consent, openness, fulfillment, non-necessity and anti-desire; it is preponderantly
unlikeness.
Thus, the rhythmicality of the musical compositional process is grounded on dramaticism
and lyricalness, linked as they are, respectively, to the notions of construing identities and
destinies and of disassembling them. They also may be temporally expansive and contrac-
tive. Deleuze, recalling Spinoza, claims as well that a temporal expansion happens as an
answer to the reception of those impressions that come concretely to our senses directly
from the infinite diversity of the things in themselves — all their possible relations in-
cluded. Yet, he also claims that a temporal contraction means a return to the things, by
giving them virtual impressions stemming from the (virtually infinite) depths of mind.38
The rhythmicality of the compositional process assumes, therefore, a psychological di-
mension, set by the level of one’s attention to life, and established, dynamically and het-
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erogeneously, between the time of reception and the time of reflection of each lived ex-
perience.
So the rhythmicality of the idea would depend initially upon these very fundamental no-
tions: as dramaticism and lyricalness, as temporal expansion and contraction, the idea
always conveying a complex composite temporal realm. I suggest that what we actually
compose, when composing music is, at the very start, the nature of this primary rhyth-
micality; not sounds. Even in case of just manipulating creatively (either instrumentally
or electronically) a given concrete sonic matter, without having yet decided its particular
compositional amplitude or use, and without whatever formal plan in mind; or even in
spontaneous improvisation based upon some compositional orientation (as Stockhausen
does in his Aus den Sieben Tagen), a given rhythmicality emerges instantaneously.39 We
always have to think about it; we have to perceive it, to pay attention, to listen to, to slow
down the creative impetus to access a new, original rhythmical configuration. 
Musical representation also depends on this, on supposing a whole complex rhythmic
reality that transcends the musical piece. It depends on conceiving that every piece of
music reflects a deeper, virtual rhythmic integration of temporal dramaticism and lyri-
calness. A musical piece thus becomes a sort of temporal window, allowing us to think
and sense time in us, and to develop our thinking and sensing of time in general.40 The
very reason for composing a piece of music, it seems, is to oﬀer one a diﬀerent, sometimes
very unique and individual, at times broad and cultural, temporal  perspective. 
Rhythmic ideas are hence precise musical ideas. However, we may want to delineate them
but not for the sake of making up any sort of compositional mechanics. Studying them
in this way has more to do with the want for investigating the depths of the musical com-
positional process, which is indeed immensely complex. Moreover, it is complex because
each temporal trait really composes heterogeneously with other traits an overwhelming
net of living impressions. The search for precision here also represents an attempt to pro-
pose a new analytical direction in music. One that could not be oﬀered otherwise: the
analysis of the musicality and rhythmicality that engenders a musical piece beyond the
analysis of the musical piece itself.
Any idea is grounded by a fundamental duration. In this dissertation, I venture the analysis
of this duration by addressing some of its potential articulations. One may picture this
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intent by recalling, for instance, that we select a chord and not another for exact rhythmic
reasons, and we do the same regarding a precise sequence of chords. This practice, in fact,
goes from plain to complex agglomerates of sounds, tonal cadences and series, timbres,
modes of attack and dynamics, and so on. We are constantly approaching rhythmic fea-
tures and rhythmic relationships when reading, listening or performing music, but —
and more importantly — whenever doing that we are actually accessing, by means of
such superficial rhythmic features, a superior rhythmicality, the rhythmicality of musical
composition itself, which, as composition, deals preponderantly not with sound forms
but with rhythmic ideas. Moreover, the whole process of musical composition is rhyth-
mically composed on the basis of the complexity of broad temporal insights. In this per-
spective, if a chord operates, for instance, in the general representational context of a
rhythmic idea, the rhythmicality of this idea operates itself, in turn, in the general context
of our representation of time. 
Compositional domains 
In support of these notions, I suggest a dynamic-rhythmical image from which the rhyth-
micality of the compositional process is viewed like ‘revolving’, as in a concentric spiral,
around distinct temporal complexities or distinct compositional domains, which, I argue,
are circumscribed by an eternal rhythmical activity, which is eternal in the sense of a per-
vasive and serial action that interweaves dramatic and lyrical temporal attributes. In this
dissertation, a first, broadest compositional domain is defined, which results from the
rhythmical interchange of the fundamental dramatic and lyrical ontological impulses just
noted. These I call musical times.41 Other compositional domains, comprehended by the
first, are addressed in an introductory way by what I call the domains of musical tempo-
ralities42 and musical temporalizations. 
Musical temporalitites are seen as intermediate psycho-physiological impulses, dramatic
and lyrical time-functions I here initially relate with determinate pulse qualities that
emerge from the rhythmical interchange of memory and imagination types. On this, I
follow Bergson’s arguments43 for the temporal complexity of memory in proposing that
there are shallow, mechanic memories, which operate automatically and straightforwardly,
as well as deeper, fluid memories, which live in us in constant movement answering the
present situation in many subtly diﬀerent ways — memories that are not that automatic
though still moved by habits and rationales. Because, as Deleuze additionally argues,44
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memory and imagination are so deeply integrated, I touch this matter following Deleuze’s
arguments as well by suggesting the hypothesis of the existence of shallow and deeper
forms of imagination. The point here is however much less to address the temporal com-
plexity of memory or imagination themselves, that is, as memory and as imagination per
se, which goes obviously beyond the scope of this dissertation, than to infer, hypotheti-
cally, on how memory and imagination may eventually compose a complex net of tem-
poral interactions in music. Here things become more complicated because in this case
diﬀerent memory and imagination types must be conceived of as impulses that are in-
ternal to the rhythmical interplay of sensibility and understanding, as previously com-
mented. And, in order to be so, one must conceive of shallow and deeper memory and
imagination types as being embraced, so to say, by each dramatic or lyrical fundamental
temporal configuration. So, it is my suggestion that an intermediate temporal scenario
does exist and is formed by a complex amalgam of rhythmical impulses that emerge amid
the integration of diﬀerent memory and imagination types. But, in spite of that, it is also
my suggestion though that this further rhythmicalization of the musical idea accepts so
many potential variations and nuances that its proper analysis deserves a greater and ded-
icated theoretical consideration in near future.
Musical temporalizations represent a compositional domain that is comprehended by
the functional interaction of the dramatic or lyrical influxes of musical times and temoral-
ities, and is responsible for the definition of the most superficial formal attributes of a
musical piece, its systemic (structural) and metrical character; that is, for the rhythmical
proportions perceived as sound-qualities (harmonic spectra) and durations (melodic
spectra) conveyed by a specific compositional organization of sounds and silences pre-
sented at the musical foreground. Also, as stated above in regard to musical temporalities,
it is not my intention to fully explore this domain in the present dissertation, but just to
introduce some main aspects I believe deserve to be yet carefully developed theoretically.
Anyway, we face here a compositional domain that encompasses the most superficial
rhythmical shape of a musical piece, a domain that is in many senses often treated — by
musical analysis, for instance, performers, listeners, etc. —, as the very fundamental one,
that is, as the source of musical time. I insist however that it cannot be so. Mistaking the
rhythmic surface of a musical piece with the broad notion of musical time it conveys must
be avoided because, otherwise, it would be impossible to establish any valuable aesthetic
relation between diﬀerent pieces: the very foundation of Music History, as discipline, de-
pends on this. The musical piece stands to one’s musical perception and musical knowl-
edge actually as a temporal surface; it is oﬀered to one’s musical representation as a
temporal experiment. The interpreter, consciously or not, will perceive and think the
piece of music through the rhythmic ideas it conveys, not the opposite; however in doing
that he completes, as it were, the compositional process, fulfilling it by means of his own,
intimate elaboration of those rhythmic ideas, in a process made up via incommensurable
acts of recognition, that account for his musical aesthetic impressions.  
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III – MAIN CONCEPTS
The main notions that ground this dissertation are those of emergence, creativity, and
originality; of musical expression and musical interpretation; of the meanings of musical
composition, musical time and musicalness; of lyricalness and dramaticism; and of  mu-
sical representation, as it develops the all-embracing notion of rhythmicality. As already
said, the philosophies of Bergson, Deleuze and also Bachelard, and the remarks about
compositional practice by Schoenberg, Messiaen and Stockhausen throw light on a sig-
nificant part of these concepts. A few other concepts, such as musical time, temporality
and temporalization, or rhythmicalization or even rhythmic idea, were conceived of along
the thesis as an answer to viewing the compositional process as creative flux. 
The concept of emergence is present throughout the argument henceforth presented.
Fundamental to Bergson’s and Deleuze’s notions of time as duration and complexity, the
principle of emergence45 receives here also the influence of Bachelard’s account of the
instant, and is therefore elaborated in the context of the rhythmicality of our musicality.
Bergson develops a notion of duration that may be understood ontologically as the be-
ingness of being, that is, as the being in its becoming, in its process of being.46 Emergence
thus occurs as a moment in this process in which a concrete, real temporal datum that
comes from the world, and is shared among everything, is actualized in us. 
Deleuze, on the other hand, presents the notion of temporal complexity. In it, the being
builds and discovers itself ideally, amongst the concreteness of things and the generality
of concepts.47 Thus, it could be said, there is in us a concrete time that emerges from the
world, and successive levels of distance and proximity from this concreteness and the
generalization that emerges from our understanding.  Moreover, these levels are marked
by temporal definitions, by instants, whose emergence ruptures the all-embracing conti-
nuity of our beingness. The instant here, represents a creative punctuation, a rhythmic
irruption. On this, Bachelard says that
pondering life in midstream, in its growth, in its ascent, we could of course always show,
with Bergson, that the words before and after serve merely as reference points, for between
past and future an evolution can be traced that seems continuous by virtue of its general
success. However, if we move into the domain of abrupt mutations, where the creative act
takes place at one stroke, how could we fault to acknowledge that a new era always opens
up through the irruption of an absolute? For every evolution — to the extent that it is de-
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cisive — is punctuated by creative instants.48
Emergence is thus circumscribed by duration, complexity, and rupture; necessary aspects,
I argue, of the idea’s rhythmicality. As their emergence is co-related and interdependent,
emergence in itself is manifold.
I have started from this broad concept of emergence in order to develop the notion of
musical creativity. This is necessarily a temporal datum, because, following Bergson’s rea-
soning, there is no creativity but inside a given duration, which is always dynamic and
heterogeneous and acts on us, as on nature, as a vital, fundamental force. The heterogene-
ity and dynamism of this duration are yielded to rhythmicalization according to the action
of idea and understanding. These two, I suggest, are the main rhythmicalizing agents that
structure temporal complexities, by acting in a constant creative movement between the
experience of the concreteness of things and the virtuality of concepts. When the object
of musical representation — the musical piece — is identified with these notions, we dis-
cover that our most day-to-day musical experiences are a direct answer to our lives, to
our perception and understanding of the world, so that a musical representation mirrors
our lived time, including the time yet to come, which is emergent from our relationship
with things.
The notion of rhythmic idea I propose is aligned, in this sense, with the criticism implicit
in the Deleuzian confrontation of the classic Aristotelian model of genera and species,49
“where a concept-genus is divided according to the diﬀerence of contrasting attributes;
[in which] the diﬀerence of being rational, for example, divides the genus animal into
human and non-human species.”50 This criticism targets the understanding that thought
is inevitably limited, or at least delimited, by a pervasive self-contained rational function
that makes it impossible to access diﬀerence but by means of the identity of the concept.51
The problem here consists in that the diﬀerence that exists outside the concept, being
truly external to the identity of the concept as a principle, would be inevitably and para-
doxically condemned into non-being. Deleuze’s critique indicates, otherwise, that the
diﬀerence that exists outside the concept is  indeed not only accessible but stands, neces-
sarily, as the means for our capacity of  understanding, the reason of our inquiries and
doubts, the eternal moving force of our creativity.  
With this in mind, I have indicated here, preliminarily, certain potential levels of temporal
complexity, always presenting musical composition as its own process of creation or of
conformation to these levels. So it becomes possible, as will be seen, to converse with
broader aesthetical notions, such as that of originality. An original piece of music testifies
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to a given original rhythmicalization, a new blend of temporal perception and cognition.
An original piece of new music is inevitably particular, individual, and deterritorialized.52
It faces the originality of the present time, its first performances, its new audiences, and
opposes the process of generalization, and therefore of conceptuation, validation and as-
similation — it resists being tamed,  a process that aﬀects over time all musical works and
gives origin to the notion of repertory.
This way there are more or less original pieces and, at the same time, any musical piece
has a certain level of originality and particularity, which is the reason for its expressivity,
as well as some degree of cultural and historical committedness, reason for its inter-
pretability. So that expressivity and interpretability are functions of the potential levels
of temporal complexity in a musical composition. A musical piece might be said to be in
transit, rhythmically, between both realms: between what is determined and what is not;
between the individual and the collective. Principles such as coherency, centripetal forces
(as Schoenberg understood),53 and linearity of direction in a piece are ruled by forces
and by needs of interpretation that emerge from a given historical and cultural context,
in a direct answer to these forces and needs in order to assure the communicability of the
piece. Musical analysis in general, which is prevalently motivated by an interpretive ori-
entation, often operates in a search for this communicability and generally does not take
into account the study of musical expressivity, which for obvious reasons is subject of
musical composition as discipline. Many interpretative and many expressive means are
necessary for composing music, always having in mind that ‘to compose’ has here a broad
sense: the musical piece is composed by expressive and interpretative traits, and the one
who is interested in music, in any way — either by writing, listening, performing, criti-
cizing, analysing pieces of music, etc. — inevitably participates in its compositional pro-
cesses by sowing them, so to say, with his own expressive and interpretative intensities.
My approach will be that of integrating both notions, by considering that in any musical
study there is a rhythmical relation one must contemplate, at diﬀerent levels and intensi-
ties, between the communicability and the originality of the musical piece. 
Seen from the perspective of the concept of originality, expressivity, and interpretability
are implicit, deeply and mutually, in the compositional process. They manifest a relation
of continuity and of necessity. Composition is a signifying process that happens in a kind
of ‘semiotical mobility’. In this dessertation, I try to indicate expressive and interpretive
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musical orientations, fundamental in their complexity and dynamics, which are installed
during the compositional process of the musical forms as they are finally presented in a
musical piece. That is, that compositional choices in a piece comprise not only of expres-
sive but also of interpretive factors. In this, musical expression and interpretation are com-
pound in their mutual interactions, expanding or contracting their natures, according to
perceptual and intellectual conditions: the amount of reiteration, or the amount of new-
ness that is included in the process. This allows considering, as a unified whole, both the
study of the musical form and of the intellectual and emotional substance that relates to
it.  
So, as mentioned, it is formed, musical composition is a process of temporal structuring
formed expressively and interpretively, by the dynamism and heterogeneity of a funda-
mental creative force — duration. Enlarging Schoenberg’s own approach to the matter,54
I identify this process as a complex temporal flow that emerges in a continuous way from
the concreteness of the things and from our understanding of them. Experience itself
seems to be dependent on this: a world of generalization only would be utterly indistinct;
a world entirely of particularities would be completely distinct at each moment, and thus
unrecognizable. Musical composition takes form as its own becoming, as a hybrid process
of conceptualizing and concretization, of concentration and dispersion, of temporal con-
traction and expansion. Amid the dynamism of the cognitive process, the composition
continuously becomes musical in its emergence.
This thesis deals therefore with notions of time and of music, approaching their intersec-
tion55 as a way of being and a way of knowing.56 There is music, and hence musical time,
only as an overlap between being and knowing. In discussing this intersection, a new ap-
proach to rhythm becomes feasible, in which rhythmic phenomena are seen, beyond the
processes of quantitative subdivision of time, as processes from which diﬀerent temporal
qualities are derived. In this perspective, rhythmic phenomena are contemplated in a way
that transcends the structure of a musical piece; they are structuring musical processes
that musicalize the human time, the quotidian temporal experience of all of us. Therefore,
to investigate musical time means to look into the intersection between being and know-
ing  — and here returning once again to Bergson’s and Deleuze’s philosophies of time —,
both as an experience of memory that is turned towards the known, and as an experience
of imagination that is cast into the unknown. This approach requires, though, a more pro-
found dive into the contemplation of its object, a gaze that is less pragmatic and more
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54 According to Carpenter and Neﬀ,  Schoenberg, in his later years, took the idea to be the art work,
the entity itself. As they explain, Schoenberg at that point considers “the totality of a piece as the idea:
the idea which its creator wanted to present.” However, they argue that “for want of better terms,
Schoenberg says, he is forced to define the idea more narrowly, as the way balance in a work is restored.
The idea thus has to do with the total dynamics of the work.” Schoenberg, The Musical Idea…, 1.
55 Intersection means the simultaneity of several ‘cuts’, involving two of more delimitations.
56 I assume here that our temporal experience is totally based on how we are by means of our knowl-
edge and on how we know by means of what we are.
open to the new, that goes into details about problems that are less obvious to musical
theory. Indeed, the investigation of this intersection asks for an unusual eﬀort of concen-
tration and, especially, for an open imagination to solutions of diﬃcult empirical valida-
tion.
I seek to progress through these empirical diﬃculties by proposing fundamental temporal
notions that might be reflected on both composition and musical representation of a mu-
sical piece. These notions refer simultaneously to a ‘temporalizing construct’, carried out
by sensibility, and to a ‘spatializing re-construct’, accomplished by understanding. In other
words: the superimposition of an a-symbolic time (and thus immeasurable and incom-
prehensible) over another time that symbolizes itself by means of a process of continually
emptying things of their concreteness and duration. I put forward that the more spatial-
ized, the more detemporalized comes to be the internal time of a composition and of a
musical representation, the emptier they become of the concreteness of things and of
their concomitant duration: routines are fixed, formalized, and delimited; qualities are
defined, generalized and conceptualized.
As will be seen, rhythmical ideas are something like consolidations of certain levels of
temporal complexity that become present in a composition or in a musical representation.
These mirror the temporal complexity of the world, such as we feel directly from our daily
life — in the wind blowing through tree leaves or in streaming water, in days going by, in
the speed of engines, etc. It is this broader temporal complexity of life that moves us and
directs us towards composition and, thus, towards musical representation. This means
that the perception and knowledge of this complexity is reflected directly on our musical
life, not because there is an exclusively human capacity of perceiving and conceiving mu-
sically, but rather because there is a musicality that comes from life.
It was from the concept of musicality that I have evolved the notions of dramatic and lyri-
cal time. As mentioned, the connotation of the word dramatization here is quite particular.
While dramatization “is … the name that Deleuze gives to the model of thought that he
presents [following Nietzsche] as an alternative to the system of representation through
the concept”;57 for me it refers to a temporal path linked to or oriented towards the notion
of identity of the concept, a path which can be however temporally expanded or con-
tracted. I suggest that dramatization compounds representation, that it is a part of repre-
sentation. Still inspired by Deleuze’s philosophy (as he says that to be creative one needs
to be transgressive), rather than opposing dramatization to representation in music, it
would be of substance (now inspired by Bergson) to conceive an integral temporal system,
internal to representation, which expands and contracts, freely, according to our freedom. 
Thus I suggest another path of creativity, which one might call lyricization. Here I quote
Stockhausen’s account of the context for the term:
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It must now be clear that points [groups and masses] can be determinate, variable, or sta-
tistical. That points being determinate can be in a development, points being variable can
also be in a development, and points being statistical can equally be in a development. That
points being determinate can also be in sequence; points being in sequence can also be in
moments; etc. This order of three times three terms: points, groups, masses; determinate,
variable, statistical; sequential-forming, development-forming, moment-forming — is an
order in which every term can be combined with every other term. And what this is ulti-
mately leading to is not that one way of forming is avoiding other ways of organization, but
can be combined with all other methods. As I said, once we reach statistical ways of con-
trolling it does not mean we forget about determinacy or directionality or variability, just
as once we attain the lyric, we don’t ignore the dramatic. Rather, what we are striving to
reach is a universal conception, within which we may move in diﬀerent directions from
work to work and within individual works, but having all the possibilities of organization
available to us in every composition.58
In music, in order to be creative, it is not only against identities that we need to be trans-
gressive. We also have non-thematic processes; we have all sorts of discontinuities. So,
lyricizing would be a way of acting that is even more complex temporally than dramatizing.
Lyricism is oﬀered as a depth of representation — a diﬀerent, more open kind of repre-
sentation — which, instead of reflecting the identity of concept, actually operates by re-
flecting its deconstructive aspects: the many ways the concept becomes another thing
than itself, or engenders another thing from itself, or yet manages relations between iden-
tical or diﬀerent things. 
The dramatic, as I see it in the wake of Stockhausen, has the sense of a musical narration,
of recovering, by means of understanding and also of memory, the direct and concrete
experience of reality, the experience that takes place through the senses. The dramatic
has a sense of girding, of focusing, that gives the products of sensibility a historical, cul-
tural direction. In other words, the direct experience of reality is dramatically carved into
a block, and thus may be shared and interpreted. This way, communication is condemned
to a certain degree of imperfection, to a want of interpretation, of dramaticism, that only
the direct experience of the thing would be able to purge. However, since the direct ex-
perience of reality is individual, unique and irreparable, and since understanding happens
ideally in a process of shared interpretation of the reality, it seems mandatory to admit
an irreconcilable internal tension between the individual (the sensible) and the social
(the understanding); an actually expressive tension, between oneself and the possible
other, a tension that could be taken — perceived and felt, contemplated and understood
—, as the necessary inner power and sense of art.59
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59 About this Deleuzean notion, Joe Hughes points out that, “the world without others is the world
of schizophrenic depth, the primary order of The Logic of Sense, the transcendental sensibility of Diﬀer-
ence and Repetition in which every encounter takes the form of a ‘slap in the face.’ It is a ‘harsh and
black world without potentialities or virtualities.’ It is this situation which made genesis, or the escape
from being, necessary. By the end of the genesis however we now live a world with others.” Thus
Deleuze describes the Other: “Around each object that I perceive or each idea that I think there is the
The lyrical means an approach to the concreteness of the now, of the present, whereas
the dramatic means a removal from this concreteness towards the development of a fitting
past or future, of a fictional space, even in case it is based on a concrete experience. We
know that a remembrance is a remembrance, and that to remember yesterday does not
take us concretely to the past: the concreteness of memory is the act itself of remembering,
and not the remembrance that is installed in it. Our remembrance, in this case, is a fiction,
a happened happening into the now. When the happened and the will-happen are pro-
jected here and now over our experience, we will say that the lyricalness of the now be-
comes dramatized, by taking diﬀerent degrees of removal from its concreteness. Lyricizing
is however geared by a force of unfoldment and opening of new meanings, of ‘metaphoriz-
ing,’ of vagueness and indeterminacy, which faces the diversity and multiplicity that one
observes everywhere directly from the concreteness of things, in their becoming. Music
is formed by several levels of dramatization and lyricization, of temporal approaching
and removal, and this is the reason, it seems, for the diversity of musical time seen in
diﬀerent musical styles throughout history.
Besides, musical lyricalness and dramaticism may be considered as well from the point
of view of an applied musical energetics, in the sense presented by Ernst Kurth, who
claims that a melodic line is a sonic externalization of a psychic energy vector, powered
by a creative Will. For Kurth, a given melody should be conceived in terms of kinetic en-
ergy,  representing the quintessential embodiment of one’s psychic energy.60 Now, con-
templating for a moment the compositional domain of musical temporalizations, it will
be possible to enlarge Kurth’s views on musical energetics, which are based on melody
and polyphony, to the other dimensions of music. This renders feasible the observation
of a flow of expansive and contractive temporal complexities, not only in the mind but
also reflected on the surface of a musical piece. This is easy to demonstrate when we con-
sider that, temporally, polyphony is more complex than homophony; that harmonic spec-
tra (pitches and timbres) are more complex than melodic spectra (regular pulses and
rhythmic patterns); that sound masses are more complex than groups of figures or delin-
eate musical gestures; that any kind of rhythmical irregularity (and also polyrhythms and
changeable tempos) is more complex than rhythmical regularity; that fast movements
are more complex than slow movements; that accelerandos are more complex than rallen-
tandos; or that textural densification is more complex than rarefication, etc. All in all, the
sonic materiality of music is to be considered a psycho-acoustic datum that reflects, by
means of a complex net of temporal articulations and durations of relative speed and reg-
ularity, the rhythmicality of the compositional process.
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organization of a marginal world, a mantel or background, where other objects and other ideas may
come forth in accordance with laws of transition which regulate the passage from one to another.”
Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 304-306 apud Joe
Hughes, Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation (London: Continuum, 2008 ), 153.
60 Lee A. Rothfarb, “Introduction,” in Ernst Kurth, Selected Writings, ed. Lee A. Rothfarb (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 24. See additionally, Lee A. Rothfarb, Ernst Kurth as Theorist and
Analyst (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988).
A 5000 Hz pulse is more complex than a 0,0005 Hz one, just because the agility of the
first induces us to consider it more from the perspective of duration than of pulsation.
Sound is only a band of speeds, situated for humans between 20 Hz and 20 kHz (an ele-
phant may hear infra-sounds, but cannot hear above 8 kHz; a bat hears ultra-sounds, 20
to 120 KHz and above).61 Thus it is possible to conceive that musical composition oper-
ates, on a musical piece, a sort of temporal folding of the apparently more rhythmically
complex over the less complex. 
Musical representation is the representation of a given musicality, which, in its turn, is a
particular conformation of the rhythmical complexity in a musical phenomenon. This
rhythmical complexity, this rhythmicality, must be understood as a function of its intensity,
of the multiple dynamics that emerge from its power of articulation and continuity given,
in the compositional process, to some musical piece. Therefore a musical representation
is a representation of this intensity, of a kind of rhythmical conformation between being,
understood as a duration, as a force of continuity or an expressive flow, and knowing, now
understood as a rupture of the duration, as an instant, a force of articulation, of cesura and
delimitation, as the ‘reach’ of interpretation and, therefore, of understanding.
It is not that the musical piece determines musical representation, it is rather the rhyth-
micality that the piece embraces to provoke in us a given sensation or attention that we
consider musical.62 The musical piece is thus a function of a purer, more direct, repre-
sentation of what we are and know. Continuity and articulation — which are the imma-
nent traits of being and knowing — are blended in virtually endless formulations amidst
this rhythmicality.63 These formulations, as changeable and ephemeral to our understand-
ing as they are innumerable, are the rhythmical ideas. There are more or less complex
rhythmical ideas: those with an articulative potential are more precise and delimited than
those oriented to the continuity. It is important to recall that rhythmic ideas live in an
ever-changing creative interval: they are actually the orientation of this change. It is also
important to recall that we do not live one idea at a time, but several in simultaneity, ideas
that come not only from the present moment, but from all that was lived, as memory, and
from all time to come, as desire or imagination.
In this wider context, musical representation always refers to a given social, historical and
shared context, and to a given individualizing, transcendental force. This is why music
demands, compositionally, distinct aesthetic attitudes of its agents. What I mean by this
is that music history is permeated by movements of confrontation or conformation to-
wards the new and the old, the original and the ordinary, the known and the unknown,
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as much as towards problems and solutions, risk and comfort, the learning and the learned,
apprehension and the apprehended, surprise and routine, etc. All these things are poured
into the musical representation giving form to musical pieces that we love or reject, as
we respond to the prompting of our most basic impulses, to the constitution of our being,
to our intellectual and psychological formation, as much as to the reach of our perception
and the quality of our attention to life. 
After all, we may infer that diﬀerence in itself, a totality, is missing from music, and argue
that this is so because it is absent from the temporal complexity of our subjectivity, from
our power of engaging into creative instants. But how would it be possible?  
I argue that music is real, though it is real to us only in that that it is also a reality in us.
This is so because music is to us according to the vital relation we potentially establish
with the totality of nature and according to the quality of this link. Music is not a gift, but
a conquest: music is impossible to the ‘demusicalized’ being, to the one who is arrested
by a profound immobility, who repeats senselessly, who by the force of his cognitive habits
avoids reflecting the expressiveness of diﬀerence in itself. 
Our sensible and intellectual experiences orient us musically along distinct levels of tem-
poral complexity — levels established amidst the infinitude of time, of its incommensu-
rability.64 This orientation is directly related both to the process of forming conceptual
identities, which is a process of temporal delimitation and emptying; and to that of
 annihilating the generality of the concept. As said, the main content of these suggestions
is to address the problem of musical composition, which is thus seen as directly related
to the subjective play of temporal complexities and complexes, reflecting the temporal
complexity of life. This is the content of the rhythmicality of the idea: any given compo-
sitional process is marked by the formalization of determinate levels of temporal com-
plexity, which, instead of being formed hierarchically by fixed proportions, are rather
always moving, expanding and contracting temporally, generating zones of intersection. 
introduction 44|
64 In the sense that is reached by Jorge Alejandro Flórez Restrepo from his comparison between du-
ration and elán vital in Bergson and Dasein em Heidegger: “It has been characterized that whereas
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So I propose a categorization, a schematic approach to the problem of musical composi-
tion, but only as a means of trying to capture moments of musical sense, similarly to the
photographer who captures a moment of life visually. Once related to the compositional
process as a creative experience, the rhythmical categories proposed are better described
as transcendentally empirical, instead of a priori. They must be conceived merely as rhyth-
mical images. 
I oﬀer my categorization as investigative clues around and among which one may find
richer images of duration. I propose that the whole process of musical composition is set
within a (rhizomatic) interplay of temporal forces.65 This interplay is what I call the com-
positional temporal agent, a power that manifests ever-new temporal formulations. The
temporal agent, as a creative force, generates rhythmic ideas, which are diverse in function
depending on their level and depth of compositional complexity. Rhythmic ideas, on
their side, rhythmicalize our fundamental musicality, by promoting a rhythmicalization
process that is responsible for the configuration of creative possibilities at each compo-
sitional level. 
All these notions were elaborated, from the start, on the grounds of Schoenberg’s notion
of musical idea, which, I argue, deserves to be enlarged, expanded by the assumption of
a simple complementary orientation, which, although important, seems to remain undis-
cussed: in order to be creative and free, the musical act depends evenly on coherent and
non coherent powers. Consequently, the musical idea and the whole set of compositional
procedures directly and indirectly related to it, must not be delimited exclusively by co-
herence, balance, and regularity, but extrapolated, otherwise, by the interplay of coherent
and non-coherent lines, of balance and unbalance, regularity and irregularity. This ex-
trapolation — and not one’s orientation by means of coherent constructs — is exactly
what we generally mean by musical time. 
To study musical time thus depends on contemplating this extrapolation, its rhythmical
forces. In this way, we may eventually find that the rhythmicality of musical time mirrors
the rhythmicality of time as time is broadly experienced. Here, I argue, both senses of
time are actually united by their rhythmicalization: by the way we live and share, some-
times shallowly, sometimes in depth, our impressions about the world that constitutes
and the world that defies our intimacy.
iv – CHAPTERS
Summarizing, the structure of this thesis is as follows. 
In the first chapter, I present a short literature review in what concerns, first of all, the no-
tion of time in general. This notion and its problematics is initially discussed from the
point of view of Kant’s Critique, further elaborated by taking into account the Bergsonian
durée, that of the unified and interpenetrative flow of time, as well as the Deleuzian idea,
of idea as complexity and multiplicity, to be finally considered from the perspective of
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Bachelard’s notion of instant. The chapter also introduces a discussion about a variety of
important aspects of musical time, as the analytical and compositional treatment of ar-
ticulation and of continuity forces forming a musical piece; the notion of musical idea
taken from Schoenberg and Stockhausen; and finally the perspective of musical time as
time represented. 
In the second chapter, I discuss the rhythmicalization process that grounds our musicality,
returning to some aspects of Bergson’s and Deleuze’s philosophies of time, and assuming
that our musicality is according to the rhythmical constitution of a fundamental duration,
of a temporal domain, which becomes musical by means of the intertwining of ideal en-
compassing creative forces, namely by means of the encounter of the powers of sensibility
and understanding. 
The third chapter deals with what I understand as a first compositional domain, with the
grounding expressive and interpretive compositional forces of musical composition. Here
I reinforce the argument that the musical compositional process is eﬀectively installed
in the emergence and constitution of a first rhythmicality. I suggest that amidst the full-
blown duration of our musicality certain rhythmic orientations emerge that are respon-
sible for the manifestation of distinct musical times. The emergence of these musical
times testifies for the action of a first rhythmicalization, of that full-blown duration, so
that they constitute fundamental compositional forces, primary rhythmical ideas.
Through these, I suggest, the totality of the compositional process and of its representa-
tion is built, in increasing levels of complexity, towards a final metric image and therefore
a spatial detailing. Yet, this chapter introduces the notion of a second and a third compo-
sitional domains, of musical temporalities and of musical temporalizations, respectivelly.
These are seen as rhythmicalizing the grounds of the compositional process by infusing
it with new expressive and interpretive forces. Here I briefly argue that new levels of tem-
poral complexity emerge as we advance in the compositional process. 
A glossary and three appendixes, containing some intermediate cathegories of rhythmic
ideas, a comprehensive analytical example of a compositional application of them, and a
temporal diagram are provided in order to facilitate the understanding of new terms and
the reading of the general theoretical arc as provided. These appendixes also provide el-
ements for future analytical work on some middle-ground rhythmical ideas and their ap-
plication. The hypotheses argued in this thesis should be understood as images intended
to the intellectual contemplation of musical artworks as creative forces, in their relations
to the individual in his intimacy and to the whole society. I provide these images as a con-
tribution to the evaluation of musical ideas along the process of creating music and also
of the intricate meanders of their presentation and representation, both as analytical, in-
terpretative tools, and an impulse for the emergence of new musical ideas. 
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Review of Literature 
1 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 415.
2Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: the doctrine of faculties (London: The Athlone Press, 1984),
22.
On Kantianism
One of the most original points of
Kantianism is the idea of a diﬀerence in
nature between our faculties. This diﬀerence
in nature appears not only between the
faculty of knowledge, the faculty of desire
and the feeling of pleasure and pain, but also
between the faculties as sources of
representations. Sensibility and
understanding diﬀer in nature, one as a
faculty of intuition and the other as a faculty
of concepts. Here again Kant opposes both
dogmatism and empiricism which, in
diﬀerent ways, both aﬃrmed a simple
diﬀerence of degree (either a diﬀerence in
clarity, based on the understanding; or a
diﬀerence in liveliness, based on sensibility).2
G. Deleuze 
On thinking
All our cognition starts from the senses, goes
from there to the under standing, and ends
with reason, beyond which there is nothing
higher to be found in us to work on the
matter of intuition and bring it under the
highest unity of thinking.1
I. Kant
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n this chapter, I present (i) a reading of the general notion of time,  taking
this notion from Kant and going through Bergson’s, Deleuze’s and Bachelard’s philoso-
phies; (ii) a  notion of musical time and discussing it according to a ‘language of the mu-
sical time’ — a given vocabulary related to time in music, that imprints spatial
terminology on our thinking about music — and its rhythmicality; (iii) Schoenberg’s
and Stockhausen’s notion of musical idea; and  finally (iv) a notion of represented musical
time, in which I take into account historical concerns.
My initial point is: the fact that we have been preponderantly thinking traditional or in-
novative musical repertoires has led us to approach music primarily from a spatial-mo-
tional perspective, that is, from the standpoint of form, and therefore with a tendency to
exclude both the notions of time and of musical time proper. My suggestion is that it
would be true that new, ‘continuative musical formulae’ (as complementary and alterna-
tive to the articulative ones) would lead us to take into account another, important kind
of musical cognition, the one that emerges preponderantly from sensibility.  This involves
first of all Kant’s propositions about the nature of sensibility and understanding as much
as the multiple interfaces between these, regarding that that may be perceived and known
and how this happens: in Kant one finds an extensive philosophical tradition gathered
on the subject. Moreover, it is his arguments that are echoed in the notion of musical idea
by Schoenberg, which is the basis of the elaboration of the notions of musical ideas here
developed.  However Schoenberg’s musical idea not only engages in dialogue with the
Kantian notion of aesthetic idea, as “the representation of the imagination which induces
much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever,”3 but it is
also in sharp contrast, in its aesthetical and temporal orientation, to the conventional no-
tion of musical idea present in the “Baroque and Classical tradition of understanding and
describing a musical work in rhetorical terms.”4 Schoenberg’s notion is clearly innovative
and points to the future: it is compositional rather than analytical and is committed to
the fertile compositional problems of 20th-century post-tonal music. This Kantian-
Schoenbergian notion has received comments, criticisms, and extensions throughout the
last century, more evidently, in philosophical terms, from the perspectives of Bergson,
Deleuze and Bachelard; and, in music, in the context of Stockhausen’s compositional
practice, which, by focusing on the problem of time in sound matter in his studies about
electronic music, also allows for an ampler approach to the notion of musical idea as
Schoenberg previously intuited.
Indeed, from Kant’s epistemological discussion on, we are provided with two modes of
I
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cognition, one that is sensible and provides us intuitions, and another that is intellectual
and provides us understandings. When understanding prevails over sensibility, we are
inclined to compose (and also to describe and listen to) music in terms of multiple strata
of significance and chronological references, because in order to understand we have to
‘cut’ music into pieces, to articulate it, and also to consider it teleologically, causally and
orderly, in response to certain rules of succession. When thinking prevails, we are inclined
to set hierarchical rules both in ‘paradigmatic and syntagmatic’ musical axes — in other
words, both in harmonic and melodic musical domains. Our musical understanding, as
Deleuze indicates,5 operates exactly in this way, by ‘spatializing’ in order to measure so
to reach a necessary generalisation and hierarchisation. 
Most probably, the opposite prevalence of sensibility over understanding would lead us
to the ubiquity of pure temporal musical descriptions. When sensibility prevails, I believe,
music should be described in terms of ‘complexities of transitoriness,’ of qualitative
changes — similar to the tensional and dynamic nature of our psychological states. Clearly,
we cannot divide our feelings into pieces. All we can do is to live them fully and integrally
because, otherwise, we would end up developing a neurotic disorder. All the same, the
‘sensitive musical sense’ cannot divide the flux of music into pieces. In order to sense
music (in Kantian terms but following Bergson’s, Deleuze’s and Bachelard’s orientations)
we have to intuit in order to know the duration of music in its evolutive process, even
when it comprises many simultaneous subroutines. Sensibility temporalises in order to
grasp the flux of transformations of the thing, and to allow for the experience of the ‘here
and now,’ which is necessarily singular, particular. The work of sensibility in music is ori-
ented to the singular musical datum, which cannot be actually repeated, which cannot
compose a generality, which is only possible, according to Deleuze, as another path that
calls upon another philosophy.6
Therefore I reason that music is always oriented — and in a rhythmical way — by un-
derstanding and sensibility, as cognitive faculties. Musical features are always both in
space and motion and in duration, that is, they pulse between two modes of cognition.
The frequency of change between these modes and their mutual rhythmical influence
set the actual meaning of musical space-motion and musical duration. These meanings
interchange and exchange both, from the inside out, the space-motion and duration of
musical forms perceived at the surface of a musical piece; and, from outside in, the space-
motion and duration of more abstract musical notions, those which address music also
in terms of conceptual and ideal forms. It is regarding interchange and exchange of mean-
ings that Deleuze, commenting on Bergson’s theses about movement and duration, argues
that
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in a sense movement has two aspects. On one hand, that which happens between objects
or parts; on the other hand that which expresses the duration or the whole. The result is
that duration, by changing qualitatively, is divided up in objects, and objects, by gaining
depth, by losing their contours, are united in duration. We can therefore say that movement
relates the objects of a closed system to open duration, and duration to the objects of the
system which it forces to open up. Movement relates the objects between which it is estab-
lished to the changing whole which it expresses, and vice-versa. Through movement the
whole is divided up into objects, and objects are re-united in the whole, and indeed between
the two ‘the whole’ changes. We can consider the objects or parts of a set as immobile sec-
tions; but movement is established between these sections, and relates the objects or parts
to the duration of a whole which changes, and thus expresses the changing of the whole in
relation to the objects and is itself a mobile section of duration. Now we are equipped to un-
derstand the profound thesis of the first chapter of [Bergson’s] Matter and Memory: (1)
there are not only instantaneous images, that is, immobile sections of movement; (2) there
are movement-images which are mobile sections of duration; (3) there are, finally, time-im-
ages, that is, duration-images; change-images, relation-images, volume-images which are be-
yond movement itself…7
Both Bergson and Deleuze built up their philosophies antagonising Kant’s grounding
epistemological diﬃculties of the powers of sensibility and intellect. Whereas Deleuze
expands and complements Bergson’s philosophical concepts, it would be Bachelard to
oﬀer a critical evaluation of Bergsonism, reconsidering it from a Kantian perspective. 
A discussion on musical time may be introduced, after all, by initially considering the lan-
guage that is used to address, in musical theory and musical interpretation in general, the
description of creative musical processes. I suggest that our interpretative practices in
music are generally guided by at least two main temporal attitudes: a formal or empirical,
and a psychological or metaphysical one. In addition, we can also discuss the influence a
temporal language of musical interpretation may have on a temporal language of musical
expression. I assume that the temporal language of musical interpretation is oriented by
musical concepts, by immobile sections in Deleuze’s jargon, and consequently by musical
understanding. Moreover, I assume that the temporal language of musical expression is,
in turn, guided by musical ideas, by mobile sections of duration, which make sense, as it
were, in our musical sensibility. 
A musical concept is any musical aspect that, born and reborn directly from concrete ex-
perience, acquires by force of habit, by repetition, the character of generalization. It is a
musical concept that is present when we talk about the best voice-leading between two
chords, or that the perception of timbre is prevalent over that of the melodic line. A mu-
sical concept thus encompasses innumerous cases of a given practice, so that there is a
concept only when musical interpretation is fixed, when there is a normalization oriented
towards the understanding and its communication. For its part, a musical idea is complex
and moving. It always has the force of a surprise, or a special case, of a unique solution. It
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is the case, for instances, of a distinct rhythmical character of a piece, of a melodic liqui-
dation that is impeccable and therefore unique. The musical idea is the mark of innovative
and purposeful creative processes.
Musical concepts and musical ideas then intercept one another within a common musical
creative field we usually call the musical piece. This interception happens to be motivated,
it seems, by historical and cultural constructs. The language of musical time is a social
phenomenon, as any language. As we have seen, in Western culture, the musical language
of time is split at first into two main strands: a spatial-motional and a durational.  
Next, I address the notion of rhythmicality, that is, the rhythmical sense of musical time.
This notion, which actually occupies the whole thesis, is initially contextualised having
in mind the previous discussion on musical time as space and duration and their necessary
dialectical relation. 
Some important notions on the very constitution of the music idea and the musical idea
represented are then approached. These problems are initially illuminated by the con-
trasting points of view of Schoenberg and Stockhausen as well as by contrasting historical
perspectives on musical representation.
I – Time
Kant: the nexus of sensibility and understanding
In his Inaugural Dissertation: on the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible
world (1770), Kant took the “task of providing certain foundations for the Newtonian
worldview without appealing to the method of mathematics.”8 According to Paul Guyer, 
the metaphysical possibility as well as the epistemology of Newtonian absolute space re-
mained a mystery until Kant solved it in his dissertation by arguing that the human mind
possesses two fundamentally distinct capacities of sensibility and intellect […] and that
the existence of a unique and absolute space — and time — in which all the objects of our
experience can be ordered reflects the inherent form of our capacity for sensible experience
itself. Thus Kant took the fateful first step of arguing that the possibility and indeed the cer-
tainty of the spatiotemporal framework of Newtonian physics could be secured only by rec-
ognizing it to be the form of our own experience, even though this meant that the certainty
of the foundations of Newtonian science could be purchased only by confining them to ob-
jects as we experience them through the senses — “appearances” or “phenomena” — rather
than those objects as they might be in themselves and known to be by a pure intellect —
‘noumena’. ”9
Henry E. Allison explains that “the centerpiece of ” Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation “is the
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distinction between sensibility and understanding as two cognitive faculties.”10 We read
in the third paragraph of Kant’s dissertation that 
Sensibility is the receptivity of a subject by which it is possible for its representative state to
be aﬀected in a certain way by the presence of some object. Intelligence, rationality, is the
faculty of a subject by which it is able to represent to itself what by its quality cannot enter
the senses. The object of sensibility is sensuous; what contains nothing but what is knowable
by the intellect is intelligible. In the older schools the former was called phenomenon, the
latter noumenon. To the extent to which knowledge is subject to the laws of sensuousness it
is sensuous; to the extent to which it is subject to the laws of intelligence it is intellectual or
rational.11
From this Kant concludes that “things which are thought sensitively are representations
of things as they appear (esse rerum representations, uti apparent), while things which are
intellectual are representations of things as they are (sicuti sunt).”12 He says that
Since whatever is in sensuous knowledge depends upon the subject’s peculiar nature […]
it is plain that what is sensuously thought is the representation of things as they appear, while
the intellectual presentations are the representations of things as they are.13
All in all, Kant describes cognition as split into two powers: sensibility (which is the cog-
nitive power in us that enables objects to be given) and understanding (the cognitive
power in us that allows objects to be thought) — a division that still orients us here, since
the proper rhythmical sense, so to say, of the rhythmic idea depends on it. 
In the preface to his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant explains his first intuition about
the problem of knowledge and representation:
up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; [i] but
all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend
our cognition have, on this pre-supposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether
we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the [ii] objects
must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of
an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are
given to us. [iii] This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did
not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the
entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater
success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we
can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the
constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori;
[iv] but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty
of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot
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stop with these intuitions, [v] if they are to become cognitions, [vi] but must refer them as
representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can
assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also con-
form to the objects, and then I am once again in the same diﬃculty about how I could know
anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing,
the experience in which alone they can be cognized (as given objects) conforms to those
concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the diﬃculty, [vii] since ex-
perience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to pre-
suppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, [viii] which rule is
expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily
conform, and with which they must agree. As for objects insofar as they are thought merely
through reason, and necessarily at that, but that (at least as reason thinks them) cannot be
given in experience at all — the attempt to think them (for they must be capable of being
thought) will provide a splendid touchstone of what we assume as the altered method of
our way of thinking, namely that [ix] we can cognize of things a priori only what we our-
selves have put into them.14
There are here some important matters: (i) that through concepts, and concepts only, we
cannot extend our knowledge of things; (ii) that things are informed by or conformed to
our knowledge of them; (iii) that eventually what seems to be a property of an object of
perception is actually a condition of the subject of perception; (iv) that things, as objects
of senses, are to us according to the constitution of our intuition (and not yet of our cog-
nition); (v) that intuitions become cognitions, that is, that things are firstly conforming
we are, and consequently conform we know; (vi) that intuitions are representations; (vii)
that experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding; (viii) that the
rule of the understanding is expressed in concepts; (ix) and that we can cognise of things
only what we ourselves have put into them.
Firstly, if it is true that intuitions become cognitions (and, by the same token, that expe-
rience is a kind of cognition which requires understanding), would it not be true as well
that both experience and understanding change around this becoming? If so, could it not
be argued that concepts may become intuitions fixing our perception in certain specific
orientations? Secondly, if it is true that we can cognise in things ‘only what we ourselves
have put into them,’ would it not be true as well that our cognition depends on our creative
power (our freedom) so much that things, as they are cognised by us, may change accord-
ingly and conform to this power? If so, could we not claim that what we put into the things
is not another thing (an intellectual one) but rather our power per se and only, the reach
of our attention, our capacity of making a way through nature? That is why I favour Berg-
son’s, Deleuze’s and Bachelard’s reasoning over Kant’s temporal arguments. 
For Kant, sensibility and intellect “function as independent sources of cognition, and
have quite diﬀerent objects: sensibility represents the world of sensible objects in space
and time; these being nothing but subjective ‘forms of sensibility’ (a new doctrine of
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Kant’s), and intellect represents non-sensible, ‘intelligible’ objects.”15 There would be
thus two main ‘modes’ of representation, a sensible and an intellectual one. However,
Kant does not suggest how reasoning ignites, whether primarily by means of sensibility
or intellect. 
Kant’s view at this point, it has been argued, suﬀers “from a fatal weakness, resulting from
the sharpness of its separation of sensibility and intellect.”16This seems to be the Kantian
Critical problem: since Kant could not admit the object of sensibility as the source of the
object of intellect and vice versa, there should be a ‘third’ cognitive power, a dialectic one,
able to guarantee the nexus of sensibility and intellect (or understanding), and their rel-
ative objects, intuitions, and concepts. However, since this nexus in itself could still be
taken as the source of its own objects, a whole cognitive system should inevitably be il-
luminated or grounded by a deeper and bounding power, a fundamental, Platonic-like, a
priori source of knowledge and truth: the goodness, the pure reason. 
For Kant “without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no
object would be thought. […] It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sen-
sible, […] as to make our intuitions intelligible.”17 I must agree on this necessity, however
disagreeing when Kant declares that sensibility and understanding “cannot exchange their
functions.”18Kant says that sensibility and understanding are isolated faculties. Moreover,
he proposes as a proof of that the negative example of ‘intellectual intuition.’19Kant claims
that “it is evident that we do not have intellectual intuition. For a subject with intellectual
intuition, there would be no room for sense experience, since to merely think of an object
would be to be presented with it; nor would it be necessary to apply concepts to objects,
since each given object would be grasped immediately in its full individuality.”20 But is
not that exactly what happens to us all the time, in a way, when we think about or we
sense something? 
When we simply think, we are presented with the object of our thought. Otherwise, when
we merely sense (something), we are also presented with all its potential generalisations.
There are, therefore, I argue, ‘levels of intuition’ as well as ‘levels of conceptualisation,’
whose absolute ones would stand for, as Kant says, the cognitive power or mind of God.
So I venture to say that instead of seeking epistemological orientation from a pure, a priori
power of reasoning, we should initially investigate the rhythmical nexus that links sensi-
bility and understanding, by claiming (still supported by Kant) that these are distinct
modes of cognition, however never completely isolated, neither completely indistinct (as
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a form of intellectual intuition).21 Instead, they are in a constant, complex lively interac-
tion. They change one another, reciprocally, according to our actual necessities. We may
observe this rhythmicality drawing our cognitions sometimes nearer our body, sometimes
farther from it. We can understand our intuitions of space and time, of the world around
us, mentally detaching ourselves from their direct experience, however still experiencing
their intensities in our imagination and memory. We can imagine new things, places and
times, new possibilities, recall past ones. Memory and imagination are, clearly, important
powers of representation; their work has much to do with the intellectual work of con-
ceptualisation. On the other hand, as previously indicated at the start of this chapter and
to be later detailed, we can also intuit concepts, new and old ones, for the same reason.
To say the least, our modes of cognition are not fixed, but fluctuate, expanding and con-
tracting towards the non-determination of the here and now, or the determination of the
other, of the past and the future, in diﬀerent levels of complexity.
Kant asserts that space and time provide the sensible form of experience, declaring as
well, according to Gardner, that space and time “are not features of absolute reality but
only forms of sensibility, […] and that everything that has spatial and temporal properties
are mere appearances as opposed to things in themselves.”22 Kant points this out by ar-
guing that “only by means of such pure forms of sensibility [space and time] can an object
appear to us, i.e., can it be an object of empirical intuition. Hence space and time are pure
intuitions containing a priori the condition of the possibility of objects as appearances,
and the synthesis in space and time has objective validity.”23
In arguing about the nature of the musical representation of time, this assumption has
only limited importance. Independently of what time actually is, a feature of absolute re-
ality or not, it is easy to agree that time is also a form of sensibility; but not only, as it is
also a form of understanding. This view receives its support in Bergson’s concept of du-
ration, when he says that
may we not conceive, for instance, that the irreducibility of two perceived colors is due
mainly to the narrow duration into which are contracted the billions of vibrations which
they execute in one of our moments? If we could stretch out this duration, that is to say, live
it at a slower rhythm, should we not, as the rhythm slowed down, see these colors pale and
lengthen into successive impressions, still colored, no doubt, but nearer and nearer to co-
incidence with pure vibrations? In cases where the rhythm of the movement is slow enough
to tally with the habits of our consciousness — as in the case of the deep notes of the musical
scale, for instance — do we not feel that the quality perceived analyzes itself into repeated
and successive vibrations, bound together by an inner continuity? […] We must insist […
that] the duration lived by our consciousness is a duration with its own determined rhythm,
a duration very diﬀerent from the time of the physicist, which can store up, in a given interval,
as great a number of phenomena as we please. […] In reality there is no one rhythm of du-
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ration; it is possible to imagine many diﬀerent rhythms which, slower or faster, measure the
degree of tension or relaxation of diﬀerent kinds of consciousness and thereby fix their re-
spective places in the scale of being.24
So there must be, as Bergson says, diﬀerent kinds of consciousness, qualified by many
diﬀerent rhythms as they measure the tension or relaxation of our being. Our state of
awareness does not always present the same intensity, as things do not do as well. 
Everything changes for us, externally and internally, and it is the form of this change, that
captivates our attention the most. A form of change is never like a shape. It is more like a
complex flow that is at once (re)-sensed and (re)-conceived at each moment of our lives.
Accordingly, intuitions and concepts are never temporally fixed — if they were their sense
would be eternally allocated inside and outside us linking diﬀerent unconnected times.
Intuitions and concepts are more like creative moments that emerge in a freer way within
a vital duration that connects them, in response to the calling of the present situation.
The behaviour of this form of change is not chaotic but rhythmical — it has a temporal
orientation. Thus, everything that changes for us, externally and internally, is the essential
source of all that we call musical.
Another important point of dispute comes from Kant’s claim, that “the subject forms its
sensible representations passively, through being ‘aﬀected’ [… while] the faculty of un-
derstanding, which produces concepts and applies them to objects, is by contrast active
and spontaneous,’ meaning that it is not caused to do what it does.”25 As Kant clarifies,
“let us give the name sensibility to our mind’s receptivity, [i.e., to its ability] to receive pre-
sentations insofar as it is aﬀected in some manner. Understanding, on the other hand, is
our ability to produce presentations ourselves, i.e., our spontaneity of cognition.”26
We are not passively aﬀected by the world, I think, because we have the choice of being
diﬀerently aﬀected in diﬀerent circumstances. Otherwise, we are not always actively ap-
plying sense to things, neither our sense making is always spontaneous. We present all
sorts of cognitive habits and vices. We are free, surely, but not always in the same way.
Sometimes our concepts are immature and false, and wrongly defined because of a lack
of attention. 
The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements of Kant’s Critique is divided into three main sec-
tions. Its ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ part is concerned with the power of sensibility
(which deals with intuitions); the ‘Transcendental Analytic’ part is concerned with the
power of understanding (which deals with concepts and their principles); and the ‘Tran-
scendental Dialectic’ section is concerned with the power of reason, and deals with what
Kant calls ideas. In a certain way, I align my main hypotheses with those included in Kant’s
aesthetic and analytic parts of his Critique. However, and this is also crucial in the current
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discussion, ideas are here viewed mostly according to the Deleuzian perspective, as ‘di-
verging and decentering’27 powers of multiplicity and ‘eternal newness.’28 For Deleuze,
there is a ‘broken connection of the faculties,’ which nevertheless does not interrupt the
temporal flux of the Idea. Indeed, Deleuze argues that there is
a serial connection between the faculties and an order in the series. But neither the order
nor the series implies any collaboration with regard to the form of a supposed same object
or to a subjective unity in the nature of an ‘I think’. It is a forced and broken connection
which traverses the fragments of a dissolved self as it does the borders of a fractured I. [… ]
Kant was the first to provide the example of such a discordant harmony, the relation between
imagination and thought which occurs in the case of the sublime. There is, therefore, some-
thing which is communicated from one faculty to another, but it is metamorphosed and
does not form a common sense. We could just as well say that there are Ideas which traverse
all the faculties, but are the object of none in particular. Perhaps, in eﬀect, as we shall see, it
will be necessary to reserve the name of Ideas not for pure cogitanda but rather for those
instances which go from sensibility to thought and from thought to sensibility, capable of
engendering in each case, according to their own order, the limit — or transcendent — ob-
ject of each faculty. Ideas are problems, but problems only furnish the conditions under
which the faculties attain their superior exercise.29 
Deleuze’s notion of idea diﬀers from Kant’s in the sense that, even though still deeply
concerned with the powers of sensibility and understanding, it does not regard them as
working as a coherent power. They are never really detached from the experience of things
— because for Deleuze, deeply guided by Bergson’s insights, sensibility deals with more
than intuitions (in a Kantian sense), transcending them so that the proper emergence of
thought, and thus the totality of our representations, are constantly influenced by them.
They are also never detached from understanding — because, working as a negative force
of amplification of thought, ideas are constantly calling thought to delve into the unknown.
Deleuze’s idea is amid intuitions and concepts as principles, working, as it were, as a mar-
vellous transcendental vehicle of sense, and hence implying a Transcendental
Empiricism.30
Thus, I assert, sensibility and understanding are not isolated realms, but linked by means
of a rhythmic manifold of psychic intensities, which conditions the rhythmicality of our
cognition in response to our freedom, and sets the reach of our knowledge. For our ca-
pacity of reasoning is not given a priori, but emerges creatively from life as life is, once we
see ourselves emerging from it. There seems to be a strong connection — a deep sense
— between everything and us. A sense I dare say, with Bergson, that is grounded by a
profound creative evolution. This connection leads us to believe that our musicality is
deeply rooted in nature; that we respond to it primordially and necessarily. That we cannot
perceive or understand the world without music. 
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Bergson: the mobility of things and of things in us
Bergson’s revolutionary conception of the mobility and intersection of things and of
things in us, evolved, as Moulard-Leonard indicates, from his 
novel concept of duration (la durée), the nexus of his ‘new philosophy,’ and his innovative
methodology of ‘metaphysical pragmatism,’ [which has] challenged our thinking of time,
and continue to defy any established idea or philosophical system concerning consciousness,
perception, memory, knowledge, life, evolution, reality, causality, and freedom.31
This thesis is illuminated by Bergson’s philosophy, or better, by his philosophical attitude
as he targets the epistemological problem raised by Kant and presents a still fresh and
new solution: there is no actual distinction between things in themselves and things in
us, except, firstly, for the fact that the thing conceived, that is, represented, is always de-
fined by a certain degree of attention, which varies in each experience in response to both
the contingency of the experience itself (its singularity) and the presentness of the expe-
rience to us (its newness); and secondly by the fact that we potentially find the whole
past psychologically projected on each new experience. Therefore, the thing is unique
not only as it is, since it is also unique as it is to us, to the self. There is an eternal and
crucial diﬀerence between the datum that comes from our sensibility and the one that
comes from our understanding, a diﬀerence though that is never defined once and for all.
This diﬀerence changes: it advances and recedes temporally, as it were, and is oriented, as
Deleuze indicates,32 sometimes to the problem, sometimes to its solution. It is sometimes
powered by a dive down into the now in the pursuit of the new aspect, the novelty, at
times by edifying transcendental principles. 
Bergson explains this continuity by saying that there is no actual distinction between
body and mind; 
in fact, the humblest function of spirit is to bind together the successive moments of the
duration of things, if it is by this that it comes into contact with matter and by this also that
it is first of all distinguished from matter, we can conceive an infinite number of degrees be-
tween matter and fully developed spirit — a spirit capable of action which is not only un-
determined, but also reasonable and reflexive. Each of these successive degrees, which
measures a growing intensity of life, corresponds to a higher tension of duration and is made
manifest externally by a greater development of the sensor-motor system.33
This general orientation comes to us, in distinct and complementary ways, from four
main sources. Firstly from Bergson’s doctoral thesis, the Essai sur les données immédiates
de la conscience, published as a book in 1889, shortly after its academic submission, as
Time and Free Will;34 from Matter and Memory, which appeared in 1896; also from the
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article “Introduction to Metaphysics”,35 first published in 1903, in the Revue de méta-
physique et de morale,36 and later in 1934, as the centrepiece of The Creative Mind 37 (La
Pensée et le Mouvant), and finally from Creative Evolution,38 that appeared in 1907.
Bergson’s Time and Free Will addresses the problem of free will. In it, Bergson contended
against Kant’s argument that our choices are traceable to conditions determined by the
empirical character (the sense self) rather than the intelligible character (the thinking
self). In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant declared that 
every human being has an empirical character for his power of choice, which is nothing
other than a certain causality of his reason, in sofar as in its eﬀects in appearance this reason
exhibits a rule, in accor dance with which one could derive the rational grounds and the ac-
tions themselves according to their kind and degree, and estimate the sub jective principles
of his power of choice. Because this empirical char acter itself must be drawn from appear-
ances as eﬀect, and from the rule which experience provides, all the actions of the human
being in ap pearance are determined in accord with the order of nature by his em pirical char-
acter and the other cooperating causes; and if we could investigate all the appearances of
his power of choice down to their basis, then there would be no human action that we could
not predict with certainty, and recognize as necessary given its preceding conditions.39
Bergson’s response to Kant’s notion of freedom aims to dispel the ‘confusion of duration
with extensiveness, of succession with simultaneity, of quality with quantity.’40 For Berg-
son, we can speak of the experience of freedom, thus of creativity, only in the context of
a dissociated time freed from mechanistic causality: time must be dissociated from space.
His overall argument is that ‘inner duration is a qualitative multiplicity,’ that ‘in the ex-
ternal world we find not duration but simultaneity.’41 Being temporal, our consciousness
operates as a vital duration in which there is juxtaposition of events — a qualitative as
opposed to a quantitative multiplicity, which is always homogeneous and can be enu-
merated.42
Bergson illustrates his point of view discussing the psychic intensities of hope and sorrow
in terms of time, with reference, respectively, to the future and to the past. He also con-
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siders aesthetic feelings as intensities. He suggests that we find pleasure ‘mastering the
flow of time and of holding the future in the present,’43 because this allows us to prioritise
emotional intensity over reflective consciousness. For Bergson, reflective consciousness
“delights in clean cut distinctions, which are easily expressed in words, and in things with
well-defined outlines, like those which are perceived in space.”44
Bergson’s response sets the context and definition of time in the present discussion. Time
is opposed to space and spacial enumeration. It is qualitative, a vital duration, and must
be discussed in terms of intensities. This notion points to a necessary and complementary
collaboration, in us, of two temporal paths: one which is turned to or tuned by continuity,
and another which is oriented by all sorts of discontinuities, outlines, articulations. 
As important is Bergson’s theory of pure perception, laid out in the first chapter of Matter
and Memory, which tries to show that — beyond both realism and idealism — our knowl-
edge of things, in its pure state, takes place within the things it represents. In order to show
this, Bergson claims that all we sense are actually images. Bergson employs the notion of
image to demonstrate — in opposition to realism and materialism — that there is no
hidden power in matter able to produce representations in us. He also criticises idealism
to the extent that Kantian idealism attempts to reduce matter to the representation we
have of it. For Bergson, images are less than a thing but more than representations. This
point is crucial because the more and the less, in this case, indicates that representations
diﬀer from images by degree. 
Bergson re-attaches perception to the real. The image of a material thing becomes a rep-
resentation, which is always virtually in the image. In any case, there is a transition from
the image as being in itself to its being for the self, but perception adds nothing new to
the image; in fact, it subtracts from it. Representation is hence a reduction or, in my terms,
a contraction of the image.45Conscious representation would thus result from suppressing
that that has no interest for bodily functions and maintaining only that that does interest
them. The conscious perception of a living being therefore exhibits a ‘necessary poverty.’46
In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson extends this notion by oﬀering three insights
to help us think about duration and therefore about qualitative multiplicities.47 The first,
implies that duration is memory. Bergson says, “no two moments are identical in a con-
scious being.”48 Memory conserves the past and this conservation does not imply that
one experiences the same (re-cognition), but diﬀerence. The second insight implies that
“pure duration excludes juxtaposition, reciprocal exteriority and extension.”49 And the
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third, implies that no image can represent duration: an image is immobile, while duration
is ‘pure mobility.’50 We can always insert breaks into a spatial line that represents motion,
but motion itself is indivisible. Now we can clearly see that duration consists of two char-
acteristics: unity and multiplicity.
We also learn from The Introduction to Metaphysics that intelligence consists precisely in
an analytic, external, hence essentially practical and spatialized approach to the world.
Bergson argues, there is a certain form of finalism that would adequately account for the
creation of life while simultaneously allowing for the diversity resulting from creation. It
is the Bergsonian idea of an original vital principle. Bergson argues that the true obstacle
to the knowledge of the absolute consists in the idea of disorder. All theories of knowledge
have in one way or another attempted to explain meaning and consistency by assuming
the contingency of order. For Bergson asks: ‘order is certainly contingent, but in relation
to what’?51 His answer consists in showing that it is not a matter of order versus disorder,
but rather of one order in relation to another. In summary, the real is essentially positive,
it obeys a certain kind of organisation, namely, that of the qualitative multiplicity. 
All in all, Bergsonism is deeply influential in respect to our creativity (freedom), to the
important distinction assumed between time and space and their many levels of cognitive
interaction, to the unity and multiplicity of our vital duration, and to  guidance on the im-
portant principle of qualitative multiplicity.
Deleuze: the broken connection of the faculties and the mobility of the Idea
The main sources of interest on Deleuze’s view in this concern are his writings on Nietz -
sche (1965), presented as a chapter in Pure Immanence: Essays on a life (2001), Bergsonism
(1966), Diﬀerence and Repetition (1968), Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1970), The Logic
of Sense (1969), Cinema I: the Movement-Image (1983), Cinema II: The Time-Image
(1985), and A Thousand Plateaus (1987).52
Deleuze argues that our subjectivity emerges from distinct, ‘diﬀerential passive synthe-
ses’ 53 — as, for instance, the synthesis of habit, in which, according to him, unconscious
(passive) temporal contractions would invariably aim to extract from a unified series of
experiences only that that is to be retained within the habit. Passive syntheses would be
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diﬀerential because ‘pervasively serial’:54 there would always be a series of distinct current
temporal contractions demanding permanent renewing. They would hence form and
conform many a distinct level, and relate all series one another in a same body, as well as
one another bodies. Subject formation would thus take place, so argues Deleuze, within
a pre-individual transcendental ‘diﬀerential field’55 formed by all these levels together.
Subjects would be thus constituted as (rhythmical) patterns of manifold serial syntheses
that, by being ‘folded’56 on themselves by themselves, would give rise to self-awareness.
This diﬀerential, immanent and genetic position — in which the abstract thing does not
explain but rather must be explained — Deleuze calls ‘transcendental empiricism’:57 that
is, instead of looking for eternal or universal essences one should concentrate on the sin-
gular conditions under which something new is produced. For Deleuze, the main object
of philosophy is finding and fostering conditions for creative production. 
The bases of our creativity are thus to be found among many and diﬀerential ‘temporal
foldings.’ Now, it is evident how Deleuze complements Bergson’s intuitions about the dif-
ferential plenitude of a vital duration, by arguing that this plenitude is actually formed by
a number of unconscious sub-routines. These routines are the reason for our rhythmicality,
so that the Deleuzian diﬀerential, transcendental, pre-individual field takes actually the
form of our musicality. This field can only happen within an all embracing temporal mul-
tiplicity, within the constant return of the past; within the durée réelle.
In Bergsonism, Deleuze approaches virtuality and multiplicity, principles that will ground
later works, chiefly, Cinema I and II. Of importance here is the fact that Deleuze openly
adopts the Bergsonian notion that the virtual is fully real, that it is the condition for the
real experience. The virtual, however, has no identity: the identity of the subject, as well
as the identity of the object, are actually virtual products constantly emerging and merg-
ing within a diﬀerential (transcendental) field which thus cannot condition any rational
experience. The virtual, consequently, can only condition the genesis of real experience
(which may be actualised or not). Deleuze also adopts from Bergson the notion of mul-
tiplicity, or the multiple, as substantive, pointing out the possibility of distinguishing types
of multiplicities — as does Bergson in Time and Free Will by distinguishing qualitative
and quantitative multiplicities. 
The condition of being unique is fundamental in Deleuze’s philosophy of diﬀerence. In
it, diﬀerence is no longer subordinated to identity, but to the notion of multiplicities as
substantives. Diﬀerence and Repetition thus re-evaluates the Kantian philosophical project
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in two ways: on the one hand, Deleuze wants to provide a view of the genesis of real ex-
perience — that is, the experience of a concretely existing individual here and now —
rather than Kantianly seeking the conditions of a possible experience; on the other hand,
in order to respect the demands of a philosophy of diﬀerence, the genetic principle must
be itself a diﬀerential principle. 
Deleuze’s philosophy of diﬀerence thus supports the notion of a creative field that acts
through many faculties according to diﬀerent levels of temporal complexity. According
to this notion, the genetic principle, the condition for the manifestation of the individual
subject and object, acts within a transcendental multiplicity, so that the real experience,
the here and now, is constantly musicalised in us, by us.58
This image is developed in A Thousand Plateaus. There Deleuze presents his geology of
morals, by discussing the beginning of non-human expressivity: everything, even inor-
ganic matter, expresses itself. The main context of this discussion is that if we lose the ca-
pacity to be moved by nature we lose something, the sense of otherness. We will find that
for Deleuze, inorganic tridimensional, voluminous, form of expression becomes unidi-
mensional organic DNA, in plants and animals, and consequently able to be excited —
it becomes sensibility. Informed by this strong expressive connection, we may return to
the Bergsonian notion of sensibility, according to which we will see ourselves comple-
menting the here and now, at each moment, with the whole of our past, including our in-
organic past, life as a whole. 
So, later in The refrain, Deleuze presents a definition of rhythm, stating that
every milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of space-time constituted by the periodic
repetition of the component. Thus the living thing has an exterior milieu of materials, an
interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, an intermediary milieu
of membranes and limits, and an annexed milieu of energy sources and actions-perceptions.
Every milieu is coded, a code being defined by periodic repetition; but each code is in a
perpetual state of transcoding or transduction. Transcoding or transduction is the manner
in which one milieu serves as the basis for another, or conversely is established atop another
milieu, dissipates in it or is constituted in it. The notion of the milieu is not unitary: not
only does the living thing continually pass from one milieu to another, but the milieus pass
into one another, they are essentially communicating. The milieus are open to chaos, which
threatens them with exhaustion or intrusion. Rhythm is the milieus’ answer to chaos.59
Rhythm is thus more than linear patterns of vibrations submitted to a certain rule of pro-
portions; it is a temporal complexity, multiplicity, folding, because “each code is in a per-
petual state of transcoding or transduction.” Rhythms dissipate, cross other rhythms; they
are also open to chaos, to indetermination. 
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Bachelard: the newness of the instant
Finally, there is Bachelard’s notion of the newness of the instant, his care for the creative
power of discontinuity, which oﬀers a clear opposition to Bergsonism. In Intuition of the
instant (1932), Bachelard opposes Bergson’s philosophy of duration and Gaston Roup-
nel’s ‘philosophy of instant.’60 For Bachelard the true time of creation is the instant, be-
cause “if we move into the domain of abrupt mutations, where the creative act takes place
at one stroke, how could we fault to acknowledge that a new era always opens up through
the irruption of an absolute? For every evolution — to the extent that it is decisive — is
punctuated by creative instants.”61
For Bachelard, if continuity (in which every moment is related to each other) were the
essential quality of time, true creation would be impossible. Consequently, the essence
of time must be the instant, which, severed from the past, would allow for something new
to happen. So for him, anything new carries or creates a necessary temporal rupture. How-
ever, although controversial concerning the assumption of this rupture as the essence of
time — because time is not made up by newnesses only, since it is also made up by the
whole past —, Bachelard’s doctrine of the instant points out more importantly the essence
of the creative act, which belongs to time as much as the sterile one does. These aspects of
Bachelard’s thought are presented mostly in Dialectic of Duration (1936)62 and The Phi-
losophy of No: a philosophy of the new scientific mind (1940).63
It is notable in The Philosophy of No, that for Bachelard, as for Kant, intuitions have to be
worked. Bachelard’s conception is however unique because temporal discontinuity is for
him an essential condition of this work. Bachelard’s interpretation of temporal disconti-
nuity makes for formal conditions to intuit phenomena as complex.64 It is only on the
basis of this complexity that (the scientific, rational) mind can be creative in the way he
proposes. 
Bachelard argues in favour of a sharp separation between the powers of understanding
and sensibility, which means, in Kantian terms, advocating for a clear separation between
mind and body. Although controversial, this sort of separation permits the developing
of a notion of time that gives freedom to the power of understanding in all circumstances:
the mind is thus free to act without the constraints placed on it by the objects of percep-
tion, and by the apparent continuity of their existence.65
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The reaction of Bachelard against Bergson’s conception of time as a continuous duration
led him to propose that if time were really fully continuous, the instant would be nothing
more than ‘une fausse césure’66 —  a false caesura. 
The instant allows Bachelard to suggest that the mind is able to make, to act, an absolute
beginning, to break with the past. However, the past rises up, as it were, from things them-
selves, from their substance. Forms of unity, of relation, and of existence that are familiar,
that come from our sensible experience, are thus connected. The point of importance
here is that a creative mind may indeed find it necessary to escape from such forms; a
negation to which Bachelard refers in La Philosophie du non, which aims at defining a
new position that is not determined by the conditions that precede it. However, even if
not determined as such, the new position is said to be not entirely unrelated to its past:
each act is not a completely new beginning because the new position is actually part of a
constructed series — it obeys a certain order, and therefore a certain rationality. This is
the work of mind: the mind thinks against something and, in doing so, it separates itself
from its own past, even though always in a way that is informed by the past it opposes.
The past is thus a background against which the act of mind occurs; however we have
still to ask how the proper act of mind occurs. In order to understand this problem, we
must grasp the relation of thought to the history against which it acts.
For Bachelard, the non characterises the creative act of the mind, which acts however al-
ways grounded in its own history. This history does not belong to things though, but to
the mind itself (to the virtual, the Idea); it is a history of images already freed from the
standard forms of sensible intuition. What would be therefore the relation of the present
instant to the instants that came before it? Bachelard concludes that this relation is musical,
that our being resonates, so to say, with the rhythm of instants, so that our being has a past
in the same way that an echo has a voice.67
It means that the more often phenomena are seen in a same, particular way, the more
likely they will be seen later in the same way: the rhythm and regularity of the past do
not simply reinforce what one perceives; above all, they reinforce the very form of one’s
intuition. Rhythm and regularity provide a rule that serves as the schema for intuition.
The rhythm, or form, or regularity that we find in the past, and which may then be con-
tinued in the present, is never — or rarely — unique. In any given example, there is,
Bachelard writes, a plurality of rhythms, forms, or regularities that, through a lack of atten-
tion, we reduce to a single unique form. It is, therefore, by being lazy that we allow the
past to shape the present and the future.68
Under the sign of determination, it may be that by avoiding looking closely enough, one
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picks out a particular rhythm or regularity and generalises it too quickly, ignoring other
possible rhythms and regularities that surround, cross, or lie alongside the first. One’s fault
is then that of being ‘wrongly’ fast. It may also be that by not looking closely enough one
fails to see that the rhythm or regularity picked out contains within it, in fact, many a vari-
ation and nuance that one had initially ignored; that is, there are layers or variations that
have been filtered out, leaving something univocal and easily put to work as the form re-
quired in the construction of sensible phenomena. One’s fault is then that of being
‘wrongly’ light. 
It would be better thus, in this case, to look more closely at the given thing, and so try to
discover something more, a richness and a complexity that one had failed to notice before.
What is sensed at first is a plain rhythm, the one which is straightforwardly, immediately
available, however in fact always transversely involved in complex temporal and formal
relations with other rhythms. This is the cognitive sense of rhythmicalization: the desire
to depart from an intuition, as given in sensibility, leads thinking to modify the rhythm
and regularity that gave form to that intuition. Closer attention to a thing or idea will al-
ways reveal a greater complexity. Looking attentively at the image and its history opens it,
allows for something, a part of the complexity of the image to be revealed: concealed
rhythms and regularities may be then combined in many new ways, producing a new
image.
Thinking, then, addresses itself to the rhythms that give form to intuitions. In addition,
the form of an intuition is not limited to its own rhythms, since it is also influenced by
(the rhythms of) a manifold of other intuitions. In all of this, the creation made actual in
the present instant would not be possible without the complexity that lies concealed for
the most part behind phenomena. In fact, one could say that the first achievement of tem-
poral discontinuity, at least for Bachelard, is to serve as a condition for this complexity,
which is itself a prerequisite for the construction of new forms of intuition.
Having in mind the complex image of time briefly introduced, now it will be possible to
approach, with some advantage, the more specific problem of musical time; initially from
the point of view of meaning, by considering how time in music is often conceptually ad-
dressed by means of space-motion constructs. This prevalence ends up orienting a whole
set of techniques of musical analysis and a lot of the aesthetical discussion in music.
Guided by spatial, motional laws, one may easily see himself contemplating music preva-
lently in terms of shape-forms or routines, instead of in terms of duration. This train of
thought has, I argue, a huge influence on the way music is studied and practised nowadays,
including on the decision of which music must be studied and performed. The new music
of our time, in itself in so many ways dedicated to the discovery of new temporal images,
is often negatively aﬀected by a theoretical tendency to make spatial references prevail
over genuine temporal ones. As result, new music is often peripheral, exceptional and
quite specialised. Now, on the other hand, the dramatic temporal structure one observes
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reflected in a spatialised musical discourse is not in itself necessarily negative, and still
quite necessary. The problem will always be the insistence of contemplating musical time
from a unique perspective. 
II – MUSICAL TIME
We normally attribute a temporal sense, or temporal meaning, to music guided or sup-
ported by a certain temporal language. This works as a way of projecting sometimes in-
novative, sometimes common-sense temporal conceptions onto our interpretation of a
given musical piece. 
This scenario is analysed in The Subconscious Language of Musical Time by Lewis Rowell,
who suggests that 
the metaphors implicit in rhythmic terms and the complex of meanings that gradually
[evolve from them] suggest that the language of musical temporality […] [its terminology],
is always a relatively late development in [any] language and tends to use existing words in
a more specific and limited sense, [becoming] a kind of sublanguage.69
An important aspect of Rowell’s critique, which is also relevant to the present discussion,
rests on his claim that the metaphors implicit in common rhythmic terms are generally
expressive of socially grounded temporal preconceptions. Normally oriented by cosmo-
logical statements, which were accumulated historically and culturally, these preconcep-
tions seem to be strong enough to define subjective conceptual frameworks and to delimit
the individual experience of time. From Rowell’s argument, an important nexus can be
made between our general representation of time and that of time in music: that the an-
alytically applied language of musical time may be equivalent to the temporal language
consciously used to qualify the direct experience of time in general. According to this, in-
dividuals shape their descriptions of music influenced by a common temporal language,
which is thus gradually turned into a technical rhythmic terminology that could be seen
as a conceptual interface that reflects broader social traits.70 The rhythmical meaning of
a musical piece — which is, I believe, fundamentally oriented by determinate rhythmic
ideas — expresses the link which happens to exist, in diﬀerent fashions, between our
temporal representation of music and of things in general. 
It seems thus that clarifying the fundamentals of musical time, its basic predicates, de-
pends, at least initially, on clarifying our rhythmic terminology. On this matter, Cooper
and Meyer also argue that indeed
the development of a fruitful approach to the study of rhythm has been hampered by a fail-
ure to distinguish clearly among the several aspects of temporal organisation itself. The re-
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sulting confusion has created a correlative ambiguity of terminology. Since clear distinctions
and univocal terminology are necessary if the analysis of the rhythmic structure of music is
to move beyond […], our first task must be one of definition.71
In response to this need of definition, but still oriented by his wider epistemological ap-
proach, Rowell proposes an initial thematic organisation of the language of musical time.
He presents eight categories of rhythmic terms that reflect a criterion of decreasing gen-
erality.72 Though well defined, Rowell suggests that these categories actually interpene-
trate according to the cultural background and the prevalent descriptive motivations of
their users. 
Musical time as space
In Western culture, the language of musical time has been prevalently  influenced by spa-
tial-motional preconceptions. Rowell observes that this tendency of projecting a spatial-
motional framework on music is as seminal and ancient in our culture as early Greek
musical theory and, in this concern,
the construction of temporal words from spatial metaphors [in Greek theory] is so prevalent
that one is tempted to wonder whether rhythm has anything to do with temporal thinking
[…]. We, like the Greeks, are still solving for ourselves the paradox of musical motion. Our
common sense tells us that we perceive motion in music, but we are not sure whether it is
time that moves, the music itself as a whole, or something within the music, or perhaps all
of these and more […]. Music’s apparent motion is a classic paradox still awaiting solution,
if indeed solution is possible. Until then we shall probably continue to depend upon spatial
metaphors.73
Commenting on the predominance of visual metaphors within Greek philosophical lan-
guage, Joseph Smith also stresses their influence on traditional Western musicology and
its applied spatial-motional terminology, arguing that  
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in the first paragraph of the Metaphysics, Aristotle claims that sight is the keenest of man’s
senses, and it is interesting to note that the Greek word, eidénai, to know, is derived from a
visual word, eidos, which means the way a thing looks; and thus its ‘essence’ 
[…]. The key to philosophical being from Aristotle through Heidegger is a study of ‘phe-
nomena’ i.e. what appears-in-light. From Plato to Husserl, the eidos of a thing was the starting
point to the discovery of essence […]. From Plato to Aristotle, through phenomenology
in its traditional forms, we are dealing almost exclusively with the phenomenon of actual
and metaphorical sight, literally dominating what a thing is by how it looks […]. Even
though we no longer bring musical sound under a metaphysical category as in the ars anti-
qua, we still look at it from the category of light and sight, as it were […]. It was Aristotle
who influenced the entire history of classic thought and its linguistic expression. And so
Augustine also, though apparently influenced more directly by Christian Platonism, made
sight stand for all the senses […]. From here it is but a step to the confluence of Platonism
and Aristotelianism in the ‘intuitional’ theories of the Middle Ages. An intuitio means, of
course, insight, literally a looking-into a thing […]. We would have no musicology, as the
knowledge of music, were it not for the development of the visual metaphor in Greek and
German philosophy, from which we finally conceive of Wissenschaft and thus of Musik-wis-
senschaft as the science of music.74
Smith also emphasises the influence of spatial aspects on the constitution of musical no-
tation itself. He argues that the score represents a strong visual determinant from which
a specific applied motional terminology naturally emerges. For Smith,
time, as philosophical and thus also as musical, has been conceived in Western thought as
‘extended in space.’ We literally draw time out in linear manner, and thus we can measure
what Hegel called the successive ‘now-points’ of a given line of time. It is obvious what west-
ern music theory has succumbed to the linear interpretation of time. It has done so more
completely than any science, for its musical notation has been literally linear from the start.
The entire history of musical notation is one of an uncritical acceptance of temporality as
linear, for we literally follow the notes like now-points across a spatially extended printed
page.75
All in all, spatial-motional metaphors still base many recent, and seemingly innovative,
investigative works on musical temporality. An interesting example is Jonathan Kramer’s
The Time of Music: New Meanings, New Temporalities, New Listening Strategies.76 In it,
Kramer aligns himself with the view of the prevalence of linear descriptions of time in
our music, observing that these descriptions turn out to be reflected in our compositional
and interpretative practices for many centuries, at least from the Age of Humanism to
the First World War — a period of time in which Western thought was strongly embed-
ded by ideas of cause and eﬀect, progress, and goal orientation. 
Kramer also claims that musical time — its language, so to say — always reflects  specific
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social and cultural contexts; the broader environment, costumes and the like; and, con-
sequently, the thought of its producers and consumers, which seems to be right and
aligned with Rowell’s thought. The striking novelty of Kramer’s analysis  resides in his
proposition of ‘listening strategies’: since musical time and its language parallel social
time, Kramer suggests that music should be as well culturally listened to, that is, it should
be approached by proper interpretative strategies, defined by cultural foundations. He
thus proposes a general categorisation of subjective  responses, that should be applied to
particular musical gestures, responses that may be actualised or not, depending on the
degree of awareness (attention), on the general musical knowledge and, again, on the cul-
tural background in use during the  interpretative act.77
Musical temporality and rhythmic terminology, Kramer suggests, should be seen nowa-
days in accordance not only with the relative temporal linearity (causality, delimitation,
flux and univocal direction) observed in traditional musical repertoires, mostly in those
identified with tonal common practice, but also with the relative nonlinearity (indeter-
mination, openness, stillness and multi-directionality) perceived on the surface of new
musical works. 
On this point, his listening-interpretative perspective is remarkably interesting. However,
we may say, Kramer’s essentialist psychological approach to musical time itself seems to
be blocked or circumscribed by the very same linear preconception he points out as a lim-
itation to traditional listening strategies. This is because he  approaches either musical lin-
earity or nonlinearity addressing, again, their mobility, in structural terms. 
Kramer’s new listening strategies ends up being sorts of motional listening strategies, as
they are linked to five motional strategies of composition or musical times.78 All in all,
Kramer’s listening and compositional strategies seem an applied system of musical tem-
poral modalities, built up in the perspective of the cadential principle of tonal harmony;
these modalities being negatively defined by the absence of the goal-oriented temporal
characteristics of tonality. This can also be perceived in his use of information-theory,
since musical linearity is defined in terms of satisfaction and expectation, in the same way
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tonal harmony is commonly addressed. On this matter, Kramer claims that
although the information-theory applied scientifically to the study of music has been prob-
lematic, it does provide a useful aesthetic framework for understanding the listening process
[… and] a context for aesthetic understanding of linear musical time […]. Events can and
do imply later events; probabilities do exist for what will follow a given sequence of events.
It may not be possible to calculate these probabilities objectively, but we do feel their force.
If an event is an outgrowth of previous events, we understand that the music has progressed
from antecedent to consequent. The piece moves through time from the music that implies
to the music that satisfies (or delays or thwarts) the expectation. This sense of progression
— coming from the confluence of several interlocking antecedent-consequent relationships
and from a complex interaction of implications and outgrowths that takes place across var-
ious durations — is what linearity means: the higher the Markov order, the more pervasive
the linearity.79
Interestingly, this same aspect of Kramer’s ideas is elaborated in Barbara R. Barry’s Musical
Time: The sense of order. Barry explores musical temporality focusing on epistemological
issues raised by Schenker, Meyer, Cone, and other European and American scholars for
the study of classic repertoire. She proposes a linear tempo-density approach based on
information-theory in which the speed at which musical time passes is the speed infor-
mation is processed.80 Both Barry and Kramer define musical time having in mind, as it
were, a functional conformity between the temporal structure presented at the surface
of a musical piece and its perception,81 notwithstanding their clearly motional or or-
dered-like analytical approach. The principle of musical motion is actually necessary in
this case because, otherwise, the inevitable teleological assumption that sustains Kramer’s
and Barry’s analyses would be ineﬃcient, that is: the assumption that music moves re-
specting diﬀerent goal orientations and at diﬀerent rates; and that the listener — the in-
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though by a variety of means and with varying degrees of local stability at cadences. For Kramer, this
musical time ‘carries’ its listeners along in its continuum, but they do not really know ‘where’ they are
being led to by each musical phrase or section until their actual conclusion. Kramer also introduces
the notion of (iii) ‘multiple time,’ or multiple directed time, which depends on a ‘reordered’ underlying
linearity that should be suﬃciently straightforward and perceptible. In order that listeners experience
the reordered linearity, they should be able to understand the ‘right’ function of a musical gesture
even when it occurs in the ‘wrong’ [sic] part of a composition. Next, Kramer proposes (iv) a ‘moment
time,’ which would be the musical time devised in pieces with no fundamental linearity. The music
would be markedly discontinuous and there would be no reordering. A work in moment time would
not really begin but simply ‘start,’ as if it has been going on all along and the listener happened to tune
in on it. Finally, there would be (v) a ‘vertical time,’ which is the musical time of works in which the
phrase structure does not seem a necessary component of music. The result would be a ‘single present’
stretched out into an enormous duration, a potentially infinite now, that nonetheless is felt like an
 instant.
79 Kramer, The Time of Music…, 23.
80 Barbara Barry, Musical Time: the sense of order (New York: Pendragon Press, Stuyvesant, 1982),
165.
81 It may be for this reason — the necessity of a perceptual functional agreement — that Barry bases
her analyses as well mostly on sections of tonal works, primarily on pieces composed by Mozart, Schu-
bert, Beethoven, Brahms, Wagner and Hugo Wolf, except for a brief commentary on serial rhythmic
figuration in Anton Webern’s opus 21 and 22.
terpreter — makes sense, or not, of this movement. The importance of their interpretation
seems to rest however on their defence that musical temporality is at the end determined
by the listener’s musical ability to process musical information, by his musical knowledge,
meaning by musical knowledge — and this is important to the discussion here presented
— the awareness of compositional processes: traditional musical styles are temporally given,
because well known by many, but new musical styles should be conquered, so to say, by
innovative listening strategies, by a new musical education grounded on the individual
eﬀort of attention, on careful contemplation; notions which are very similar to those pre-
sented in Schoenberg’s Musikalische Gedanke82 and Brelet’s Le Temps Musical,83 and
which reflect in many ways the thought of Bergson. 
In some cases, the language of musical time in use in Western culture is well delimited
by pure spatial constructs, that is, by proper applied analytical methods that ground our
musical understanding by guiding our attention to the greater or smaller segmentation
and hierarchisation of musical substance. Clearly, the greater segmentation and hierar-
chisation of musical substance accounts for a higher necessity of definition, of conceptu-
alisation. We routinely find analytical commentaries based on this sort of necessity, such
as Charles Rosen’s, for instance, when he says that “the discontinuities that distinguish the
sonata forms from binary form are evidently easier to conceive as stylistic procedures
than as definitions of form;”84 or Nicholas Cook’s who, addressing Rose’s analytical ac-
count of sonata forms, holds that, in Rosen’s view, “you can’t fully understand classical
music, especially classical chamber music, just in terms of how it is heard. You also have
to understand it in terms of the musical thinking that gave rise to it, and of course it is the
job of analysis to uncover what this musical thinking was.”85 Discontinuities, definitions,
thinking, the concept, understanding, etc., are central aspects of these sort of commen-
taries.
Music must be sectioned in order to be understood; while, in doing so, we inevitably end
up conceiving musical substance spatially as it were composed of distinct objects, by im-
mobile sets that, instead of being motional, actually behave according to distinct motional
procedures. 
The work of sectioning musical substance that has in mind the commentary of its under-
standing is generally conspicuous in musical semiotics. Thomas Reiner’s Semiotics of mu-
sical time develops, for example, an epistemological approach to the inherent temporality
of semiological tripartition. Though, instead of models of musical analysis, Reiner oﬀers
arguments for models of analysis as collections, sets of symbolically driven constructs,
and music as a product of signs, sign systems, and sign-oriented behaviours. Reiner points
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out that much of what constitutes musical time is the result of sign-oriented activities,
such as the composer’s creation of a musical score, the transformation of notational signs
into sonic signs by performers, or listeners’ actualization of sonic signs as music.86 For
Reiner,
much of what constitutes musical time is a product of semiosis. Musical time subsumes
music’s recognizable [my stress] temporal properties and their physical anchorage, its mode
of being is essentially that of a concept, and its semiotic status is revealed when it reaches
consciousness through interpretative responses that actualize its representations.87
In the same vein, though more pragmatically, in The Stratification of Musical Rhythm,88
Maury Yeston suggests that musical time should be defined hierarchically, hence spatially,
and regulated by a metric theory that ‘distributes’ its sense in diﬀerent structural layers
of signification. Yeston develops a spatial multi-layered metric theory which considers ir-
regular patterns of accentuation as results of the overlaying of diﬀerent non-interpreted
rhythmic strata. Yeston’s study examines in depth the concept of ‘rhythmic consonance
and dissonance,’ and proposes a methodology directed to rhythmic analysis, which par-
allels the Schenkerian organicist paradigms, as we may see in Yeston’s own words:
first, music is considered to be uninterpreted, then the various middle ground levels are
postulated, then the structures that are formed on or between the levels are examined, and
finally the various middle grounds levels are evaluated to determine which of them has es-
pecial relevance for a metric accentuation of the foreground rhythm.89
There are many more analytical works on rhythm and meter, like Yeston’s study, inspired
by the Schenkerian approach. Grosvenor Cooper’s and Leonard B. Meyer’s The Rhythmic
Structure of Music90 oﬀers a theory of musical accentuation based on a multi-layered anal-
ogy between rhythmic grouping and classic poetic feet, assuming musical time as a strat-
ified product of a finite number of rhythmic archetypes (a rhythmic formulation of
temporal modalities). Another is Joel Lester’s study,91 which presents a comprehensive
analysis of rhythm and meter in tonal music, based on an extensive categorisation of mu-
sical accentuation and its role in defining metric and hyper-metric structures. Musical
time as metric ratios and metric deviations is also presented in David Epstein’s Shaping
Time,92 which explores, primarily in the context of musical Romanticism, rhythm, meter,
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and general aspects of periodicity in tonal pieces. He considers that the sense of time is
fundamentally dual, hierarchical, and therefore he defines, like Kramer and Barry did,
some temporal modalities. Epstein tackles time in music as a special case of time in gen-
eral. He looks for a scientific approach, and presents many numerical charts consisting
of calculations of tempo and rhythmic proportions based on metronomic markings. By
establishing metric ratios and metric deviations, he aims to illuminate how musical-time
shapes aﬀect the listener’s emotional responses. His approach is based as well on a ten-
sional relation between stimuli and satisfaction, and, consequently, related to informa-
tion-theory. 
The language of musical time, as far as recent Western scholarship is concerned, seems
to be based on very few, recurring temporal conceptions, most of them, if not all, strongly
governed by spatial-motional metaphors. Moreover, in the academy, musical time has
been systematically qualified by means of slight variations of a spatial-motional vocabulary,
in response, it seems, to a quest for scientific precision. Musical theory is expected to con-
sistently apply a terminology that allows for a clear definition of musical form, implying
all sorts of articulations. This terminology has developed a common conception of mu-
sical time in which musical temporality is discussed and perceived spatially in terms of
its linearity (its goal orientation), like in Kramer; of its density (number or elements of
speed of presentation), as in Barry; of its semiotical physical anchorage, as Reiner claims;
of its metrical hence pattern-like accentuate qualities, as in Yeston’s, Grosnover’s and
Meyer’s, and Lester’s theories, or yet of its metronomical formulae, as in Epstein’s and
the majority of rhythmic studies. 
The spatial-motional approach in our musical descriptions, I believe, responds to a cul-
tural tradition arising from the position of music in the superior group of liberal arts that
composed the quadrivium, the four ways, of the ancient academy. Music has been ever
since described in arithmetic, geometric and astronomical terms. And music has been
logical, proportional, formal, gravitational, and so on. This condition has been, as Rowell
indicates, part of our subconscious language of music. We commonly think music in these
ways, responding to hundreds of years of cultural background. But during the twentieth-
century, and after all its many technological developments and consequent philosophical
turns, this background has changed. After all, we opened the door, so to say, to other ways
of describing music and consequently composing and listening to it. Kramer makes this
clear, especially when explaining his notion of vertical time. We can also think about all
technical developments after Debussy’s new modalism, Messiaen’s uses of Indian rhythms,
Schoenberg’s 12-tone presentation and after all the serialists from the fifties. We may
think also about Stockhausen’s many new formulae, including sonic multi-directionality,
sound masses, or yet about Feldman’s and Cage’s indeterminacy, etc. A whole new tem-
poral language is necessary, I feel, to describe this new music, and the main problem in
my view, as indicated by Cooper and Meyer, is that ‘the study of rhythm has been ham-
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pered by a failure to distinguish clearly among the several aspects of temporal organisation
itself.’ Rhythmic phenomena in the new music of twentieth-century cannot be described
anymore only by the temporal musical language we were used to before. 
This guides me to the analysis of the grounds of rhythmic phenomena in music. Rowell’s
rhythmic categories (and Kramer’s, however negatively) were very important to setting
first steps in this direction. But, before working on a new musical temporal language, it
will be important to consider some earlier steps, digging deeper into the way we cognise
the musical phenomena. There have been constant works in this direction that takes a
psychological approach in experimental researches. In my case, however, I have decided
to debate the problem mainly via a philosophical and a slightly anthropological perspec-
tive. 
Musical time as duration 
Bergson’s Essai, we have seen, presented at the twilight of the nineteenth century the the-
sis that time is essentially duration, a fully heterogeneous continuity. The meaning of this
continuity, Bergson insists, is that our perception, pervading us objectively with the
world’s concreteness, does not do it simply by juxtaposing sensible intuitions, as if things
and our subjectivity were eternally dislodged, but rather operates amid a marvellous tem-
poral blending: the world’s concreteness continues in us, so to say, as we continue the
work of concreteness bringing into it our entire life, our shallow or deep and purest mem-
ories. Bergson’s doctoral thesis was indeed, at that point, revolutionary. 
Inasmuch as Bergson’s thesis has been extensively studied, developed and criticised by
innumerable scholars throughout the twentieth century, it is striking to notice that almost
no trace of the Bergsonian continuous, fluid time is present in the perception, implicit in
most recent analytical musical literature, of musical time as a form of segmentation and
hierarchy. 
This contrast between the perception of the essence of time as continuity, stemming from
Bergson’s thought, and of musical time as segmentation, previously commented, and tak-
ing into account the studies on applied metrics, makes me wonder how much musical
theory is open to ontological and (consequently) to metaphysical speculation, that is,
how much the way we study music reflects our mind set on these matters, even uncon-
sciously. Forte’s work, for example, seems not to be occupied at all with the problem of
musical time but with musical structure. However, what is the meaning of structural think-
ing? It is a process of applying a framework to an unstructured problem. That is, a process
of projecting a plan of coordinates that maps the whole picture in order to understand it;
and this is still surely under the kind of spatial-motional description just mentioned. There
is no problem at all in describing music spatially, since we have been doing this with con-
siderable success for hundred of years. However, problems arise when we fail to distin-
guish our structural thinking — which is a process of mapping the thing — and the thing
review of literature 76|
itself. Tricked in this way, we may easily confound the structure of something with the
manner we structure things. 
Returning to Bergson’s argument that we continue the work of concreteness, to look at
something’s segmentation and hierarchy seems to reflect a positive attitude of attention,
including of perception, about segmentation and hierarchy itself in accordance with the
segmentation and hierarchy in, or of, one’s own subjectivity. Structural thinking is thus
not exclusively spatial after all because, at least in a Bergsonian point of view, the essence
of time embraces everything that makes us what we are, including how we look at things. 
That considered, thinking in itself is eternally spatialising time; that is, it is a force that ori-
ents us indefinitely to seek a superior degree of spatialisation, of rationalisation, within a
given duration. Moreover, the contemplation of this image of infinite levels of spatialisa-
tion suggests the existence of infinite levels of de-spatialisation — because becoming al-
ways implies infinite orders of sense and nonsense.93  But what does this infinite
‘de-spatializing’ orientation actually means in musical terms? 
Let us consider the work of spatialisation found in Forte’s The Structure of Atonal Music
and in Cooper and Meyer’s The Rhythmic Structure of Music. Forte splits musical matter
(Webern’s, Berg’s, Schoenberg’s, Stravinsky’s atonal music) into primary harmonic sets,
prioritising pitch-class sets over other parameters as bases for musical structure. Why do
pitch sets rank above durations and rhythmic patterns, timbres and textures? Cooper and
Meyer, then, create a hierarchy for the rhythmic/temporal composition of musical matter
(tonal music by Bach, Beethoven, Mozart, Brahms, Chopin, etc.) placing them in layers.
Rhythm is understood as an intensive-cumulative structuring of accentuation patterns,
around primary durational sets, durational-class sets, so to say. But, again, why should
duration and rhythmic-patterns sets be privileged over pitches, timbres and textures?
Forte’s and Cooper and Meyer’s analyses are selective, it seems, because they look toward
a superior determination, a clearer mapping: in order to better understand their object
of study, they seem to feel the necessity of split and place it outside, so to say, its true tem-
poral sense. 
Messiaen’s rhythmic approach is diﬀerent. In his Traité de Rythme, de Couleur, et d’Or-
nithologie,94 he considers fourteen diﬀerent langages rythmiques:95 a rhythmic language
of durations, a rhythmic language of intensities, a rhythmic language of densities, a rhyth-
mic language of pitches, a rhythmic language of timbres, a rhythmic language of attacks,
a language of rhythmic movement, a rhythmic language of tempi, a rhythmic language
of transpositions and permutations, a polyrhythmic language, a rhythmic language re-
sulting from polyrhythm, a rhythmic language of harmony, a rhythmic language of mu-
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sical premisses, and finally a rhythmic language of silence. So Messiaen also splits music
into contrasting languages, but there is a fundamental diﬀerence: his langages rythmiques
are presented in a complementary way that form a complexity, a whole in which each one
is derivable from another. He presents a duration. For Messiaen we cannot understand
or grasp the true temporal, musical sense of hauteurs, for instance, by isolating them from
durations, intensities, densities, and so on: the pitch spectrum is actually informed by all
musical spectra. 
This is the work of Messiaen’s musical de-spatialisation: musical time is always complex,
forming a heterogeneous continuity. It seems correct to say that Messiaen was less per-
meated by a segmented-hierarchical conception of musical matter, perhaps as a reflex of
his deep contemplation of musical matter throughout his life as a composer, of his deeper
musical perception (formally and objectively, but also ontological-metaphysically and
subjectively). But not only this, because he also calls our attention, on the very first pages
of his treatise, to the importance of Bergson’s thesis. A musician, he says, 
is inevitably a rhythmicist; if not he does not merit the title of musician. If he is a rhythmicist,
he must refine his sense of rhythm by a more intimate knowledge of true time, by the study
of diﬀerent concepts of time and diﬀerent rhythmic styles. Bergson pretends that duration
is an ‘inherent trait of consciousness.’ In fact, duration presents itself to us with fluctuations
of tempo, changes of rapidity: it is true duration, heterogeneous duration, of which appre-
ciation depends essentially on the number of exterior and interior events that are fulfilled
for each one of us, in the present and in the past. Abstract time, or structured time arises in
the face of true duration. True duration is not measurable. True duration is changing. All
perception remains, but this first duration is so far from time in its literal sense that it cannot
acquaint us its true nature.96
A complementary example is Wallace Berry’s functional approach in Structural Functions
in Music.97  He considers musical matter as well in its vital and energetic impulse, and
refers to the essential role of rhythm “in the delineation of processes of growth and decline,
climax and subsidence, stability and flux” to metric rhythm “as the rate and pattern of met-
ric change.”98  Berry seems to be imbued as well with a curiosity for musical time as be-
coming and continuity — rather than exclusively as articulation and space. 
Bergson suggests that the attention specially turned to segmentation creates false images
of movement. The term image is appropriate here. These images are like temporal pieces
or ‘frames’ withdrawn from the concreteness and vitality of duration. Since this sort of
attention implies rationalisation, in the sense of a division of the whole into parts, Bergson
insists that it is not wise to trust reason with the responsibility for the experience of con-
tinuity. This is perhaps the simplest sense of intuition in Bergson’s philosophy: the atten-
tion which is turned to the direct experience of continuity. This intuition entails though
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a crucial problem: how to communicate the experience of continuity, hence of duration,
of the fullness of time, considering that in order to communicate any experience one de-
pends on the articulations, implied in thinking, on a language that is internally organised
due to spatialised images, even images of movement? For, it seems, the implementation
of a whole new temporal language would be in fact needed, a language able to bring out
our temporal contemplations, to represent time; perhaps a language internally organised
according to images of intersection, of implication and influence. 
As an answer to this problem, Bergson suggests that thinking is not made up uniquely by
spatialised images, but that it is equipped with a capacity of proceeding temporally much
further than them, therefore responding to a superior eﬀort of attention. He says:
Take a complex thought which unrolls itself in a chain of abstract reasoning. This thought
is accompanied by images that are at least nascent. And these images themselves are not
pictured in consciousness without some foreshadowing, in the form of a sketch or a ten-
dency, of the movements by which these images would be acted or played in space — would,
that is to say, impress particular attitudes upon the body, and set free all that they implicitly
contain of spatial movement. Now, of all the thought which is unrolling, this, in our view, is
what the cerebral state indicates at every moment. He, who could penetrate into the interior
of a brain and see what happens there, […] would know no more of what is going on in the
corresponding consciousness than we should know of a play from the comings and goings
of the actors upon the stage. That is to say, the relation of the mental to the cerebral is not a
constant, any more than it is a simple, relation. […] Thus our cerebral state contains more
or less of our mental state in the measure that we reel oﬀ our psychic life into action or wind
it up into pure knowledge. There are then, in short, diverse tones of mental life, or, in other
words, our psychic life may be lived at diﬀerent heights, now nearer to action [and space],
now further removed from it [in time], according to the degree of our attention to life.99 
Music must not be divested of articulations, disruptions, conclusions, logical linkages
and contiguities, of causes and eﬀects, because all of these are to be found as well in our
quotidian experiences. The point here is that it is possible to consciously proceed beyond
formal disruptions, paying attention as well, in diﬀerent levels of depth, to zones of greater
continuity and flux. 
I argue, returning to Bergson’s argument, that music may in fact be perceived and thought
in the context of ‘diverse tones of mental life.’ It is possible to conceive of music as existing
precisely at the intersection between sensible and conceptual experiences. More to the
point, it is possible to suggest the existence of innumerous musical representations of
time, emerging precisely because of a relatively greater or smaller spatialisation of thinking. 
The contemplation and attribution of continuity or segmentation to music correspond
to specific levels of musical representation, either oriented or not towards the purity of
time, levels whose echoes appear to manifest deeper or shallower tones of mental life,
which are further removed or near to action. We may have indeed distinct representa-
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tional approaches in music, devoted to distinct moments, so to say, of our musicality. If
such distinction is true, time may be indeed represented by music, since in our musical
representation, oriented by the surface of the musical piece, we reel oﬀ our psychic life
into action or wind it up into pure knowledge in diﬀerent levels of depth.
Musical time’s rhythmicality
Rhythms are created as ‘foldings,’ as nodes between the sensible and the conceptual, be-
tween the pure temporal and the pure spatial within a fundamental duration. These fold-
ings are more or less complex both materially and intellectually, which means that they
are more or less profound or intense within a duration. In  figuring out this relative rhyth-
mical profundity, one should consider Bergson’s distinction between pure memories (a
Bergsonian doctrine) and sensations: 
My actual sensations occupy definite portions of the surface of my body; pure memory, on
the other hand, interests no part of my body. No doubt, it [pure memory] will beget sensa-
tions as it materializes, but at that very moment it will cease to be a memory and pass into
the state of a present thing, something actually lived. I shall then only restore to it its char-
acter of memory by carrying myself back to the process by which I called it up, as it was vir-
tual, from the depths of my past.100
There are, thus, intense actualities as there are intense virtualities, which are related, but
not of necessity proportional, to each other. So, if the folding of musical sensibility and
musical understanding is deeper, it so represents a deeper rhythmical order (that of mu-
sical times) that manifests the emergence of fundamental temporal archetypes. If inter-
mediary, it represents an intermediary rhythmical order (that of musical temporalities)
that manifests the emergence of distinct temporal-psychological traits. Now, if superficial,
their folding represents the very surface of rhythmic phenomena, a rhythmical order (of
musical temporalizations) that manifests systemic and metrical models, common-sense
rhythmical features. 
Now, we must not confuse the surface of rhythmic phenomena with their sensation, be-
cause what is addressed here is not sensation as such (hearing, for instance) but sensibility,
which is a diﬀerent concept. I quote Bergson in the context of pure memory just to call
the attention to the fact that there are diﬀerent cognitive regions within a duration, all
virtual, though the more embodied is the work of our mind, the more spatially it seems
to operate rhythmically. Common-sense rhythmic phenomena are, in essence, embodied,
but there are other rhythmical complexes that manifest deeper and less sensory rhyth-
mical orders. This understanding is crucial, because a grounding rhythmicality is diﬃcult
to trace, even more to describe. We will not find these orders so easily projected on the
surface of the piece of music. We need to investigate their presence and constitution be-
yond the musical work as it is actually presented to our senses. Because they are funda-
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mental, in order to describe them we need to concentrate our best eﬀorts in trying to
solve fundamental musical problems as well: for example, beyond the problem of how
musical accentuation is distributed at the surface of a musical work, we may want to in-
vestigate how intense this distribution seems to be, that is, how complex is the deeper
rhythmicality it reflects. In brief, musical surface is a realm of rhythmical appearances,
and to exhaust these appearances analytically, as if they were the only rhythmical aspect
to look at in music, means, frankly, undermining the whole problem of time and rhythm
in music. 
With this in mind, I argue, with Bachelard, that time is not really much more than what
we know about it: that time is to us according to our understanding of it.101 This is a bet,
of course, that understanding time is possible. But, in case we admit the existence of a
‘temporal understanding’ or something related to it, what would this specific understand-
ing mean? Would it be governed by the same rules of our understanding in general? 
Bergson’s philosophy addresses this problem. He proposes, first of all, that the possibility
of knowing emerges along with the possibility of being, as he considers this possibility
in view of his durée réelle: to be and to know can only be real for us within a vital duration.
Though it is a duration that cannot be rationally simplified or isolated in any form of being
and knowing, but only lived in its own flux according to their heterogeneous and complex
composition. Knowing and its mechanisms of representation would be always turned to-
wards non-being, answering a necessity of articulating, of cutting out the vital flux of ex-
perience in as many pieces as possible, of producing generalities, concepts. The problem
remaining then is that of conceiving a way of knowing capable of keeping itself as close as
possible to the vital flux of experience. 
Bergson alleges that there is an important distinction between a knowing that “implies
that we move round the object,” and another that implies “that we enter into it.” He asserts
that
the first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which
we express ourselves [while] the second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on
any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the ‘relative’; the second in
those cases where it is possible, to attain the ‘absolute.’ 102
Like Bergson, I also ask about the possibility or viability of this second way of knowing,
in which we do not stop at the relative but reach for the absolute. This second method of
knowing, opposed to analysis, is what Bergson calls intuition. Intuition is a sort of tem-
poral consciousness, an attention to life dedicated to the understanding of the vital flux
of experience, of the here and now — instead of building blocks of meaning about past
and future events. This way of understanding is, as I see it, the very type of understanding
that allows for the temporal knowing suggested by Bachelard: time would not be really
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much more than what we understand about it when we exercise a way of knowing anti-
thetical to the usual analytical way of knowing, when we wield a special way of knowing,
that “senses and feels” temporal fluxes, the inner being of things.
Bergson’s philosophy advocates the implicitness of being and knowing. Beingness — the
quality, state, or condition of being, which is who we are at the very core of life and so is
more than just existing103— would constantly evolve creatively in the presence of knowl-
edge: expanding, itself and knowledge, by newness and originality; contracting and being
contracted by habit and determination. This matches once more Bachelard’s proposition.
We all agree that time passes in diﬀerent ways for diﬀerent people. It is not counterintu-
itive to suggest that time seems to expand and contract many times during the span of
our lives. Saying that time is what we know about it, as Bachelard does, may mean that
time is, of necessity, an unique intimate experience which is according to what we are,
diﬀering in as many ways as we diﬀer ourselves. 
Reading Bergson induces the insight of a transforming movement, a dynamic, heteroge-
neous reality and vital flux that expands and contracts due to the expansion and contrac-
tion of being and knowing, as they reflect, relatively, the potential of innovation or
recursiveness of each lived experience. Our musicality depends, it seems, on this dual
motor: severed from knowledge, the being is condemned to a hellish living alienation;
severed from beingness, the knowing is obscure like the shadows in Plato’s cave. 
Since Plato, at least, philosophy has searched for a solution to the same dilemma: are we
as we know, or do we know as we are? However, the problem here presented is a lot sim-
pler. My thesis dwells exactly in between the terms of that dilemma: I intend to demon-
strate that our musicality may be studied as their intersection and mutual influence. 
I try to confer on the relation between being and knowing a rhythmical characteristic, 
of flux and complexity, and to relate the rhythmical nature of this relation to the essence
of the compositional act in music. In doing so, I have extended the ordinary meaning of
 representation, suggesting that it can be musically qualified. Knowing is dependent on
envisaging a possibility for logical successions of events. It is also dependent on conceiv-
ing of a possibility for the absence of logical relations, that is, a possibility for the unknown.
In the same way, knowing is subject to conceiving a possibility of advancing towards
knowledge by means of the problem, and of retreating in the direction of the known
through problem solving. There are two primary modes of knowing but also two primary
attitudes towards knowledge. This understanding informs the bases of our musicality with
forms of determination (and habit) or non-determination (and discovery), and also of
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diﬀerence (and expansion) or repetition (and contraction) directly related to our
 experiences. 
For Deleuze, additionally, thinking is delimited in its very constitution by a permanent
search for identities, by a force of intellectual purification that looks forward, so to say, at
the diﬀerential plenitude of concreteness, the best definition, the clearer outline, the un-
derstanding. Thinking is directed towards the task of recognising, repeating. Our sensi-
bility, on the other hand, fully resonates, as it were, the diﬀerential plenitude of
concreteness, its intensities, always propelling diﬀerent impulses, according to its (ours)
own diﬀerent perceptual reaches. It is diverging, centrifugal, a source of ideas. A force
that charges ideas themselves with multiplicity and creativity. 
Thinking may be influenced by sensibility, becoming expanded, diversified, decentred,
and directed to problems more than to problem solving, to becomings more than to de-
fined states, etc. But sensibility may be also influenced by thinking, contracting, and turned
into acquiring from the world only those intensities which are suitable to a specific rep-
resentation. This orientation works as a limitation to sensibility — a limitation that is not
real but provisional, since, in essence, sensibility is free of this sort of intellectual
 restraining. 
It is from this perspective that I propose that sensibility and understanding fold and unfold
one another; that we place ourselves in between an eternal rhythmical structuring. Tem-
porally the self goes back and forth, in itself, between two methods: the method that en-
genders logic and certainty — hence history, pastness, and future — and the method that
leads to presentness, to the most concrete and direct experience of things. 
This folding is always riddled with problems, either taken positively and necessarily, as
creative forces; or negatively and problematically, as something that must be avoided. That
is why Christopher Hasty posits that “music has occasionally been valued as an opening
for thought, or rather thought about thought”.104 Music is thus a source of problems that
“can be seen to lead to further, new, and creative thought.”105 But, I insist, the creative
power of music can be also ‘devaluated’ by temporal contraction, if the problems involved
in its constitution stand “in the way of a proper thought,”106 of a thought that is invigo-
rating. Hasty explains that,
in a Deleuzian sense, problems do call for a creative eﬀort that can be diﬃcult or burden-
some, but they are not to be avoided or cut short; indeed, with the exercise of creative
thought and good fortune, problems can be exhilarating. For Deleuze, problems are the ac-
tualizing, aﬀective moments of Ideas.107
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For Deleuze, there are true and false problems. In Bergsonism, he points to what he calls
the first rule of a Bergsonian intuitive method: “[to] apply the test of the true and the
false to problems themselves [and to] condemn false problems and [to] reconcile truth
and creation at the level of problems.”108 It is my intuition, though, that truly creative
ideas are not always exhilarating, but composed as well by false problems: their rhyth-
micality is formed and transformed by an eternal superposition of problems as much as
of solutions. Our musical representation is musical exactly because our representation
faces both sides of problems simultaneously, their power and weakness. 
It is possible to speak about (and to theorise about) musical concepts, such as unit of
time, binary form, series, tonality, and so on, in the context of musical representation. As
concepts, they are ordinarily pictured by the musical mind as temporal solutions, as mu-
sical schemes that are taken for granted as structuring musical forces. But it is also correct
to say that the musical concept alone does not serve or compose a truly creative musical
idea because, in this case, it is just an index, emptied of time, which can never by itself
supersede the experience of musical composition. Musical representation is distinct be-
cause it always implies a creative mixture of musical concepts (that base our musical un-
derstanding) and the actual musical matter (that grounds our musical perception). It
implies proceeding beyond the crude musical materiality perceived at the surface of a
musical piece. It also implies proceeding beyond the understanding of the musical struc-
ture re-cognised from past musical experiences. That is, proceeding beyond matter and
memory towards the complexity and multiplicity composed by them. In other words,
musical composition dwells, in a manner never fixed, between musical expressivity and
musical interpretability. 
From this point of view, the problem of representation in general is one and the same
with that of musical representation, and this obviously includes considering musical rep-
resentation from the point of view of change. For “Deleuze’s critique of static represen-
tations of experience — which, being static, cannot truly represent experience — suggests
ways of developing music theory that might foster creativity and minimise some of the
more alienating eﬀects of music-theoretical discourse.”109
Deleuze’s thought is indeed significative for a new, innovative music theory developed in
opposition to the traditional epistemological orientation that avoids untidy diﬀerences
by privileging a clearer outline, the generalization of musical objects and of formal rules
or constants. That is why Brian Hulse comments on Deleuze’s philosophical project that
what Deleuze wants thought to do, whether it is thought on music or on something else, is
to contemplate this intensive assembling of things in all their diﬀerences, rather than, as is
so often the case with music theory, to reduce away the messy diﬀerences of actual becom-
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ings in order to postulate unities, identities, ‘coherence,’ and so on.110
Because of that, a great amount of recent literature devoted to the study of musical time
and to its analysis is not dealt with here, especially when it presupposes a musical under-
standing when facing the diﬃculties of musical presentation to the consciousness. In that
field of studies, there is much research on the nature of musical metrics and its perceptions,
like Justin London’s Hearing in Time: psychological aspects of musical meter;111 or dedi-
cated to the problem of musical narrativity — which usually deals with the matter of con-
tinuity of thematic flux in a musical work — such as Silence and Slow Time: studies in
musical narrative, by Martin Boykan.112 There are, still, even more specific studies com-
mitted to the musical structure of some faculty, noticeably to the study of musical memory,
like Bob Snyder’s Music and Memory,113 or to the nature and problem of temporality in
20th-century music, involving speculative work both of composers and performers.114
However important, conventional studies on musical metrics or on musical narrativity
add only very indirectly to the theoretical bases of this thesis. The metrical problem, for
example, is dealt with here as an expressive-interpretative musical fact of relative mobility
and heterogeneity in what concerns the complexity of the compositional process. Musical
metrics do not reflect exclusively the regularity or irregularity of a certain pulse, its se-
quentiality, but rather the regularity and irregularity of several simultaneous pulsations,
of several ‘rhythmic languages,’ as much as their role in forming a particular metrical image,
temporally complex, that is oﬀered to musical representation as a means to the represen-
tation of the compositional process proper. This view, therefore, is not — or it is very
frailly — explained by the traditional approach to the matter.
In the same vein, the problem of musical narrativity as presented here escapes the scope
given by ordinary literature to the issue, by being also broached as a function of the com-
positional process, as a fact of its temporal complexity, seen as a whole. Musical narrativity
is here dialectically set against musical episodicity, forming a determined compositional
level as if it were a play of ‘temporal layers of meaning.’ My approach to the narrative as a
layer of meaning is distinct from traditional studies on musical narrativity, which by and
large are strongly, and almost exclusively, concerned with narrativity as a function of the
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linearity of musical discourse, of its sequentiality, of its teleological nature. Musical time
as complexity even implies considering the possibility of absence of a musical narrative,
or rather, of the existence of specifically lyrical musical languages, and it is because of this
context of mobility of the senses that the musical narrativity is here developed almost ex-
clusively from Schoenberg’s and Stockhausen’s approaches.115
The approach to theory I aim to develop here does not comply with the usual distinction
between musica speculativa and musica pratica.116 I look at them here as if united by a
common problem: the deepening of philosophical and psychological aspects of the com-
positional practice. In other words, they are here bound by a two-folded diagnosis of the
temporal complexity and multiplicity of the musical idea, and that of the experience of
this complexity.
This approach is not in fact extraordinary. As Christopher Hasty says,
much of what we call music theory has had an eminently pragmatic function — the devel-
opment of musical notation and categories for composing and reading music, for example,
concepts of consonance and dissonance, the harmonic and non-harmonic, categories of
modal species, metrical types, ‘formal’ and interval types. The objects of writing and reading
do indeed supply a necessary and eﬃcacious fund for musical practice and its teaching.117
Much of music theory has been indeed desirable and useful to our day-to-day musical
practices, but the main point to be considered here is how “music theory in its many
forms can function more or less creatively or destructively. It can lead to a growth of skill
and sensitivity, or it can lead to an alienation or distancing from aesthetic experience. ”118
It is in this specific sense that music theory shares the same image of rhythmicality that
has been in discussion here: music theory may be creatively dynamic; and it is this specific
dynamicity that allows my research to try overcoming that usual distinction between mu-
sica speculativa and musica pratica theoretically. Alone, musica speculativa always runs
the risk of missing its own object as it tries to crystalise music and musical experience, by
negating its constant, necessary mutableness. Alone, musica pratica stands a chance of
being imprisoned in the superficiality and emptiness of an act, a function, a craft. Asso-
ciated, however,  in a musical theory amply open and dynamical, their individual senses
are multiplied and renewed: they become alive. 
From a Deleuzian point of view, if a musical work can be understood, 
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this understanding should be consonant with our hearing and seeing (the notation) and
with our imagining and remembering […] a work requires that it can be sensed, understood,
and remembered as this work — that it can be re-cognized as the work. Deleuze calls this
ideal cooperation of faculties, working in a unitary subject in which they are joined, common
sense or a concordia facultatum. ‘Common’ here means commonality of faculties converging
on an object of knowledge. Of course, in this scenario the work can be more or less ade-
quately thought, and thinking about the work can change, presumably in the direction of
increasing adequacy to the ideal work. This possibility introduces the need for a good sense.
Good sense introduces a regulative valuation for the operations of common sense, a faith
that with good will our thinking will move toward proper understanding, that the direction
of change is indeed toward an ideal adequacy, an adequacy to the ideal of the work as a
stable, self-same object. 119
It was in a similar context that William James argued that “the everlasting coming of con-
crete novelty into being is so obvious that the rationalising intellect, bent on explaining
what is by what was, and having no principle but identity to explain by, treats the percep-
tual flux as a phenomenal illusion.”120 So, Deleuze calls “good and common sense,” what
James called the “rationalising intellect,” and claims that ideas despise common and good
sense. They despise because in his transcendental empiricism,  
the transcendental is understood as the potential or virtual and designated as the realm of
Ideas. Deleuze’s Ideas are nothing like generals or concepts. Ideas are fully real but have no
actuality—they are purely virtual. Nor do they in any way resemble the actualities in which
they are incarnated. Ideas have no identity or sameness because they are in themselves nei-
ther one nor many. Ideas have nothing to do with knowledge and everything to do with
learning. 121
As ideas have nothing to do with knowledge, they are accessible only in a negative way,
by initially identifying the forms of recognition that derivate from good and common
sense. For a moment, if we really want to work the openness of our analytical power, we
must illuminate good and common sense always in order to avoid it. For the rationalising
intellect operates in fact as a rhythmical force, a force that opposes the world of ideas, and
at the same time serves the ideas positively. The rationalising intellect spells out ideas, be-
cause its nature contrasts with the ideas.
In a fresh, ever innovative musical theory, the musical work would be as a verb,
an activity or performance in which what is (per)formed is the actual, the wirklich—fleeting
and changeable—then the question of production can no longer be addressed by substan-
tives (nouns). But if it cannot be addressed by substantives and the postulation of an en-
during self-same substance, then by what? Deleuze’s answer to this question crucially
involves Idea as a way of mediating a transcendent virtuality, or a way of moving from po-
tential through actual. 122
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In a way, this thesis is also an attempt to answer, in music, this question. So I agree with
Hasty´s comments about the need to look at music as a “useful vehicle for criticising the
doxa of representation and thus for thinking in unorthodox ways [in order to] problema-
tise notions of subject and object, unity and multiplicity, finite and infinite, knowing and
feeling.” 123
In short, the most important thing to be initially said about Deleuze and about the de-
velopment of his thought from Bergson is that for Deleuze the idea is essentially compo-
sitional, and that the same should be said about the musical idea and its theory. It is not
a knowledge, but a source of knowledge and, as such, it is not confined to itself. My un-
derstanding of Deleuze thus induced my critical stand towards conventional musical the-
ory. This criticism, of course, has to do with the idea of theorising musical representation
in a manner open enough to answer both to the good and common sense and to an un-
common sense. As I see it, a music theory devoted to the compositional process as expe-
rience should always contemplate both spectra of representation: the representation that
tries and fixes meanings, and that which seeks the mobility of the meanings.  
III – MUSICAL IDEA
Schoenberg: the repetition in the diﬀerence 
In his notes for the preface of Musikalische Gedanke, Schoenberg entitles a section as “the
Profundity of the Idea and its Realization as a Standard: profound and superficial ideas,
higher and lower forms, primitivism and art music.”124 Although never properly written
down and conceptually developed — we have only a few schemas and draftings —, this
section, at least its title, is a very important guide to the present discussion. In it, it is made
clear that, for Schoenberg, the musical idea subsumes a sort of tridimensional musical
space, formed between (i) profound and superficial musical ideas, in the sense of the idea’s
fundamental temporal complexity — which is here considered in respect of musical lyri-
calness and dramaticism, and their expansibility or contractibility tendencies, as they
constitute determinate musical times; (ii) higher and lower musical forms or formations,
meaning the formal distribution of the idea’s fundamental temporal complexity — which
is here considered in respect to distinct memory and imagination types of musical im-
pulses and to distinct metric and systemic forms of musical thought, as they constitute,
respectively, determinate musical temporalities and musical temporalizations; and (iii)
primitive and artful types of music, in the sense of the response-quality of individual and
social types of musical representations — which is here considered in reference to de-
terminate levels of temporal conformity or transgression. 
These distinctions concern the graduality or degree of spatialisation of the musical idea,
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in the senses of its emergence, composition and presentation. All in all, they address a
counterintuitive notion of space, which is actually a ‘moving, flowing temporal space’ that
becomes positively or negatively spatial by including its own aﬃrmation and its own nega-
tion, its building or deconstruction.
Instead of representing a fixed, independent and homogeneous dimension that receives
the musical idea, this flowing musical space is rather a moving dimension that emerges
and develops simultaneously with the emergence and development of the musical idea
itself. It changes, becomes deeper and more condensed or less so, as the idea is composi-
tionally transformed. This notion of musical space, I argue, does not indicate the existence
of a place external to music, and therefore potentially shared by all possible musical ideas,
where music would be disposed, both cognitively and materially, in diﬀerent manners
and directions. It rather indicates an ideal body of music and the movements of this body.
A heterogeneous body that, on the one hand, is deeply invented and revolutionised, ac-
cording to many diﬀerent levels of temporal complexity, by means of the process of mu-
sical composition itself; yet, on the other hand, a body that is also superficially invented,
transpiring a fluid sound space, simultaneously given and received, by means of the pre-
sentation and representation of the musical idea. It is deeply invented not in the sense of
being on the surface of music — as sound — in its presentation or representation, ori-
ented by cultural values and historical demands; but rather as a compositional process,
which is invented as becoming, as musical time — complex and intimate.
Even if qualitatively diﬀerent, the Schoenbergian notion of musical depth coincides with
the notion of compositional depth here presented: in both cases, the musical idea exhibits
a deep side, a sort of all-embracing and profound expressive compositional force, in the
sense that it always occupies the depth of a given compositional process, as it always
works in advance, as it were, of musical presentation. 
Considering that an important expressive side of the musical idea occupies the depth of
a given compositional process and that the presentation of the musical idea always refers
to this process, if something is lost in the presentation of the musical idea, much more is
at stake than that that was lost: one loses musical depth. On this, Schoenberg says that
much may be more or less literally repeated in musical space. But musical space is not infi-
nite; it is circumscribed by recollection [my stress]. One must make do within these limits.
Whatever may be wasted in a presentation through breadth, may be doubly lost, that is, the
loss is squared or even cubed since depth will thereby be lost.125
Here Schoenberg presents the problem of what is missed, wasted, in the sense that “much
may be more or less literally repeated in musical space,” indicating the importance of the
compositional treatment of repetition in up-keeping the depth of the idea. That would
be so because, for Schoenberg, the musical space itself would be circumscribed by re-
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membrances. Thus, in order to create the musical space itself, and consequently to allow
for accessing its depth, one should enforce the compositional treatment of repetition over
that of diﬀerence.
For Schoenberg, therefore, musical composition should answer to an increasing refining
of diﬀerence, to a crescent voiding both of the composition of the musical idea as its pre-
sentation and of the presentation of the musical idea as its representation. Since, on the
one hand, the composition of repetition would be extremely needed to the justness of
the presentation of the idea and, on the other hand, the space of remembering is not end-
less, the representation of the musical idea should be primarily oriented by an economy
and a control of diﬀerence, towards a constant pursuit of  coherence.
However — now having in mind the qualitative distinction, mentioned above, between
Schoenberg’s notion of musical idea and that that is here discussed — the notion of mu-
sical depth I present also tackles the compositional treatment of diﬀerence, without priv-
ileging repetition over diﬀerence or vice versa, since they have diverse representational
functions. Perhaps the main diﬀerence between both notions is that while, for Schoen-
berg, the musical space is preponderantly made up of remembrances, and must be built
by the controlling of repetition over diﬀerence, here, it evenly comprises remembrances
and prospects, memories and imaginations — which freely advance and recede subjec-
tively between pure memories and motor diagrams, to say it in Bergson’s jargon —, that
is, here, the musical space is also undone by the control of diﬀerence over  repetition.
The reiterative orientation of Schoenberg’s thought is clear, for example, when he em-
phasises that intelligent relations between diﬀerent things can only be established by
means of resemblance. For him, “resemblance means: partly equal, partly diﬀerent. If all
parts should be equal, the things should be identical. Should all parts diﬀer, the things
should be diﬀerent. Resemblance must not only be direct, but can also be indirect, me-
diate.”126 For Schoenberg, resemblance means, ultimately, the direct or indirect compo-
sitional installation of articulations, of evokers, within the continuity and heterogeneity
of the temporal flux of the musical idea, evokers that refer more closely to degrees of rep-
etition than of diﬀerence. 
Resemblance, as Schoenberg maintains, is not really expressive of musical continuity but
necessary as a temporal intersection, as a contraction of musical continuity, as a reiterative
bridge that connects diﬀerences. Hence it is here of necessity conceived in a dramatic-
evolutive musical context, just like, for example, the common-note importance in har-
monic connections: in this sense, just as the connecting note guarantees a fluent, coherent
harmonic transition, a ‘connecting thought,’ so to say, guarantees its own formal fluency
and coherence, that is, the fluency and coherence of thought and not that of the music.127
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Resemblance, in Schoenberg’s musical idea, represents the parcel of repetition that is in-
ferred from diﬀerence, which, refining diﬀerence, becomes logically controlled. Actually,
this parcel of repetition and the greater or lesser relative complexity of the control by rep-
etition over diﬀerence are precisely what Schoenberg calls idea and  the profundity of
the idea, as Schoenberg establishes that diﬀerent things are only possibly connected by
means of repetition and that intelligent relations between things are always inevitably co-
herent.
Although the Schoenbergian notion of the cohering capacity of a musical idea is correct,
I contend that the musical idea itself exceeds that capacity. The dramatic-evolutive en-
lacement accomplished and warranted by articulating musical continuity by means of
repetition is not, in my opinion, the sole possibility of establishing intelligent relations
between things. There are also intelligent non-evolutive lyrical relations that can be es-
tablished, directly and indirectly, between diﬀerentness and diﬀerentness, without the
need of connecting diﬀerence to diﬀerence by means of the same. 
Schoenberg claims that one should compositionally experiment in unbalance only after
controlling balance. Discussing tonal harmony, for example, Schoenberg aﬃrms that “ad-
vanced harmonic techniques will only benefit him [i.e., the student] if a sense of balance
and form, and the understanding of musical logics, enable him to control his ideas.”128
Musical form would hence only arise, in this perspective, by stopping, limiting or solving
unbalance. For Schoenberg,
every succession of tones produces unrest, conflict, problems. One single tone is not prob-
lematic because the ear defines it as tonic, a point of repose. Every added tone makes this
determination questionable. Every musical form can be considered as an attempt to treat
this unrest either by halting or limiting it, or by solving the problem.129
Still, in the context of harmony, Schoenberg also claims that “the centripetal function for
progressions is exerted by stopping centrifugal tendencies, [thus establishing] a tonality
through the conquest of its contradictory elements.”130
He assumes at this point the potential expansion of musical form, its centrifugal tenden-
cies. It follows that tonality should always be thought in perspective of a permanent formal
contraction, as a manner of compositionally approaching centripetal formal tendencies
in order to control centrifugal ones. But, if that were the case, for necessity atonality or
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non-tonality should rather be thought in a distinct way, preponderantly by approaching
centrifugal formal tendencies in order to unleash centripetal ones. 
So, musical form is primordially defined neither by centripetal nor by centrifugal forces,
but by the flux or degree of complexity both in the control of diﬀerence by repetition and
in the unleash of repetition by diﬀerence. Even if he privileges the importance of repeti-
tion over diﬀerence in the constitution of the idea, Schoenberg  supports this point of
view once he expresses the mutuality and complementarity of the compositional function
both of repetition and diﬀerence:
the less objects are equal, the more they are diﬀerent, the more it is diﬃcult to join them.
But the more they are equal, the more the relation is of no interest. And we can pretend a
diﬀerence amongst (i) such ideas which establish [intelligent] relations between very re-
sembling things and (ii) such [ideas] which [establish intelligent relations between] very
diﬀerent things.131
Unmistakably, I think, Schoenberg’s musical idea, however grounded on the coherence
principle, is itself potentially imbued of a diﬀerential gradualness that allows it to be ex-
tended beyond the boundaries of coherence and remade as a function of a certain level
of non-coherence. This hints, additionally, that the role of repetition and its graduality
(and thus of articulation and coherence) is one, and the role of the graduality of diﬀerence
(and thus of continuity and non-coherence) another. I suggest that the role of repetition
would be that of spatializing the musical idea, of enabling it to be accessed by represen-
tation and hence also by interpretation, whereas the role of diﬀerence would be that of
de-spatializing the idea, of referring it back to its creative origins and expressivity. The no-
tion of musical space, after all, should not be metaphorically accepted as invoking a fixed
Newtonian space that receives time as motion, but as a fluid and compound moving sub-
stance, which, formed evenly by space and time, constantly advances and recedes between
them in infinite mixtures.
Yet, in arguing for the notion of musical space, Schoenberg further addresses the relation
between its realisation and the source of the musical idea. Schoenberg asks whether they
compose a unity: “what is the inspiration of the composer? And, what is inspiration, what
is realisation: is realisation also inspiration and to what extent? Or: How do individual
works (ideas, inspirations) of a composer relate to one another, namely, do they form a
unity? To what extent and what kind of unity?”132
For Schoenberg there are two musical orientations: that of inspiration and that of reali-
sation. It is implicit that the orientation of realisation is that of repetition, of permanence,
of past and memory, and hence of interpretation, because “the musical space is not infinite
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but circumscribed by recollection,” by the temporal contraction of the idea. It is also im-
plicit that that of inspiration is towards diﬀerence, change, towards the future and imag-
ination, an orientation to the expression and the temporal expansion of the idea. Thus
the Schoenbergian musical space seems to be delimited by the compositional process it-
self, even if Schoenberg does not directly refer the diﬀerence which imbues the musical
idea to its sensible bases, but rather to what is beyond the self. Thus, beyond the play of
diﬀerence and repetition, there is also in Schoenberg’s thought an awareness of the play
of certainty and uncertainty, that is, of the relative dramaticism and lyricalness of the idea. 
As I see it, however, Schoenberg’s understanding of the depth of the musical idea is prob-
lematic exactly because although he does actually conceive of a possibility of a lyrical
idea, by restricting the notion of lyricalness in the world, as he apparently does, he curtails
the lyricalness of the idea in the self. For Schoenberg, once installed in the self, once ‘in-
spired,’ the idea is (or should be) logically controlled by repetition, which indicates a ra-
tionalist (and therefore articulative) stance regarding the diﬀerential fullness of things
(as things without us, as things in themselves). If Schoenberg were of a mind that diﬀer-
ence could be, in a Bergsonian way, subjectively installed (be with us, in us, beyond rep-
etition), maybe it would have been possible for him to consider, in his own compositional
process, more intensive forms of serialisation or even open, random and improvisational
forms, so frequent in the second half of the 20th-century. All in all, this reinforces the
thesis that the musical idea is actually according to its inspiration in the self, and not
something that is already there to be fully received, in an essentialist way. It is indeed ac-
cording to its own temporal expansions and contractions in us, as we are and live, as we
create. That is why, in music, it is fundamental that diﬀerence has in composition the same
importance as repetition.
Having briefly defined the main terms of the depth of the Schoenbergian musical space,
it remains to be noticed what may be understood as higher and lower musical forms and
as primitive and art music. As I see it, higher and lower forms emerge already during the
compositional process and not at the presentation of the musical idea. A lower form, for
example, means a contractive form of relative temporal simplicity and temporal deter-
mination and not exactly a form of relative material simplicity. Even pieces of unques-
tionable material simplicity may be based on higher temporal forms, as far as it is the
complexity of the idea and not exactly that of the presentation of the idea that defines,
after all, their formal status. Form in music could be thought as the form of a musical
idea’s temporal complexity, more than as the form of the material complexity of a musical
idea’s presentation. But how can someone analyse form as idea? 
The formal status of a musical idea is given, it seems, by the distribution of its temporal
complexity over distinct layers and zones of projection of musical meaning, as this dis-
tribution happens before its presentation. Clearly, the presentation of the idea presents a
possible version of a given distribution of the musical idea’s temporal complexity. A higher
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musical form would be a higher form of temporal complexity. The idea would be placed
in a given moment of the creative spectrum either oriented as a higher form towards
deeper levels of temporal complexity, towards diﬀerence and non-determination; or as a
lower form towards shallower levels of temporal complexity, towards repetition and de-
termination.
Additionally, on primitive and art music, Schoenberg posits that 
[i] the more primitive a musical idea and the piece based on it, the more the concern for
comprehensibility prevails, the slower the tempo of presentation, the fewer the gestalten
and remote gestalten employed. [But] [ii] the more artful or at least the more complicated
the idea is, the richer the number of gestalten, the greater their distance from the grundgestal-
ten, the faster the tempo of their stringing together, and the more the ability of a listener
will be relied on to grasp quickly and in their full consequences the coherence-forming com-
ponents.”133
He suggests that the primitivity of music is conditioned by a commitment of the idea and
its presentation to interpretation. Musical art, as opposed to musical primitivity, would
be oriented by expression. Thus, a greater need of understanding — that is, of interpre-
tation —, means a greater need to present the idea in an articulated, careful, parsimonious,
homogeneous and melodic manner. All the same, the greater the demand to share the
richness of the idea — that is, to expression —, the greater the need to present the idea
in a manner that is agile, heterogeneous harmonically and polyphonic. It follows that a
primitive musical idea or presentation will condition a primitive musical representation,
and vice versa. The real diﬀerence between primitive and art music would be given in the
context of a temporal complexity at the representation of the idea, since the idea will only
be actually artistic or primitive when artistically or primitively redone by the other. This
means that primitive musical ideas ask for primitive presentations, for simple diagrams
that imply many levels of inattention and lesser introspections. Moreover, it means also
that artistic musical ideas ask in turn for artistic presentations, which, as complex diagrams,
demand greater introspections and musical representations able to infuse motor diagrams
with purer times.
Stockhausen: the diﬀerence in the repetition 
Stockhausen promotes, both compositionally and theoretically, the notion of a temporal
continuity of sound matter over the musical idea (its ideal space). He does it chiefly by
means of a subsidiary notion of the existence of a temporal continuum between regular
pulsation and pitch, and between irregular pulsation and tone colour (timbre). Stock-
hausen remarks that
I started to compose sounds in a new way in 1956. I recorded [a] individual [regular] pulses
from an impulse generator, and spliced them together in [b] a particular rhythm. Then I
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made a tape loop of this rhythm, let’s say it is tac-tac, tac, a very simple rhythm —and then
I speed it up, tarac-tac, tarac-tac, tarac-tac, and so on. After a while the rhythm becomes
continuous, and when I speed it up still more, you begin to hear [c] a low noise tone rising
in pitch. That means this little period tarac-tac, tarac-tac, which lasted about a second, is
now lasting less than one-sixteenth of a second, because a frequency of around 16 cycles
per second is the lower limit of the perception of pitch, and a sound vibrating 16 cycles per
second corresponds to a very low fundamental pitch on the organ. The [c] timbre of this
sound is also an eﬀect of the original rhythm being tarac-tac rather than, say, tacato-tarot,
tacato-tarot, which would give the rhythm a diﬀerent tone colour. You do not actually hear
the rhythm anymore, only a specific timbre, a spectrum, which is determined by the com-
position of its components. Now imagine speeding up the original one-second rhythm on
thousand times, so that each cycle now lasts one-thousandth of a second: that will give you
a sound in the middle range of audibility, of a [d] constant pitch about two octaves above
middle C on the piano. A frequency of 1000 cycles per second, and a particular timbre.[…
] What we perceive as rhythm from a certain perspective is perceived at a faster time of per-
ception as pitch, with its melodic implications. You can make melodies by changing the
basic periodicity, making it faster or slower for the sound to go up of down in pitch respec-
tively. Within the basic pitch, there are what I call the partials, which are subdivisions of the
basic periodicity, and they are represented here by inner divisions making up the original
rhythm. These are perceived as the timbre.134
Relations of temporal complexity that make up the presentation of a musical idea may
be seen in proportional relations according to their greater or lesser pulsative, vibratory
regularity. At the presentation of a musical idea, the formal link between regular pulses
and pitch, and irregular rhythmic cells and timbre-tone colour may be seen thus reverse
structuring the temporal complexity of the musical space, and its depth. 
In this sense, the presentation of a musical idea by means of organising pitch-classes, for
example, indirectly demonstrates a determined spectral engagement in the regularity of
pulse and thus in repetition, whereas the presentation of the idea by means of timbre-
class organisation, demonstrates otherwise a spectral commitment to the irregularity of
pulse and diﬀerence. Either reiterative or diﬀerential, the musical idea is thus subject to
a graduation, in its presentation, according to its spectral zone of meaning. This completes
the previous notion of musical space by indicating that the complexity of the idea is really
proportional to its medium of presentation, as the spectral complexity directly refers to
that of the idea’s composition. It also indicates the depth of the musical idea as a function
not only of the composition of repetition that is reflected in the regularity of pulsation,
but also of the composition of diﬀerence that is reflected in its irregularity. 
The compositional research of musical timbre leads to a study of frequency irregularity,
which characterises some sound mediums or sound syntheses, and tends to be structured
around musical ideas that deal mainly with the time of diﬀerence. Since timbre compo-
sition is essentially diﬀerential, it refers as well to diﬀerential ideas, resulting in a need of
lyric compositional work. The same may be said about the research of complex rhythms,
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of polyrhythms, etc., of all sorts of irregular rhythmic elaborations. That is, material ir-
regularity is directly related to ideal irregularity or better to the notion of irregularity in
the idea. 
The discovery of a temporal continuity in sound matter, which is organised in terms of
regularities and irregularities, actually refers to the temporal continuity of musical idea,
to its contractive or expansive formal organisation as time, in terms of repetitions and
diﬀerences, to its temporal complexity.135 Departing from the analysis of sound material,
Stockhausen opened up a path of temporal widening, a path for complexity, which favours
listening to material expressivity rather than to the interpretability of the  (musical)
 concept.
Stockhausen disclosed, I think, a continuity of meaning between diﬀerent temporal spec-
tra, a continuity of ranges of time that is established between harmony and melody by a
principle of metrical proportionality. The harmonic spectrum (pitches, timbres, etc.)
could be directly related to the melodic spectrum (metric patterns, rhythmic cells, etc.)
by their relative regularity or irregularity of pulsation. As the notions of regularity and ir-
regularity are, in this case, functions of repetition and diﬀerence, Stockhausen’s harmonic
and melodic compositional practice complements Schoenberg’s in what concerns specifi-
cally the lyricalness of the idea. For Schoenberg, the idea should be conquered and con-
trolled by being securely formed and informed by an ideal (harmonic and melodic) space
of conservation and coherence that pertains exclusively to the idea proper, that is, it
should constantly be turned into a dramatic and reiterative idea, which is normally pre-
sented with a compositional emphasis on articulative and coherent harmonic and melodic
images. For Stockhausen, moreover, the idea must be built in a space of non-conservation
that reflects directly the temporal continuity of sound matter, the deconcentration, as it
were, of this matter in non-coherent, continuative harmonic and melodic images. That is
because, at heart, the principle of coherence is already given by the sound matter itself,
by its temporal plasticity, which makes of regularity and irregularity a single soul, leaving
to the composition the discovery of new dimensions of non-coherence.
Whereas, for Schoenberg, diﬀerence must be controlled by logic links that are the form
of the idea and the cause of its presentation, for Stockhausen, it is repetition that must be
broken loose by means of qualitative temporal diﬀerentiations emerging from the ma-
nipulation of sound matter. Diﬀerentiations are ultimately the form of the idea and the
cause of its presentation. For Schoenberg, the presentation of the idea happens as a level
of its articulation; for Stockhausen, it happens as a level of its continuity. Schoenberg is
mostly concerned with the temporality of reason and with the creation of a musical space
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of conservation that, despite being relatively complex, is oriented to the spatialisation of
the idea — a space that veils the idea’s deepest times. For Stockhausen, on the other hand,
the temporality of intuition is foremost and the musical space is created as a space of non-
conservation, designed for de-spatialising the idea, to the discovery of its deepest times.
The musical temporal continuum Stockhausen discovered stretches beyond the plain
pulsation to the macroform of presentation. Stockhausen explains that
if now we slow down the speed of a given rhythm, we come into the realm of form. What is
form in music? Well we usually say a musical structure of between the one or two minutes
of a piece of entertainment music, and the hour and a half of a Mahler symphony, which is
about the longest we encounter in music of the western tradition. […] So, according to the
fixed perspective of our tradition form varies between dimensions of around one minute
and ninety minutes. This corresponds to 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128 — a range of around seven
octaves. Amazingly enough, we find a similar seven-octave range within the traditional for-
mal subdivisions of music, from the length of a phrase, the smallest formal subdivision, say
eight seconds, to the largest complete section, or ‘movement’, of about sixteen to seventeen
minutes’ duration (8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024 seconds). So there is a range of about
seven octaves for durations from eight seconds up to seventeen minutes. Between eight and
sixteen seconds, durations become less and less easy to remember. It has something to do
with our perception: If I ask you to compare a duration of 13 seconds with one of 15 seconds,
you hardly know the diﬀerence. If I ask you to compare a sound of one second with a sound
of three seconds’ duration, on the other hand, the same diﬀerence of two seconds appears
enormous. Our perception is logarithmic, not arithmetic, and that is important. Rhythm
has its own field of perception and between eight and sixteen seconds there is a transition
between our perceptions of rhythm and form. Rhythm and meter are organized in measures,
traditionally to a fixed periodicity or tempo for a given movement, say fast, or medium fast,
or slow, because everything was based on dancing or body actions, and that’s where the
music came from. A periodicity of eight seconds is perceived as very slow: we are already
entering the region where form begins. Subdivide eight seconds and you have 8, 4, 2, 1, a
half, a fourth, one-eighth, one-sixteenth. One-eighth, eight attacks per second, is about the
fastest we can play with our fingers: it is a limit determined by our muscles and bodily con-
struction. I could go faster perhaps, to twelve or fourteen, by rolling my hands in a special
way, but no more. There again, you see, the range is seven octaves (8, 4, 2, 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16):
its very interesting.136
Musical time is fostered above musical space by means of a total temporal integration of
timbres, pitches, rhythmic patterns and music macroform. The idea is pinned down
favouring musical time, and as a function of it. As previously suggested, musical idea as
time refers firstly to concretenesses, while as space it refers to concepts. Schoenberg’s and
Stockhausen’s conceptions of musical idea and of musical presentation are diﬀerent: for
the former, the material must be folded, articulated into a concept derived from the idea;
for the latter, this concept results from a material unfolding, disarticulation that favours
an idea. The concept supplies both the composition of the idea with its presentation and
the presentation with its composition.
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Stockhausen also suggests various criteria for musical composition, valid not only for
electroacoustic music. These criteria — all of them very important to the present discus-
sion — attest his commitment to the notion of temporal continuity between sound mat-
ter and compositional processes. The first criterion is based on the continuity of diﬀerent
ranges of time, exclusively given by perception itself, as if the sound matter were split and
compositionally dissociable in diﬀerent ranges of time.
As perception is something that evolves and is enhanced by one’s attention, the compo-
sitional process should be understood as a force for expanding the temporal awareness
about things by the things. Stockhausen comments that
the ranges of perception are ranges of time, and the time is subdivided by us, by the con-
struction of our bodies and by our organs of perception. And since these modern means
have become available, to change the time of perception continuously, from one range to
another, from a rhythm into a pitch, or a tone or noise into a formal structure, the composer
can now work within a unified time domain. And that completely change the traditional
concept of how to compose and think music, because previously they were all in separate
boxes: harmony and melody in one box, rhythm and meter in another, then periods, phras-
ing, larger formal entities in another, while in the timbre field we had only name of instru-
ments, no unity of reference at all.137
In Kontakte (1958), Stockhausen explored the composition of ranges of perception (Fig.
1.1). There, the notion of presentation of a musical idea is turned directly into the idea,
into its moving form, which is extracted directly from constant changes and transforma-
tions of the musical material. About this, he says,
many of the various sounds in Kontakte have been composed by determining specific
rhythms and speeding them up several hundred or a thousand times or more, thereby ob-
taining distinctive timbres. What is interesting about this moment is that if I were to play
little bits of the passage one after another, like notes on the piano, nobody would be able to
hear the transition that takes place from one field of time perception to another. The fact
that I make the transition continuously makes us conscious of it, and this eﬀort of con-
sciousness changes our whole attitude towards our acoustic environment. Every sound be-
comes a very mysterious thing, it has its own time.138
Sound matter is thus presented in the context of the deepening of its own time. Stock-
hausen searches for a deepening in the perception of the idea through the material, as a
sort of revelation. This is quite distinct from simply presenting an idea, or an aspect of an
idea, because it implies presenting the idea as a whole, as a totality, by linking the idea to
the whole spectrum of possibilities available to musical perception, as well as to the will
of amplifying of this spectrum. The composition is committed to a demonstration of its
own compositional process. It represents an invitation to delve into time: the composi-
tion’s theme, so to say, is the process of musical composition in itself translated in its tem-
poral complexity. 
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Another distinction Stockhausen suggests, which reinforces the first, refers to splitting
sounds into their components. For Stockhausen,
If we understand that sounds can be composed, literally put together, not only stationary
sounds which do not change, but also a sound like owww, which changes in the course of
its duration; if we can compose these sounds, in the sense of the Latin componere meaning
put together, then naturally we can also think in terms — note the quotation marks — of
the ‘decomposition’ of a sound. That means we split the sound, and this can be much more
revealing in a certain context than hearing a unified sound on its own terms, and comparing
it to another which is happening at the same time or immediately before or after it. […] So
what has this got to do with composing? What makes this more than just an example from
a lecture by an acoustician or a physicist […]? This is the point: whereas it is true that tra-
ditionally in music, and in art in general, the context, the ideas or themes, were more or less
descriptive, either psychologically descriptive of inter-human relationships, or descriptive
of certain phenomena in the world, we now have a situation where the composition or de-
composition of a sound through several time layers, may be the theme [the idea] itself,
granted that by theme we mean the behavior or life of the sound. And we live the same
transformation that the sound is going through. [If] the sound split into six, and if we want
to follow all six, we have to become polyphonic, multi-layered beings. And if the sound falls
six and a half octaves, you have to go with it, because if you stay put in your time chair, as it
were, you won’t perceive it. […] So there you have it: the theme of the music, of Kontakte
itself, [its idea], is the revealing of such processes, and their composition.139
The presentation of the idea is once again linked to its compositional process, by elabo-
rating the idea exactly in what it represents, diﬀerentiation and revelation of other times.
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Figure 1.1: Kontakte (1958), detail of the score. The reason for the new notation 
is the  complexity of the idea.
139 Stockhausen, Stockhausen on Music…, 97.
A deep commitment to multiplicity, to the notion of diﬀerent world-views, is present.
Stockhausen sees his music ideally engaged in the role of revealing diﬀerent temporal nu-
ances. His musical ideas are therefore deeply continuative and diﬀerential, accomplished
in a perspective of a mobile time that is structurally composed as well as decomposed in
many layers and zones of temporal delimitation, that is preponderantly lyrical. 
The third criterion suggested by Stockhausen concerns, more concretely, the real spatiality
of the presentation of the idea, which is conceived in terms of displacements of the sound
source. Referring to this criterion in the composition of Kontakte, Stockhausen comments
that
Multi-layered spatial composition means the following: that only does the sound move
around the listener at a constant distance, but it can also move as far away as we can imagine,
and also come extremely close. […] At the end of the section in Kontakte where the sound
is split into its separate components […] there are dense, noisy sounds in the forefront,
covering the whole range of audibility. Nothing can pierce this wall of sound, so to speak.
Then all of a sudden, I stop the sound and you hear a second layer of sound behind it. I cut
it again, like with a knife, and you hear another layer behind that one, then again. Building
spatial depth by superimposition of layers enables us to compose perspectives in sound
from close up to far away, analogous to the way we compose layers of melody and harmony
in the two-dimensional plane of traditional music.140
The spatialisation of sound sources re-elaborates the meaning of musical space, making
it more concrete than the Schoenbergian idealised one. The presentation of the idea is
here actually and necessarily spatial. Its spatialisation makes the compositional role of
musical continuity and its relationship with the purest temporal creative domains even
more evident at the presentation of the idea, converting in this way actual spaces into
times. 
Finally, the last important criterion suggested by Stockhausen concerns the continuity
between sound and noise. As he says,
if I change the periodicity of the sound a little faster, a little slower, or to be more precise,
make the duration of each period a little shorter or a little longer, then the sound starts os-
cillating around a certain middle frequency, and all the half vowel of half consonant com-
ponents, which are already fairly broad-band, begin to break-up. So the continuum between
sound of fixed pitch and noise is nothing more than that between a more and less stable pe-
riodicity: the noisiest noise being the most aperiodic. This discovery of a continuum be-
tween sound and noise was extremely important, because once such a continuum becomes
available, you can control it, you can compose it, you can organize it. […] Nowadays we
have various electronic filters and modulators available to transform a steady sound into
one is more aleatoric in its inner structure. As it has become possible to define a continuum
between sounds and noises, completely new problems have come up for when we compose
or play intuitively, because we have no training whatsoever in balancing tones and noises.
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[…] The integration of noises of all kinds has only come about since the middle of this
[last] century, and I must say, mainly through the Discovery of new methods of composing
the continuum between tones and noises. Nowadays any noise is musical material, and it is
possible to select a scale of degrees from sound to noise for a given composition, or choose
an arbitrary scale, from the complete range. […] From this we discover new principles of
musical articulation, for example that I worked with forty-two diﬀerent scales in this par-
ticular work [Kontakte]. If you know the piano has a half-tone scale, twelve steps to the oc-
tave, then imagine forty-two diﬀerent scales, where the octave is divided into thirteen, fifteen,
seventeen, twenty-three steps, and so on. I have used a scale of scales, where the ratio of in-
crease in the step size is constant from one scale to the next, and each particular scale is
strictly associated with a particular family of tones and noises.141
Stockhausen argues for a new way of conceiving the relationship between harmony and
melody directly based on sound properties, from which the composition (and thus the
musical idea) emerges. Musical form is in fact directly given, inspired by the temporality
that is internal to the things and not the opposite. Stockhausen says that
We have discovered a new law of relationship between the nature of the sound and the scale
on which it may be composed. Harmony and melody are no longer abstract systems to be
filled with any given sounds we may choose as material. There is a very subtle relationship
nowadays between form and material. I would even go far as to say that form and material
have to be considered as one and the same. I think it is perhaps the most important fact to
come out in the twentieth century, that in several fields material and form are no longer re-
garded as separate, in the sense that I take this material and I put it into that form. Rather, a
given material determines its own best from according to its inner nature. The old dialectic
based on the antinomy — or dichotomy — of form and matter has really vanished since
we have begun to produce electronic music, and have come to understand the nature and
relativity of sound.142
Considering these arguments — that is, the perception as ranges of time; the possibility
of splitting sounds into their components, and hence how the graduality of this operation
and the many compositional functions that stem from it could be considered as the main
idea of a composition; the real spatialisation of musical presentation and its artistic elab-
oration; and also the continuity between sound and noise —, Stockhausen is in accor-
dance with the majority of  temporal notions here suggested. Therefore, he complements
the notions elaborated by Schoenberg on the problem of the musical idea, and makes vi-
able a new interpretative path: that the musical idea is creatively composed between time
and space, that its medium, which is normally called musical space simply, is actually
made of a two-fold, heterogeneous rhythmical movement that advances simultaneously
towards its constitution (as an articulated spatial notion that articulates the notion of
time in us) and its annihilation (as an unarticulated temporal notion that inarticulates
the notion of space in us).
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IV – MUSICAL representation
Individual and social musical times
We have noticed earlier in this chapter that we make sense of time individually, but always
measuring, so to say, our subjective temporal experiences from common temporal
grounds or horizons. Our temporal experiences, kept intimately, cognised in forms of
‘temporal disregard or conformism,’ of ‘celebration or transgression,’ are always somehow
socially shared: we represent time to ourselves but also from others and to others. We
communicate time.
Addressing this temporal aspect, Stuart Hall in Cultural Representations and Signifying
Practice143 points out that since meaning is fashioned by people in the context of their
culture, representation can be conceived creatively as a process of exchange of meanings.
This adds a new perspective to the common-sense view that representations are merely
intellectual objects representing, moving towards a focus on the relationships and pro-
cesses through which these objects are produced, valued and exchanged.
In my view, there is a number of social modes for the representation of time, among which
are two main orientations. On the one hand, is a mode of representation guided by local
or community necessities, in which the values of temporal representation exchanged obey
determinate rules of social balance. Representations exchanged confirm each other and
allow people to have a sense of temporal stability and order. This, I argue, is a centripetal
social mode of representation of time that reflects its centricity on its representational
products, which are temporally anchored by the taste of the many. On this, W. Mitchell
says that “it is impossible to divorce representations from culture and the society that
produces them. In the contemporary world there exist  restrictions on subject matter, lim-
iting the kinds of representational signs allowed to be employed, as well as boundaries
that limit the audience or viewers of particular  representations.”144
On the other hand, is a mode of representation guided by universal aims, which is, of ne-
cessity — to the local community point of view — temporally transgressive, because it
ideally favours an all-embracing (and sublime) superior temporal order. Representations
exchanged may eventually discord and antagonise, defying people to reorient their tem-
poral routines. This centrifugal social mode of representation has no definite temporal an-
chors and cannot ever be fasten by the taste of the many. Here, amid shared temporal
novelties, we might find place for the manifestation of genuine individual representations
of time: the universal time (of mankind) is held by the few. 
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There exists an infinite socially extended representational tissue that temporally anchors
and destabilises us at the same time in diﬀerent areas of our life. The complexity of this
infinite and socially transcendent representational fabric allows, I suggest, for a kind of
Jungian collective temporality, a sort of collective temporal unconsciousness populated
by a number of individual archetypical temporal traits. 
An archetypical example is found in the individual time that produces superficial repre-
sentations. The object of representation is represented as it appears; it is its surface. Here,
representation does not ignite quests or doubts, and time is definite and given, anchored
by its own internal routines. This, I argue, is the archetypical time of repetition. Looking
round at things, as Bergson would say, instead of into them, provides us the opportunity
to project on them our pre- or misconceptions: we repeat generalities, we remake con-
ceptual identities, by fixing the time of things around them. An alternative archetypical
example is the individual time that goes further now into the thing in order to achieve a
superior transcendental image, in order to stretch the scope of its concept, operating nor-
mally via manifold and multidisciplinary interpretations — a discipline advocated by
Deleuze when discussing the creative power of Ideas. 
It seems that living in society depends on a constant play of temporal balances and un-
balances, on a permanent temporal adjustment that grants individual processes of repre-
sentation a common social status to agree or to discord with. The individual time is
permanently aﬀected by contingent reasons, becoming either ampler and freer when af-
fected by unusual temporal orientations, or completely transformed if it is merged into
innovative ones. Finally, it seems that, by becoming ampler, freer and transformed, art
may be understood as if it really were a mechanism of expression for the freedom that
dwells between and beyond consolidated ideas of the world, actually a whole vehicle of
expansion for such ideas.
Souvtchinsky, Langer and Brelet
The problem of musical representation would be immensely illuminated by these notions.
There are distinct perspectives on the matter, such as P. Souvtchinsky’s, who, according
to Edward Campbell — arguing in Music After Deleuze the value for music of Deleuze’s
philosophy of time —,
writes in 1932 of an aesthetic conjunction linking Bergson, Proust and Debussy, honoring
the composer as the first to extend the musical instant in terms of sound duration. Distin-
guishing between ‘psychological time’ and ‘ontological’ or ‘real time,’ in which the multi-
farious manifestations of the former are rooted ontologically in the latter, it is suggested that
music provides ‘one of the most pure forms of the ontological sensation of time.’145 While
individual composers present their idiosyncratic experiences of musical time, the spectrum
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of temporal possibilities is typified generally by the alternative of the chronometric (onto-
logical), characterized by a sense of ‘dynamic calm,’ and the chrono-ametric (psychological),
which relates to the ‘secondary notation of primary emotive impulses.’ Stravinsky and Wag-
ner are identified as respectively exemplifying each tendency.146
For Souvtchinsky, the piece of music represents the realisation of its composer’s  temporal
experiences.147 He suggests a functional approach, in which an ontological time, related
in his view to a primary, inner awareness of a real  objective time, is opposed to a psycho-
logical time, which would concern otherwise a  elusive, subjective perception of the pas-
sage of time, whose qualities would  fluctuate with changing emotions. 
Souvtchinsky’s contrasting temporal modes are placed between a socially shared outer
time (extensively allocated outside its direct experience, even though still constituting
and depending on the flux of one’s individual perception) and an individual inner tem-
porality (which is entirely intimate, subjective and necessarily intensive). In Souvtchin-
sky’s view, the collective way of sensing time (and also thinking time) reflects what time
truly is, as he places the truthness of time very objectively on a reliant sense of dynamic
calm, shared by the many. On this basis, Souvtchinsky suggests that the intensive, inner
temporal sense of each individual is, of necessity, psychologically illusory, false and, in
any event, socially transgressive. Souvtchinsky develops his temporal notions from a com-
mon construct: that truth is unchangeable; that in order to seek, and luckily find, truth
(the true meaning) we must avoid the circumstance of the particular case. Indeed, how
could the truthness of time be grounded on one’s intimate temporality since it fluctuates
immensely according to one’s particular emotions? His answer: in order to be real, time
must be dynamically calm, regular and balanced. 
Souvtchinsky calls chronometrique those creative musical processes oriented by his notion
of ontological time. He considers that musical works produced by this kind of composi-
tional process allow for composers and interpreters (performers, listeners, analysts, etc.)
to communicate a feeling of satisfaction. Based on this perspective of other’s satisfaction,
this process would allow people to integrate their temporal perceptions in music by means
of a shared modality of musical time, somehow expressively and interpretatively reflected
at the surface of the musical piece. Souvtchinsky’s chronometric time works thus as a
model social time for composers and performers, listeners, a time characterised by a feel-
ing of gratification, social conjunction and balance, of a greater regularity. 
Conversely, chrono-ametrique creative musical processes, oriented by his notion of psy-
chological time, would produce unbalanced, dissociated musical works. They would be
permeated by all sorts of interferences and dissimilarities, by social deviation, as they
would have the individual temporality  prevailing against the collective time.148
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The dialectics of chronometrique and chrono-ametrique musical times reflects an old dis-
cussion, which stems from Heraclitus’s and Parmenides’s diﬀerent views about the essence
of time. Heraclitus sustained that the only true reality would be one of perpetual change,
whereas Parmemides upheld that change in itself is an illusion and only what is permanent
has substance. Souvtchinsky unquestionably privileges Parmenides’s point of view. 
Even if I do not agree with Souvtchinsky’s functional approach, since for me the proper
existence of musical time depends on a mutual influence as well as on a perpetual and
rhythmical relationship between both notions (permanence and change), what strikes
me the most in Souvtchinsky’s arguments is that he consciously contrasts permanence
and change in the creative arena. That is, in his view, even in opposition to ontological
time, and illusory, psychological time is still a creative option, and in some sense accept-
able and necessary. 
Thus for Souvtchinsky, music does not only provide a psychological, fluctuating temporal
mode, but it also ‘fluctuates compositionally,’ so to say, between two temporal realms,
which, instead of being distinguishable only by their power of producing a sense or a feel-
ing of gratification and its opposite, are actually characterized by the intensity of their so-
cial and cultural attachment. Certainly, we are not internally moved to a feeling of
gratification and dynamic calm by the piece of music only. We are rather influenced in
this or another way by means of the piece; and even more by the contrasting temporal at-
tributes and qualities it evokes in its relation to our daily life. Life is, at last, the creative
arena in which permanence and change, regularity and irregularity, conjunction and dis-
sociation, ontological and psychological powers exchange their intensities. In life as in
music, so it seems, both ways are necessary.
Another perspective is Susanne Langer’s, who, in Philosophy in a New Key, claims  that
“music is preeminently non-representative even in its classical productions, its highest at-
tainments,” but exhibits pure forms. She aﬃrms that
it exhibits pure form not as an embellishment, but as its very essence; we can take it in its
flower—for instance, German music from Bach to Beethoven—and have practically noth-
ing but tonal structures before us: no scene, no object, no fact. […] There is no obvious,
literal content in our way. If the meaning of art belongs to the sensuous percept itself apart
from what it ostensibly represents, then such purely artistic meaning should be most acces-
sible through musical works.149
Langer’s claim that music is non-representative depends obviously on the broader context
of her discussion of meaning in art. She implies that music is non-representative of things
or occasions as that, their images, their connotation, their materiality. She points out, oth-
erwise, that it does represent something from itself, that is, a form of percept: music rep-
resents the way through which we represent it. It could be interpreted that Langer means
by that of the compositional process. This strange observation may be better understood
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in the context of emotions. For Langer
music is formulation and representation of emotions, moods, mental tensions and resolu-
tions — a ‘logical picture’ of sentient, responsive life, a source of insight, not a plea for sym-
pathy. Feelings revealed in music are essentially not ‘the passion, love or longing of
such-and-such an individual,’ inviting us to put ourselves in that individual’s place, but are
presented directly to our understanding, that we may grasp, realize, comprehend these feel-
ings, without pretending to have them or imputing them to anyone else.150
The way we approach music, our representation of it, unveils (or not) the feelings it is
able to reveal. When we delve into it, we may see ourselves relatively detached amid two
temporal realms, the one we find in the piece of music and the one we project on it. We
find instruction in Langer’s claim that music is ‘a logical picture of sentient life.’ This claim
is perfectly rhythmic. We also believe that the ‘feelings revealed in music are presented
to our understanding,’ though not only, since our understanding is also presented to it,
informing its formulations. 
Susanne Langer is proposing a similar approach to the likeness of Souvtchinsky’s chrono-
ametric musical time. She sustains that a piece of music creates a subjective temporal
image which could be considered (and measured) by the proper motion of musical forms
presented at the surface of the musical piece. In her view, such motion objectively draws
or outlines this temporal image. 
These notions of Langer are built from the perspective of the musical piece and its motional
substance, whose sense is entirely subjective, individual. Langer’s musical time is symbolic,
in the sense that it creates temporal images. However, in a Kantian manner, Langer’s sym-
bolic musical time is of necessity ‘socially blocked,’ in the sense that it is formed as a con-
scious intimate image that, however ordinarily experienced by everyone, always prevails
over the abstraction of a collective regulatory time. Clearly, the social arena is here excluded. 
Langer’s musical time seems more complex than Souvtchinsky’s. Her intuition is wider
because she addresses a subjective-psychological time having in mind, it seems, that this
time has a complex, multi-dimensional quality, a depth, a volume, a dense completeness
able to mirror, to represent the transitoriness of musical forms fully. 
Unlike Souvtchinsky, Langer follows the Heraclitean conception that change has primacy
over permanence, and consequently, that the individual prevails over the collective, the
particular over the generic. If, on the one hand, Souvtchinsky gives us a dialectic vision
of musical creativity, by assuming the regulatory importance of social time over individual
time; Langer, on the other hand, provides a deepening of this  dialectic vision as she as-
sumes the individual temporality, not the collective, as her point of reference, and thus
commits to the creative importance of change over permanence. 
However, it is interesting to notice in Langer her stance towards the substance of change,
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a substance which, partially reflecting Bergson’s thought, is fundamentally heterogeneous
and manifold, and made of innumerable layers of meaning. It only partially reflects it pre-
cisely because Bergson contemplates the essence of this heterogeneity beyond the forms.
For him, the meditation on the movement of (a) form is necessarily a contemplation of
spatiality, of extensiveness. To be properly Bergsonian — as the arguments in the present
thesis intend to be — Langer’s conception of musical time would have to consider not
exactly the movement of musical forms as the actual creative datum of a subjective, sym-
bolic image of time. Instead, this conception should be more intensive, advancing over
and beyond this movement in order to observe how this movement actually becomes a
movement within the subject, because fullness of time, in Bergsonian terms, transcends
the image of movement (of the thing) in favour of the duration that is informed, in a com-
plementary manner, by the concreteness of the thing and the whole of our past experiences. 
Gisèle Brelet’s mode of musical representation is even more complex. Her system en-
compasses Souvtchinsky’s ontological and psychological temporal modes in an immanent
metaphysics of music, deducing all essential parameters of music from le temps musical.
This is not properly a derivative temporal mode, but a particular temporal experience,
unique to music, in which both chronometrique and chrono-ametrique creative processes
are oﬀered, integrally, as temporal revelation. She proposes that the whole musical work
is a structure imposed on time by a composer which is only meaningful as a function of
time itself, because in it — in the musical work — is expressed an experience and a con-
ception of a primordial time that it takes as its secret mission to reveal to us.151
Brelet’s musical time seems a composite of Souvtchinsky’s and Langer’s. Brelet still links
an ontological primordial time to a derivative psychological applied time, but instead of
being clearly opposed, they are rather quite connected. Contrary to Langer’s and similarly
to Souvtchinsky’s ideas, Brelet aﬃrms the existence of an original and extensive time
which is there, Kantianly, beyond our understanding. Langer’s time, though not extensive,
is not a social time but rather a time in itself, a time which exists beyond history and cul-
ture, a time which is set beyond mankind. On the other hand, contrary to Souvtchinsky’s
and similarly to Langer’s ideas, Brelet aﬃrms the impossibility of accessing directly this
extensity except by means of a subjective intensity given by music as a type of secret rev-
elatory mission.
Brelet decides for music as the proper language of time, and proposes that there is not a
better way of sharing and exchanging individual experiences and conceptions of time.
The arguments here discussed share with Brelet’s a same perspective of musical time, dif-
fering only in what concerns the rhythmicality of musical time. In this context, Souvtchin-
sky’s ontological time assumes the image of a temporal whole, complex and
heterogeneous, hence diverse and full of possible distinct temporal actualisations. The
chrono-ametrique creative process is one of these possibilities. Otherwise, time in itself
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is really not beyond our understanding, since we depend on exchanging and developing
our intellectual powers by means of it. Agreed, we can do that musically, with the simple
diﬀerence that our musicality emerges simultaneously to the manifestation of that ex-
change. 
All in all, Souvtchinsky proposes a permanent social time, which is deviated by a changing
individual time. Langer proposes that the changing individual time is not a deviation
from permanence, but actually the norm of time. Brelet, in turn, proposes that the indi-
vidual time is, in any case, a parcel of a comprehensive and totalising time — so each
piece of music is a testimony of a rather thin layer of time extracted from the total com-
plexity of Time as it is, a time though beyond our comprehension. In all these cases, mu-
sical time is considered as arising from the relation between the individual and the many. 
When Bergson’s philosophy of time is fully considered, the existential expression of time
neither relies exclusively on the notion of regularity (and also of homogeneity, linearity,
consonance, etc.) as an index for the normative temporal conduct of the many; nor on
the notion of irregularity (and of heterogeneity, non-linearity, dissonance, etc.) as an im-
pulse for the individual that extrapolates a collective temporal rule, as suggested by Sou-
vtchinsky and Brelet. This existential expression of time relies neither exclusively on the
notion of regularity as a shared temporal background onto which subjective temporal
images are delineated by means of manifold musical forms, nor on irregularity as the
source for the emergence of le temps musical, as suggested by Langer and by Brelet. 
Bergson’s philosophy is related to all these notions but simultaneously and in many com-
plex ways. It includes the tension between the few and the many, but in all its complex
relations with the ‘being of time,’ with the durée réelle — the continuous life of memory
that extends transcendentally, linking everything and everyone, joining the whole past
of matter and memory to the present experience. 
Without this survival of the past into the present, there would be no actual duration but
only instantaneousness, and hence no place for individual or collective time, no place for
time at all. So, in the end, these very notions of individual and collective time may be
Bergsonianly extrapolated, either by excess or by default, to a complete merging of the
temporal dynamics of the few and the many into an all-encompassing  duration. 
In Bergson’s thought, both individual and collective temporal qualities emerge from the-
same complex diﬀerential temporal field, which changes constantly depending on who
emerges, individually or collectively, and how this emergence happens. These notions,
which are apparently scattered, because they answer to distinct individual and collective
perspectives, may be finally integrated into a Deleuzian-like notion of musical represen-
tation, into a complex representational rhythmicality, in which a ‘disregardful,’ individual
notion of musical time, caused by a strong attachment to regularity and too superficial
musical traits, may be seen archetypically linked to a ‘conformist,’ collective notion of
musical time, which conforms that attachment to a given social, cultural or historical con-
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text. And into a representational rhythmicality in which a more conscious ‘celebratory,’
individual notion of musical time, provided by a fearless curiosity about irregular and
deep compositional constructs, should be seen as related to a ‘transgressive,’ collective
notion of musical time, that is powered by diversity, by the need to share among the many
the depths, the originality, of each single individual musicality.
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Rhythmicalization
1 Deleuze, “Conference Presentation on Musical Time.”
2 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, viii.
On I am and I
We cannot say with Descartes, ‘I think,
therefore I am. I am a thing that thinks.’ If it
is true that the I think is a determination, it
implies in this respect an indeterminate
existence (I am). But nothing so far tells us
under what form this existence is determined
by the I think: it is determinable only in time,
under the form of time, thus as the existence
of a phenomenal, receptive and changing ego.
I cannot therefore constitute myself as a
unique and active subject, but as a passive
ego which represents to itself only the activity
of its own thought; that is to say, the I, as an
Other which aﬀects it. I am separated from
myself by the form of time, and nevertheless I
am one, because the I necessarily aﬀects this
form by carrying out its synthesis and
because the Ego is necessarily aﬀected as
content in this form. The form of the
determinable means that the determined ego
represents determination as an Other. It is
like a double diversion of the I and the Ego in
the time which relates them to each other,




In every domain, we are done believing in a
hierarchy that would go from the simple to
the complex, according to the matter-life
mind scale. It could be on the contrary that
matter is more complex than life, and that
life is a simplification of matter. It could be
that vital rhythms and durations are not
organised and measured by a spiritual
[spirituelle] form, but take their
articulation from the outside, from molecular
processes that traverse them. In philosophy
as well we have abandoned the traditional
coupling of an undiﬀerentiated thinkable
matter with categorical forms of thought or
grand concepts. We are trying to work with
carefully elaborated thought materials to
render thinkable those forces that are not
thinkable by themselves. In philosophy it is
no longer a matter of an absolute thought
such as classical philosophy wanted to
embody, but rather an impossible thought
[…] It is the same story for music when it
elaborates a sonorous material to render
audible those forces that are not audible in
themselves. In music, it’s no longer a matter
of an absolute ear but rather an impossible




his chapter elaborates the notion of rhythmicalization, which is explained
as an all-encompassing rhythmical power, co-responsible for the emergence and mani-
festation of the creative impulses that ground a compositional process, as well as of the
distinct rhythmical ideas that compose the many levels of temporal complexity in this
process. 
Musical time is musical as such, I suggest, because it is rhythmicalized. Rhythmicalization
happens by means of many distinct actions. In discussing these actions, this chapter read-
dresses some previous notions in order to contextualise the necessary temporal domain
in which rhythmicalization occurs, and also the temporal complexity informed by this
temporal domain as rhythmicalization eﬀectively happens. The chapter also presents a
deeper account of the main rhythmicalization hypotheses to be further elaborated in
chapter three.
I – TEMPORAL DOMAIN
The rhythmicality of the idea
Following Bergson, I assume that ideas are forms of multiplicity, a force simultaneously
turned to, and composed by, the absolute non-determination of the infiniteness of time
and the relative temporal finitude of diverse levels of determination.
Bergson claims that ideas are 
[…] pure recollections summoned from the depths of memory, [which] develop into mem-
ory-images more and more capable of inserting themselves into the motor diagram. To the
degree that these recollections take the form of a more complete, more concrete and more
conscious representation,3 they tend to confound themselves with the perception which
attracts them or of which they adopt the outline.4
In Bergson’s view, representation is situated somewhere in a mid-point between the  purity
of deep memories and the purity of matter. Representation is thus temporal, a process
that gradually progresses towards a critical ‘point of return’, a marvellous moment of con-
scious emergence, of conjunction, in which the idea represents itself in the thing(s), as
the thing(s) is then seen, as well, represented by it. In this view, representation is
 surrounded, as it were, by a dynamic creative field, by sensibility.
In a Bergsonian perspective, one’s sensibility is eternally turned to the infinitude and com-
plexity of causes that generate the actual experience. We are surrounded by infinite chains
of actions, by immeasurable chains of outer impressions, of which we are presented (con-
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sciously or not) the most immediate bit only. We are constantly touched by their  temporal
immediacy, gradually organising them in expansible or contracting manners, in nascent
motor impressions capable of scanning, of resonating them, to the point that their fun-
damental rhythmic aspect is intimately emphasised.
Now, in this way, according to Bergson,5 as the infinitude of matter encounters the infini-
tude of memory, matter and memory exchange (virtually infinite) possible meanings;
meanings that depend on the quality of that scanning, that is, on its relative openness or
closeness, on the presence or absence both of sensory apparatuses and of memory. Mean-
ing is thus according to the depth of one’s reality, to his or her reach or power of penetra-
tion into the potential infinitude of matter and memory, many times intangible. 
Sensibility is, at last, a power dedicated not only to receiving the experience of things as
they are, but also to carrying and keeping this experience as much as possible immaculate
at the depth of memory. It surrounds representation and enables diverse experiences to
be temporally merged, be seen through one another. It is like a dynamic temporal field
that circumvents, with no ruptures, a rational nucleus. Its dynamics links everything tem-
porally, past, present and future(s).
While sensibility is a vital force turned to the infinitude of time (of things in themselves
and in ourselves) and its object is the sublime, our capacity of understanding, otherwise,
is a power turned to varying levels of temporal finitude, to the generalization of the par-
ticular. Together, I argue, sensibility and understanding form a rhythmic cognitive appa-
ratus, which stretches, expands and contracts temporally, as it were, positively or
negatively, depending on some important causal factors. 
Important in these dynamics is that the more penetrating the sensibility, the more intense
is the access to the genesis of the idea, to its ‘source’. In this respect, the more intense the
access is, all the better; because intensity defines a temporal territory, it delimits the temporal
map available for the work of our understanding. In other words, the more penetrating
the power of sensibility is, the broader and consequently the freer the power of under-
standing — it is this simple assertion that grounds Bergson’s doctoral thesis, Time and
Free Will,6 and, it could be argued, his philosophy as a whole.
Sensibility can be conceived, consequently, as the measure of a deepening into the real,
while understanding is the measure for choosing the ‘better’ reality according to the actual
necessity and circumstance. The rhythmicality of the idea will therefore be distinguishable
both by the strength of penetration of sensibility into the real and by the freedom of the
conscious act in the perspective of this penetration. 
The work of sensibility thus always points toward freedom by deepening the reality of
things, so that in this deepening a significant number of intelligent, creative alternatives
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of representation may be possible. Essentially, there is only one idea, the real, which is the
deepest idea possible in any a given situation. This idea works, I argue, as a fundamental
temporal flux grounding the emergence of diverse understandings. This explains why the
work of sensibility and understanding cannot be isolated, or exclusively delimited, by the




























It is in the perspective of this creative field (Fig. 2.1) that Bergson develops his notion of
motor-diagram. Motor-diagrams are unconscious or ‘translucent cognitive interfaces’,8 intan-
gible callers of eternal, ideal multiplicities. They are to be thought as the frame of sensi-
bility, and situated amid one’s sensibility and one’s motor centres. 
Using an instance taken from natural language, Bergson claims that as the needed coor-
dination of motor tendencies with their motor accompaniment (the diagram) happens,
utterances would be ready for the embodiment of ideas. He considers as object an
interlocutor whose [ideas] develop within his consciousness into auditory representations
that are then materialised into uttered words. So, if we are right, the hearer places himself at
once in the midst of the corresponding ideas, and then develops them into acoustic mem-
ories, which go out to overlie the crude sounds perceived, while fitting themselves into the
motor diagram. To follow an arithmetical addition is to do it over again for ourselves. To
understand another’s words is, in like manner, to reconstruct intelligently, starting from
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ideas, the continuity of sound that the ear perceives. And, more generally, to attend, to rec-
ognize intellectually, to interpret, may be summed up in a single operation whereby the
mind, having chosen its level, having selected within itself, with reference to the crude per-
ceptions, the point that is exactly symmetrical with their more or less immediate cause, al-
lows [the self] to flow toward them.9
It follows, according to Bergson, that recognition operates in a sort of symbiotic temporal
mirror, in which passive actions — lying near the organs of sensibility as motor-diagrams,
as potential or proto-ideas — reflect active actions — actual ideas enforced in reiterative
or diﬀerential temporal fluxes that provide those proto-ideas their representational sub-
stance. That is, representation works by reflecting two temporal flows, at the meeting
point of two moving systems. 
Yet, in the context of language, Bergson questions (but, in this case, the questioning could
be transferred to music) whether 
do we passively wait for the impressions to go in search of their images? [Or] do we not
rather feel that we are adopting a certain disposition, which varies with our interlocutor,
with the language he speaks, with the nature of the ideas he expresses — and varies, above
all, with the general movement of his phrase, as though we were choosing the key in which
our own intellect is called upon to play? The motor diagram, emphasizing his utterance,
shows our thought the road. It is the empty vessel, which determines, by its form, the form
the fluid mass, rushing into it, already tends to take.10
Each side of this meeting oﬀers a particular fundamental rhythmic potency that cannot
be frozen in order to be analysed. Bergson’s argument may explain why Deleuze holds
that the positivity of diﬀerence in itself (see below) cannot be subordinated to the identity
of the concept, and why such subordination happens only later, in response to the qual-
itative and formal aspects of the object of representation, according to a complex rhythmic
process.
The idea in itself would be, thus, perfect and potentially multiple in relation to the perfect
multiplicity (of cases and dates) of the thing that calls it. But the idea would be however
rarely perfectly representable, because representation, as a critical moment, happens not
once and for all, but progressively and retroactively, that is, rhythmically, and varies in ac-
cordance with one’s level (or depth) of attention (i.e. the level of consciousness), thus in
accordance with one’s greater or lesser subjective awareness. 
Devoting to a deeper memory the purity of time and assuming varying levels of subjective
awareness as a critical representational factor, Bergson sets a temporal domain, which has
as its obvious limits, on the one hand, the purity of time (which seems to be infinite and
intangible) and, on the other hand, many levels of ‘temporal impurity’.
For Bergson, matter and memory actually form an indivisible system. The deepness of
memory corresponds perfectly to the reality of things in the self, as they are in themselves,
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which implies that the purity of time in us actually corresponds to the purity of time of
things themselves: the depth of memory in us reflects the depth of memory in nature.
Pure memories are thus concrete, reflecting integrally the concreteness of life; and since
this concreteness is purely temporal, the diﬃculty here is how concreteness might be
purely temporal. On this we may add that any step further from the purity of time is as
well a step further from the particular towards the general, by referring to the problem of
diﬀerence in itself. 
Deleuze argues that the purity of time is essentially composed by diﬀerence in itself .11
For him the purity of time excludes representation: it is always poetically ahead, always
moving, always escaping from the principles of reason. He indicates that “diﬀerence in
itself appears to exclude any relation between diﬀerent and diﬀerent which would allow
it to be thought; [pure] diﬀerence is not and cannot be thought in itself, so long as it is
subject to the requirements of representation.”12
Diﬀerence in itself thus stands as an infinite, unreachable poetic space of non-conservation
that is cause and object of cognition. Deleuze argues that philosophy has always tried to
grasp or conquer diﬀerence in itself — the infinite — by creating and applying techniques
of reasoning that contract or expand representation to its smallest or largest versions. So
much that 
with Leibniz, representation conquers the infinite because a technique for dealing with the
infinitely small captures the smallest diﬀerence and its disappearance. With Hegel, repre-
sentation conquers the infinite because a technique for dealing with the infinitely large cap-
tures the largest diﬀerence and its dismembering. […] But what is the point of making
representation infinite? It retains all its requirements. All that is discovered is a ground which
relates the excess and default of diﬀerence to the identical, the opposed, the analogous and
the similar. […] The entire alternative between finite and infinite [representation] applies
very badly to diﬀerence [in itself ], because it constitutes only an antinomy of
representation.13
Nevertheless, the Deleuzian argument changes drastically when diﬀerence in itself is po-
etically lived, as it were, in a Bergsonian way, throughout and beyond the process of the
emergence of representation, that is, when diﬀerence in itself is progressively turned into
ideas and then into concepts.
This solution brings a primary, intensively equivalent positivity to diﬀerence and repeti-
tion as ideas. With repetition, on the one hand, this positivity is a necessary condition
for the emergence of identities. With diﬀerence, otherwise, this positivity is necessary to
holding, as it were, diﬀerence back into its original freedom, so that diﬀerence (and its
creative power) is consequently projected in between the identity of concepts. Pointing
out this last image, Deleuze says that
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ideas are not concepts […], instead of representing diﬀerence in itself by subordinating it
to the identity of concepts, and thereby to the resemblance of perception, the opposition
of predicates and the analogy of judgment, ideas liberate [diﬀerence in itself] and cause it
to evolve in positive systems in which diﬀerent is related to diﬀerent […].14
This intensive temporal evolution, I argue, would be rightfully real both to diﬀerence and
repetition as ideas, allowing them to evolve temporally under identical conditions: diﬀer-
ence projecting itself in an unarticulated space inter-images, repetition through the images.
It follows that the diﬀerential soul of the diﬀerence, by its capacity of  divergence and de-
centering, circumvents the concept, slightly touching its edges and creating potential
links, while repetition, by its powers of displacement and disguise, goes across the concept,
dislodging it, and giving it its significance and identity. 
There is thus diﬀerence in itself but also ‘another diﬀerence’, which, following the present
argument, stands as a rhythmical diﬀerence, the diﬀerence that composes the temporal
complexity of the idea during its progressive emergence towards the moment of repre-
sentation. This rhythmical diﬀerence, I suggest, is powered in reverse by a negative gen-
eralising force, in the sense that it in a way complies with the emergence of the concept.
It allows for many memories, strong and soft impressions to be summed into a single
image — which, depending on the degree of one’s representational compliance, can be
more or less temporally open. 
Concepts are thus formed (or informed) by diﬀerences that are progressively compressed
or blocked into a generality that gradually arrests their diﬀerential power. Diﬀerences are
thus emptied, so to say, from their presence and singularity, their concreteness, in order
to manifest an encompassing image (a formula) of repetition suﬃciently ample to be ap-
plied to the past or to the future; future and past being, in this sense, actually illusions
created out of the process of conceptualisation proper. 
One may say, following this argument, that there really is in Bergson’s and Deleuze’s
thought a direct correspondence between the concreteness of the particular and the no-
tion of pure time, and the degree of conceptuality of the general and the notion of space. 
It is in the context of the ideal reflexion of the purity of time in the self and in the things
themselves that any movement from this purity may represent a degree of spatialisation
in us. As we will observe, a degree of spatialisation ends up working — as Bachelard also
indicates15 — as a rhythmical mark at the surface of the duration of the idea (in its evo-
lution from pure memories towards the representational moment): the idea becomes rhyth-
mical for the simple reason that it looks forward to be represented. 
Space is thus a conceptual sense which emerges with the represented thing, varying ac-
cordingly to it; while time is a concrete sense, attached to the reality of things (in the self
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and in things themselves). While space is always turned to the logical, geometric defini-
tion, time, otherwise, is always turned indefinitely and infinitely to the sublime. 
The temporal domain that grounds the whole argument for the process of rhythmical-
ization of the idea, as it has been said, is formed by the infiniteness of time now imagined
as a pure duration without space; and varying levels of temporal finitude, conceived of,
each one of them, as a pure space without time. This is the temporal scenario of the rhyth-
micality of the idea.
The notion of rhythmicality, however, must not be confused with that of rhythm, neither
is it composed by rhythm(s). It is actually a temporal frame, a major temporal property
or quality, a condition for the emergence of rhythm(s). Rhythm, otherwise, is the eﬀect of
rhythmicality, meaning that there is no rhythm in pure time or in pure space, but only as
a consequence of their intersection. Rhythm is thus caused by the intersection of time
and space; or, saying it diﬀerently, there is rhythm when the infiniteness of time is cut
out and delimited by varying spatial intensities. It also means that time or space in them-
selves do not evolve, since the condition for their evolution is their intersection. 
Conditioned by space (a conceptual sense), time evolves into something that was or
something that will be, or rather, into conceptual senses of beforeness or of afterness. The
notion of the passing of time depends thus on the notions of past and future, which are
however unconceivable without the notion of something that endures, of a same, the de-
fined thing that was or will be. It means that there is no past or future in themselves, but
only in relation to something that becomes past-ish or future-ish by means of space: they
are just abstract general notions of passing time, which is actually referred or conditioned
by the identity, the archetype, the myth, the persona, the characterization of something
that becomes a symbol (a conceptual sense) of time passing. Temporal evolution is a re-
ality to us because, although we sense the actual thing growing and degenerating, or
changing its relative position, all the time there is something that is kept unchanged
around us. Thus, there would be no time passing, no past, no future and all things were
to be perpetually made anew if in the absence of identity. For we may say that the infini-
tude of time coincides with the infinitude of the now, as the infinitude of the now coin-
cides with the infinitude of the new. 
In music, we will find extrapolated from the notion of identity many forms of thematicism.
Indeed, the proper sense of temporal evolution in music (called by many authors, musical
motion) depends on a sense of sameness delivered by a consistent recapitulation (varied
or not) of figures and gestures, and also by the recursiveness and regularity of musical ac-
centuation, the takt. The temporal evolution observed at the surface of the musical piece
reflects the evolution of time in general in common sense, because both time and musical
time are conditioned by the notion of identity that is necessary to the constitution of
space.
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Rhythmic and metric theories which discuss mostly the rhythmic and metric accent per-
ceived at the surface of the musical piece are, in this sense, spatial-to-temporal-like musical
theories. Because the main point of discussing musical accentuation is to address less its
structure, than the problem of musical temporality from the point of view of the futurity
or pastness of musical contents. One may count how many beats or pulses (simple or
complex) a determinate event lasts, or in how many beats it returns from its past or will
probably return in its future; we may concur on the regularity or irregularity of its past
or future. Musical meter and musical rhythm are, in this specific sense, always temporally
evolutive. In other words, we never discuss musical space for the sake of discussing itself,
but rather to virtually construe, from a notion of musical space, a temporal evolution of
some element or force in a given musical context. 
Eﬀected by time, otherwise, space evolves to become the something’s coming or the some-
thing’s going, or rather, the senses of the ‘nearness’ or of ‘remoteness’; both of which are
 unconceivable without the notion of relative change. We have this feeling of ‘space passing’
because we are able to conceive of the passage of something in relation to another. More-
over, added to the notion of a thing that passes, we are also able to conceive the passage
itself. 
Spatial evolution is a reality to us because things in movement produce diverse spatial re-
lations, as they become closer or more distant in many complex ways. To be clear, spatial
evolution is hardly possible without at least two referential moments: moments, not
points, because the thing’s evolution is in itself always an intensive rather than extensive
power. Generality arises, it seems, exactly from the installation of extensiveness, from
measuring relations, when points within the evolution are consciously fixed, defined. We
behave in this way, I suggest, in order to construct safety, or better, to construct a degree
of safety, because safety is never absolute. Our integrity is in many ways a construction
dependent upon measuring relations between things because by doing it we achieve a
degree of certainty: I am safe because I am sure, to some extent; the power of measuring
being thus directly proportional to the power of extracting extensivenesses from inten-
siveness. However, since the actual thing is perpetually changing, as well as its infinite re-
lations, it is necessary to create a generalization, a formula of change, able to replace the
work of measuring. This order of things is at the base of Bergson’s claim that the concep-
tual mind is per se anti-temporal.16 Moving a step backwards, we find an intermediary
evolutive domain, in which space is eﬀected by time, in which identity is less important
than the changing relations created at each moment between identity and identity. 
In music, we see this, for example, in the art of counterpoint. In it, the sense of relative
change is given by qualitative means: each melodic displacement is measured in relation
to another, being contextually more or less consonant or dissonant. In counterpoint, we
also may have thematic elements, though not as something (the same) that progresses
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temporally. Instead, the theme, the subject is ‘placed against’ the other — which, even in
case of openly imitating the theme, is always diﬀerent, just because it does not utter the
endurance of the same but the appearance of something else, which may but also may not
be imitative. The important aspect here is that between something and something else,
in the temporal interval produced by their diﬀerence, a domain of change, a variation, is
created. Musical space is thus eﬀected by musical time; it evolves becoming the changing
aspect of that interval. 
Now, between the temporal evolution of the same and the spatial evolution of the change,
there is a common force: their frequency or rate of their manifestation. The rhythmicality
of the temporal domain just mentioned reflects thus the double aspect of the frequency
or rate of manifestation of the same and of the change. It means that, as principles, both
the generic and the particular imply variable frequencies of manifestation, they entail
levels of complexity that vary depending on their mutual and necessary influence. 
II – TEMPORAL COMPLEXITY
Bergson says that the uniqueness of things rests transcendentally in us; in other words,
that there is a profound continuity linking everything and us. However, he also points
out that, unfortunately, in order to represent the world we are forced by the circumstances
to cut down that profound continuity by means of many levels of articulation. 
I suggest that the degree of continuity and articulation is oriented by the play of funda-
mental vital forces; those imbued by the notions of determination and repetition as well
of indetermination and diﬀerence. On the one hand, the greater the articulation, the
greater is the action, the temporal influx of determinism and repetition in us (as vital
forces), and so the shallower and more generalising one’s subjectivity in relation to the
concreteness of things. Consequently, one’s responses to stimuli become more agile and
mechanistic as they become nearer to the motor centres, that is, the lesser the reach of
one’s attention in relation to the experience of this concreteness. On the other hand, the
more profound, more diversified and less deterministic one’s subjectivity is in relation to
this same concreteness, the greater one’s capacity to make particular the experience of
this concreteness and, consequently, of its continuity — one’s responses to stimuli be-
coming more slow and conscious as they are further from the motor centres.
Once someone’s attention is contracted, it becomes diﬀuse, and makes for an extremely
controlled and, consequently, strongly articulative representation. This would imply the
inaction of matter. Matter’s inactivity would be thus an illusion caused or reflected by a
contraction of attention, by a contraction of one’s interest and curiosity. In this specific
respect, I suggest, repeating demands forgetting. By the same token, the expansion of
one’s attention would produce uncontrolled, strong, continuative music-like representa-
tions, ‘pieces of freedom’. It may mean that, independently of their actual movements, the
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experience of nature’s actions depend on our freedom, on our creativity. Only in this way
will these actions be a reality to us. In this specific sense, freedom means rememberness,
while rememberness means, in turn, an expansive temporal commitment, a gesture of
uncontrol, a rupture with the delimitation of generality; it means to plunge into the
uniqueness of each experience. 
Deleuze complements the previous notions by proposing that our thoughts are actually
moved between certainty and uncertainty, because it is not enough to think of the diﬀer-
entiated thing without thinking of the diﬀerentiating process that culminates in the diﬀer-
entiation. As we have seen, for him, our thoughts evolve between a diﬀerence that is
internally balanced by a driving impetus of coherence and a diﬀerence that is external to
this balance, which is always moving beyond itself, in non-coherence. Whereas the first,
Aristotelian, compliant diﬀerence looks for the core attributes of things to discover their
potential superior links, for their lost common genus, their essence; the Deleuzian diﬀer-
ence, taking hints from Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, and others, creates the conditions
for the existence of the future, the unknown, and works as a zone of interpenetration that
always discloses a newness from everything.17
The rhythmicality of the idea is thus modelled after the eﬀect of temporal expansion and
temporal contraction that emerges from these two diﬀerences — from that diﬀerence
that cannot be attained simply by the deductive rationales of a dialectic discourse, and
from that diﬀerence which is crucially dependent on the identity of the concept. There
is a problematic diﬀerence at the core of the idea, a diﬀerence truly accessible only by
means of a superior eﬀort of attention; and, all the same, there is a solving diﬀerence ac-
tually extracted from the thing by means of a disattention that favours the emergence of
conceptual identity. As I see them, both the problematic diﬀerence and the solving diﬀer-
ence contribute to the understanding of the process of musical composition. That is why
I suggest the process required to access the diﬀerence installed in the idea, as well as the
process required to refer the diﬀerence denounced by the identity of concept, are both
composed by internal temporal fluxes, intensities, the interchange of these intensities
turning them into rhythmic influxes. 
This would be the fundamental content of musical time: it is a duration which expands
and contracts, with us and in us, depending on determinate cognitive dispositions. I claim
that the expansion and contraction of musical time are or act like the expansion and con-
traction of the experience of time in general, so that the music we produce mirrors or
represents this experience. However, in music, we do not simply mirror the temporality
of our daily experiences. That would be too simplistic. Because music is in itself an artistic
domain, we, by means of our musical practices, also project on the experience of time in
general a determinate, unique temporal construction, a kind of human time that cannot
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be found anywhere but only in music as the musical phenomena happen to be to us:
music is, in some way, the eﬀect and not the cause of our musicality. 
We may add to these notions the understanding that ideas are not concepts, that they are
[…] a form of eternally positive multiplicity [my stress], distinguished from the identity of
concepts, […] that ‘liberate’ [diﬀerence and repetition, by making them] many objects of
aﬃrmation [and contradiction] which rupture the framework of conceptual representation.
The powers of repetition include displacement and disguise, just as diﬀerence includes di-
vergence and decentering. The one no less than the other belongs to ideas, for no more have
an inside than they do an outside. The idea makes one and the same problem of diﬀerence
and repetition.18
In this way understood, ideas are thus a form of eternally positive multiplicity that allows
for the emergence of diﬀerential and reiterative powers. These powers gradually develop
and assume, as we will see, the form of diﬀerential or reiterative concepts. In this context,
I argue, both diﬀerence and repetition are ideally available, so to say, to be used as powers
of representation. The actualisation of these powers is up to the act of representation
proper — the power of repetition that denotes the temporal contraction of the generic
and the power of diﬀerence that denotes the temporal expansion of the particular. 
However, the fact that diﬀerence and repetition are evenly available as ideal emerging
powers does not imply that they are representable in the same way. Representation as
diﬀerence implies the emergence of a diﬀerential conceptualisation process, which is crit-
ical and frankly opposed to the ordinary perspective of conceptualisation, in which the
concept may be seen as the contraction of an infinite number of actual (material) singular
cases into a generic case, an image devoid of substance. The diﬀerential concept exists
otherwise as an expanding particularising force, which is a necessary creative force that
negates or deconstructs the generic thing: the diﬀerential concept is thus not a concept
proper, but a negative conceptual power, necessary to the manifestation of the creative
act. 
Bergson’s and Deleuze’s philosophies converge on this matter at a point specifically rele-
vant to this thesis: the representation of the idea may be deeper or less, and thence more
or less temporal or spatial, since the idea is a form of multiplicity that allows for an even
representation of diﬀerence and repetition: of the temporal expansion that leads to par-
ticularisation, or of the temporal contraction that leads to generalization proper. These
movements of temporal expansion and contraction provide, I believe, the foundation of
that that is musical in us, forming what I have called the compositional process. Since ev-
erything in music is related to this process, the study of music would depend primarily
on the study of this foundation. The philosophical idea, that is, the idea itself, and the
musical idea are the same; the ‘musical,’ in musical idea, denotes the temporal sense that
qualifies the philosophical idea.
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Lyricalness and Dramaticism
Adding both philosophies to develop a notion of musicality, I suggest that the eternally
positive multiplicity of the idea (Deleuze) is itself composed by purer lyrical and dramatic
temporal fluxes, as I call them. This, keeping in mind that the lyricalness and the dramati-
cism of the idea signifies, respectively, the depth of its emerging diﬀerentiative or reiter-
ative powers; that lyricalness is a deep temporal power that allows for the emergence of
an expanding diﬀerential power responsible for the formulation of the diﬀerentiative con-
cept (the concept that posits the doubt), and that dramaticism is also a deep temporal
power responsible for the emergence of a contractive reiterative power that allows for
the formulation of the reiterative concept (the concepts that posits the definition). For,
with Deleuze, we may claim that the multiplicity of the idea is actually a form, since it is
evenly composed by the depth of diﬀerence and  repetition. 
The problem here is that since the diﬀerential and reiterative powers that gradually evolve
into the represented thing emerge from the depth of the idea, there may be a fundamental
temporal motor responsible for this emergence. Thus which would be thereby the funda-
mental powers of lyricalness and dramaticism?
I argue that the motors of lyricalness and dramaticism are, respectively, indeterminism
and determinism. Everything in nature seems to be simultaneously ruled by indetermin-
ism and determinism. So that in everything, and all the time, we may find the expression
of a potential lyricalness and of a potential dramaticism we are formed and informed by.
This is a crucial point. While in Plato’s thought, ideas are immutable powers faced by the
mutability of matter, here I address the transversality of Bergson’s and Deleuze’s philoso-
phies saying that change and permanence are actually relative. They are points of view,
perspectives or degrees of (temporal) complexity, which exchange meanings depending
on the position or intention of the observer: we unconsciously respond to these perspec-
tives, becoming gradually aware of them.
We may claim thus that the purer indeterminate-powered lyrical and determinate-pow-
ered dramatic temporal fluxes that potentially form the multiplicity of the idea gradually
develop into heterogeneous and compound temporal fluxes, because both indetermina-
tion and determination have two sides. While the diﬀerential power emerging from in-
determination is manifested in a diﬀerential concept (a level of intensity of doubt), the
target of this concept is obviously its opposite, the determined thing, including its pro-
cesses of emergence. Likewise, whereas the reiterative power which emerges from deter-
mination is attested directly in a reiterative concept (a level or intensity of certainty), the
target of this concept is the undetermined thing, including its process of emergence. The
concept hence emerges from, no less then it submerges into, the idea. 
The ideal diﬀerence is a force that emerges in a complex indeterminate context, resulting
from the temporal expansibility of this context, so that this expansibility becomes inde-
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pendent of its source. Ideas liberate diﬀerence, says Deleuze, but the price of this liberation
is to condemn diﬀerence to a sort of intermediate temporal realm, to be excluded from
the pure multiplicity of the idea.19 Diﬀerence becomes here the doubt, the problem, the
interrogative mark. It has a function: to problematise repetition, but also to problematise
itself and its own origin. That is why we may find two, compound diﬀerential temporal
fluxes, lyric and dramatic. But we may say also that repetition is a force that emerges in a
complex determinative context, resulting from the temporal contractibility of this context,
so that this contractibility becomes as well independent of its source. Repetition is hence
also excluded from the multiplicity of the idea becoming the impulse towards the solution,
the noun, the exclamative mark. Its function: to solve diﬀerence, but also to reinforce its
own origin. That is why we find two compound reiterative temporal fluxes: the lyric and
the dramatic. 
Thus, it is Deleuzeanly advocated here that by means of a fundamental lyricism or dra-
maticism, pure temporal fluxes that form the multiplicity of the idea release diﬀerence
and repetition, turning them into several objects, compound temporal fluxes, of aﬃrma-
tion and contradiction that makes it possible for the installation of a conceptual frame-
work for the emergence of representation. So far as the self, more consciously, reaches
for these pure and compound fluxes, they tend to be, in the process of representation,
confronted or conformed to the perception that attracts them. In this sense, both repeti-
tion, in its dispositional and articulative power of displacement and disguise,20 and diﬀer-
ence, in its energetic and connective power of divergence and decentering,21 belong equally
to the idea as its lyrical and dramatic temporal expansions and contractions.
The eternal multiplicity of the idea referred to by Deleuze is the necessary unknown fore-
runner that is applied permanently by the self on expressive and interpretative germinal
powers, in their temporal evolution. Lyricism and dramaticism, the two-folded principle
of this eternal and ideal multiplicity, act by releasing the positive powers of diﬀerence and
repetition in their constant temporal flow within the self. 
Diﬀerence and repetition evolve temporally within fundamental lyrical and dramatic
fluxes, into compound fluxes more and more capable of inserting themselves into the
motor-diagrams given to the self by perception. Compound fluxes are a Bergsonian mov-
ing house that expands and contracts temporally, in which the powers of diﬀerence and
repetition are retrospectively influential for the work of lyricalness and dramaticism. This
ideal dissemblance operates in increasing levels of complexity, exerting an increasing,
concrete influence on consciousness, as it responds to the relative openness or closeness
of motor diagrams, of sensory-motor apparatuses. 
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Diﬀerence and repetition as ideas are juxtaposed rather than opposed. They actually com-
pose, in simultaneity, an ideal multiplicity of moving surfaces. Moreover, “it is at the same
time and from the same point of view that [ideal] diﬀerence ceases to be reduced to a
simply conceptual diﬀerence, and [ideal] repetition establishes its most profound link
with [ideal] diﬀerence and finds a positive principle both for itself and for this link.”22
Thus, ideas may really represent the plenitude of possibles. Perhaps a proper musical in-
terpretation of such plenitude is to conceive of it formed equally by infinite temporal
paths of diﬀerence and repetition. In this way, I think, guided by an excess and an exag-
geration, in their plenitude, both diﬀerence and repetition may temporally evolve up to
their final representational forms.
This evolution has, however, another side. It seems to depend as well — and simultane-
ously — on another complementary, interdependent temporal juxtaposition, that which
happens between diﬀerence and repetition along their way back from their representa-
tional forms, or misrepresentations, again towards diﬀerence in itself. It seems that in
their transcendental way back to their plenitude, our ideas exercise our creativity, our
freedom. In it, we are inevitably confronted by the diﬀerentiation and repetition of our
subjectivity, by our transgressivity or conformation. 
Representation actually completes its journey when powers of our own diﬀerentiation
and repetition link, as it were, the transcendental complexity of our ideas with the com-
plexity of our experiences, attitudes and desires. So much that our ideas reflect our indi-
vidual disposition towards life in what life has of permanence and mutability. 
Repetition and diﬀerence
Deleuze claims that real repetition is not conceptual but ideal. It diﬀers from the repetition
that stands blocked, so to say, as concept, because concepts cannot evolve — their con-
stitution is grounded on immobility. For Deleuze, the work of ideal repetition always im-
plies a temporal evolution, because “to [actually] repeat is to behave in a certain manner,
[not in relation to something general] but in relation to something unique or singular
which has no equal or equivalent.”23 Ideal repetition thus opposes the immobility of the
generality of the particular with the mobility of the universality of the singular, meaning
that it represents the behaviour of the singular. It means that it is always possible to imag-
ine real repetition as singularity, as the unrepeatable unity in itself, as the singular feature
that forms, next to infinite other singular features, the multiplicity of diﬀerence in itself.
Generality opposes ideal repetition for, while the former organises, the latter flows; while
the former connects ordinary particulars, the latter dissociates distinctive universalities.
Yet, while the former opens spaces to variation (and here we may find perhaps the grounds
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for musical coherence), the latter closes times to instantaneousness (because only the in-
stant can evolve). This means that ideal repetition conveys diﬀerence in itself to time, to
the ‘time of being.’ 
The unavoidable immobility given to the generality of the concept is thus opposed by
the unavoidable mobility of the idea, or rather, by the mobility of repetition as idea. As
it is necessarily diﬀerent from the generality of the concept and its immobility, ideal
 repetition acts in a moving way in relation to a particular something, acquiring (arresting)
a specific feature of diﬀerence in itself and, thence, promoting the temporality of this dif-
ference. 
As for Deleuze, there is no ideal repetition without the anteriority and primitivity of
diﬀerence in itself.24 Diﬀerence in itself is original. Thus, obviously, the reality of a diﬀer-
ential fullness is shown to be transcendental and prior to sensibility; it cannot exist (to
us). In order to exist, to pertain to the domain of sensibility, diﬀerence in itself, or rather,
a specific trace of diﬀerence in itself must be arrested, being thus dependent on the mo-
bility installed in the idea by the work of repetition. For this reason, diﬀerence in itself
becomes ideal diﬀerence by means of ideal repetition, while, at the same time, there is no
ideal repetition without the possibility of ideal diﬀerence. This assumption explains why
the rhythmicality of diﬀerence and repetition cannot be actually dissociated, forming a
complex temporal unit. 
Otherwise, material repetition (the experience of repetition) is in many ways an illusion
caused by the conscious or unconscious eﬀort of imposing a conceptual control on na-
ture’s multiplicity. This control expresses many designed architectural symmetries: the
human world of repetition is built on a natural world of non-repetition. True material
repetition seems to be rare: no colour, shape or texture is actually repeated around us, be-
cause in nature there are no stationary objects, nor observers. The experience of repetition
seems to be thus a side eﬀect caused by a conscious or unconscious mind in its constant
eﬀort of blocking, of arresting nature from its diﬀerential depth. 
Diﬀerence in itself is thus regulated, restrained, so to say, by means of a necessary process
of identification that leads to the represented thing. This process, however, is not ignited
in us by the thing itself and only. If it were so,  there would be a total and natural identifi-
cation between the things as they are and their concepts: the things would be totally iden-
tified because they would instruct and conduct us through the process of their own
identification. Alternatively, we may suggest that while the things present themselves to
us integrally as they are (they are concrete, real), we are provided, otherwise, with a power
of identification, our intellect. Identification is thus an operation caused from within; it
is a projection of the self on things — the projection of identity. It is more an echo of the
something similar, a memory-quality, than a true perception of repetition. 
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Concerning the identification process, it seems that the more repetition occurs, the more
intensive, ideal it is. Deleuze also demonstrates that
identical elements repeat only on condition that there is an independence of cases or a dis-
continuity of times such that one appears only when the other has disappeared: within rep-
resentation, repetition is indeed forced to undo itself even as it occurs. Or rather, it does
not occur at all. Repetition [as such, as idea] cannot occur under these conditions. That is
why, in order to represent repetition, contemplative souls must be installed here and there;
passive selves, sub representative syntheses and habituses capable of contracting the cases
or the elements into one another [into concepts], in order that they can subsequently be
reconstituted within a space or time of conservation that belongs to representation itself.
[…] since this contraction is a diﬀerence or modification of the contemplative soul [ —
that is, since modifying ideal repetition is itself a diﬀerential process —], it appears that the
most material repetition occurs only by means of and within a diﬀerence which is drawn
oﬀ by contraction, by means of and within a soul which draws a diﬀerence from repeti-
tion.25
This means that as much as there is no ideal diﬀerence but by the temporal mobility of
ideal repetition, there is no conceptual repetition without the immobilisation of ideal rep-
etition. Ideal repetition captures diﬀerence — forming an ideal object, or soul constituted
by a repetition which is filled by diﬀerence —, but then, as the process of representation
advances, this diﬀerence is drawn oﬀ from true ideal repetition, leaving to repetition no
other choice but to behave as a ghost, emptied from its particularity: concepts are exactly
this. 
Diﬀerence in itself, ideal diﬀerence, ideal repetition and repetition as concept, form a
temporal system of gradual immobilisation. Thus temporally contracted as concept, as
generality, repetition eludes its internal diﬀerence, the diﬀerence which was once idealised,
arrested from diﬀerence in itself. This temporal contraction expresses the merging of the
same into a unique concept, and is related to the most external aspect of repetition. It is
superficial and dependent upon a contracting diﬀerence, which contracts, immensely, the
whole past, because
everything changes. If a diﬀerence is necessarily (in depth) part of a superficial repetition
from which it is drawn, the question is: of what does this diﬀerence consist? This diﬀerence
is a contraction, but in what does this contraction consist? Is it not itself the most contracted
degree or the most concentrated level of past which coexists with itself at all levels of relax-
ation and in all degrees? This was Bergson’s splendid hypothesis: the entire past at every
moment but at diverse degrees and levels [my stress], of which the present is only the most
contracted, the most concentrated.26
This temporal contraction that leads to the represented thing is thus achieved by the
(gradual) contraction of the whole past, and obviously, I argue, of the whole future, in
infinite relaxing levels, or degrees of temporal complexity, as I call them. Even when im-
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mobile, representation may oﬀer diverse images (interpretations, understandings), be-
cause in its gradual emergence it is subjected to diﬀerent levels of temporal contraction. 
Following this train of thought, we may be able to represent the idea of repetition as well
as the idea of diﬀerence: while there is a temporal path oriented to the immobility of the
concept, to generality, there must be another path oriented to the mobility of the idea, to
particularity. If past and future may be drawn at the surface of repetition, as contractions,
there must be always the hope for another past and another future, that is, their creative,
expanding alternatives.
Repetition stands, on the one hand, as the bare material repetition of successive elements
or external parts, and, on the other hand, as the ideal repetition of totalities coexisting in
diﬀerent degrees of temporal contraction. We thus find, grounding our cognition as well
as our music, a kind of successive (extensive and quantitative) and a kind of coexisting
(intensive and qualitative) repetition. 
Diﬀerence, in turn, is either conceptually drawn oﬀ by an external, shallow repetition or
ideally captured, displaced and disguised, as it were, by a profound repetition.27 Now we
may find likewise a kind of successive and a kind of coexisting diﬀerence, which however
cannot be conceived without the work of repetition: the successive diﬀerence we observe
between the elements of a shallow repetition (because drawn oﬀ from it), and the coex-
isting diﬀerence we intuit between one another ideal repetition, as the interval of their
reach. 
The elementary, horizontal repetition is the most relaxed level of a totalising, vertical rep-
etition, which intensively evolves in diﬀerent levels or degrees of complexity. This vertical
repetition has its most contracted version when diﬀerence is totally drawn oﬀ from it.
Deleuze explains that
Diﬀerence is therefore between two repetitions: between the superficial repetition of the
identical and instantaneous external elements that it contracts, and the profound repetition
of the internal totalities of an always-variable past, of which it is the most contracted level.
This is how diﬀerences have two faces, or the synthesis of time has two aspects: one, Habitus,
turned towards the first repetition which it renders possible; the other, Mnemosyne, oﬀered
up to the second repetition from which it results.28
Diﬀerence as Habitus is the most relaxed level of a totalising repetition; related to the ex-
ternal aspects of repetition. Diﬀerence as Mnemosyne is the tensional level of a totalising
repetition, related to the internal aspects of repetition. Two diﬀerences and two repeti-
tions: a contracting diﬀerence that renders the repetition of the same, which is negative
and contemplates diﬀerence from outside, as an extracted power; and an expanding diﬀer-
ence allowed by the repetition of totalities which coexist at diﬀerent levels or degrees of
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(temporal) complexity, which is positive and contemplates diﬀerence from inside, as its
subject and force proper. 
Deleuze points out that memory is, nevertheless, the first form in which the opposing
characteristics of the two repetitions appear. He says that 
one of these repetitions is of the same, having no diﬀerence but that which is subtracted or
drawn oﬀ; the other is of the diﬀerent, and includes diﬀerence. One has fixed terms and
places; the other essentially includes displacements and disguise. One is negative and by
default; the other is positive and by excess. One is of elements, extrinsic parts, cases and
times; the other is of variable internal totalities, degrees and levels. One involves succession
in fact; the other coexistence in principle. One is static; the other dynamic. One is extensive;
the other intensive. One is ordinary; the other distinctive and involving singularities. One
is horizontal; the other vertical. One is developed and must be explicated; the other is en-
veloped and must be interpreted. One is a repetition of equality and symmetry in the eﬀect;
the other is a repetition of inequality as though it were a repetition of asymmetry in the
cause. One is repetition of mechanism and precision; the other repetition of selection and
freedom. One is bare repetition that can be masked only afterwards and in addition; the
other is a clothed repetition of which the masks, the displacements and disguises are the
first, last and only elements.29
However, Deleuze claims, it is not enough to exercise this sort of opposition. We should
pay attention that there is a creative order sustaining one another repetition. In this, ideal
repetition stands as the reason for conceptual repetition. Indeed, 
it is not enough to oppose two repetitions, one bare and material in accordance with the
identity and default of the concept, the other clothed, psychical and metaphysical in accor-
dance with the diﬀerence and excess of the always positive idea. This second repetition
should be the reason of the first. The clothed and living, vertical repetition which includes
diﬀerence should be regarded as the cause, of which the bare, material and horizontal rep-
etition (from which a diﬀerence is merely drawn oﬀ) is only and eﬀect.30 Clothed (repeti-
tion) lies underneath the bare (repetition), and produces or excretes it as though it were
the eﬀect of its own secretion. The secret repetition surrounds itself with a mechanical and
bare repetition as though this were the final barrier which indicates here and there the outer
limits of the diﬀerences that it communicates within a mobile system. […] The words and
actions of men give rise to bare, material repetitions, but as eﬀects of more profound repe-
titions of a diﬀerent kind (eﬀects in a causal, optical and vestiary sense). Repetition is pathos
and the philosophy of repetition is pathology. However, there are so many pathologies, so
many repetitions entwined in one another.31
When discussing these interactions, Deleuze essentially tries to demonstrate the distinc-
tion that exists between the common perception of diﬀerence and repetition, and the re-
ality of diﬀerence and repetition as ideas. Now adding to the point that memory is the
first form in which the opposing characteristics of the two repetitions appear, Bergson
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similarly suggests that we are theoretically confronted by two independent memories, in
which
…the first records, in the form of [compound] images, all the events of our daily life as they
occur in time; it neglects no detail; […] it stores up the past by the mere necessity of its
own nature. By this memory is made possible the intelligent, or rather intellectual, recog-
nition of perception already experienced; in it we take refuge every time that, in the search
for a particular image, we remount the slope of our past. But every perception is prolonged
into a nascent action; and while the images are taking their place and order in this memory,
the movements which continue them modify the organism and create in the body new dis-
positions toward action. Thus is gradually formed an experience of an entirely diﬀerent
order, which accumulates within the body a series of mechanisms would up and ready, with
relations to external stimuli ever numerous and more varied and answers ready prepared to
an ever growing number of possible solicitations. We become conscious of these mecha-
nisms as they come into play; this consciousness of a whole past of eﬀorts stored up in the
present is indeed also a memory, but a memory in the present and looking only to the future.
[…] In truth it no longer represents our past to us, it acts it; and if it deserves the name of
memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful
eﬀect into the present moment. Of these two memories, of which the one imagines and the
other repeats, the second may supply the place of the first and even sometimes be mistaken
for it.32
Bergson indicates that the deep memory imagines diﬀerences and the shallower memory
enacts repetitions. For him, the shallow-embodied memory that repeats is never separated
from the memory that imagines; it is geared towards actions, by repeating accumulated
experiences, dates and places, the ever-diﬀerent moments of life. Readdressing Bergson’s
argument in Deleuzian terms, it could be suggested that the contraction of repetition
would actually “have two aspects: one by which it bears upon a physical element of rep-
etition that it modifies, the other by which it concerns a psychic totality that is repeatable
in diﬀerent degrees:”33
We repeat twice simultaneously, but not the same repetition: once mechanically and mate-
rially in breadth, and once symbolically and by mean of simulacra; first we repeat the parts,
then we repeat the whole on which the parts depend. These two repetitions do not take
place in the same dimension, they coexist: one is a [melodic-like] repetition of instants, the
other [a harmonic-like repetition] of the past, one is a repetition of elements, the other is
totalising; and the most profound and productive is obviously not the most visible or the
one which produces the most eﬀect.34
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III – RHYTHMICALIZATION HYPOTHESES
The whole rhythmicalization argument hereafter presented gradually develops on the
previous basis, by means of five main hypotheses. Very initially, I argue that our musicality
emerges temporally as a complex and heterogeneous duration (in a Bergsonian sense)
of multiplicities (in a Deleuzian sense), which is actuated, so to say, at the dialectical merg-
ing point (actually the moment of coming together) of the powers of sensibility and un-
derstanding, thus answering to their mutual influence.
For emergence is a process whereby entities, patterns, and regularities of a higher order
arise out of interactions among smaller or simpler entities which themselves do not ex-
hibit the emergent properties. A property of a system is said to be emergent thus if it is a
new outcome of some other properties of the system and their interaction, while it is itself
unexpected and diﬀerent from them. This notion is present, in diﬀerent ways, both in
Bergson’s and Deleuze’s philosophies. In Bergson, when he declares that the uniqueness
of every experience carries paradoxically the whole past: though singular an experience,
it is in fact never so, because it is always subjectively redone as a sign for uncountable and
complex emerging remembrances that, being neither pure matter nor pure memory, grad-
ually assume the form of the represented thing.35 In Deleuze, when he says that the iden-
tity of the concept cannot contend with nor fulfil the  multiplicity of the idea:36 there are
always infinite emerging senses, intensities orbiting any given concept, so much that no
concept whatsoever may be said to perfectly consummate, all constantly deserving a
philosophical, political, artistic, etc.,  re-examination.
So, I argue that our musicality37 is produced, excited, so to say, during the experience, as
far as we (following Kant) take by experience the act ignited by the clash of the powers
of sensibility and understanding.38 Our musicality, in a broad perspective, is inevitable
just because it cannot be excluded nor isolated from the totality of our living experiences.
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Only under this condition, the art of music can be representative and meaningful: because
the superficial musical experience, often conditioned by the final form of the piece of
music, is deeply anchored in the musicality of the experience itself.
Saying that our musicality emerges temporally as a complex, heterogeneous duration of
multiplicities implies a long philosophical tradition that goes back to Aristotle,39 a tradi-
tion that, in discussing the notion of complexity, reaches the Deleuzian readings of
Bergsonism. We find traces of this everywhere in Deleuze’s teachings. For example, in ex-
plaining Spinoza, he writes that “when a body ‘encounters’ another body, or an idea an-
other idea, it happens that the two sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole,
and sometimes one decomposes the other, destroying the cohesion of its parts.”40 Or
also, when discussing Nietzsche’s thought, he declares that 
every relationship of forces [being unequal] constitutes a body — whether it is chemical,
biological, social or political — […] This is why the body is always the fruit of chance, in
the Nietzschean sense, and appears as the most ‘astonishing’ thing, much more astonishing,
in fact, than consciousness and spirit. But chance, the relation of force with force, is also the
essence of force. The birth of a living body is not therefore surprising since every body is
living, being the ‘arbitrary’ product of the forces of which it is composed. Being composed
of a plurality of irreducible forces the body is a multiple phenomenon, its unity is that of a
multiple phenomenon, a ‘unity of domination’.41
The heterogeneous duration, mentioned above, means the Deleuzian body of our musi-
cality. I think that this body is formed by unequal forces that interact, exchanging their
multiplicity to constitute a unity, that of a multiple phenomena. As pointed out, I have
distinguished, among all possible, two main forces: sensibility and understanding —
which alone or isolated cannot yet constitute a body. Sensibility as a force eternally di-
rected to the incommensurable, to the wholeness and nothingness; and understanding
as a force oriented to the commensurable, to partialness. The body of our musicality is
thus formed — it emerges I suggest — because our sensibility and understanding clash,
because both strive for dominance. 
As T. Fraser says, the “dichotomy between time felt and time understood is a hallmark of
scientific industrial civilisation, a sort of collective schizophrenia.”42 I seek to overcome
this dichotomy by putting it forward as the very cause of our musical experiences. Because
time felt is indivisible and time understood is pure division, it may be the case of suppos-
ing that the notion of music in us and for us originates from the perpetual conflict of two
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impossibilities: the impossibility of feeling, of sensing, and the impossibility of knowing,
of understanding life as it is. Because the continuity of life is insurmountable, we are
forced to sever it either intellectually or psychologically; but since the whole set of emerg-
ing articulated senses and feelings that are created according to the actual necessity, always
impose a number of barriers to the experience of such continuity, we also need to re-join
them, to look through them and beyond them. As Bachelard says,
in vain do we try to diﬀerentiate between understanding a process and living it, for in what
we call living a time we must always distinguish between what we know and do not know,
since our use of this phrase implies that we have immediate and silent knowledge of duration.
We do not though live ignorance any more than we see darkness.43
For I suppose, even though absolute in its continuity, the complex duration that grounds
our musical ideas flows in quite opposite but complementary, dialectical directions: ac-
cording to the power of our understanding and allowing for the sensible; and according
to the power of our sensibility by taking into account the intellectual. The complexity of
this duration reveals itself to be full of ruptures, links, revolutions and sub-routines, minor-
times, sub-times. This complex temporal panorama, the time of our nascent musical ideas,
which emerges and blends with the time of life, stands, I think, as the emergent order of
dichotomies and foldings, contrasts and symbiosis, developments and variations, which
are perceived at the surface of a piece of music that, by actually reflecting this complexity,
is in itself inseparable from it.
Now, I argue that the musical compositional process proper is also emergent, and installed
in a first rhythmicalization. Once installed, this first rhythmicalization imprints the het-
erogeneous duration of our musicality with a complex rhythmic orientation, with a given
creative guidance, marked by many inventions or refutations of past- and a future-bound
compositional archetypes.
In itself, our musicality is complex,44 heterogeneous and multiple. It is formed, as it were,
by a profuse mixture of temporal fluxes, of diﬀerent speeds and volumes. Moreover, our
musicality is, more than an abstract concept, a sort of eternally diﬀuse musical power we
all share. I assume that the actualisation of this power, either expressively or interpreta-
tively, is not a direct, pure answer to its complexity as a whole, but it always depends upon
a compositional process that delimits a domain inside the whole of our musicality — a
compositional process that must be created within this complexity, along with virtually
infinite other temporal delimitations and orientations that inhabit in it.
It is this attempt to determine the content and meaning of the notion of musical inspira-
tion I employ here: music is inspired as it traverses a given compositional process, which
involves diﬀerent levels of temporal complexity. Here I consider one and same thing mu-
sical inspiration and musical composition. Musical inspiration follows the emergence of
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a fundamental rhythmicality, which may be initially defined as a rhythmically-oriented
field of musicality, as a broad and deep compositional force. This force is qualified in its
very beginning, in its emergence, by a prevalent vital action either of sensibility or un-
derstanding, to become therefore a force of musical lyricism or dramaticism, respectively. 
To be musically lyrical means to compose (to orient) the musicality under the guidance
of indeterminacies,45 as sensibility is indeterminate. About this, what is transcendental
in Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism lies in a production of sensibility. It cannot be de-
fined in terms of 
simple receptivity thereby assuming sensations already formed, [related] to the a priori
forms of their representation which are determined as space and time. […] Receptivity
must be defined [otherwise] in terms of the formation of local selves or egos, in terms of
the passive syntheses of contemplation or contraction, thereby accounting simultaneously
for the possibility of experiencing sensations, the power of reproducing them.46
According to Deleuze’s argument, the guidance of sensibility excludes a priori musical
forms or processes, because sensibility itself produces its own many and distinct senses,
including those that account for the experience of musical sensations. 
On the other hand, to be musically dramatic means to compose determinacies. Following
Bachelard’s arguments, I assume understanding as the power of determining things di-
alectically, based on previous dialectical processes. Determinism is often contrasted with
free will. In contrast, I do not consider causal, nomological or necessitarian forms of de-
terminism, nor pre-determinism or fatalism and the like. Following Bergson’s thought,
all these notions must be refused because they are the result of an illegitimate translation
of the unextended into the extended. In Bergson’s words, 
definite facts are appealed against freedom, some physical others psychological. Sometimes
it is asserted that our actions are necessitated by our feelings, our ideas and the whole pre-
ceding series of our conscious states; sometimes freedom is denounced as being incompat-
ible with the fundamental properties of matter, and in particular with the principle of
conservation of energy. Hence two kinds of determinism, two apparently diﬀerent empirical
proofs of universal necessity. We shall show that the second of these two forms is reducible
to the first, and that all determinism involves a psychological hypothesis: we shall then prove
that psychological determinism itself, and the refutations with are given of it, rest on an in-
accurate conception of the multiplicity of conscious states, or rather of duration.47
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Approaching the Bergsonian conception of duration from Bachelard’s perspective, I 
argue that the power of understanding produces its own many and distinct determinative
senses, including those that account for thinking about music. This is not a challenge to
free will, since many products of understanding respond accordingly to many distinct
levels of complexity. It is impossible to reproduce a given conscious and even less an un-
conscious one; they are unrepeatable. It remains to our philosophical, artistic enquiries
only to ask about their diﬀerentiation and about the diﬀerential principle that grounds
their uniqueness. 
Beyond that, at a level of superior specialisation, this profound compositional force is re-
qualified. Firstly, according to the particularising influence of sensibility on understanding,
an influence that is temporally expansive, and aligned to diﬀerence in itself (to say it with
Deleuze), such as to represent a power of eternal innovation, the concreteness of the new.
Secondly, according to the generalising influence of understanding on sensibility, an in-
fluence that is temporally contractive, and aligned to the principle of conceptual identi-
fication.  
A given compositional process evolves in complex ways (more or less determined, more
or less indeterminate) during the installation of rhythmicalized times, of musical times.
Times that are creatively rhythmicalized, emerging from the inside of the heterogeneity
of the duration of our musicality and, beyond, from the heterogeneity of life. Times that
evolve from plain, still diﬀuse temporal potentials (contingent, archetypical and primitive
temporal forms of perceiving and understanding the reality) to the point of firmly be-
coming rhythmic ideas.
There are some hints in Lúcio Alberto Pinheiro dos Santos and Henri Lefebvre’s Rhyth-
manalysis,48 as it is presented by Bachelard,49 but the meaning of the term rhythmical-
ization in use here is new. It means the process of producing foundational, intermediate
and superficial rhythmic ideas. It is usual to suppose the existence of three analytical levels
in music, fore-, middle- and background musical realities.50 I approach this schema, but
from a quite diﬀerent point of view. I also identify three levels of compositional complex-
ity, but the diﬀerence is that, here, musical background is traceable but not yet directly
observable; it does not result in original sound-forms or formal schemas, as the Schenke-
rian Ursatz suggests — the underlying structure, in its simplest form, from which the
musical work as a whole would originate. I argue in contrast that the musical background
must be seen, first of all, as a creative field, formed by fine temporal orientations. Musical
background is thus fully ideal and maturates rhythmically into simple compositional no-
tions: the notions of characterization and non-characterization, and the notions of rou-
tinization and non-routinization. 
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The notion of characterization stands, simply, as a temporal orientation that fixes and or-
ders the heterogeneity of our musicality around certain temporal impulses that privilege
identity, recognition and repetition, ‘the step backwards,’ the past, and also hierarchy, ar-
ticulation and stratification. The notion of routinization, otherwise, privileges routines,
clear rules of conduct, cohesion and coherence. 
We do not need to use sound forms to compose through these notions since they take in-
finite shapes, and may be seen as compositional archetypes. For, I think, a given compo-
sitional process is always individually ignited by certain temporal orientations, as it is first
of all archetypically defined to meet determinate expressive and interpretative necessities.
Depending on the case, the power of the characterization or of the routinization, or their
negation, will dominate. 
Moreover, there is a second, intermediary compositional stage or level, manifested as a
second rhythmicalization, which is responsible for the specialisation of the fundamental
rhythmic orientation of the compositional process — in the sense of the formalisation
or de-formalisation of its general extensive qualities, of its ‘spatiality,’ according to some
dialectic rhythmical operations deduced from the direct experience of the mobility of
matter.
This second instance of rhythmicalization, which is internal to the first, reorients the com-
positional process as a whole. It represents a sort of musical middle-ground that is not
topped hierarchically but embedded into a given musical background. It emerges and is
thus also placed, as it were, inside the body of a musicality, composing with a plurality of
irreducible forces the multiple phenomena that forms the unity of the process of musical
composition. 
It is thus for two reasons. To begin with, because, in order to remain creative, a given mu-
sical background must be considered from the compositional point of view, and taking
into account the viability of indeterminacy as much as of determinacy. To understand
musical background as a creative field implies considering its dialectical nature, its tem-
poral mobility and, consequently, the impossibility of deriving from it any fixed, all-per-
vasive compositional rule. We may admit influences, ‘transparencies,’ expressive and
interpretative callers, but not rules. Consequently, I think, the response of middle-ground
music to any kind of stratification principle is sometimes contingent but never necessary. 
The second reason is that musical middle-ground, as here suggested, emerges by  obeying
a qualitative change handled by diﬀerent creative powers and faculties than those vital
forces that ground it. Musical middle-ground resonates, so to say, the calling of diﬀerent
memory and imagination impulses. Memory and imagination impulses and their conse-
quent rhythmical production integrate the creative powers of sensibility and understand-
ing, instead of laying architectonically on top of them. Memory and imagination co-exist
within the temporal interpenetration of sensibility and understanding, constantly quali-
fying and re-qualifying this interpenetration. 
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This notion is based on Bergson’s claim that we are provided shallow and deeper memory
types. In his words, memory creates
anew the present perception, or rather it doubles this perception by reflecting upon it either
its own image or some other memory-image of the same kind. If the retained or remembered
image will not cover all the details of the image that is being perceived, an appeal is made
to the deeper and more distant regions of memory, until other details that are already known
come to project themselves upon those details that remain unperceived. And the operation
may go on indefinitely — memory strengthening and enriching perception, which, in its
turn becoming wider, draws into itself a growing number of complementary recollections.51
However, considering that all we have of memories are their resonances, their impulses,
I find it necessary to match the Bergsonian assumption of memory levels to shallow and
deeper types of imagination. It is necessary to follow Bergson on these matters because, 
we are dimly aware of successions in nature much more rapid than those of our internal
states. How are we to conceive them, and what is this duration of which the capacity goes
beyond all our imagination? It is not ours, assuredly; but neither is it that homogeneous
and impersonal duration, the same for everything and for every one, which flows onward,
indiﬀerent and void, external to all that endures. […] In reality there is no one rhythm of
duration; it is possible to imagine many diﬀerent rhythms which, slower or faster, measure
the degree of tension or relaxation of diﬀerent kinds of consciousness and thereby fix their
respective places in the scale of being.52
We remember and imagine the world in diﬀerent ways, according to diﬀerent degrees of
tension or relaxation of memory and imagination, diﬀerent levels of consciousness. Mem-
ory and imagination impulses form an intermediary creative zone inside a broad creative
field. Thus many new rhythmical notions emerge and create the possibility of advancing
compositionally, a step further, towards the final musical formalisation of the piece of
music. They manifest, so to say, a second rhythmical translation: characterizations and
routinizations are transmuted into strong and weak forms of symmetries and asymmetries,
some of them superficial and immediate, that many times emerge as agile and involuntary
impulses, some others more profound and mediate, emerging as slower and more con-
scious impulses. I call them musical temporalities.
There is a temporality that resonates a kind of shallow memory, which is delimited by
bodily stimuli. Here we find memory as gesture, as inborn or conditioned reflex, that
demonstrates a greater commitment to regularity as principle. 
There is a temporality that, otherwise, resonates a shallow imagination, a sort of transitory
temporal realm placed, as it were, between bodily and mental impressions. Here we find
imagination as a vital force that fluctuates between the gesture and the anti-gesture, be-
tween the conditioning and the anti-conditioning factor, as it demonstrates a greater com-
mitment to irregularity as  principle. 
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There is also a temporality that resonates a sort of deeper memory, which aims at the bal-
ance of regular and irregular impulses. I consider this temporality as the mediator of the
gesture and the anti-gesture, of conditioning and anti-conditioning factors. It is to the
compositional process as the principle of tonality is to the presentation of tonal musical
works. It is regulatory, and exerts its power of regulation by always looking for the most
eﬃcient solution. 
Lastly, there is a temporality that resonates otherwise a kind of deeper imagination. I con-
sider it the arguer: it demands the annihilation of balance lines between the gesture and
the anti-gesture, conditioning and anti-conditioning factors, as it demonstrates a greater
commitment to imbalance as principle. It is thus de-regulatory, and exerts its power of
de-regulation always looking for the most eﬃcient method of problematisation. 
Yet a third compositional stage follows. A stage in the context of a third rhythmicalization
— of the musical foreground — which emerges  surrounded by many types of memory
and imagination and around definite musical meanings.
I suggest a functional division between systemic and metric musical meanings, which are
to be conceived compositionally much closer now to sound-forms than before. They are
about to erupt, to materialise, to form the ‘musical diagram’. 
While the whole argument raised from first and second rhythmical levels makes use
mostly of philosophical and psychological orientations respectively, now, at this point, I
distinguish musical systems and metrics, having in mind a  structural approach. But again,
any given musical language, so to say, is hierarchically built on those philosophical and
psychological bases. It is rather a necessary part of them, as it composes with them — to
put it using the reading given by Deleuze to Nietzsche’s doctrine of expressive power53
— a unified body of multiplicities.
Now, the piece of music proper gradually arises. It happens irregularly, amid many creative
spasms and voluntary architectonical steps. At this level, all main compositional decisions
are metrically related and, in this context, new rhythmic ideas may emerge: the musical
system is gradually metrified, becoming a piece; becoming its own example, a bit of its
own rhythmical properties, its own applied case study. This perspective is related to Stock-
hausen’s compositional theory and practice: at the limit, not only the piece of music but
any sound is in itself a marvellous complex metric structure. That is why studying sound
properties is always advisable, because in this way we prepare ourselves to the discovery
(and consequent artistic appropriation) of new, unknown metric arrangements, to the
discovery of new musical pieces. 
In the end, a musical piece’s surface is always quantity, and as quantity it surely can be
measured, analysed. One may thus expect that the work of musical analysis is eternally
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circumscribed by many sorts of quantitative issues, even though the musical analysis
could always trespass this very quantitative boundary in order to extract quality from
quantity, that is, in order to make quantitative aspects meaningful so that one would de-
vise something like an ‘interpretative machine,’ that would allow us to travel back towards
the foundation of our musicality.
At this point, the compositional process is apt to manifest many  architectonic rhythmical
notions. I argue that the structured spatiality of a musical piece is thus systematically dis-
tributed along distinct layers of musical meaning and distinct zones of projection of mu-
sical meaning, which are consequently distributed in metric images of particular fashion
— diﬀerentiated according to their melodic or harmonic uses, or rather, according to the
melodic-like and harmonic-like distribution of musical accentuation.54
After all, I argue that the piece of music allows for a process of musical representation
that also acts rhythmically reflecting or translating the rhythmicality of the piece’s com-
positional process. This rhythmicality, perceived at the surface and beyond the surface
of the musical piece, reflects particular temporal images and aﬀections,  individual or col-
lective, marked by impulses of disregard or celebration in relation to the most intimate
experience of this rhythmicality, and yet of conformism or  transgression in relation to
social, cultural or historical rules or values projected on this rhythmicality.
I suggest that musical representation must not be limited to nor delimited by a musical
foreground, by the assemblage of elements presented on the surface of the piece. Musical
representation is essentially an attitude powered by one’s and also by a given society’s de-
gree of compositional attachment. This was remarkably called to our attention by John
Cage’s 4’33” (1952). Music is, or may be, presented by any assemblage of sounds. But
this assumption does not imply that, once presented, a given assemblage of sounds im-
mediately signifies music to us. The proper notion or idea of music seems to depend on
how the assemblage is simultaneously perceived and understood. In this perspective,
Cage’s 4’33” may or may not be music under diﬀerent circumstances. In order to be so,
one may listen to the assemblage of sounds guided, so to say, either by aesthetic or poietic
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beginning of a musical event that marks oﬀ accented points in time. Accents are, therefore, points of
initiation.” Joel Lester, The Rhythms of Tonal Music, 16.
manners of feeling and thinking, ideally by both. And these manners may be strongly in-
timate and irreducible, very particular of one’s sensibility and understanding, but also
given or territorialized, in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s wording, within diverse strata of sig-
nificance granted by social means. Strata which “are acts of capture, [which] are like ‘black
holes’ or occlusions striving to seize whatever comes within their reach [as they] operate
by coding and territorialisation upon the earth; [and] proceed simultaneously by code
and by territoriality.”55
The territory of music, like any territory, is stratified, coded, demarked in diﬀerent ways
by diﬀerent individuals and social groups. But it is also always on the verge of being der-
ritorialized, transgressed in order to be reterritorialized in a new fashion. For the territory
of music is also drawn from its own negation. It is its permanent reconstitution. Music is
always new. In this sense, 4’33” ’s musical representation responds to the very same set
of representational paths presented by every other musical piece; its singularity lying in
its absolute temporal transparency only, in its absolute lyricalness. 
I suggest that musical representation mirrors the rhythmical dynamism and heterogeneity
creatively devised along the compositional process. If we assume that this dynamism and
heterogeneity is reflected in diverse ways by the surface of a musical piece, then musical
representation would access diﬀerent levels of temporal depth and density by traversing
the musical foreground. It would do so, first of all, according to the relative power of
 penetration of one’s attention in regard to the originality of the compositional process,
but also to the compliance one demonstrates in regard to a greater or lesser collective
 attachment of the many to determinate musical territories. 
The compositional process is somewhat remade by one’s musical representation, which
returns to the emergent basis of his own musicality, so that the generality of the notion
of time ends up being reflected by the particularity of the notion of musical time. The
representational act is understood always in the context of its power of penetration, ac-
cording to the interpretative reach of a given expressivity. The musicality of musical rep-
resentation implies a resonance of the rhythmical complexity of the composition by the
rhythmical complexity of representation itself. In the end, the interpretative reach of rep-
resentation is defined by its own rhythmical complexity, its musicality. As the rhythmical
complexity of the composition answers functionally the need to instill in it several levels
of depth and density, of articulation and continuity in this same way, musical represen-
tation also reflects diﬀerent rhythmical complexities by aligning itself to those levels of
depth and density in as many diﬀerent ways as necessary. In this sense, music is truly per-
meated by expressive and interpretative contrasts, distributed compositionally according
to diverse models of temporal complexity. 
On the one hand, the most original rhythmicality testifies a given expressive prerogative
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which points out, at the limit, the play of non-determinacy and diﬀerentiation, lyricism
and the perpetual expansion of musical time, forms of musical freedom, presentness and
concreteness. On the other hand, the least original rhythmicality testifies a given inter-
pretative prerogative which points out the play of determinacy and repetition, dramaticity
and temporal contraction, forms of control, causality and generality. Musical represen-
tation is therefore never neutral, because the attitude in face of articulation and formal
balance in music is always related to the communicability and sociability of the musical
discourse in a given context. Otherwise, the treatment of musical continuity and formal
unbalance always brings a revolutionary musical datum, which is cause of the musical




and the rhythmic conception of the musical idea
1 Deleuze, Diﬀerence and Repetition, 2.
2 Schoenberg, The Musical Idea…, 99.
On chickens and eggs
An attempt to recognise and define the
musical idea stands in clear contradiction to
the sentimental poeticising notion that a
composition might arise from the motive as
germ of the whole, as a plant grows from a
seed. This is a childish notion, quite apart
from the fact that it neither questions nor
answers the problem that next arises: where
does the seed come from, and what is it?
Which comes first, the chicken or the egg?2
A. Schoenberg
On heads and hearts
The head is the organ of exchange, but the
heart is the amorous organ of repetition.
[… ] If repetition concerns the most interior
element of the will, this is because everything
changes around the will. […] Pius Servien
rightly distinguished two languages: the
language of science, dominated by the symbol
of equality (quantitative generality), in
which each term may be replaced by others;
and [the] lyrical language, in which every




n the bases previously presented, I now develop a critical view of some pro-
cesses of music composition, considering them in the perspective of the general problem
of time in music, and their representation. In the current chapter, I distinguish and discuss
three main temporal complexities3 — creative powers or impulses — that any musical
compositional project would ideally share: the temporal complexity of musical times, that
of musical temporalities and that of musical temporalizations, as I call them.4
One must always consider though, that the distinctions I here present do not stand as
precise ruptures in a creative musical flux, nor they respect necessarily a determinate cog-
nitive order — following here the creative doctrine of the virtual, discussed extensively
by Deleuze in his development of Bergson’s temporal findings5 — as none is more im-
portant in compositional terms than another. They are not hierarchical, stratified in any
O
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3 Temporal complexities considered in the sense presented above, for instance in page 20, as duration
and multiplicity forming the idea, to which Bachelard’s notion of instant is also crucial. However the
idea, including the musical idea, may be described by Deleuze and Bergson as multiplicity, and as
such as a fluid and engaging, eternally renewed force, forever resignified by the complexities of life,
there are always temporal ruptures, absolutely new events: we always resort to articulations of creativity.
That considered, the distinction of main temporal complexities that ideally form the process of musical
composition is necessary in order to investigate musical creativity further, being in itself a fundamental
compositional demand.
4 Many analytical approaches in music are tripartite, taking into account ground, intermediate and
surface complexities. One may consider, for instance, the analytical model proposed by Heinrich
Schenker, in which musical substance is hierarchically stratified, accordingly, as pertaining to fore,
middle and background layers of musical sense; one may yet ponder upon semiological or grammar
grounded approaches, mainly after Chomsky, as proposed for example by  J. J. Nattiez, Lerdahl and
Jackendoﬀ, and others, as Nicolas Ruwet or Otto Laske. Even though not directly related to nor ori-
ented by these approaches, my own discussion still aligns with them by cogitating the existence of
ground, intermediate and surface temporal complexities in music. See J. J. Nattiez, Fondements d'une
Senmiologie de la Musique (Paris: Union Generale d'Editions, 1975); Lerdahl and Jackendoﬀ, “Toward
a Formal Theory of Tonal Music,” in Journal of Music Theory, vol. 21, no. 1 (1977), 111-172; Nicolas
Ruwet, “Theorie et Methodes dans les Etudes Musicales,” in Musique en Jeu, no. 17, (1975): 11-36;
Otto Laske, “Introduction to a Generative Theory of Music,” Sonological Reports, no. lb, (1975). 
5 According to Deleuze: “The virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed or a problem to
be solved: it is the problem which orientates, conditions and engenders solutions, but these do not
resemble the conditions of the problem. […] The Bergsonian schema which unites Creative Evolution
and Matter and Memory begins with the account of a gigantic memory, a multiplicity formed by the
virtual coexistence of all the sections of the 'cone', each section being the repetition of all the others
and being distinguished from them only by the order of the relations and the distribution of singular
points. Then, the actualisation of this mnemonic virtual appears to take the form of the creation of
divergent lines, each of which corresponds to a virtual section and represents a manner of solving a
problem, but also the incarnation of the order of relations and distribution of singularities peculiar to
the given section in diﬀerentiated [sic] species and parts. Diﬀerence and repetition in the virtual
ground the movement of actualisation, of diﬀerentiation [sic] as creation. They are thereby substituted
for the identity and the resemblance of the possible, which inspires only a pseudo-movement, the
false movement of realisation understood as abstract limitation.” Gilles Deleuze, Diﬀerence and Repe-
tition, 264.
way. They might be said to be qualitatively distinct, but in the sense of the Bergsonian durée
réelle, of distinct elements forming an indissoluble mixture, of forming a multiplicity, a
musical idea.6 It is important to note that I am aiming here, and in all that follows, to pen-
etrate the proper notion of musical idea as it has been directly suggested by Schoenberg
and Stockhausen — who are, I assume, next to Messiaen, the major and most important
theorist-composers of the twentieth century. This eﬀort depends fundamentally on the
Bergsonian philosophy of time, a philosophy that bravely faces many important problems
raised by Kant, and addresses these problems to the creative mind of twentieth century.
It also depends however, both on the direct critique of Bergsonism, oﬀered by Bachelard,
and, on the consequent and crucial Deleuzian support, defence and expansion of
Bergsonism that still illuminates the thought and understanding of the problem of time. 
On these grounds, I argue here that the process of music composition is always a tempo-
rally complex matter, composed by several interwoven creative moments which integrate,
interpenetrate and mutually cooperate in distinct creative tasks, exchanging their powers.
Obviously, we may want, try to isolate these moments in order to investigate their par-
ticular qualities, but always having in mind that, being temporal, they never restrict them-
selves to the limits of their own capacities: like the covalent bonds connecting hydrogen
and oxygen atoms to form water, or the mutual interference of two wave systems on a
surface of a fluid, (Fig. 3.1), these capacities are integrated into a unitary but complex
temporal substance.
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I – MUSICAL TIMES
Musical inspiration
Musical times form a first, fundamental compositional rhythmical complexity. It was sug-
gested above, earlier in chapter one,8 that this primordial rhythmicality emerges as a con-
tinuous heterogeneous creative line, as an answer to the dynamism of profound,
fundamental ontological impulses, and to the mutual influence of the powers of sensibility
and understanding, as they have been philosophically considered in the twentieth century,
mainly after the philosophical work by Bergson and Deleuze on Kant’s.
Accordingly, with this in mind, we may now readdress the Schoenbergian notion of mu-
sical idea considering that the compositional process we experience (ideally and in-
tensely) as gradually forming a musical piece — which is reflected (extensively) in the
piece itself —, does not emerge and operate only as thinking,9 as Schoenberg would per-
haps say, but rather as a temporal linkage, (Fig. 3.2), eﬀected by the rhythmical interchange
of those powers (sensibility and understanding). 
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notion of idea it is asserted that our capacity of reasoning may be seen not as something given a priori,
but as something that emerges creatively from life as life is, once we see ourselves emerging from it. See
also the discussion on sensibility and understanding presented in page 115 onwards.
9 Thinking as the process of thought, of reasoning, of judgment, also in the sense conveyed by Deleuze
when discussing representation, which for him “is a site of transcendental illusion. This illusion comes
in several forms, four interrelated forms which correspond particularly to thought, sensibility, the Idea
and being. In eﬀect, thought is covered over by an ‘image’ made up of postulates which distort both
its operation and its genesis. These postulates culminate in the position of an identical thinking subject,
which functions as a principle of identity for concepts in general. A slippage occurs in the transition
from the Platonic world to the world of representation (which again is why we can present Plato as
the origin or at the crossroads of a decision). The ‘sameness’ of the Platonic Idea which serves as model
and is guaranteed by the Good gives way to the identity of an originary concept grounded in a thinking
subject. The thinking subject brings to the concept its subjective concomitants: memory, recognition
and self-consciousness. Nevertheless, it is the moral vision of the world which is thereby extended
and represented in this subjective identity aﬃrmed as a common sense [Cogitatio natura universalis].”
Deleuze, Diﬀerence and Repetition, 334.






To propose that the compositional process emerges primordially as a temporal linkage
implies the notion that the interpretative experience related to this process, its represen-
tation, also emerges, later on, reflecting the same linkage, actually complementing it, be-
cause the musical idea is not and cannot be outside its actual (musical) experience. More-
over, this proposition also implies the simple assumption that any musical piece is ulti-
mately a further rhythmical realisation of a shared temporal background. Yet, granted
expressive and interpretative favourable conditions, this shared temporal background
aligns, so to say, allowing for a favourable aesthetical experience. The compositional pro-
cess may be seen thus as an integrated whole that sums expressive and interpretative
forces; not as a closed process in which a given, ‘coded’ musical message is ideally deci-
phered by (an ideal) receiver, but as a continuous and open creative process that simul-
taneously gives and receives its meanings from both sides, (Fig. 3.3). 
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Returning to Schoenberg, briefly, it is almost inevitable to admit, after his many annota-
tions on the musical idea,10 that, for him, thinking has a central role in music composition.
Now, however distinct, there is no actual contradiction between the Schoenbergian point
of view in this respect and the argument presented above, because, as previously com-
mented,11 Schoenberg also shows a subtle awareness of the importance of compositional
forces other than thinking and, beyond that, of the possibility of conceiving of a deeper
(pre-compositional) creative domain which concerns the necessary inspiration of the mu-
sical idea. Schoenberg has never intended to define this domain categorically, and left us
a huge problem to solve — that is, that of indicating what would musical inspiration con-
sist of and how would it operate. All in all, and according to the arguments previously ex-
posed, I initially suggest that the Schoenbergian notion of musical inspiration might be
contemplated in the perspective to the process of emergence of our ideas in general. In
this respect though, even knowing that ideas in general happen to us all the time, usually
many times in a single moment, it still remains to be asked where do they come from, on
the origin of our ideas. Bergson’s splendid answer is that ideas come — emerge — simul-
taneously from the reality (the expressivity, to use a Deleuzian notion) of things in them-
selves (as they are now) and in us (as they once were for us): for Bergson, the present
moment inspires the whole past and is inspired by it. 
Following the suggestion of Bergson, our present musicality would always depend on the
whole past musicality of the world. The totality of our past musical experiences and mu-
sical knowledge, added to the totality of evanescent environmental and conceptual mu-
sical impressions that surround us, moment after moment and from everywhere, plus the
vivid and very intense musical experience sometimes demanded by the musical perfor-
mance proper, and our impetus, our individual creativity and freedom, our attention to
life, etc; all these matters would be constantly exchanging their expressive and interpre-
tative powers, forming, not a defined musical substance, but a creative musical process, a
temporal complexity composed of distinct intensities, of distinct temporal qualities, of
distinct musical times, as I call them; or yet as Schoenberg would say, by distinct musical
inspirations. 
This is my initial intent in expanding the Schoenbergian notion of musical idea: it does
not emerge purely as thinking — deterministic and teleological in essence, as if it were
always, a priori cognitively oriented by the ‘strongest virtual link’ between past and future
events —, but in a temporally complex way, and always presenting at least two sides. The
side brought to our attention by Schoenberg, of course, that of thinking, of understanding,
which evolves creatively producing musical generalisations, structures, coherence and
form; but also another side, which is otherwise eternally turned to the concreteness of
things, to their crude reality, to their dis-formed sonority, the side of sensibility. I thus
suggest that both thinking and non-thinking music — or better, thinking music and its
opposite — ground the compositional process, occupying by necessity a central role in
composition. 
Therefore, now following Bergson and Deleuze, I propose that the emergence of our mu-
sical ideas, actually of any idea, occurs — is ignited — within an ‘intensive diﬀerential
field’, the temporal linkage mentioned above, an ephemeral moment of transition in-
stalled, so to say, between outer and inner  experiences, or better, in their rhythmical en-
counter. A moment that involves and revolves immediate perceptions and profound
memories, and also their products, their impressions and our  intelligence. A moment
that exists between everything and us (including our identity proper, the totality of our
conscious and unconscious states) according to our deepest interests and necessities. Ex-
panded in this way, the Schoenbergian notion of inspiration of the musical idea is not
and cannot be delimited by a given musical matter (a tone, a theme, for instance) to which
we apply our intellect only, but by a particular rhythmicality, which can be more or less
complex, and on which we musically exercise the exchange of our intellectual and sensi-
tive powers. 
I additionally argue that musical inspiration is actually a perpetually foundational tem-
poral field that makes it possible for the musical idea to consolidate around a given tem-
poral orientation — to the extent that our sensibility opens the possibility of perceiving
the musicality of things in themselves and in us (as memory) so that this musicality can
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be oﬀered to our understanding; as well as to the extent that our understanding closes,
blocks the particular (perceived) musical token into a necessary (artistic) generalization
so that it can be oﬀered back to our musical perception, ideally though not necessarily,
enriching it. Clearly, perceiving music depends on thinking as much as thinking music
depends on perceiving. They are perpetually exchanging their powers and are mutually
 implicated.
This is easily demonstrable, for example, in the contemplation of a plain regular sequence
of pulses: on the one hand, in itself, the perception of the regularity of pulsation involves
a particular experience of memory, an ever renewed, diﬀerential calling of the same, which
however still happening now is though constantly (openly) informed and temporally
qualified by the past; on the other hand, regularity in itself is a logical construct informed
by the intelligence that articulates and measures, and also presumes, to the extent that a
close (and closed) future is made possible, anticipated in the form of expectation based















In music, as in everything it seems, there is indeed a double inspiring quality: that of sen-
sibility which is intensive and diﬀerentiative, and that of understanding which is extensive
and reiterative in nature. In this sense, the sensible side of musical inspiration is irrational,
always deconstructive: it defies the sign, the language. Its intellectual side, on the other
hand, is mathematising, formalizing, structuring. Any musical idea is, in this context, more
or less (rhythmically) structured or non-structured according to the greater or lesser (rel-
ative) inspiring action of sensibility and understanding. 
Furthermore, there is, I propose, something like a ‘rhythmical gradualness’ acting between
these vital powers. A gradualness we can picture in itself as the fundamental rhythmicality
of the idea — time, or better musical time, being perceived and understood by means of
the very evidence of this gradualness: some ideas are very determinative and work under
the sign of equality; other ones are ‘lightly causal’ and approximate conclusions; some
ideas are completely open to indetermination or are essentially illogic; other ones are
simply risky.
The most direct product of such a gradualness is comparable to a vital pulsation which
may be identified as the deepest sense of rhythm we may ever experience. One might say
of this pulsation that it is underpinned and boosted by a sort of perpetual temporal im-
balance or unrest: because we are constantly spinning, as it were, around the perceived
thing and our understanding of it. One might still suggest, in like manner, that a perfect
balance between our sensibility and our understanding is unattainable; and, to say the
least, that it would produce no music: such a rhythmical perfection would reflect, in fact,
a very special temporal case, a ‘quiet time’ in which there is actually neither rhythm nor
time — because, then, the thing would be fully experienced and understood now as it
was and will be forever in all its cases, in all its possible variations. 
The discourse about musical balance and imbalance, or the one related to the restoration
of balance is central to some important twentieth-century compositional theories. We
find it clearly indicated, for example, by many interpreters of Schenker’s and Schoenberg’s
accounts on the Ursatz and the Grundgestalt, respectively, like Matthew Arndt, who de-
clares that
Just as in Schenker’s mature theory of composition, the realization of the tone on the logical
level is not just about the Ursatz but about interruption, so in Schoenberg’s, this realization
is not just about the Grundgestalt (the basic shape), which is regarded as his core construct,
but first of all, as it always is for him, about problems or unrest. Schoenberg relates problems
and the Grundgestalt as follows: “The continuation of the musical idea... can only happen
thus: that the unrest — problem — contained in the Grundgestalt or in the motive (and for-
mulated by the ‘theme,’ or not, if none has been stated) is shown in all its consequences. These
consequences are presented through the destinies of the motive or the Grundgestalt. How
the Grundgestalt changes under the influence of the forces struggling within it, in this move-
ment to which the unrest leads, how the forces again attain a state of rest, this is the realization
of the idea, this is its presentation12.13
Obviously, for Schoenberg, a state of balance or rest is or must be compositionally attain-
able because he ideally contemplates musical composition mainly from the perspective
of musical thought. Otherwise, would be enough for him to consider that the continua-
tion, or better the duration of the musical idea, could be presented (and represented) by
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13 See Matthew Arndt, The Musical Thought and Spiritual Lives of Heinrich Schenker and Arnold Schoen-
berg (New York: Routledge, 2018).
problems, destinies, the struggle of diﬀerential forces internal to the Grundgestalt only,
and without any need or want for a restoration of balance. 
If this is not the case for Schoenberg or Schenker, perhaps it may be for us, and at our
time after almost one hundred years, that a musical world is possible without a strong ar-
ticulative and logical imposition of musical thought on musical perception. The first step
in this direction is perhaps to consider the actuality of this possibility and its implications,
as well as the possibilities that seem to exist rhythmically ‘in between’ them. Indeed, be-
cause it is possible to us now to consider that the blend of our sensibility and understand-
ing forms not a Kantian homogeneous and straightforward line linking perception to
cognition, intuitions to knowledge, but actually a heterogeneous complex temporal field,
the crucial initial point here will bee to consider, in discussing the most profound tem-
poral design of the musical idea, the dynamism implicit by the creative synthesis of sen-
sibility and understanding powers, their intrinsic rhythmicality.
Informed thus by Bergson’s and Deleuze’s philosophies of time, we may now assume that
the process of musical composition is gradually and rhythmically installed, moment by
moment and always beyond the actual present time, out of the most direct and concrete
experience of things and their concomitant field of significance (of their many possible
meanings). This rhythmicality is doubtless very complex, composed, as it were, by count-
less temporal potentials, as many as the substances and forms constituting the reality, and
the qualitative states constituting our psyche. One also needs to keep in mind the funda-
mental notion that even though a strong quest for precise perceptual or conceptual images
may be found in every (actual or virtual) experience, these images are in turn and in any
case condemned to be eternally imprecise simply because their reality is not informed
to us  like in a sum in which two diﬀerent elements coordinate their quantities hierarchi-
cally, domesticated by a regime of equality, but like a blend or mixture in which two com-
plexes are mutually implicated: there is no perceptual image without a coordinate
conceptual one and vice versa, but composite complex-images forming a temporal grad-
ualness that rhythmically oscillates, which are sometimes dominated by sensibility and the
sensible, sometimes by the understanding and the concept. 
Given the immense diﬃculty of rendering all the complex-images that form this funda-
mental rhythmicality — and also considering that in order to do so one must always have
in mind that the self is never immune from a blending of his own subjective interpretative
and expressive forces, nor from the rules of conduct he is internally and externally subject
to, by himself or others  —, I have here restricted their investigation to a minimum nec-
essary in order to demonstrate the thesis of their rhythmicality, presenting four temporal
complexities only, defined below, by their relative or potential, aﬃrmative or negative, fu-
ture- or past-bound compositional orientations.
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14 Lyricalness happens, we may say oriented by Bergson, as attentive contemplation, whereas dra-
maticism as the lack of such attention, as expectation or remembrance. In any case though one may
find a gradualness. St. Augustine refers to these notions as follows: “suppose I have to recite a song I
know by heart. Before I begin, my expectation is directed to the whole poem, but once I have begun,
whatever I have plucked away from the domain of expectation and tossed behind to the past, becomes
the business of my memory, and the vital energy [my stress] of what I am doing is in tension between
the two of them: it strains toward my memory because of the part I have already recited, and to my
expectation on account of the part I still have to speak. But my attention is present all the while, for
the future is being channeled through it to become the past. As the song goes on and on, expectation
is curtailed and memory prolonged, until expectation is entirely used up, when the whole completed
action has passed into memory.” St. Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, ed. David Vincent Meconi, S. J.
(New York: New City Press, 2012), 361. On Augustine’s thesis on time, see also Paul Ricoeur, “The
Aporias of the Experience of Time: Book XI of Augustine’s Confessions,” in Time and Narrative, vol.
1, trans. David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 5-30.
Fundamental rhythmical forces
The creative power of determination, here understood as the one that orients the mani-
festation and evolution of musical past(s) and musical future(s), I call dramatic. And the
creative power of non-determination that otherwise deconstructs or is antithetical to them,
I call lyrical.14
In this respect, what I call dramatic musical time implies a vital urge shed between the
causes and their eﬀects, something like a force of relative compliance and linearity, but
also of unity and homogeneity, of complement and coherence (which tends to be pre-
sented in several thematic forms). There are musical pieces completely dominated by this
urge. A classical and strong example is Beethoven´s Fifth Symphony, in C minor, Op. 67,
first mov. (1808), in its unrelenting, emphatic demonstration of musical development.
Other examples may be mentioned in the context of imitative techniques, such as Bach´s
Fugue in G minor, BWV 578 (1707) in which a temporal linearity is easily observed in
the constant unfoldment of musical forms.
What I call lyrical musical time implies otherwise a more radical openness of one’s sub-
jectivity to novelty and problematization. It is a force of relative non-compliance, a type
of attention of a superior order; a force of the perception that constantly plunges towards
the present moment, but also towards diversity, heterogeneity, contrasts and non coher-
ence (which tends to be presented in non-thematic ways). There are musical pieces in
which this openness is thoroughgoingly called. Rhythmically complex music, as Brian
Ferneyhough´s Mnemosyne (1986) or Karlheinz Stockhausen´s Klavierstücke V (1954),
for example, come to mind. There are also other musical pieces in which this sort of open-
ness is texturally, fully, subtly or momently called, as for instance in Henry Cowell´s The
Banshee, for piano strings (1925), or in Salvatore Sciarrino´s Canzona di Ringraziamento
per flauto (1982), or yet Georg Friedrich Haas’s String Quartet No.2 (1998).
The dramatic musical time is, thus, a time oriented towards comprehensibility, methods,
logic, rules, laws and inevitability, etc., and is opposed by the lyrical one which, conversely,
heads towards mystery, chaos, surprise and insubordination, etc. All in all, the dramatic
musical time is dialectically opposed to the force of ‘presentification’15 and diversity of
the lyrical time, bringing to it a certainty of ‘movement’16 and unity.
In order to preliminarily illustrate the whole discussion on the rhythmic idea, as follows,
the creative orientation towards determinations and non determinations may be musi-
cally ‘translated’, as it were, into two general compositional principles, two fundamental
‘temporal images’: a centripetal image of movement (spatially oriented, hence articulative
and aligned with the powers of understanding); and a centrifugal image of presence (du-
rational, therefore ‘continuative’ and processual, aligned with the powers of sensibility).
An image of movement, because certainty and determination, that is, dramaticism, in fact
depend on a kind of ‘cognitive temporal movement’ that constantly favours the before
and the after in opposition to the now: one is constantly ‘pulled in and out’ from and to
diverse causes and eﬀects in order to understand their links and establish a generalisation.
An image of presence, because uncertainty and non-determination — lyricalness — really
seem to depend on the maintenance of a sort of ‘presentifying cognitive state’, a state of
superior attention that favours the now against the before and the after, (Fig. 3.5).
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16 Movement in a Bergsonian sense, that is, in the sense of the vital dynamism of one’s subjectivity, in









In our current practice, music composition is preponderantly guided by one of these two
general compositional principles. But nothing prevents the manifestation of both tem-
poral orientations in a same creative process, in diﬀerent degrees. Lyrical moments may
follow dramatic ones and vice versa. A dramatic moment may be gradually transformed
into a lyrical one, and the same may occur in the other way around. Both compositional
tendencies may orient a same moment in a polyphonic manner, etc. These are main com-
positional temporal fluxes that potentially accept infinite combinations. 
Moreover, I propose that these main temporal tendencies are constantly re-qualified, as
it were, during a compositional process, by secondary ones — and specially in the com-
positional context of musical microform(s), in which local temporal manipulations and
transformations of musical matter are frequently necessary. This temporal re-qualification
is sometimes reiterative, sometimes diﬀerential. It is my suggestion that, within this specific
context of a temporal requalifying, repetition is musically received as a sign of the past,
and diﬀerence as a sign of the future. ‘A sign of the past’, because, in common sense, rep-
terministic. It is a grounding compositional principle related to the manifestation of contrasts, sus-
pensions, formal expansions, etc., of non coherent compositional operations. 
etition is always pointed towards something that has happened, to a recollection (of
course, there is another, profound repetition that ‘repeats only itself ’, as particularity, in-
stead of something else as generality, to say it with Deleuze,17 but this is not the case of
the repetition here referred). ‘A sign of the future’, because, as common sense indicates,
diﬀerence is always pointed towards something that may eventually happen, to something
that may or may not be, to a possibility. Having in mind these matters, based as they are
on the reiterative and diﬀerential constitution of the idea, as elaborated by Bergson and
Deleuze, I argue that a reiterative re-qualification of musical time concerns a transient
temporal quality which both contracts, closes (in the dramatic case), or expands, opens
(in the lyrical case) the notion of musical past; while, in turn, a diﬀerential re-qualification
concerns a similarly transient quality that results both in the contraction (in the dramatic
case), or expansion (in the lyrical case) of the notion of future in music, (Fig. 3.6). 
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17 According to Deleuze, “to repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something
unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent. And perhaps this repetition at the level of external
conduct echoes, for its own part, a more secret vibration which animates it, a more profound, internal
repetition within the singular.” Deleuze, Diﬀerence and Repetition, 2
It happens to be so because, from a reiterative standpoint, these temporal formulas reflect
a primordial subjective impulse of contraction, a force that pulls together a subject in re-
lation to his own past, but which also takes the form of a revaluation of the past. And be-
cause they also reflect, from a diﬀerential standpoint, a primordial contracting impulse
of one’s subjectivity that faces the determination in the future, the destiny, which is held
as a promise, but which can also be questioned and conquered, and held as unfoldment
and evolution. This temporal requalifying can be musically translated as well into two
other general compositional temporal images: a centripetal image of permanence and a
centrifugal image of change. Permanence, because, under the sign of the most external rep-
etition, there is a strong tendency of everything to remain the same. Change, because,
under the sign of diﬀerence, this tendency is challenged and everything tends to become

















Thus briefly, the compositional merging of temporal images of
movement and permanence renders a new image that is very con-
tractive; composed by a general strong deterministic, dramatic
tendency and by a reiterative attitude: the past is contracted. Ob-
serve, as an example of this compositional image, the first mea-
sures of Bach’s Toccata and Fugue in F Major BWV 540 (1731),
(Fig. 3.8), in which a pedal unifies the general design, while the
canonic exposition constantly reaﬃrms the melodic flux:
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The merging of the temporal images of movement and change
renders, on the other hand, a composition that, even though in-
ternally diﬀerential, is externally ruled by a general strong de-
terministic, dramatic tendency: the expansive force of the future
is controlled. Observe, as an example of this image, the ‘unified
diﬀerential process’ in the course of some thematic variations




and  Fugue  in  F  Major
BWV 540 (1731), excerpt.
Figure 3.9: Beethoven’s  7
Variations  on  'Bei  Män-
nern, welche Liebe fühlen',
(1801), excerpt.
Beethoven’s variations are unified
by cadential and melodic determi-
nations. There is a diﬀerentiative,
centrifugal, attitude there to be
perceived throughout the varia-
tions, although  the compositional
process is necessarily centripetal
all through the variations. It is
dominated by a cause — the
theme and its character — from
which the bondaries of an ‘imagi-
native territory’, are demarcated.
The merging of the temporal images of presence and permanence
renders another kind of composition, which is externally cen-
trifugal, but internally contractive temporally. Now,  to a general
non-deterministic, lyrical compositional tendency is added a re-
iterative attitude, a lyrical repetition, that ‘repeats exceptions’:
the past is reviewed. Observe, as an example of this image, the
continuous flux of contrasting melodic expansions in the first
measures of Varèse’s Density 21,5 (1946), (Fig. 3.10), in which
the ‘scope’ of thematic features (their melodic and rhythmical
complexity) is gradually amplified by means of a continual use
of contrasting melodic and rhythmic manipulations.
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The merging of the temporal images of presence and change ren-
ders yet another composition type, fully expansive, in which to
a general non-deterministic, lyrical compositional tendency is
added a diﬀerence that ‘amplifies the future’, that ‘multiplies ex-
ceptions’. Observe, as an example of this image, the dense and






My approach to these notions (of determination, non-determination, diﬀerence and rep-
etition) is generally delimited by the rhythmical quality of the duration that is ontologically
established between our sensibility and understanding during a compositional act (which
obviously reflects one’s living sensible and intellectual experiences in general, their volume,
intensity and complexity).18 Clearly, I do not pretend to reflect on the transcendental
foundations of this quality, as Bergson does,19 but to investigate it only in the perspective
of the construction of a piece of music only.  
In this precise perspective, I have suggested that our experiences in general and in music
‘oscillate’ in a rhythmical way between the concrete thing and its concept, between how
we see or hear or touch or feel and how we understand what we see or hear or touch or
feel: sometimes we better understand, something we better perceive a thing, including
all we feel about it. On this, we should return, for a moment, to the Bergsonian-Deleuzian
reasoning on movement and duration. As we have seen, it is regarding interchange and
exchange of meanings that Deleuze, commenting on Bergson’s theses on movement and
duration, argues that
in a sense movement has two aspects. On one hand, that which happens between objects
or parts; on the other hand, that which expresses the duration or the whole. The result is
that duration, by changing qualitatively, is divided up in objects, and objects, by gaining
depth, by losing their contours, are united in duration. We can therefore say that movement
relates the objects of a closed system to open duration, and duration to the objects of the
system which it forces to open up. Movement relates the objects between which it is estab-
lished to the changing whole which it expresses, and vice-versa. Trough movement the
whole is divided up into objects, and objects are re-united in the whole, and indeed between
the two ‘the whole’ changes. We can consider the objects or parts of a set as immobile sec-
tions; but movement is established between these sections, and relates the objects or parts
to the duration of a whole which changes, and thus expresses the changing of the whole in
relation to the objects and is itself a mobile section of duration. Now we are equipped to un-
derstand the profound thesis of the first chapter of [Bergson’s] Matter and Memory: (1)
there are not only instantaneous images, that is, immobile sections of movement; (2) there
are movement-images which are mobile sections of duration; (3) there are, finally, time-
images, that is, duration-images; change-images, relation-images, volume-images which are
beyond movement itself...20
According to this notion, everything we experience, musically or not, though musically
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Continuum, 2009), 150-154.
19 On this, Bergson also says that “however brief we suppose any perception to be, it always occupies
a certain duration, and involves consequently an eﬀort of memory which prolongs one into another
a plurality of moments. As we shall endeavour to show, even the subjectivity of sensible qualities con-
sists above all else in a kind of contraction of the real, eﬀected by our memory. In short, memory in
these two forms, covering as it does with a cloak of recollections a core of immediate perception, and
also contracting a number of external moments into a single internal moment, constitutes the principal
share of individual consciousness in perception, the subjective side of the knowledge of things.” Berg-
son, Matter and Memory, 25.
20 Deleuze, Cinema I ..., 11.
in special, ‘pulses’ between two modes of cognition: between instantaneous images, that
is, immobile sections, which are dramatic, formal, conceptual, closed, spatially well-de-




The fundamental rhythmicality I here propose is in the middle of this creative play of
temporal images.
When we approach things with our best attention, we are performing a kind of lyrical act.
If this lyrical act addresses concreteness and the sensible, in its myriad of diﬀerential in-
tensities, addresses ‘diﬀerence in itself ’, to say it with Deleuze, then the powers of diﬀer-
ence, the future, are in a sense ‘liberated’ within us. If, otherwise, this lyrical act addresses
concepts, thoughts in general, generalisations, equalities and similarities, deep and shal-
low memories, then we are able to ‘reconsider’ those powers of repetition that, in another
sense, were viciously defining our past, our values, our certainties. The past is now oﬀered
back, renewed, to our creativity. 
However, when we approach things but with poor attention, we are in another way per-
forming a kind of dramatic act. If this act addresses concreteness and the sensible, then
the powers of diﬀerence — the future —, becomes ‘controlled’, delimited within us. If,
otherwise, this dramatic act addresses concepts, memories of all kind, then the conceptual
image and the values it conveys are celebrated and confirmed. The past remains the same. 
The frequency of change between these modes and their mutual rhythmical influence
set the actual meaning of our ideas in general and consequently of our musical ideas as
well. These meanings interchange and exchange both, from the inside out, the rhythmi-
cality of musical forms perceived at the surface of a musical piece; and, from outside in,
the rhythmicality of more abstract temporal notions, those which address music also in
terms of conceptual and ideal forms. 
On musical dramaticism 
Musical dramaticism is thus closely related to the manifestation and consolidation of mu-
sical thematicism, to compositional processes of building virtual ‘bridges of recognition’
between thematic elements. We observe these bridges in a lot of tonal pieces, like
Chopin’s Mazurka, Opus 24, no. 1 (1836), for instance, (Fig. 3.13), acting as two-folded
compositional force in which dramaticism is established both from the past-like (usually
involving melodic characterisation of motives) and the future-like (usually involving har-
monic directionality and cadential formulas) points of view of coherence and integration.
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Figure 3.13: Chopin’s Mazurka, Opus 24, no. 1 (1836), excerpt.
Musical dramaticism is causal, teleological, and thus involves of necessity the building of
‘logical links’, the aﬃrmation of the cause by all its possible or plausible eﬀect(s). Stock-
hausen corroborates this argument, evidencing this orientation from the perspective of
the technique of musical development, when he says that
in the history of classical western music, development, […] plays an increasingly important
role. At the same time […] we find the number of themes becoming fewer, from three to
two, sometimes even a single theme. Schoenberg’s Third String Quartet [1927] takes this
tendency to an extreme: as he said, ‘everything is development’. […] Dramatic means to
present figures, protagonists, as in Greek drama, and then develop to lead these figures to
all diﬀerent kinds of experiences. […] Dramatic means that you can always follow the thread
[…].21
Moreover, reflecting on his Kreuzspiel (1951), Stockhausen draws a clear image of dra-
maticism, when he posits that
Development as a method of composing is governed by the arrow of time. If you listen care-
fully to the first movement of Kreuzspiel, what you hear in the piano are six notes in the
highest octave and six notes in the lowest octave. During the movement, each note crosses
over, one by one, passing through the seven octaves, until at the end of the movement the
six notes that start in the highest octave are in the lowest, and vice versa. The development
process can be clearly perceived because as each note crosses into the three middle octaves,
it is picked up and played by two other instruments, bass clarinet and oboe. So the middle
region gradually fills up towards the middle of the movement, and then empties again as
the notes continue out to the edges. But it is a clear development, lasting all of two min-
utes.22
The ‘arrow of time’ installed in the transpositional cycle of the basic series of Kreuzspiel,
(Fig. 3.14) is a necessary condition to the presentation of a fundamental dramatic time. 
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Figure 3.14: Pitch rows and their derivation in Stockhausen’s Kreuzspiel (1951).  
Then again, the technique of presentation serves the composition of the musical idea,
which confounds itself, in this case, with the composition of the drama. It does it by
means of a cross displacement of the series on the surface of the musical piece, from one
extreme register of the piano to the other. The piece is subject to a complex twelve-stage
rotation, which culminates in a complete reversion of the two main hexachords of the se-
ries, forming a mirror image. This strategy of displacement is guided by certainty, by a
goal, it is a destiny-personification that promotes, through the many varied repetitions
of the series almost in sequential form, the repetition of a sameness which progresses sys-
tematically within the constant manifestation of diﬀerence. 
Indeed, the dramatic time is here wanted as a ‘moving thing’. It is referred to an abstract
notion of movement that always involves the fluency of the before and the after; it also
one’s musical creation and representation inevitably and to this same fluency.  Moreover,
this fluency seems to work as a Bergsonian  dramatic diagram, in itself a necessary condi-
tion for accessing instances of conceptualisation. This notion implies that we are in posi-
tion to contemplate the identity of something only because we are able, first of all, to
privilege the thing’s afterness and beforeness, that is, by generalising its presentness. That
considered, the work of musical dramaticism and the work of thinking in general really
Begins
measure Row
14 i Eb Db C D Bb F B E G A Ab Gb
20b II Db C D Bb F Gb Eb B E G A Ab
27 III C D Bb F Ab Eb Gb Db B E G A
33b Iv D Bb F A Db Gb Eb Ab C B E G
40 v Bb F G Gb C Ab Db A Eb D B E
46b vi F E Eb D Ab A C Db G Gb Bb B
53 vii Gb Db B Bb A D G C E F Ab Eb
59b viii Ab Gb C F G Bb E D B A Eb Db
66 ix A Ab Gb D E B F Bb G Eb Db C
72b x G A Ab Gb Bb B F E Eb Db C D
79 xi E G A Ab Gb F B Eb Db C D Bb
85b xii B E G A Ab Gb Eb Db C D Bb F
appear to be one and the same — a notion also held by Deleuze. In addition, past and
future temporal notions may yet be seen as functions of actual spatial movement. In other
words, our motional sense and our ‘dramatic sense’, so to say, seem to be mutually impli-
cated. Accordingly, it is by means of this more comprehensive notion of mobility that the
dramaticism presented in a musical piece also finds its meaning in the world’s dramati-
cism.
On musical lyricalness 
Musical lyricalness is here related to the manifestation and consolidation of many athe-
matic or ‘anti-thematic’ compositional process. Textural-spectral music, such as Tristan
Murail’s Désintégrations (1983), (Fig. 3.15), are good examples of this practice, in which
we observe a “constant flux of the music between moments of order and consonance to
moments of disorder and noise as the primarily harmonic spectra are disintegrated and
deformed into irregular and inharmonic ones.”23
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Figure 3.15: Tristan Murail’s Désintégrations (1983), excerpt.
This alluded flux from moments of order into moments of disorder, from consonance
into noise is lyrical. In it, as expected in a lyrical context, irregular features do not comply
to a general rule or a sense of regularity, quite on the contrary, it is the regularity that
abides by a general sense of irregularity. One may also picture this and other similar lyrical
compositional formulas ‘in reverse’, considering them, for example, from the perspective
of Palestrinian counterpoint, in which moments of order and consonance are privileged,
while dissonance (disorder) controlled. One may consider, for example, the technique
of suspension in which dissonances are used only in restricted forms and in places where
they do not produce an obtrusive eﬀect. Clearly, the Palestrinian suspension enforces the
submission of dissonance, while in Murrail’s piece dissonance is liberated. The composi-
tional work here is preponderantly athematic and follows the formal sense conveyed by
most spectral works that “do not utilise thematic material, and are not motivic in con-
struction. […That do not ] make use of any repeating harmonic elements, and the rhyth-
mic language appears to be vague at times.”24 Vagueness, systematic diﬀerentiation, dis-
sipation, etc. (which are musical qualities that underlie the general notion of non-deter-
mination), may be seen thus as strong lyrical structural musical features. 
Some compositional ideas by Stockhausen about musical athematicism are also appro-
priate to the contextualisation of compositional lyricalness. In the context of his Carré
(1959), for four choirs and orchestras, for example, Stockhausen says that the conscious
avoidance of building thematic relationships led him to approach some alternative in-
stantaneous forming processes, which he himself also describes as lyrical. In Carré, he
says, 
I tried for the first time to concentrate on instantaneous forming, or the forming of moments.
It was, as many people wrote at the time, quite illogical [my stress], a complete reversal of
normal musical convention. I worked on the basis of starting with the here and now, and
then we will see if there is any past and future. This led to the approach I now call lyric, and
in our Western tradition the composition of lyric forms are very rare, given the predomi-
nance of sequential and developmental conventions.25
For Stockhausen, musical lyricalness is mixed up with the notion of ‘here and now.’ How-
ever, the lyricism indicated by Stockhausen is slightly diﬀerent from that that I propose.
Lyricalness is here approached from the standpoint of a possible now, a kind of now es-
tablished among other ways of perceiving and understanding the present reality. All in
all, Stockhausen’s musical lyricalness is motivated by a general, diﬀuse concept of present-
ness, while in here presentness is itself understood in a deep compositional context as a
heterogeneous creative force, as temporal complexity. 
This perspective is concerned, furthermore, with privileging the emergence of strategies
to accessing concreteness, aligning with Bergson’s intuitive philosophical approach: lyri-
calness is not the same with the here and now, but rather a transcendental force firmly
committed to grasp, so to say, the here and now; a force eternally driven by and towards
an impossible resolution, source of a profound creativity.
The lyrical time is here willed as ‘presence’. This abstract notion always involves a negation
of the fluency of the before and the after, referring one’s musical creation and represen-
tation preponderantly to this negation, which seems to work as a lyrical diagram. It means
that we are in a position to contemplate a thing’s concreteness only because we are able,
first of all, to avoid the thing’s afterness and beforeness, that is, by concentrating our atten-
tion on its presentness. Hence, and again, the work of musical lyricalness appears in this
way to be one and the same as the work of perceiving in general — a notion also held by
Bergson. In other words, it would be by the more comprehensive notion of presentness
that the lyricalness of a musical piece finds meaning in the lyricalness of the world.
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On repetition and diﬀerence 
I have suggested above that both musical dramaticism and musical lyricalness assume, in
their dialectical relation, subsidiary temporal influxes of diﬀerence and repetition —
which are in fact necessary and wanted in most cases.
Reaﬃrming these notions, I argue the temporally contracted compositional act flows cre-
atively as if ‘deviating from the dialectical opposite’ by means of coherent compositional
operations that establish ‘orbits of sense’, so to say, around particular, unique impressions.
Complementarily, the temporally expanded compositional act flows creatively as if im-
bued, inspired with more impetus ‘towards the dialectical opposite’ by means of contrast-
ing compositional operations.  
With this in mind, I thus suggest that temporal contractions and expansions only happen
actually within a given dramatic or within a given lyrical compositional context, respec-
tively. Dramaticism, in its predominant relation to the conceptual thing, contracts repe-
tition and diﬀerence. Lyricalness, in another way, in its predominant relation to the actual,
concrete thing, expands them, the past and the future.
The dramatic past is a closed past, an ‘attached-like’ actual past, that exists only within
itself, and deeply inscribed within a feeling of nostalgia. The dramatic future is a kind of
‘necessity-like future’, a closed future dominated by a cause, or a set of causes or rules, by a
form and a destiny. The lyrical past, otherwise, is a kind of open past, a ‘past that becomes’,
that is constantly reconsidered from the point of view of the present moment, that de-
constructs itself, and negates itself, a kind of ‘vague pastness’, a sort of ‘detached-like’ mu-
sical past informed by a sense of loss, by diﬀerent degrees of forgetfulness. And the lyrical
future is something like a ‘certain or anti-future’, an open ‘absent-like’ future with no causes. 
For, accordingly, as far as musical creative processes are concerned, there seem to be two
musical pasts and two musical futures, (Fig. 3.16): 
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Figure 3.16: There are two musical pasts: a musical past that contracts dramatically, 
which is strongly turned to itself by means of its own repetition, always closing itself, 
and a musical past that expands lyrically, also by means of repetition, which is however 
















(i) a musical past that contracts dramatically, as repetition, closing itself, and is turned
into a refrain; (ii) a musical past that expands lyrically, also as repetition, though as a diﬀer-
ent repetition, motivated by non determinations, which opens itself and, while doing so,
also opens the refrain; (iii) a musical future that, however diﬀerential, contracts and closes
itself dramatically, becoming routinized; and (iv) a musical future that expands lyrically,
as true diﬀerence, and opens the routine. 
Moreover, other important dialectical relations emerge from the tensional diﬀerences
that manifest themselves between the notions of nostalgia and loss, commented above,
which informs us the ‘complex pulsation’ of musical past. The same happening with the
tensional diﬀerences that are revealed between the notions of necessity and absence,
which also informs us of the complexity of the ‘yet to come-pulsation’ of musical future.
These antagonistic images of past and future are easily pictured in music. 
Oriented by repetition, musical thematicism  works in the perspective of a self-referential
past, while musical athematicism works in the now in the perspective of the deconstruc-
tion and problematization of the past: in the first case, the thematic element is constantly
turned back, folded onto and reaﬃrming itself, and the stronger this refrain, the stronger
the general sense of immobility in music (that is, the sense of stasis conveyed by the rep-
etition of a determinate musical element or aspect in the perspective of musical dramati-
cism); in the second case, if something eventually still remains, it is not by necessity, but
happens as a kind of reverberation, as ‘resonance.’ 
Thematic and athematic compositional procedures that are oriented by diﬀerence, on
the other hand, usually work in the perspective of musical variation. With the diﬀerence
that, from a dramatic viewpoint, variation does privilege musical progression and conse-
quently the establishment of a general sense of musical motion (that is, the sense of
progress conveyed by the diﬀerentiation of a determinate musical element or aspect in
the perspective of musical dramaticism), while, from a lyrical point of view, because the
general sense of  presentness a lyrical composition conveys, and because, in this case,
sometimes there are even no clear element or aspect to be set in progress, variation does
not result in or seek musical motion but, on the contrary, to cancel it (that is, the sense
of ‘open stasis,’ or of resting in abeyance or suspension generally conveyed by diﬀerential
compositional procedures in the perspective of musical lyricalness).  
In the next pages, I readdress some previous arguments from a more pragmatic and
schematic point of view, and provide some short compositions and additional applied
musical examples, aiming at demonstrating and contextualizing the matter a little further. 
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II – THE FIRST RHYTHMICALIZATION PROCESS
It has been my suggestion that specific creative orientations emerge in the midst of the
experience of musical composition, as the outcome, the produce of a particular rhyth-
mical interplay, a ‘mixture’ of temporal tendencies. 
Returning briefly to the previous arguments in a more schematic way, it was argued that
this mixture is grounded by a fundamental temporal linkage of understanding and sen-
sibility powers, in all that in understanding is implied about the products of thinking and
processes of conceptualisation, the manifestation of generalisations and, from them, of
determinations, including important intellectual attributes as ‘the meaning’, ‘the language’,
and ‘the social construct’; and also in all that the notion of sensibility implies about the
uncountable ways the world is individually perceived and, now returning to Bergson’s





26 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 14.
Moreover, it has been suggested about this mixture that in case of being it preponderantly
oriented by the understanding, the creative act operates in a dramatic way. That is, it op-
erates linearly, teleologically, linking past and future events causally and stands as a sign
of movement. It also has been suggested that, being the case, this mixture be otherwise
oriented by sensibility, then the creative act ‘opens up’ causality, so to say, favouring the
non-determination of past and future events, that is, operating in a lyrical way, rupturing





In addition, it also has been argued that dramaticism, [D], and lyricalness, [L], both re-
ceive further rhythmical orientations from reiterative, [r], and diﬀerentiative, [d], creative
processes, repetition standing complementarily as a sign of past, of memory, of perma-




















This hypothesis implies that determination and non-determination, diﬀerence and rep-
etition, are all-pervading temporal intensities, spreading throughout the duration that
lasts creatively between sensitive and intellectual impulses, allowing us infinite (musical)
interpretations of the world, and of music as well in its relations to the world. 
A grounding temporal complexity of this kind is comprehensively envisaged by Bergson
but also by Bachelard: on the one hand, it is integrally formed, with no rupture, by the
totality of its own duration(s); on the other hand, it also presents inner opposite, dialec-
tical temporal orientations, which even though opposite do not oppose in a dialectical
way, but perdure in opposition, entangled one into the other. 
In this way, the temporal flux of the (musical) thing or aspect which is non-determined,
—lyrical —, may flow, as it were, through and towards understanding, in contrary motion
to the temporal flux of the thing or aspect which is determined, dramatic, and flows oth-
erwise through and towards sensibility. In other words, within this grounding subjective
temporal dimension, non-determinations give birth to determinations and vice-versa.
27 See Salvatore Sciarrino, Le Figure della Musica, da Beethoven a Oggi (Milano: Ricordi, 1998).
Moreover, it is from the blend, the rhythmicalization of these fundamental temporal
forces that more elaborated temporal mixtures emerge, now involving well-defined classes
of musical past(s) and future(s). (i) We may now reason out about the emergence of a
contracted, determined past from the mixture of dramaticism and repetition [Dr], mu-
sically marked by the manifestation of the motif, the refrain, the thematic feature or ges-
ture, the memorable contour or intensity, etc.; (ii) about the emergence of an expanded,
open and non-determined past from the mixture of lyricalness and repetition [Lr], mu-
sically marked by the manifestation of the variation or unfolding, by the development of
the thematic feature and all sorts of transitions, bridges, and compositional manipulations,
by subtraction or addition, by multiplication, inversion or retrogradation, etc.; (iii) or yet
about the emergence of a kind of contracted, controlled future, from the mixture of dra-
maticism and diﬀerence [Dr], musically marked now by unifying rules, homogeneity and
complement, by the impulse towards coherence and invariance, towards the control of
formal expansion, etc.; and finally (iv) or yet about the emergence of an expanded, un-
controlled, open future from the mixture of lyricism and diﬀerence [Ld], musically
marked by diversifying compositional operations, by formal unbalance and heterogeneity,























The meeting of these fluxes creates one other ever new rhythmical instances. Determi-
nation and non-determination interpenetrate creatively in such an essential and profound
way that one might even venture to say that we cannot in fact truly distinguish between
them. The very sense of this proposition resides in the fact that, on the ground of our
lived experiences, no moments of life can in fact be of absolute determination or indeter-
mination to us. The rate of determination-indetermination in a given moment is absolutely
contextual: there are no determinated or non-determinated things per se but tendencies
to be so. In reality, our freedom, and consequently our creativity, depends on this — again
agreeing with Bergson’s temporal thesis, when he asserts that 
in man, the thinking being, the free act may be termed a synthesis of feelings and ideas and
the evolu tion which leads to it a reasonable evolution. The artifice of this method simply
consists, in short, in distinguishing the point of view of customary or useful knowledge from
that of true knowl edge.28
Which means that we are free and creative exactly because in any cause, external or in-
ternal to us, lies its opposites, the ‘anti-causes,’ its possibility of being diﬀerent, oﬀering
us, at each moment, the totality of possibilities to come. Our freedom, our creativity
emerges precisely from this temporal clash.
Deterministic rhythmical senses
With this in mind, it is my suggestion that the general ‘deterministic rhythmical sense’ of
musical dramaticism is itself composed by two inner senses: the sense of Characterization,
[C] — that resonates the dramatic repetition, [Dr] —, and the sense of Routinization,
[R] — that resonates the dramatic diﬀerence, [Dd]. Characterisation thus means to aﬃrm,
to thematise a given musical form (or aspect) or a feature of it. Routinization means in
turn to aﬃrm, to thematise a given ‘musical routine’ or a feature of it.
Accordingly, I insist, one must conceive of a dramatic compositional sense that demands
the enclosure of musical flux within the past by means of strong thematisation, sectional
forms, all sorts of repetition, ritornelli, etc., and another dramatic compositional sense that
demands again the enclosure of musical flux but within the future, by means of a systematic
control of musical variation. To be musically dramatic means thus to creatively manifest
an applied rhythmicality, the rhythmic fluctuation, a pulsation of past and future musical
dramatic senses. Senses that exist — or better, are formed — within a strong temporal
dynamics determined by past and future thematic materials. 
Many analytical techniques in music end up working on models for the systematic
demonstration of these dramatic senses. This is the case, for example, of the model of
semiological analysis proposed by Jean-Jaques Nattiez on Debussy’s Syrinx (1913), (Fig.
3.20),29 in which the pulsation between past and future dramatic senses is clearly estab-
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28 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 186.
29 Cook, A Guide to Musical Analysis,159-165.
lished: the existence of a musical past is shown as a stratified cumulation of memories
— the many instances of a same, of reiterative melodic gestures, even when slightly mod-
ified, are pilled down as if they all pertain to a same moment —; but there is also a given
musical future whose existence must be otherwise induced and defined as diﬀerence, be-
coming necessarily a ‘new’, potential  moment of stratification.
It is a similar notion to that expressed by Alan Forte in his analytical model based on
pitch-class sets and their relations in atonal pieces, especially when invoking criteria for
the segmentation of musical substance. It is thus that Forte asserts that during the pre-
sentation of his analytical model
[...] several references have been made to contextual criteria for segment determination. The
term contextual here is intended to cover decisions concerning segmentation which involve
references to the local context of the candidate segment or which involve references to non-
local sections of the music. It seems virtually impossible to systematize these in any useful
way. Certainly, however, recurrence is a commonly invoked criterion [my stress]. If a particular
segment forms a set that is represented else where in the music, it is probably a legitimate
structural component. On the other hand, a segment that forms a set that occurs only once
may have its own raison d’être.30
Thus, recurrence is indeed a commonly invoked criterion indeed and probably also a le-
gitimate structural component when a dramatic sense preponderates compositionally.
Moreover, the diﬀerential raison d´être elegantly referred by Forte is in itself informed by
a ‘dramatic’ attitude in his analyses which privileges the sense of characterization, that
observes the musical substance predominantly from the perspective of a necessary de-
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30 Alen Forte, The Structure of Atonal Music (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 91.




termination of musical past. This dramatic attitude is perceived everywhere in Forte’s
structural model based on pitch-class set equivalences, reducible to prime forms by trans-
position or by inversion followed by transposition, in which (formal) structural coherence
is investigated by means of archetypical harmonic formulae.  
Nattiez’s and Forte’s analytical approaches share a similar dramatic temporal attitude, al-
though applied to diﬀerent expressive strata — respectively to melodic gestures and to
harmonic collections. In both cases the suggestion of invariance seems to be almost in-
evitable. This dramatic inclination shows however a very sensible interpretative problem
we need to address: is it really true that only by means of coherent operations would a
given compositional process conquer a higher artistic rationale? As far as the quality of
musical composition is concerned, is it just a matter of characterizing a given musical past
or routinizing a given musical future (by means of the definition and recurrence of a
theme, a collection of pitches, etc.)?
Non-deterministic rhythmical senses
The ‘non-deterministic rhythmical sense’ of musical lyricalness is also composed by two
inner senses: the sense of Non-characterization, [NC] — that resonates the lyrical repe-
tition, [Lr] —, and the sense of Non-routinization, [NR] — that resonates the lyrical dif-
ference, [Ld]. To ‘non-characterise’ means to negate, to a-thematise a given musical form
(or aspect) or a feature of it. To ‘non-routinise’ means otherwise to negate, to ‘a-thematise’
a given ‘musical routine’ or a feature of it. Lyricalness negates, dislocates, ignores, decon-
structs, etc., musical past and future. In it, both temporal domains are also dynamically
and mutually implicated, although in a negative way: a lyrical musical past is a past in
constant deconstruction of thematic features, of main and subsidiary elements that are
part of the form. In it, musical gestures lose their contours, textural or spectral formulae
lose their characteristic energy, etc; a lyrical musical future aims at dismantling the clear
moments of formal articulation, blurring cadential functions and musical development
proper, etc.
Accordingly, the pulsation of past and future lyricalness is observable is many athematic
techniques of musical presentation, including techniques of rarefaction, diﬀraction, com-
plex serialisation, models of statistical composition, randomisation, etc. Stockhausen’s
Klavierstück XI (1956), (Fig. 3,21), is an example of this practice. It is composed by nine-
teen fragments of diﬀerent lengths, each one of them fully notated as to pitch, register,
and duration. The player starts selecting a first fragment randomly and decides on its
tempo, articulation and dynamics. From this point onwards indications for these param-
eters are provided at the end of each fragment, which are to be fully applied to the next
fragment. The performance ends if any fragment is randomly encountered a third time,
allowing for diﬀerent performances of greatly varying lengths. 
In Klavierstück XI, a lyrical past is constantly reestablished in response to the potential
non repetition of each fragment, as each one is compositionally negated or deconstructed
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accordingly, by the application of random parametric operations. Moreover, the fragment
itself is not varied or developed in a traditional sense, but disguised or dissembled behind
many routes of performance. There is no end, finality or point in time to be addressed as
a conclusion “bringing about the possibility of an always renewed form, which is to say
a unique morphology of the continuity, a unique expressive context, for each perfor-
mance.”31 Many works of this kind come to mind, by seminal composers, such as Henry
Cowell’s Mosaic Quartet (1935), or Earle Brown’s ‘mobile’ pieces, like Twenty-five Pages
(1953) or Modules I and II (1967), and John Cage’s Music of Changes (1951). They all
have plenty of formal experiments of lyrical extraction.
Primary rhythmical ideas
Thereby I finally identify four fundamental rhythmic ideas, that is to say, four fundamental
compositional operations that, in theory, guide and control the manifestation (the inspi-
ration) and complexity of the basic temporal design of any compositional process, inde-
pendently of the musical style.
Now, these fundamental rhythmic ideas are thought as resulting from a more complex
and broad rhythmicalization process, (<r>),32 involving more elaborated rhythmical
senses, that is to say, those of characterisation, [C], routinisation, [R], non-characteriza-
tion, [NC] and non-routinization, [NR]. 
Next, I detail each one of these ideas, presenting some analyses and contextualizations.
They are: the rhythmic ideas of Closed Refrain, [CRe] and Closed Route, [CRo], and the
rhythmical ideas of Open Refrain, [ORe] and Open Route, [ORo], as I call them, (see Fig.
3.22).
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31 John Cage, Silence (London: Marion Boyars, 2009), 35.
32 The sign ‘<r>’ means rhythmicalization. It thus stands as a functional/compositional operation of
coordination or mixture of similar or opposite elements forming a given temporal design. 
Figure 3.21: Stockhausen’s Klavierstucke XI (1956), excerpt.
The rhythmic idea of Closed Refrain [CRe]
Characterization [C] <r> Routinization [R]
I have argued that this rhythmic idea, [CRe], results from the rhythmical interplay, the
rhythmicalization of the senses of characterisation and routinization, as previously dis-
cussed. Oriented by it, the compositional process revolves, on the one hand, around op-
erations of thematic consolidation, in building of strong identities, memorable shapes
and intensities and, on the other hand, around the maintenance, the keeping of a ‘closed
future’, of formulas of repetition, (see appendix 2).
This rhythmic idea may be thus related to traditional or to innovative forms of musical
thematicism, and also related to the building or to the reinforcement of underlying the-
matic features or to any indirect compositional factors that favour musical thematicism.
It is important to have in mind that rhythmic ideas work as rhythmical levels of temporal
complexities of musical ideas. This assumption is indeed complementary to the Deleuzian
proposition about the nature of recognition, in which recognition is viewed as involving
many senses. Deleuze explains, for example, that recognition is managed by a concept of
repetition, though always calling diﬀerent levels of complexity — diﬀerent levels of tem-
poral contraction, as it were. It is my suggestion that, in music, one of these levels of recog-
nition is reached precisely by the temporal contraction compositionally promoted by the








(iii) Open Refrain, [ORe], [C]<r>[NR], 
is related to the compositional expansion of thematic features. 
(iv) Open Route, [ORo], [NR]<r>[NC], 
is related to the compositional expansion of variational features. 
In it, the past is contracted and turned onto itself, confirming itself; while the future is
also contracted and, in a similar way, also points to itself, (Fig. 3.23).
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An applied compositional example, oriented by this rhythmic idea, is demonstrated below,
(Fig. 3.24):33
Figure 3.23: Rhythmic idea of Closed Refrain, [CRe]: 
the past and the future are temporally contracted.
33 All compositional examples provided are based on the same series, P0[5, 2, 9, 8, 4, 0, 3, 7, 6, 11, 10,
1], which is the same series in use in Flegetonte (see appendix 1).







In the example above, the melodic designs (a) and (b) are reexposed three times in se-
quence. This operation is guided by the rhythmic idea of Closed Refrain in the sense that
a same design is plainly reexposed instead of varied or developed, and also in the sense
that its repetition is oriented by a simple compositional rule of alternation. It is dramatic,
deterministic, and contracts temporally around sharply delimited impressions, melodic
in this case. Memory and the principle of identity are celebrated, and the composition
projects creatively this necessity of confirmation and stability.
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Figure 3.25:The composition of micro designs, 
under the influence of the idea of Closed Refrain.
This rhythmic idea projects its influence both on micro and macro designs. For instance,
resulting in a steady pedal note within an ornamental melodic passage, or simply emerging
as the repetition of a theme in the context of a melodic cadence, (Fig. 3.25). Moreover,
these same notions may also extrapolate their contractive temporal force on other com-
positional domains — harmonic, timbral, etc. —, or yet be purely formal; grounding, for





Clearly, this rhythmic idea projects both on repetition and on diﬀerence a strong temporal
contraction that rhythmically crystalises the compositional process in a determinate iden-
tity or a number of identities and in a determinate routine or routines. Under its influence,
I suggest, perception becomes firmly engaged in a quest for recognition strong (even sub-
tle) impressions able to induce some sort of psychological connection, of temporal agree-
ment. Of course, it may be suggested that this psychological stress on recognition seems
to depend anyhow on a preconditioned articulative drive — a drive for articulative motor-
diagrams, to use Bergson’s jargon — that happens as a predisposition to segmentation:
in order to be well determined, the thing must be well delimited, which may mean that,
being a thing segmentally apprehended, it is so because its virtual, its temporal  constitution
depends on articulation.
This rhythmic idea always approximates and synthesises by concentrating aspects and
elements able to be linked, merged into a wider, comprehensive image, which may rep-
resent, at every turn, as many similar aspects as possible: clearly, a thematic process is a
generalization, depends on the same process in use when doing conceptualisations. 
The rhythmic idea of Closed Route [CRo]
Non-Characterization [NC] <r> Routinization [R]
I have argued that this rhythmic idea, [CRo], results from the rhythmical interplay, the
rhythmicalization of the senses of non-characterisation and routinization, as previously
discussed. I relate this idea to traditional or innovative forms of (strong or soft) goal-ori-
ented, linear rules of control of the progression of musical variation. Oriented by it, the
compositional process revolves around the routinization of operations of thematic ex-
pansion, in the building of ‘contracting variational strategies’. In it,  the compositional pro-
cess is throughout influenced by a given plot, by a particular objective or resolution. It
represents, in this sense, the certainty of a prospective movement, the surety that justifies
some actions by considering what these actions may give origin — a certainty firmly con-
ditioned by what things will become, (see appendix 2).
In it, the past is expanded and turned to the present, while the future is contracted and
points to itself, (Fig. 3.27).
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Figure 3.27: Rhythmic idea of Closed Route, [CRo]: 
the past is expanded and the future is contracted temporally.
Most of all, this rhythmic idea implies the compositional projection of a unifying varia-
tional factor (or factors) that delineates a process of change, giving it a trajectory or a per-
spective, and stands as an influent factor in the creation of simple unfolding and
developmental forms (which usually favour the manifestation or necessity of unifying
rules of variation being applied).
Figure 3.28: Compositional example based on the rhythmic idea of Closed Route.
It implies the projection of a rule of control of variation and the keeping of this rule. 
In the example above, (Fig. 3.28), harmony alternates between two chords (a) and (b),
both in terms sequence and inversions. This alternation guides two diﬀerent sections in
a composition. While at the surface these two sections are completely diﬀerent in char-
acter and mood and impetus, they are integrated by a same inner order or rule of organ-
isation. This operation is guided by the rhythmic idea of Closed Route, in the sense that
diﬀerent elements, and their potential versions or variations, are oriented and unified by
a same compositional rule. However expanding temporally by means of harmonic diﬀer-
entiations, this example is still fundamentally dramatic and deterministic, because it keeps
the delimitation or restriction of the harmonic organisation and progression, giving it a
temporal perspective and projecting creatively on it a necessity of control and purpose. 
In this same vein, this rhythmic idea grounds, for example, many a strongly goal-oriented
compositional process, such as those commonly observed in the developmental sections
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the thematic element through many instances of a musical narrative. Developmental sec-
tions vary considerably in length from piece to piece; and they may be more or less com-
plex. Examples of short and long developmental sections in the context of sonata forms
are, respectively, Mozart’s Eine Kleine Nachtmusik, K 525/i (1787), and Beethoven’s Sym-
phony No. 3 in E-flat major, Op. 55, Eroica, (1804). Many things happen to thematic ele-
ments: transitions, bridges are built and destroyed, transformations, mutations are
proposed and negated. All in all, there is a sense of fate, of control; and a sort of musical
ethics seems to be granted to musical form: the theme, the thematic structure in itself,
may be developed in many ways, one may add or extract materials, one may stretch or
shrink the thematic conduct, clarify or obscure the trajectory of dissonance and conso-
nance, etc.
Another example of this rhythmic idea is how the pitches forming a twelve-tone row are
distributed among the voices, and a balance of principal and secondary elements in this
context is achieved. Schoenberg’s dodecaphonic music is, in this perspective, also sense-
oriented by dramaticism. Its condensation of developmental and variational types of tem-
poral structures, in which melody and harmony are interwoven, demonstrates — along
with its many rotations, transpositions, overlaps — a clear necessity: the presentation of
the series, either homophonic or contrapuntal, must manifest the control of a form of
becoming, the control of a process of change. Thematic features are seen from multiple,
subtle perspectives. That which is readily apparent is less the theme than its march, its
many transformations. 
See below, (Fig. 3.29), another example, yet in the context of microform, in which vari-
ation is unified by means of rules of pitch content rotation, by a rhythmic pedal and by
means of rhythmic fragmentation.
Figure 3.29: Compositional example based on the rhythmic idea of Closed Route.
This kind of mixed operation, composed by many organisational orders, is also oriented
by the rhythmic idea of Closed Route; diﬀerence resting only on the fact that in this ex-
ample, instead of one, several temporal perspectives contribute to forming a same devel-
opmental impetus. Rotations, pedal and fragmentation collaborate temporally, so to say,
actually intensifying the ‘closed route’ eﬀect. 
The rhythmic idea of Open Refrain [ORe]
Characterization [C] <r> Non-routinization [NR]
This rhythmic idea, [ORe], results from the rhythmicalization of the senses of character-
isation and non-routinization. It is directly related to traditional or innovative forms of a-
thematicism in music. It is also related to the limitation, liquidation, disturbance,
opposition, deconstruction or negation of thematic features and rules; and, indirectly, to
any underlying compositional condition allowing or favouring musical  a-thematicism. It
implies a sense of de-identification, a reaction against identification, a sense that is only
partially non-determinative, because it is overall projected as a way of problematising the
generalising and reiterative influence that thematic features have, (see appendix 2).
This rhythmic idea renders a compositional notion that is antithetical to the rhythmic
idea of Closed Refrain, of centripetal tendency, acting thus as a decentring power, as a
force of annihilation, of anti-repetition. It represents a deconstructive force projected on
thematic features. While the theme has an inside, a history which is concealed within
itself, the rhythmic idea of Open Refrain has an outside, which is neither its skin nor its
territory, but the process of operating a thematic disappearance, that has something to do
with an impulse towards forgetfulness. 
This rhythmic idea stands thus as a force of repetition that carries a diversifying soul. It
grounds a sort of uncertainty of retroactive presence, which means the possibility of not
having been or of not having happened, that is, the doubt, the uncertainty of the perma-
nence of the past in the present. It is the ‘uncertainty’ of the thematic feature. This rhyth-
mic idea is moved by a drive for originality, for dissociation. Dissociation because the
present is then the expression of an undetermined past, which remains in the now but
does not have any influence on it.
I suggest that, in general, past-bound rhythmic ideas, either dramatic or lyrical, follow
similar processes, related to a centralising mental structure. But they are opposed in regard
to their degree of determination. While the rhythmic idea of Closed Refrain repeats the
permanence of a singular image, the rhythmic idea of Open Refrain repeats the aspects
of change implied in the arrangement of images or sets of images: in the first case, there is
no arrangement, but points and singularities; in the second case, instead, there are no
singularities, but arrangements, principles. In it, the past is contracted and turned to itself,
confirming itself, while the future is expanded and points to the present, (Fig. 3.30).
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Figure 3.30: Rhythmic idea of Open Refrain, [ORe]: 
the past is expanded and the future is contracted temporally.
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Many compositional techniques may be used in order to approach these temporal notions.
They are observed, for example, in compositional processes based on abstract textural
shaping. Pointillistic pieces of music, such as Boulez’s Structures 1a (1951), (Fig. 3.31),
in which the dispersion of the sounds impedes the crystallization of thematic lines, are
examples of its influence. 
The rhythmic idea of Open Refrain thus implies the compositional projection of a diver-
sifying factor (or factors) that defies or contributes to blur or attenuate the recognition
of a given thematic feature. It also implies the avoidance of thematic formulae, or its ten-
dency. This rhythmic idea stands as an influent factor in the creation of relatively complex
thematic-variational and athematic forms (which usually favour the manifestation or ne-
cessity for changing compositional operations). An applied compositional example ori-
ented by this rhythmic idea is demonstrated below, (Fig. 3.33):
Figure 3.31: Boulez’s Structures 1a (1951), excerpt.
It is also to be found in indeterminate pieces such as Earle Brown’s 4 Systems (1954), (Fig.
3.32), which avoids the thematic element by leaving open the interpretation of melodic
and  harmonic features.
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Figure 3.33: Compositional example based on the rhythmic idea of Open Refrain.
In the example above, no thematic formation or variation is actually proposed, but only
a process of constant diﬀerentiation that gives the composition a general impression of
vagueness, created, most of all, by a lack of identifiable designs. Each impulse is internally
diﬀerentiated in terms of speed, quantity, rhythm and contour, while they are articulated
one another by diﬀerent intervals of time as well. 
This operation is guided by the rhythmic idea of Open Refrain, in the sense that there is
a clear questioning of identity and characterisation is weaken. However still contracting
temporally, this contraction happens in a diﬀerentiative, negative way, by avoiding and
questioning thematicism instead of promoting it. This example works, in this sense, within
the scope of a lyrical a musical past, that contacts always around emerging new impres-
sions, gestures, masks and aﬀects. 
The rhythmic idea of Open Route [ORo]
Non-characterization [NC] <r> Non-routinization [NR]
This rhythmic idea, [ORo], involves the rhythmicalization of the senses of non-charac-
terisation and non-routinization. It provides a compositional notion which is antithetical
to the rhythmic idea of Closed Route, as this projects a sense of accommodation by multi-
plication (as the multiplication of possible developments and variations generates a sen-
sation of immobility), an impulse towards renouncement and abandonment, which is
opposite to what seemed to be pretended, (see appendix 2).
This idea renders the conditions for a superior rhythmical elaboration,  imbued with the
expansion of variational rules and orientations, thus conditioning a sort of anti-developing
musical composition. Its expands the notion of uncertainty so to represent an inevitable
temporal expansion towards the present moment: a kind of uncertainty that concerns
the possibility of what will not happen. That is why, in many senses, this rhythmic idea is
also powered by unambitiousness. It deconcentrates musical future, makes it indeterminate,
arresting its lines, its focal points, and privileging a sense of totality. It thus works as if
eternally expanding the present time to many possible futures, never crystallizing into
just a single tendency. In this case, the future is something like a ‘shadow without the ob-
ject,’ the residual eﬀect of negating its determination. 
Guided by this rhythmical idea, the compositional process will result in a multiplication
of temporal images. These are simultaneously implicated and excluded, while projected
on a completely dispersed and neutral ‘rhizomatic panorama’34 that presupposes a creative
force Deleuze calls ‘topographical’: we cannot analyse its material and conceptual ele-
ments; we cannot cut oﬀ these elements from within; we cannot even measure them. It
thus implies a sense of trans-transformation and can be related to non-linear processes
of transition, both traditional or innovative, that a-thematic musical elements or rules
undergo, as much as to the limitation, disturbance, deconstruction or negation of sequen-
tial, variational, unfolding and developing musical formulas.
In it, the past and future are expanded and turned to the present moment, (Fig. 3.34):
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Figure 3.34: Rhythmic idea of Open Route, [ORo]:  
the past and and the future are temporally expanded.
34 According to Deleuze and Guattari, this panorama is a perfect model of our culture, since the rhi-
zoma opposes the organisational structure in root-tree systems that charts causality along chronolog-
ical lines and looks for the original source of things in the pinnacle or conclusion of those things. That
is so because a rhizoma ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organisations
of power, and circumstances related to the arts, the sciences, and social struggles. Rather than making
narratives out of history and culture, the rhizome presents them as a map or a wide array of attractions
and influences with no specific origin or genesis, for a rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always
in the middle, between things — inter-being, intermezzo. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousands Plateaus...,
7, 25.
There are many ways of compositionally addressing this idea. A basic approach would in-
clude: means (i) of approaching or creating a-thematic compositional techniques or rules
in order to establish non-linear processes of transition; or (ii) of breaking, problematizing,
or even blurring musical linearity.
These notions are implicit in Stockhausen’s moment forming, which delivers, as he himself
tells us, forms that 
are immediately intense and seek to maintain the level of continued ‘main points,’ which are
constantly equally present, right up until they stop. In these forms a minimum or a maxi-
mum may be expected in every moment, and no developmental direction can be predicted
with certainty from the present one; they have always already commenced, and could continue
forever; in them either everything present counts, or nothing at all; and each and every Now
is not unremittingly regarded as the mere consequence of the one which preceded it and as
the upbeat to the coming one […] but rather as something personal, independent and cen-
tred, capable of existing on its own. They are forms in which an instant does not have to be
just a bit of a temporal line, nor a moment just a particle of a measured duration, but rather
in which concentration on the Now—on every Now—makes vertical slices, as it were, that
cut through a horizontal temporal conception to a timelessness I call eternity.35
Another example is in Messiaen’s uses of non-retrogradable (palindromic) rhythmic for-
mulae, of a superposition of a rhythm upon its retrograde or his uses of superposed modes
of limited transposition. As he says, about his L’Ange aux Parfums (1939), (Fig. 3.35), by
superposing several layers, an image of eternity is  created:
Beside its curious mixture of timbres, it superposes diﬀerent rhythms and modes, combining
thus polymodality and polyrhythm. From the modal point of view: all the chords of the
upper staﬀ are written in the second mode of limited transpositions, all the chords of the
middle staﬀ are written in the third mode of limited transpositions. And the bass uses the
whole-tone scale. There is then a superposition of three modes of limited transpositions.
From the rhythmic point of view: the right hand repeats the rhythm, the left hand repeats
the retrograde of this rhythm. […] There is, then, a superposition of a rhythm upon its ret-
rograde, the combination taking place several times consecutively and occurring each time
with the elements an eighth-note farther apart than the preceding time. As for the bass, it
repeats a non-retrogradable rhythm, divisible in two groups, one of which is the retrograde
of the other, with a central common value. There are three rhythms that are repeated inde-
fatigably, in ostinato. This is the principle of the rhythmic pedal, and here we are in the pres-
ence of three superposed rhythmic pedals, the second being the retrograde of the first, the
third being non-retrogradable.36
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35 Karlheinz Stockhausen, “Momentform: Neue Beziehungen zwischen Auﬀührungsdauer, Werk-
dauer und Moment,” in Texte zur Musik, vol. 1 (Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963), 198-99.
36Olivier Messiaen, Technique de mon langage musical, vol. 1 (Paris: Alphonse Leduc, 1944), 23.
Figure 3.35:Messiaen’s L’Ange aux Parfums (1939), excerpt.
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This rhythmic idea stands as an influent factor in the creation of complex forms of un-
folding and development, and also of open forms, including those that make use of win-
dows and collages (which usually avoid, or question the manifestation or necessity of
clear unifying compositional strategies). An applied example of a composition oriented
by this rhythmic idea is shown below, (Fig. 3.36), which implies the compositional pro-
jection of a diversifying factor (or factors) that defies, or contributes to blur or attenuate,
a given rule of coherence, as much as is implied the avoidance of fixed, clear compositional
strategies or tendencies to unify it.
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Figure 3.36: Compositional example based on the rhythmic idea of Open Route.
In the example above, the unifying variational procedure of pitch rotation is blurred by
the interception of minute echoes. A little further, a pedal is questioned as well by the in-
termission of quite strong variations, while those echos which were initially negatively
presented as a neutralising force are now transfigured and approached in a rather positive
thematic way, and used as such. This operation is guided by the rhythmic idea of Open
Route, in the sense that a questioning of well established routines and perspectives is
constantly projected compositionally. However expanding temporally, this expansion is
not dramatically motivated and necessary, but rather it works in the context of the free-
dom given by a lyrical musical future, devoid of purpose.
In any case, either temporally expansive or contractive, lyrical and dramatic musical times
must be understood as part and parcel of a same temporal image or sense of continuity,
as a duration. This understanding is illuminated, for example, by Giovanni Piana’s con-
cepts of totality, integrity and intertwining, who posits that our
interior life is characterized by extreme mobility, though it is not an undetermined, chaotic
mobility, but presupposes those orderings that are also apparent in the conflicting forms.
The internal tensions grow and develop according to several intertwinings [my emphasis]
until they reach paramount points after which only relaxing and lowering stages may happen,
which, subsequently, prepare new conflicts and new resolutions. The double situation of
tension-distension resurfaces successively in discourses on the subject of rhythm, and the
rhythmical animation of musically organized sounds seems to pose a new. The sonic image
of that rhythm that pervades subjective life itself. And considering that living experiences
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37 Giovanni Piana, A Filosofia da Música, trans. Antonio Angonese (Bauru: Edusc, 2001).
38 Musical times and musical temporalities are qualitatively diﬀerent. It is my suggest that while the
former is ontological and involves the totality of one’s temporal capacities, the latter is psychophysi-
ological, and involves, in turn, more specific, specialized rhythmical capacities, the suggestion of di-
verse classes of rhythmical regularity and irregularity. Moreover, the domain of musical temporality
is ‘intermediate’ in relation to the (compositional and representational) experience of musical time
and the experience of the rhythmicality of musical piece’s presentation. 
do not take place, in their temporal process, one after the other, instead, they are reciprocally
integrated, being themselves formed by the subjective unity which is being created, a similar
concept of totality seems to stand as a natural model of unity for the musical piece. All those
processes of perceptive integration and of internal connexion between sounds that take
place in listening should be, thus, understood as a true and proper revelation of the unitary
cluster of living experiences inside a unitary cluster of sounds.37
Thus, we really may conceive a line of complexity linking lyrical and dramatic musical
times. Clearly, the dramatic is the lyrical and vice versa in all cases; the diﬀerence being
a distinct creative orientation, a distinct disposition sometimes turned towards the prob-
lem, the doubt, sometimes turned towards the solution, the search for certainty. 
I have initially proposed that the musical compositional process is ignited (inspired), in
the midst of the temporal foundation of our musicality, and follows a given temporal ori-
entation. I also have proposed that this orientation is further actuated by the rhythmical-
ization (the rhythmical interplay) of the temporal influxes that constitute that foundation.
On these bases, it is possible to suggest now that this rhythmicality potentially consoli-
dates thereafter into some superior archetypical rhythmical senses — rhythmic ideas —,
into ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ temporal images that represent further creative moments
in a musical compositional process. 
III – Other times
Musical temporalitites
Once inspired, installed and initially rhythmicalized on the temporal bases previously
mentioned, it is my suggestion that the compositional process advances, so to say, by
means of a second stage of temporal elaboration. It now receives a whole range of novel-
ties — of new sensations and new questionings — from the influx of diverse, evanescent
creative tendencies born in memory and imagination. In it, the musical idea is requalified
and re-signified, and its grounding times supplied, with no ruptures, with new dramatic
and lyrical compositional senses.
In a way akin to entering the Bergsonian temporal cone, I argue that a new rhythmicality,
compositionally significative, may be contemplated. It is fully comprehended by the pre-
vious one, and formed by a number of emerging psychophysiological impulses I call mu-
sical temporalities.38 This hypothesis concerns a further formalisation of the temporal
complexity of the musical idea, which is now seen rhythmically redefined by one’s sub-
jectivity only. It is psychological instead of ontological, a very particular class of rhyth-
micality that emerges exclusively under the influence of one’s memory and imagination:
in it, the musical idea is formally ‘distributed’ in diverse types of psychophysiological im-
pulses responding to diverse levels of rhythmic regularity and irregularity. Here, I follow
Bergson’s arguments about the plasticity and temporal complexity of memory, which
demonstrates that to assume time in us as being composed by many diﬀerent levels of
complexity is not only possible but necessary.
Bergson suggests that we are provided with shallow memories, which operate mechani-
cally, almost automatically and straightforwardly, in response to determinate routine-im-
pressions built under strong conditioning factors39 (including here the genetic factor).
In this, Bergson also supposes the existence of deeper memories, which, although still
motivated by determinate habits and rationales, are less conditioned and relatively less
mechanistic. Memories that answer creatively to the present situation in uncountable
subtle, diﬀerent, particular ways, in accordance with the actual necessity and with the de-
gree of one’s power of attention to life. 
With this in mind, and guided as well by Deleuze,40 on the notion that memory is
unattainable without imagination, we may additionally reason about the existence of shal-
low and deeper forms of imagination, and that these forms operate in similar manners as
those of memory. Deeper forms of imagination would thus convey diﬀuse amalgams of
memories emerging from diﬀerent moments of life. While shallow forms of imagination
would do the same but in relation to sharp, functional memories that emerge viciously
from habits and routines. We may suggest in this manner that deeper forms of imagination
dream; that they are illogical and able to mix (infinite) disparate impressions. That they
work openly, accepting all kinds of impossibilities. While shallow forms of imagination,
on the other hand, look forward to the best link, the eﬃcient solution. That they select
and summarise.41
Our temporal experiences seem to be indeed constantly re-oriented by uncountable psy-
chophysiological impulses that emerge sometimes close to motor centres, sometimes far
from them, sometimes as emptied memories, limited to just a few impressions, sometimes
as very constricted forms of imagination, apparently devoid of meaning, sometimes as
more complete memories, composed creatively by virtually infinite possible links, yet
sometimes as open forms of imagination, spread throughout the imaginable.
In all these cases diverse impulses are supposable. However the main issue here is less
this diversity, the detailing of the temporal complexity of memory or imagination, than
the investigation into how memory and imagination may actually compose the whole
complex net of temporal interactions that forms the compositional process in music.
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39 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 31.
40 Deleuze, Diﬀerence and Repetition, 91, 97, 169.
41 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 21, 45, 180, 189.
Things now become more complicated, because shallow and deeper forms of memory
and imagination, as proposed, must be contemplated therefore as impulses that actuate
‘within’ the fundamental rhythmical interplay of sensibility and understanding (in a sec-
ondary, intermediate rhythmicalization process). In order to be so, I argue, one must con-
ceive that both shallow (on which now we may say as well reactive) and deeper (reflexive)
memory and imagination types evolve temporally ‘resonating’, as it were, grounding, dra-
matic and lyrical past-bound rhythmic orientations (the rhythmic ideas of Closed and
Open Refrain), and also, accordingly, grounding dramatic and lyrical future-bound rhyth-
mic orientations (the rhythmic ideas of Closed and Open Route).
It is my suggest that all this amalgam of new impulses forms an intermediate temporal
scenario, that rhythmicalizes the compositional process in many new, varied ways. To
give just a plain example, one may think that by resonating the rhythmic idea of Closed
Refrain [CRe], the temporality implied in the shallower memory type may emerge as a
sort of mechanical musical dramaticism, that anchors the creative flux into a vicious,
frozen thematicism, fully delimited, as it were, by a shell of causes. While, on the one
hand, in a deeper compositional level,  the blend of the creative forces of characterisation
and routinization contracts musical time as a whole, giving it a strong thematic orientation,
the shallow memory type now establishes the proper thematic routine, which can be neu-
tral or light, or yet be so extreme that only the most centripetal image of repetition would
remain: the regular pulsation.
In order to introduce the discussion about this sort of complex rhythmical images, I pro-
pose an applied terminology, (see Fig. 3.37, below).  The Shallow Memory type of impulse,
[SM], I call the impulse towards symmetry (a kind of memory which is mechanical, that
is oriented to and by patterns and regularities, cycles and pulsation, by the least eﬀort
and best economy of resources, etc.); and the Shallow Imagination one, [SI], I call the im-
pulse towards asymmetry (a kind of imagination that looks forward to the transformation,
the mutation, the break of codes and habitus, that accepts accidents and mistakes, irreg-
ularities and gaps, that is adventurous and demands energy, etc.).
At this level, everything seems to be a matter of  ‘keeping it the same, cyclically, as much
as possible’ or ‘deviating it from itself, in order to regain life, and so keeping itself alive.’ At
this level, everything seems to be related to the body, the gesture, the feeling, the function,
the organs, ecologies and survival. At this level, the importance of everything’s happening
seems to be restricted by the momentum of the experience, as experiences happen, here
and now (accordingly, as microforms and micro-movements).
Likewise, the Deep Memory type of impulse, [DM], I call the impulse towards balance.
This is a kind of memory that although also seeking for patterns and regularities does not
do that organically, that is, as an ‘organ’ would do — because an organ is implicated in its
own roles and functions, in a particular performance, as the rhythmical patterns per-
formed by the heart or the lungs —, but as something that operates in between, ‘inter-
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organs,’ making inferences about the balance and harmony of distinct images, about their
cooperation and collaboration and, from that, building and favouring a virtual rhythmical
horizon or line of reference — which is not at all absolute, but is stable — to which all
cases, similar or not, are submitted; a kind of memory that favours balance over diﬀerence,
etc. And the Deep Imagination one, [DI], I call impulse towards unbalance.42 I argue that
this imagination type favours unbalance or the least balance. It problematizes balance,
makes unstable the points of reference and creates new ones as it creates new organs, new
functionalities, new solutions. (See Fig. 3.37, above). Thus briefly: we have dramatic or
lyrical, reiterative or diﬀerentiative musical times resonating and being resonated simul-
taneously by symmetric, asymmetric, balanced and unbalanced musical temporalities, in
a complex rhythmical model, (see Fig. 3.38, below).
We have seen that Schoenberg makes it clear that, for him, musical composition is directly
related to a sort of fluid musical space that is constantly redefined during musical experi-




























































42 Symmetry, asymmetry, balance and unbalance are psycho-physiological impulses, intermediate, in-
herent rhythmical attributes of the musical idea’s temporal complexity. It is thus assumed that they may
represent — or, better, ‘promote,’ as impulses — diverse levels of rhythmic and formal regularity/ir-
regularity. 
his view, musical composition constantly (re)-organises the complexity of memory —
the musical space — by means of diﬀerent types of musical presentations. It is important
as well to notice that for Schoenberg primitive musical forms, in his terms, are directly
related to primitive (and now we could say shallow, reactive) forms of memory, in which
the musical idea is usually ‘slowly’ presented (in this case, in regard to something’s po-
tential changeability, everything has to remain the same in order to make sense), produc-
ing, or better, demanding quite direct, local and immediate temporal relations. Following
this argument, for Schoenberg, artful musical forms are such because they address like-
wise artful, reflexive and more profound forms of memory that are called by means of
‘faster’ forms of presentation of the musical idea (in this case, in order to make sense, all
potential symmetries considered, everything has to be balanced), which consequently
requires distant and mediate temporal relations.
By the same token, Stockhausen, whose compositional practice is, clearly, more related
to the creative role of imagination than to that of memory, informs an alternative under-
standing of musical composition. There is indeed a great diﬀerence between the serialism
seen in Schoenberg’s and in Stockhausen’s works. On the one hand, for example, Schoen-
berg usually approaches the series in a thematic way, working it prevalently in the per-
spective of memory (which stands to the series, in his view, as a power of conservation
—  a coherent, fixed musical realm — that makes it possible a continuous temporal emer-
gence of deep, and mediate, artful musical forms). For Stockhausen, in turn, the serial
work is preponderantly treated in the perspective of imagination, which happens within
a non-coherent and mobile musical realm — a power of multiplication — that enables a
deepening into the temporality of music by means of manifold projections of superficial
musical matters. 
So for Schoenberg, it seems, what matters is to work oriented by the depth of memory,
while for Stockhausen it may be argued that what matters is to work motivated by the
depth of imagination. However, in any case, the temporal substance the Schoenbergian
musical memory seeks for the emergence is the same temporal substance the Stock-
hausean musical imagination seeks for the deepening: the musical idea. This, we now
may assume, is to be observed either from the point of view of thinking, reasoning, un-
derstanding (in which we find a Schoenbergian-fixed musical space of conservation, of
repetition) or from the point of view of perceiving, sensing (in which we find a Stock-
hausean-mobile musical space of multiplication, of diﬀerence).
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shallow memory impulse Symmetry repetition and regularity
deeper memory impulse Balance stability, articulation
shallow imagination impulse Asymmetry diﬀerence and irregularity




I argue that these two perspectives are mutually complementary. They inform a transient,
intermediary compositional function which, following on from the fundamental temporal
work of sensibility and understanding; evidence distinct levels of functional response or
response time over the many senses initially provided by primary rhythmic ideas.
Here, agreeing with Schoenberg, and adding insights from Kramer’s and Barry’s ap-
proaches to musical time based on information theory previously discussed, I argue that
a primitive, shallow memory type requires a slower presentation, in Schoenberg’s view,
not because in its primitiveness it is lagging, but because its scope is actually short and,
being so, strongly driven by articulation and regularity. The primitive memory must redo
itself more constantly to make sense. It depends on a greater number of actualisations of
the same causal factor (and the more regular this actualisation, the better). Likewise, an
‘artful memory’, again, following Schoenberg’s words, will require a faster presentation
not because it rushes over itself, but because it is long in scope, and as such regulatory
and driven by continuity and by complex meaning. It may prolong itself over a greater
number of singular processes, looking forward to make sense. 
I add to these notions that we are provided as well with primitive and artful imagination
types. In this, either short or long, imagination is always problematic and deregulatory.
It reshapes the image and its repetition, thus also making problematic its balance. 
One must conceive that the temporal quality and scope of distinct musical temporalities
is thus determined by the quality levels of their functional response. In this, I also follow
Bergson, who says that diﬀerent memory- and imagination-types of impulses are oriented
by more or less deep embodiments: the more embodied and shallower an impulse, the
more it consists of a strong and straightforward reactive process directed towards working
out a given stimulus; and the less embodied and deeper the impulse, the more it embraces
an active process oriented to problematizing a given stimulus.43
Musical temporalizations 
In order to briefly introduce a few aspects on the compositional domain of musical tem-
poralizations, it is my suggest that the lyricalness and dramaticism of the compositional
process as a whole are both regarded in their most direct and immediate rhythmical in-
fluence on the presentation of the musical idea. It is thus that, having in mind the previous
domains — those of musical times and of temporalities —, I suggest this further one, in
which the emerging rhythmicalized musical idea intercepts what is commonly under-
stood as the métier of composing, namely, the commonality of musical techniques and
the language often used to name them. 
Temporalizations may be split into two general classes: systemic and metric. 
43 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 130-133.
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SYSTEMIC TEMPOraLIzATIONS may be seen as rhythmical operations that account for the
consolidation of musical meaning, which may be understood in the perspective of the pre-
sent discussion as something completely delimited by a given rhythmicality, and does
not unfold in any construct other than that which is conveyed by the particular ‘sense of
rhythm’ put into form and act as a response to very specific rhythmic operations. Of
course, each one of the many compositional images previously suggested — such as the
archetypical (ontological, so to speak) temporal images of characterisation, non-charac-
terisation, routinisation and non-routinisation; or those, in a sense correlated, psy-
chophysiological rhythmical impulses, gestated in memory and imagination, towards
symmetry, asymmetry, balance and unbalance — informs a very specific sense of rhythm,
thus carrying a specific musical meaning; like the rhythmical idea of Closed Refrain,
[CRe], for instance, whose musical meaning is precisely conveyed by the consolidation
of musical thematicism. 
The rhythmical play of memory and imagination suggested above — which becomes in-
creasingly necessary and important compositionally, as the compositional process ad-
vances and merges musical times and musical temporalities — implies virtually infinite
‘deepenings’ (that is, of memory) and ‘densifications’ (the way imagination is fostered)
of a given musical idea’s temporal complexity.
Deepening temporally a musical idea, I suggest, amounts to conceiving of its temporal
complexity in terms of layers of musical meaning, which thus conceived, like layers, may
be more or less superficial. These layers reflect the amplitude of memory and conse-
quently the temporal depth of a composition. In this particular sense, musical meaning
may be seen as informed by the degree of deepness conveyed by distinct temporal struc-
tures (like the structures of points, figures, groups or masses, as they are discussed by
Stockhausen), temporal structural relationships (like the diverse qualities of permutational
and transpositional relationships that may be compositionaly projected on those struc-
tures) and temporal structuring processes (like the ordinary processes of variation and de-
velopment, among others, that usually orient the general compositional arc of a musical
work, its macro and micro forms), as I call them. That is, the meaning of music reflects,
on the one hand, its temporal structural complexity. 
Now, to condense a musical idea temporally implies conceiving of its temporal complexity,
conversely, in terms of zones of projection of musical meaning.44 These projections may be
seen as reflecting the imaginative amplitude and specific qualities of the creative field to
which memory is subjected. In this precise sense, I suggest that musical meaning is also
informed, on the other hand, by the degree of temporal density given by distinct levels of
44 Layers and zones of projection of musical meaning are tied up in several ways and the formal clas-
sification presented here is only introductory. There would be certainly much more to say about the
distribution of musical meaning in memory and imagination than may be addressed in this simple
scheme.
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textural amplitude/design, of performance-determinability (or performing control), and of
frequency ranges.
METRIC TEMPOraLIzATIONS, on the other hand, may be seen as rhythmical operations
exclusively related to the general organisation of musical accentuation, here assumed, ac-
cordingly, in its relation with two distinct senses, ‘extensively’ — in which distinct accents,
following sequentially one another, form and inform orderly, chronological intervals of
time, pieces of duration;  and ‘intensively’ — in which distinct accents ‘accumulate,’ and
thus form common, though heterogeneous and multiple, fields of rhythmical significance.
Musical presentation would be thus composed of many a rhythmical image that integrate
temporally, always answering to the quality and kind of rhythmical tension that is cre-
atively established between lyricalness and dramaticism during the compositional act.
Metric temporalizations are in a sense more superficial rhythmical operations that reflect,
intensify or attenuate, a musical idea’s fundamental lyricalness and dramaticism, forming
a two-dimensional melodic-harmonic complex image of musical accentuation. This no-
tion implies lastly that musical meter has always two sides or orientations, a chronological,
horizontal orientation, and an ordinate, vertical orientation, each one in line, respectively,
with the melodic and harmonic dimensions of musical presentation. 
This last assumption is held by Stockhausen’s on how time is organised within a piece of
music, in answer to our perceptive capacities, as previously discussed. These ideas lead
me to suggest a rationalisation of musical metrics that accounts specially for the possibility
of conceiving of it in relation to diverse spectral zones of temporal complexity. Following
this reasoning, it may be argued that frequencies usually perceived as meter and rhythm
and those usually perceived as pitch and timbre are not only structurally but also metri-
cally related. They may be creatively and compositionally integrated, participating of a
same temporal continuum: independently of its complexity and spectra, a whole set of
resonant rhythmic proportions may ideally emerge as it were from any given concrete,
sonorous rhythmic pattern, and vice versa; that is, that concrete, sonorous rhythmic de-
signs may emerge as if resonating the whole set of rhythmic proportions that quotidianly
reach our perception (which can be sometimes purely conceptual, or summed from many
diﬀerent memories of diverse moments of our life). 
We may once again return to those empirically-transcendental notions of time, elaborated
mainly by Bergson and Deleuze, as previously discussed, and propose, following them,
that there is thus a distinction we must make, a very important one, between the percep-
tion of musical surface, of a sonic phenomenon, and the perception of musical composition,
which is always and necessarily ideal. 
We cannot conceive of music as only an amalgamate of sounds and sound shapes. When
listening to music, we are aﬀected above all, beyond sounds, by temporal complexities.
Even in chaotic musical formations we detect a ‘chaotic musical time’. Because musical
matter imprints us with an echo eﬀect we must always account for. An echo directly related
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to a temporal linkage with the when, the how and the why we are: the echo echoing our-
selves; the composition being there, during this echo. For this reason, it very is important
to understand that the structure of accentuation responsible for a given metric system
we perceive at the surface of music must always be raised, so to say, to the compositional
domain. 
All this considered, it seems that it will be possible to elaborate new metric distinctions,
distinct at least from the ordinary notion of musical accentuation, which is usually re-
stricted to the melodic perceptual domain (the chronological one). Yet, as I see them,
these new metric distinctions must be intimately allied to a broad understanding of mu-
sical interpretation and expression, because these notions are deeply implicated in the
formative process of the presentation of the idea.
The grounds for this broad understanding is the notion that the interpretive contraction
and the expressive expansion of musical form and time are in practice inseverable compo-
nent parts of the same creative process. A process made up by a continuity of complexities,
both heterogeneous and multiple — to say it with Bergson and Deleuze — in which har-
monic and melodic features are constantly juxtaposed. Only in this way it will be possible
to deepen the notion, here briefly suggested, that a musical composition actually repre-
sents a continuous folding of the harmonic over the melodic spectrum and vice versa. 
This continuous folding is also discussed by Deleuze and Guattari with reference to a cre-
ative diagonal. As Edward Campbell indicates, “in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guat-
tari, drawing on Boulez, conceptualise the role of every great composer in terms of the
invention of a diagonal, a ‘transversal line’, a deterritorialization. In this respect, the Vi-
ennese school (presumably the second) is cited as exemplifying this kind of diagonal
move which produces ‘a new system of territorialization’. ”45 On this, we read directly
from Deleuze and Guattari that, 
When Boulez casts himself in the role of historian of music, he does so in order to show
how a great musician, in a very diﬀerent manner in each case, invents a kind of diagonal run-
ning between the harmonic vertical and the melodic horizon. [my stress] And in each case it is
a diﬀerent diagonal, a diﬀerent technique, a creation. Moving along this transversal line,
which is really a line of deterritorialization, there is a sound block that no longer has a point
of origin, since it is always and already in the middle of the line; and no longer has horizontal
and vertical coordinates, since it creates its own coordinates; and no longer forms a localiz-
able connection from one point to another, since it is in “nonpulsed time”: a deterritorialized
rhythmic block that has abandoned points, coordinates, and measure, like a drunken boat
that melds with the line or draws a plane of consistency. Speeds and slownesses inject them-
selves into musical form, sometimes impelling it to proliferation, linear microproliferations,
and sometimes to extinction, sonorous abolition, involution, or both at once.46
45 Edward Campbell, “Rethinking Boulez Schemes: logics and paradigms of musical modernity,” in
Erling E. Guldbrandsen and Julian Johnson (ed.), Transformations of Musical Modernism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 183.
46 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus…, 296.
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It was this that Ernst Kurth also indicated in his theory of the simultaneous complemen-
tarity and opposition between harmony and melody. Kurth conceived of harmony and
melody as dynamic forces of cohesion but also of dissipation. He pleads that
if, according to [Carl] Stumpf ’s47 formulation of the ‘fusion phenomenon,’ the vertically
oriented cohesion eﬀect constitutes that relationship of (simultaneous) sensory contents
(individual tones) ‘whereby they form a whole rather than a sum,’ then with regard to the
other of the two structural forces — the basic process upon which horizontal, melodic hear-
ing depends — the eﬀect of kinetic energy can be characterised similarly as that relationship
of individual tones where (in succession) they form a whole rather than a sum, the contin-
uum of the line that arises from the melodic energy flowing over the individual tones. [… ]
Each force strives in its own way to bring the individual tone under its influence, chordally
or linearly. In musical activity the individual tone means nothing, its context everything;
the individual tone unto itself escapes conscious awareness, which summarises larger com-
plexes. A perception of individual tone contradicts the essence of music; music always sig-
nify activity, dynamism, while the awareness of the individual tone is, in itself, still merely
acoustic-psychological hearing. The compositional treatment of musical materials, as well
as its technique, is based on the dual tendency of these two fundamental forces, on the com-
petition to absorb the individual tone into their sphere of influence, and on the fluctuating
equilibrium between the two sensations of force. An oppositional tendency thus charac-
terises the technical features of a linear contrapuntal design and, on the other hand, of har-
monic design. Their diﬀerence is profound; it extends to the very roots of compositional
technique, which, in the harmonic view begins with the chord, and in the linear view with
the line as the unit and origin.48
Kurth’s understanding of the complementary opposition between harmony and melody
can be enriched by the concept of intertwinement of the harmonic with the melodic
spectrum. Harmony and melody are mutually implicated both in their duration and
rhythm. They have in their centre, we have seen, a common universe of frequencies,
whose sides are, respectively, the dimensional (harmonic) and motional (melodic) qual-
ities of the musical structures that co-exist in it.49 This universe of frequencies extends
from about 30 to 5000 Hz, comprehending the perceptual tonal range, where the unfold-
ing of harmonic and melodic formal, temporal proportions in general takes places. 
This last notion suggests a central diﬀerence between a tonal perception (a perception
oriented to the presentation of the idea) and the compositional perception mentioned
before. Plain tones are immediate musical percepts: they stand ‘transparently’, as diagrams,
as Bergson would put it, at the core of any musical composition, and representing first of
all its presentation. Ultimately, however, they reflect only themselves and not (yet) the
47 Carl Stumpf, Tonpsyshologie, 2 vol (Leipzig: Hirel, 1890).
48 Kurth, Selected Writings, 43.
49 On this I also recommend the first chapter of Joe Hughes’s Deleuze’s Diﬀerence and Repetition…, p.
96 onwards, which is organized around the quote: “First of all I want to ask: what is the characteristic
or distinctive trait of a thing in general? Such a trait is twofold: the quality or qualities that it possesses,
the extension that it occupies. […] In a word, each thing is at the intersection [my stress] of a twofold
synthesis: a synthesis of [i] qualification or specification, and of [ii] partition, composition, or orga-
nization.”
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complex formal, temporal proportionality projected on them by musical composition as
a whole. Every proportional relation existent between musical facts (and in particular be-
tween the domains of harmony and melody), on the other hand, need to be structurally
amplified (by memory and imagination, in their way of organising the work or sensibility
and understanding), that is, they have to be ‘creatively folded’ within a given perceptual
tonal range, in order to be cognisable and aesthetically manageable; they do not reflect
tones but musical ideas and their rhythmicality. 
This compositional folding has two sides: an expressive side, whose main objective is to
drive into the realm of harmony and melody all those frequencies that escape, either cen-
trifugally or centripetally, the immediate transparency of isolated tones, forming and
structuring them temporally, in depth; and an interpretative side, whose main objective
is to create applied techniques of musical presentation that allow for musical expression
to be accessible by our understanding, techniques which are thus related to the degree
of veiling, of concealment of the musical idea, during its presentation.
This notion suggests that everything in music results from the juxtaposition of virtually
infinite ‘supra- and infra’ rhythmical designs/frequencies mediated by sounds — the dif-
ference between supra and infra rhythmical designs being only their relative diﬀerence
of speed; and the distinction between harmony and melody, in compositional terms,
being only that the treatment of harmony implies transplanting rhythmic designs/fre-
quencies that are usually extensive (melodic) to an intensive spectrum, and vice-versa.
Conclusion
The alternative musical idea 
he experience of music would be rather difficult, even impossible, if we
 dispensed with the diﬀerential power of the idea that exists outside the concept. It would
be so because this experience demands a constant creation of ‘intermediate zones of
meaning,’ zones which are still not clearly and objectively crystalised, which are eternally
emerging and mixing and vanishing, like vapours amidst the haze. I have endeavoured in
this dissertation to provide a way of investigating some of these intermediate zones —
by suggesting classes of musical times, of temporalities, of temporalizations, of musical
representations — taking as my starting point a necessary critical evaluation of the
Schoenbergian concerns about the nature of the musical idea and the problems of its pre-
sentation.
Music is eternally changing, in itself and in us. In essence, I argued in this thesis — in-
formed mainly by the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze and also in many ways by the
compositional practices and thought of Stockhausen — that our finest musical experi-
ences do not engender only the sentiment of certainty Schoenberg seems to be commit-
ted to when he declares that “composing is thinking in tones and rhythms” and thus
“subject to the laws and conditions of all other thinking;” the same feeling that, as a rule,
would lead us unavoidably to final, logical conclusions about music and its artistic value.
Rather, any higher musical experiences seem to happen in a context of ‘alternative
Deleuzian diﬀerence’ — as doubt and surprise, as if they were contaminated, so to say,
by a sentiment of dynamism and evolution, by a profound creative flux. Moreover, such
musical experiences provide us with the amazement of a first encounter, and not only in
regard to the new music of our time, for it suﬃces that the interpretation, the analysis,
the critique, etc., of any piece of music or musical aspect, be in diﬀerence. 
Regardless of that, if the sentiment of certainty somehow arises from a given musical con-
text, it does so momentarily and functionally only, as if it were merely for the renewal of
the possibility of doubt: many a tonal musical piece, for instance, is formed by superficial
rests, marks, points of reference, all sorts of fleeting attachments, installed on its deep
motional substance. 
All in all, these assumptions naturally led to the discussion of the Schoenbergian notion
of musical idea, which is, to say it with Deleuze, a concept-genus musical notion perme-
ated, as it is, by the principle of identity. Mostly from Schoenberg himself, and from many
sources, we have learnt that Schoenberg’s musical idea favours a principle of coherence,
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which works both as the virtual basis for a process of musical composition and as the
foundation of the technique of presentation of the musical piece resulting from that pro-
cess: however eventually comprising many sorts of sub-routines, distinct sections, rup-
tures and oppositions, for Schoenberg a musical piece must be ultimately well-balanced
and form a whole, a noticeable unity. 
On this basis, and following both Bergson, and Deleuze’s and Bachelard’s accounts of
Bergsonism, I have extensively argued that there must be ‘another kind of musical idea,’
necessary and essential to music, ruled as well by non-coherence and temporal transgres-
sion. I have suggested moreover that music, any music, is unavoidably composed of both
kinds of musical ideas, with no primacy of coherent or non-coherent creative musical
powers. 
I sought to demonstrate critically a manner of discussing how these two kinds of musical
ideas interact and produce, reaching a broad panorama of a fundamental question, that
is, of how coherence and non-coherence emerge as distinct by complementary musical
powers. This perspective was substantially supported by Bergson’s philosophy, which ad-
vocates the infinity and profound heterogeneity of time; that ideas are truly complex tem-
poral entities, which may evolve positively, freely and creatively as everything in nature
does, though also may be captive of conception-forming processes and preconceptions. 
For Bergson, and also for Deleuze, our ideas are essentially free, provided that their sense-
freedom is creative and expressive; for both, freedom is in itself creative expression. In this,
order and disorder are equivalent creative products. Indeed, coherence and identity are
necessary ordering factors in a world of infinite change that constantly defies the defined
thing. But non-coherence and non-identity are all the same necessary in a world domi-
nated by rules of conduct and by fate. In this way, we are free to apply a determinate order
to things, to define a field or plan of actions, to circumscribe a determinate problem; but
only on condition that such determinations radiate, expressively and transversely, alter-
native orderings, fields, and problems. This is in a sense conveyed by Deleuze when dis-
cussing a “diagonal running between the harmonic vertical and the melodic horizon.”1
In each of these cases,
a diﬀerent diagonal, a diﬀerent technique, a creation […] a ‘nonpulsed time’: a deterritori-
alized rhythmic block that has abandoned points, coordinates, and measure, like a drunken
boat that melds with the line or draws a plane of consistency. [In which] Speeds and slow-
nesses inject themselves into musical form, sometimes impelling it to proliferation, linear
microproliferations, and sometimes to extinction, sonorous abolition, involution, or both
at once. The musician is in the best position to say: ‘I hate the faculty of memory, I hate
memories.’ And that is because he or she aﬃrms the power of becoming.2
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Art, music, like everything, depend on this symbiotic temporal relationship; moreover,
they demonstrate this relationship.
The whole discussion here presented was thus guided by the emerging dialectical dy-
namism of two fundamental musical senses, lyricalness and dramaticism, that are juxta-
posed and linked in many complex ways, to compose a single interdependent rhythmic
system by means of many a creative temporal process, by many rhythmicalizations. To be
clear, the principle of coherence is not enough, in itself, as a ground for aesthetic investi-
gation in music. It seems to be a mistake to say that some pieces of music are better ac-
complished just because they are, or appear to be, more coherently shaped than others.
The coherence-balance musical aesthetical stand
It did not seem pertinent to restrict the concept of musical idea to the standpoint of time
as regularity, of a time that is stretched spatially and is cyclically structured. I argued that
this is so because musical time is also in itself a diﬀerential substance heterogeneously
made up by irregularities no less than by regularities. All the same, it did not appear up
to the point curtailing the elaboration of a given musical idea by considering music only
from the viewpoint of order and proportion and, consequently, of music conformation
to norms of balance, conjunction, and complementarity, of consonance of any kind. This
is because music, I think, is also a diﬀerential substance, notoriously composed of imbal-
ances, and obviously by dissonances. 
Regularity and balance are significative temporal and musical principles, but only when
seen from the antagonistic perspective of partial or complete irregularity and randomness.
Of course, there is music that is cyclically organised, as much as there is time that is pro-
portionally ordered, but these sorts of things do not implicate regularity and balance as
normative either for time in music, or for music in time. Regularity and balance are not
indisputable characteristics of any given musical idea, but rather aesthetic positions cho-
sen with precision from an ample spectrum of possibilities of representation. Regularity
and balance have been related here aesthetically to the degree of communicability and
comprehensibility of a musical idea. In other words, they were vindicated as temporal
principles oriented, in general, to the interpretability of a musical idea, to that that I have
called musical dramaticism, a term that stems from Stockhausen’s reasoning, when he dis-
cusses, about his Kreuzspiel (1951), the profound dramatic aspect of the musical form
when this is causally governed and teleologically planned towards a point of conclusion.
I discussed the interpretative power of musical dramaticism and, more precisely, the in-
terpretative power of any sort of temporal contraction, articulation, repetition, deter-
minability, etc., suggesting, in the same vein of thought, that the power of musical
interpretation demands, of necessity, the complementary or creative antagonism of ex-
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pressive musical powers, of musical lyricalness — which is also, I insist, an aesthetic po-
sition, one that favours non-determination, irregularity and unbalance. 
For Schoenberg, the musical presentation of the idea is in constant need to search for a
right balance to instability, to restore in a logical, systematic manner what was inescapably
installed in the idea already at its genesis. One is tempted to think, following his claim,
that temporal balance should be conceived as ‘perfection’ — or perhaps as the perfect
source of music — in which regard any given musical idea somehow falls short, and to
which a musical idea always must yield, in order to return to its primitive state: it should
return to balance simply because it was somehow previously disrupted. 
In this dissertation, however, I systematically aimed at contemplating the problem of
restoring the balance in music from a contrasting vantage point. I looked precisely into
temporal perfection in a Bergsonian-Deleuzian way as complexity and deepness of mean-
ing(s). Thus, the temporal complexity of a given musical idea may eventually perfectly
mirror the temporal complexity of the world. 
I have delved into this question in a gradual manner, steadily, in order to verify the di-
alectics of determination and of non-determination, of repetition and diﬀerence, and so
on, as fundamental compositional principles. Henceforth, I suggested that the rhythmi-
cality of the musical idea would be granted exactly by the creation of regions of greater
and lesser determination, of greater and lesser balance and stability. In the end, it would
be justly the rhythmical mobility, with no privilege to temporal balance or unbalance, to
confer upon the idea its musicality. 
That time as complexity, instead of as balance, could be of choice to represent temporal
perfection in musical terms, is a proposition grounded on a crucial and unexpected
change with regard to the usual interpretation of Schoenberg’s thoughts about composi-
tion. Musing over the problem raised by Schoenberg about the nature of the musical idea,
it soon becomes evident that the word restoration would be in any case improper, specially
in the sense that he sometimes gives to it, of restoring the balance to the musical idea, or
of being the idea itself a process of restoration of balance. Because Schoenberg does not
in fact consider that balance is the cause of the idea, nor that the restoration of it (by the
presentation of the idea) is justified by its primitivity. Assuming thus the primary and
proper sense of musical idea given by Schoenberg — that of an ‘ideal’ which becomes
temporally specified in its material, sonic presentation —, a given musical presentation
never restores, as a matter of fact, the musical idea it is related to. Instead, it infuses this
idea compositionally with the notion of temporal balance, as much as (in my point of
view) with that of temporal imbalance — because this ideal is always temporally mediated
between the extremes. Then again, it is even possible to ascertain that for Schoenberg the
notion of musical idea is indeed that of something temporally complex (although not
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complex in the sense of a deviation from nature’s integrity), because it reflects, at some
perceptual and intellectual level, the complexity of nature itself. One just has to recall, for
instance, his considerations, in the Theory of Harmony, about the discovery and assimila-
tion of dissonance throughout the history of music. Of course, there are in Nature innu-
merous elements and forces of balance or rest as of disturbance. Temporal balance and
imbalance (as much as consonance and dissonance, etc.) may be seen after all, even in
Schoenberg’s compositional thought, not as absolute notions coexisting externally to a
given musical idea, but as relative and changeable notions that are compositionally infused
into the idea, in order to manifest a given musical representation of reality.  
Therefore, ‘to restore’, as used by Schoenberg and others, may signify more than restoring
a disrupted balance. It may have the sense of working out, consciously and systematically,
both the balance and the unbalance that are needed to inspire the musical idea, respec-
tively, with interpretative areas, that are fields of coherence and comprehensibility, and
with expressive areas of non-coherence and apparent incomprehensibility (because they
are original, problematic, arousing, etc.).
All in all, Schoenberg’s apparent partiality towards balance has opened the path for this
thesis. Although it is evident that for him temporal balance is a factor of comprehension
and coherence that concentrates the musical idea around certain logical lines of thought,
it was possible to develop from this notion a dialectical approach that considers, in essence
and fully, the musical idea’s temporal complexity, and the possibility of creating, on this
complex basis, countless relations of meaning that deal with the world’s complexity. 
The Rhythmic Idea
It remains to be said that Schoenberg’s approach to the problem of musical idea in his
writings is circumscribed by the nature of its presentation. For him, a musical idea and
its presentation are in many senses inseverable, as he presumes the idea to represent a
creative foundation for its own presentation, at the same time that the presentation itself
bestows on the idea its form and character. Here I argued that this approach is the main
reason for Schoenberg to consider the musical idea necessarily as a form of musical
thought and, in consequence, to correlate musical thought and other forms of thought;
the crucial point being that, for him, presentation must comply with idea, as it works to-
wards a greater comprehensibility of the idea by unveiling it, step by step, in a logical and
coherent manner. But since in his approach idea and presentation are formally confused,
the principle of coherence in the presentation of the idea is eventually transferred (con-
ceptually and retroactively) to the idea itself, which thus becomes inevitably and viciously
reoriented in a way that its own cohesive power, regularity, and balance end up prevailing
over heterogeneity and diﬀerence. Essentially, musical thought for Schoenberg depends
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on this: the regulatory influence of the interpretative power of the presentation of the
idea over the expressive power of the idea. 
The Schoenbergian notion of musical thought was here thus critically dealt with by con-
sidering the problem of musical idea from a strictly temporal standpoint, without taking
into account its final form of presentation. In order to do so, I referred to the principle
that any idea is related to things as a fixed image and, simultaneously, as a moving image.
The relation is a temporal flux, that is, a flow of relations, more or less fixed or mobile.
Moreover, illuminated by Bergson’s thought, I have argued that this flux is a vital one. It
is constantly renewed by one’s subjectivity, without ruptures, answering to the continuity
and integrity of one’s inner self that spans throughout the powers of sensibility and un-
derstanding, and, as a result, of representation. In this sense, the musical idea, as I see it,
is not confused with its presentation but with the time of its experience, as idea. Thence
the Augustinian notion of distentio animi was relevant. For Augustine, time is experience,
and the experience of time itself is an eternal present that stretches formally, as expecta-
tion and memory, towards a possible or impossible future as well as towards a possible
or impossible past: for the experience of the musical idea happens, I have argued, by means
of the piece of music, which stretches formally this experience towards possible and im-
possible musical pasts and futures, and even  towards their negation.
There is thus a diﬀerence between the Schoenbergian notion of musical idea and that
that I presented here. As I said, Schoenberg understood the musical idea as a form of mu-
sical thought, implying that it is necessarily ruled by principles of logic and coherence,
and that it is, consequently, essentially articulative and spatial in nature, as any form of
thinking is. In turn, what I have presented here, developed the notion of musical idea in
the perspective of its own emergence as time, that is, reflecting the experience in itself as
much as the subjectivity of one’s response to it. Not simply those experiences informed
by the power of thought but also, and sometimes with more intensity, by the powers of
sensibility, memory and imagination. By doing so, I asserted priority to the process of
composition and representation of the musical idea. This process was explained by many
a distinct creative impulse, always having in mind the strict relation these impulses might
hold with time as experience. It was necessary, in this concern, to delineate some funda-
mental temporal orientations, routines and anti-routines, forms of freedom and control.
From this point, in which the musical idea integrates a general notion of time as experi-
ence as it surpasses the mere status of a form of musical thought, it became clear that the
discussion about the musical idea has no sense without a concurrent discussion about
the notion of musical time, which, in turn, has no sense without a discussion about
rhythm. 
The limits of my approach were, thus, Schoenberg’s concept of a temporality for the mu-
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sical idea restricted to its presentation, and a notion of a superlunary musical idea, a uni-
versal something exterior to the individual creativity and to one’s experience of time. I
progressed between these limits taking into account as well Stockhausen’s idea of musical
time as continuity, which by existing as a dynamic and inarticulate spectrum is established
as an equitable basis for the emergence of diﬀerent musical formations. This notion is
presented as an alternative both to a universal musical idea of Platonic extraction and to
a delimitation of musical time by the concreteness of a sensory, sonic musical matter of
Aristotelian descent. Stockhausen’s musical idea was shown to echo the Bergsonian con-
ception of delimiting the idea by the concreteness of an interior life time, as a response to
memory and imagination, to thought and to representational actions (material, concep-
tual, artistic, etc.) that stem from concreteness. It also echoes the Deleuzian concept of
an idea that is built in the self as knowledge (and whose genesis in the individual sensi-
bility is unrepeatable).
All in all, the foremost concept presented, which permeates the whole work, was that of
rhythmic idea. The rhythmic idea is a model for investigating the process of creation and
representation of time in music and by music. Our ideas, pure times, are rhythmicalized
in accordance with ideal rhythmical shapers. This rhythmical process emerges amid diﬀer-
ences and repetitions, continuities and articulations, and only in the perspective of this
rhythmical amalgamate of fluxes and influxes, I have argued, it is possible to consider the
emergence of the musical idea proper, which stems from this process, and renders a mix-
ture of the concreteness, so to say, of time and many a temporal concept, in a process that
defines and fixes routines, that freezes impressions, at the same time that it liberates them
from their own rhythmical mechanisation. It was thus that I have opposed concretenesses
and concepts; and also that I have devised several musical compositional orientations as
variations of these conceptual and concrete experiences.
Rhythmic ideas were shown to be consolidations of such variations, of the experience of
the same and of the diﬀerent, of the concept and of concreteness. They are formal grada-
tions of diﬀerent ideas. 
The compositional process
In discussing the processes of musical composition, four thematics were contemplated:
the rhythmicality of ontological temporal influxes; the rhythmicality of psychological
temporal impulses, the rhythmicality of structural and metrical temporal pulses; and, fi-
nally, the rhythmicality of musical representation. 
Thus, by the appropriation and re-elaboration of temporal notions presented by Bergson
and Deleuze, I have presented the concept of a first, all-encompassing compositional do-
main of potentially distinct musical times, as diverse in quality and quantity, as the diversity
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of our actual experiences and actions —, investigating among them the possibility and
compositional viability of musical dramaticism and lyricalness, and their internal move-
ments of temporal contraction and expansion. Compositional processes may be funda-
mentally oriented by distinct temporal influxes, which are never fixed, and change and
exchange their creative powers all the time, even in a same compositional project. 
I have introduced next the notion of a second, intermediate compositional domain, that
of musical temporalities, which is internal to the first and receives from it, in totality, its
temporal influence. Musical temporalities are also illuminated by a Bergsonian and Deleu -
zian-like approach to memory and imagination, and are defined by the actuation of dis-
tinct psycho-physiological factors or impulses, distinguished in terms of shallow and
deeper memory and imagination types. I also have finally suggested a third compositional
domain, that of musical temporalizations, here generally distinguished in terms of sys-
temic and metric kinds only. Some aspects of Stockhausen’s compositional practice came
into play here, especially those concerning his spectral conception of musical time. Many
further considerations may arise from these notions, chiefly those that may be linked with
Schoenberg’s traditional ones; for instance, that of development, variation and conjunc-
tion, or of the mutual relation between homophony and polyphony and their composi-
tional treatment, etc. A same musical idea may be presented in numberless manners, in
innumerous pieces of music. However, it is always possible to go upstream to the idea
from which they sprung. Therefore, the study of musical composition should also be con-
cerned with studying the composition of the idea, reaching further than the presentation
of it, and comprising the metric image presented as medium. As Schoenberg exclaimed,
it is not worthy “seeing how it is done… I have always helped people to see: what it is!”3
Lastly, after the presentation of the musical idea by means of the musical piece, comes its
musical representation. To tackle this latter aspect, a few complementary arguments on
musical representation may be touched, and chiefly among them are those of musical
representation as temporal conformity and transgression. Either a ‘con-formation’ to the
forms presented on the surface of the piece of music; or one that ‘transgresses,’ transcen-
dentally breaking through that surface. Musical representation is always temporal. There
is thus a musically represented time that conforms, that assimilates routines, which is fre-
quently a time of repetition or nullification. But there is also a musically represented time
that transgresses, that creates perspectives, a time of diﬀerence and discovery.
Musical Representation
All foregoing matters considered, we may aﬃrm that, ideally, a piece of music reflects and
concentrates the multiplicity and complexity of temporal intensities and interconnections
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informed by the compositional process as a whole — not only its most superficial pro-
cesses of temporalization, the structural and metric compositional operations that usually
orient the presentation of the musical idea, but also the kind(s) of musical temporality(ies)
and time(s), predominant or concealed, that constitute the musical idea´s rhythmical
grounds. On this, one may always have in mind, by taking into consideration the many
Schoenbergian arguments on the matter, that the art of composition of the musical idea
and that of its presentation are diﬀerent in kind. For example, when, in praising Mahler’s
scores, Schoenberg declares that
one should really have been able to recognize Mahler's high artistry on one's first glance at
his scores. [...] That it is entirely out of the question for someone to accomplish something
masterly in any respect who is not a master in every respect. Therefore, anyone who can
write such scores has one of those minds in which perfection automatically originates. And
the concept of perfection completely excludes the concept of imperfection; therefore, it is
not possible to give a representation of an imperfect thing which produces the impression
of perfection.4
Or yet, on Bach’s music, because
while Bach [...] produced work after work in a new style, his contemporaries knew no better
than to ignore him. [...] But [...] it was not musical ideas which their New Music wanted to
establish, but only a new style for the presentation of musical ideas, whether old or new; it
was a new wave in the progress of music, one which [...] tried to develop the other direction
of musical space, the horizontal line.5
Also, when he separates musical form, as something related to musical presentation, and
musical content, as something related to that (the idea) which must be presented, asserting
that
form in music serves to bring about comprehensibility through memorability. Evenness,
regularity, symmetry, subdivision, repetition, unity, relationship in rhythm and harmony
and even logic — none of these elements produces or even contributes to beauty. But all of
them contribute to an organization which makes the presentation of the musical idea intel-
ligible. The language in which musical ideas are expressed in tones parallels the language
which expresses feelings or thoughts in words, in that its vocabulary must be proportionate
to the intellect which it addresses, and in that the aforementioned elements of its organiza-
tion function like the rhyme, the rhythm, the meter, and the subdivision into strophes, sen-
tences, paragraphs, chapters, etc. in poetry or prose. The more or less complete exploitation
of the potency of these components determines the aesthetic value and the classification
of the style in respect to its popularity or profundity.6
Or yet, when Schoenberg elaborates, arguing in a detailed, long list of aesthetical reflec-
tions, the very same distinction between the musical idea and its presentation, to say that
in order to value a composition, ‘the expert’(or in other words the one who is able to)
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should do it first of all in regard to the composition’s more profound elements; he should
value
a composition more highly only if its themes and melodies are significantly formulated and
well organized; if they are interesting enough to hold the attention of a listener; if there is a
suﬃciently great number of ideas; if they are well connected so as not to oﬀend musical
logic; if they are restricted by subdivision to a conceivable size; if monotony is avoided by
good contrasts; if all ideas, however contrasting, can be proved to be only variations of the
basic idea, thus securing unity; if a thorough elaboration proves that their inner merits sur-
pass their incidental advantages.7
Secondly, after having evaluated a composition from these viewpoints, which are the ones
related to the formulation of the musical idea, the expert should also proceed evaluating
problems of style. He should ask, for example:
Is the time-space adequate for the importance or the unimportance of the ideas?  Are main
ideas distinctly diﬀerentiated from subordinate ideas in space by adequate proportions as
well as in emphasis, so as always to secure the predominance of the object? Is the breadth
of the presentation justified? Is it admissible because of the number of ideas, because of
their inescapable consequences, or because of comprehensibility? Is every detail presented
in as brief and as condensed a manner as possible?8
Now, also according to Schoenberg, in order to achieve a unified formulation from both
kinds of evaluation, the expert should lastly verify many other things. He should ask, for
instance, about the appropriateness of the compositional techniques in use at the pre-
sentation of the idea.
Does the profundity of the real meaning interfere with the elegance of the presentation and
the polish of the surface? Is the material adequate with respect to the medium, and vicev-
ersa? Are heroic themes ascribed to unheroic instruments, such as flute, guitar or mandolin?
Is a violin sonata supposed to express passionate emotions adequate for a symphony? Is an
instrument as immobile as a contrabassoon required to play a gracious barcarolle? Is musical
description stylized tonally and technically to fit the nature of the instruments, as the calls
of the nightingale, quail and cuckoo in the Pastorale Symphony are suited to the flute, oboe
and clarinet respectively? Is the descriptive element incorporated formally and motivally
within the basic conditions of the piece? Are states or situations illustrated whose nature is
opposed to that of music - as, for instance, expressing repose by slight movement, or silence
by sounds, or abstract philosophy by concrete tones? Does the piece elaborate its ideas and
material in a technique inappropriate to its style? Are contrapuntal ideas accompanied in a
quasi-contrapuntal manner, scarcely producing more than a harmonization? Is the natural
phrasing of a homophonic melody confused by the addition of sophisticated counter-
melodies, as often happens in popular music? Are dissonances which are not inherent in
the tonal content added to simple folk-tunes?9
Or performing a deeper analysis and questioning about the inventiveness of a composer.
In this case,
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was he able to bring forth as much variety as unity and comprehensibility will tolerate and
the stimulation of interest demands ? Was he able to prove the necessity of the work — that
it was forced upon him by an inner urge for creation? Has he been able to produce some-
thing which fills a gap in the knowledge and culture of mankind, or, if not that, which at
least satisfies a desire for entertainment? In other words, does his product, through novelty,
prove to be a desirable contribution? Is this novelty one of essential or subordinate qualities?
If derived from essentials, is it of a nature like Beethoven's dramatization of the elaboration,
or comparable to the novelty of the structural, emotional and descriptive qualities of Schu-
bert's songs? Or is it like Wagner's entirely new way of building, expressing, harmonizing
and orchestrating, thus revolutionizing music in all its aspects? Has this novelty been pro-
duced through a new personality rather than through revolutionary changes, through evo-
lutionary developments rather than through frightening outbursts? Did this novelty come
from a personality comparable to a Mendelssohn, a Schumann, a Gounod, a Debussy, etc.,
— artists whose ambition was not that of the reformer, though their originality was rich
and distinct enough?10
By delving into these distinctions, many compositional issues could be contemplated.
One may think, for example, on a compositional process predominantly oriented by a
dramatic musical idea whose dramaticism is negated or denied at the presentation of the
idea. Let us consider this hypothetical example, for a moment, in the context of tonal
harmony. Independently of its actual shape or contour, quality and number of elements,
the harmonic progression that bridges the chords of tonic and dominant in a tonal piece
is always devised in a dramatic context, that usually works a specific model of determi-
nation: the common practice of the past advises us that, in order to accomplish its destiny,
above all to guarantee the balance of form, the tonic chord must be acoustically reinforced
by means of the dominant one. This general sense determination is even more evident if
such compositional device is used to define a moment of formal articulation between
sections or main parts. This is a temporal sense, a dramatic idea which may be though
deflected by mistake or want in its presentation. In this case, there happens to be a rupture,
an  incongruousness between the composition of the idea and the composition if its pre-
sentation (a rupture which is consequently sensed in its representation).
In many occasions, along with our training in the craft of music composition, we face this
problem. It is this incongruousness that we fight against in order to elaborate a novel com-
positional project: sound materials, music notation, and the limits of performance and
perception (evident or otherwise) enforce upon us many diﬀerent challenges. Now, on
the other hand, the musical pieces we admire have this eﬀect on us mostly because they
allow us a deepening of our perception (and, from that, also a deepening of our under-
standing) — on whose viability or not rest the majority of our aesthetical impressions
—, yet a deepening that happens precisely because these very same pieces are usually
congruous in their most superficial and inner temporal complexities. 
I have argued that the creative process that orients the composition of a musical piece is
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informed by a number of rhythmicalizations, guided by distinct rhythmic ideas. It is up to
us the interpretative mission, the crucial decision to delve into that process or to remain
securely on its most apparent surface.
Musical thematicism, for instance, the object of a dramatic musical time, may be the rea-
son for a simple and playful melodic enchantment; it may be, otherwise, a motivation
for a complex analysis of music form. Yet, it may unite people under a same refrain, or
gather distinct musicalities under a broad, all-encompassing musical polyphony. For, dra-
matic or lyrical, temporally expansive or contractive, oriented by regular or irregular im-
pulses or balance, etc., a piece of music is most probably independently and distinctly
represented. This does not mean, however, that the piece is senseless in regard to its own
compositional process: a piece of music results, in any case, from concrete creative de-
mands, from particular artistic necessities and interests, which are still there (as creative
forces) to be shared by the many. The point is that musical representation, because mu-
sical, is also rhythmic and deals with the compositional process and its  resulting musical
piece, in a rhythmical way. 
As we observed before, when discussing Schoenberg’s concept of musical space present
in his notes for the preface of his Musikalische Gedanke, for him, there are “profound and
superficial ideas, higher and lower forms,” that would allow for a distinction between
“primitivism and art music.”11
In another occasion he also states that for him a good  composer
likes to be conscious of what he produces; he is proud of the ability of his hands, of the flex-
ibility of his mind, of his subtle sense of balance, of his never-failing logic, of the multitude
of variations, and last but not least of the profundity of his idea and his capacity of pene-
trating to the most remote consequences of an idea. One cannot do this with a shallow idea,
but one can, and one can only, with a profound idea.12
In the same terms, a representation of musical time may be deep or shallow. And since
the depth of musical time ideally is so close to the very original source of our musicality
— time in general — our interpretative duty will always be that of looking for the tem-
poral complexity of the process of musical composition by means of the temporal com-
plexity of our representation of it, and thus to enlarge and deepen the musical foreground,
without ever denying its importance.
t
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In this dissertation, I have attempted to translate into an all-embracing creative image of
rhythmicalization, a view of the process of musical composition that expands Schoen-
berg’s as a complement to his implicit intuition about the fundamental convergence of
sensibility towards understanding in the musical idea. I have presented an image of an
ideal rhythmical movement that is essentially creative and links diﬀerent levels of sub-
jective commitment that amalgamates both the lyrical and the dramatic creative impulses,
the powers of continuity and articulation, the simultaneous and heterogeneous and the
sequential and homogeneous, non-determination and determination, diﬀerence and rep-
etition. I could not exhaust these images in all of their aspects, but only suggested a view
of the organisation and functionality that the conceiving of these images allows. I have
considered that contemplating them is already a creative exercise in the field of musical
composition. I hope that future research could be made using some of the general notions
here introduced so that these notions continue to be developed and detailed. I also hope
that the synthesis of time and music proposed may induce the formulation of deeper
compositional images. Lastly, I hope that the notions of musical expression and interpre-
tation presented may lead to a larger discussion of the problem of the structural complex-
ity of musical time and its rhythmicality.
This thesis opens the possibility of enquiring about the rhythmical qualities of the creative
forces that constitute the compositional process. Therefore it expands a traditional notion
of musical idea by means of diverse complex compositional images that do not necessarily,
or easily, comply with the common understanding that composition is or must be always
unequivocally coherent. It serves the purpose of demonstrating that the problem of com-
positionally achieving musical coherence is indeed only part of the whole compositional
problem, which also includes a continuous search for innovation. There is a permanent
rhythmical opposition, which is complementary but inevitably tensional, between achiev-
ing formal balance (and presenting this balance) and creating new, original pieces of music.
This thesis provides a way of studying this creative tension, its duration and temporal
complexity — its diverse and complex processes of expansion and contraction —, and,
on the grounds of this possibility, I hope, it will contribute to the emergence and devel-




Adorno, Theodor W. Alban Berg, Master of the Smallest Link, trans. Juliane Brand and Christopher
Hailey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Agsteribbe, Frank, et al. (ed.), Identity and Difference: essays on music, language and time. Leuven:
Leuven University Press, 2004. 
Allison, Henry E. “Kant´s Inaugural Dissertation and its Context,” in Kant’s Transcendental De-
duction: an Analytical-Historical Commentary, 43-84. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015.
Almén, Byron. A Theory of Musical Narrative. Indiana University Press, 2008. 
Anderson, Julian. “Note on Désintégrations.”  www.tristanmurail.com. Accessed 04 July, 2017.
http://www.tristanmurail.com/en/oeuvre-ﬁche.php?cotage=28227.
Arndt, Matthew. The Musical Thought and Spiritual Lives of Heinrich Schenker and Arnold Schoen-
berg. New York: Routledge, 2018.
Augustine of Hippo, St. Confessions, ed. David Vincent Meconi. New Your: New City Press, 2012.
Bachelard, Gaston. La Dialectique de la durée. Paris: Boivin, 1936. Engl. trans. Mary McAllester
Jones, Dialectic of Duration. Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000.
Bachelard, Gaston. L’intuition de l’instant. Paris: Stock, 1932. Engl. trans. Eileen Rizo-Patron, In-
tuition of the Instant. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013.
Bachelard, Gaston. La philosophie du non. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1940. Engl.
trans. G. C. Waterston, The Philosophy of No: a philosophy of the new scientific mind (New
York: Orion Press, 1968).
Barry, Barbara Rosamund. Musical Time: the sense of order. New York: Pendragon Press, Stuyve-
sant, 1982. 
Bedau, Mark A. “Weak Emergence,” in J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, Mind, Causation
and World, vol. 11 (1997): 375-399.
Begbie, Jeremy. Theology, Music and Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Bent, Ian. Analysis. London: The Macmillan Press, 1987. 
Bergson, Henri Bergson. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Com-
pany, Inc., 1999.
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. New York: Cosimo, 2005.
Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer. New York: Zone Books,
1991. 
Bergson, Henri. The Creative Mind. New York: Dover Publications, 2010. 
Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will: an essay on the immediate data of consciousness. New York:
Dover Publications, 2001.
Berliner, Arnold. Treatise of Physics In Elementary Presentation. Berlin: Julius Springer, 1935. On
line. Accessed 31 July, 2017. http://mpec.sc.mahidol.ac.th/radok/physmath/PHY-
SICS/Start.htm.
| 208 |
Barry, Barbara. Musical Time: the sense of order. New York: Pendragon Press, Stuyvesant, 1982.
Berry, Wallace. Structural Functions in Music. Mineola: Dover Publications, 1976. 
Binkley, Timothy. “Langer’s Logical and Ontological Modes,” in Journal of Aestheticsa and Art Cri-
ticism 8 (1970): 455-464.
Birch, Deborah. “Time in New Music.” MA dissertation, Brigham Young University, 1979.
Boss, Jack. Schoenberg´s Twelve-tone Music: symmetry and the musical idea. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014.
Boykan, Martin. Silence and Slow Time: Studies in Musical Narrative. Oxford: The Scarecrow Press
Inc., 2004.
Brelet, Gisèle. Le temps musical: essai d’une esthetique nouvelle de la musique. Paris: Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 1949. 
Brower, Candace. “Memory and the Perception of Rhythm,” in Music Theory Spectrum, vol. 15,
nº 1 (Spring, 1993): 19-35.
Brown, Jason W. Time, Will and Mental Process. New York: Plenum Press, 1996.
Bryant, Levi R. Difference and Givenness. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2008.
Campbell, Edward. Music after Deleuze. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
Campbell, Edward. “Identity, Difference and Repetition: Boulez, Webern and Schoenberg,” in
Music after Deleuze, 11-15. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013.
Campbell, Edward. “Rethinking Boulez Schemes: logics and paradigms of musical modernity,”
in Erling E. Guldbrandsen and Julian Johnson (ed.), Transformations of Musical Mo-
dernism, 172-189. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Carpenter, Patricia. “Musical Form and Musical Idea: reﬂections on a theme of Schoenberg, Hans-
lick and Kant,” in Music and Civilization: Essays in Honor of Paul Henry Lang, ed. Ed-
mond Strainchamps and Maria Rika Maniates with Christopher Hatch, 394-427. New
York: Norton, 1984.
Carter, Elliot. “Shoptalk by an American Composer,” in Musical Quarterly 46 (1960): 226-67.
Cherlin, Michael. Schoenberg’s Musical Imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007.
Cheveigné, A. de, “Pitch Perception,” in Oxford Handbook of Auditory Science - Auditory perception,
ed. Plack C. J., 71-104. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Cook, Nicholas. A Guide do Musical Analysis. New York: Norton, 1992.
Cooper, Grosvenor and Leonard B. Meyer. The Rhythmic Structure of Music. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1960. 
Cornicello, Anthony. “Timbral Organization in Tristan Murail’s Dèsintégrations.” PhD diss., Bran-
deis University, 2000.
Cott, Jonathan. Stockhausen: conversations with the composer. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1973. 
Crispin, Dala and Kathleen Snyers. Unfolding Time: studies in temporality in twentieth-century music.
Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2009.
Cushman, Robert E. “Greek and Christian Views of Time,” in The Journal of Religion 33, nº 4
(1953): 254-265.
bibliography 209|
Dahlhaus, Carl. Between Romanticism and Modernism: four studies in the music of the later nineteenth
century, trans. Mary Whitall. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
Damasio, Antonio. The Feeling of What Happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness.
London: Vintage, 2000.
Decroupet, Pascal, Elena Ungeheuer and Jerome Kohl Source. “Through the Sensory Looking-
glass: the aesthetic and serial foundations of Gesang der Jünglinge”, in Perspectives of New
Music 36, nº 1 (Winter, 1998), 97-142.
Deleuze, Gilles. Bergsonism, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam. Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books,
1988.
Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema I: the movement image. London: Continuum, 1986.
Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: the Time-Image, trans. Hugo Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Lon-
don: Continuum, 2011. 
Deleuze, Gilles. “Conference Presentation on Musical Time,” IRCAM Conference, 1977, web-
deleuze.com. Accessed 07 August, 2017. https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/113.
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton. New York: Continuum International
Publishing Group, 2004. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Kant’s Critical Philosophy: the doctrine of faculties. London: The Athlone Press,
1984.
Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche and Philosophy. London: Continuum, 1986.
Deleuze, Gilles. Pure Immanence: essay on a life, trans. Anne Boyman. New York: Zone Book,
2001.
Deleuze, Gilles. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. R. Hurley. San Francisco: City Light Books,
1988.
Deleuze, Gilles. “The Fold,” in Baroque Topographies: Literature/History/Philosophy. Yale French
Studies, nº 80 (1991): 227-247.
Deleuze, Gilles. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. London: The Athlone Press, 1993.
Deleuze, Gilles. The Logic of Sense. London: Continuum, 2010. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 2005.
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. What is Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press,
1994.
Epstein, David. Shaping Time: music, brain, and performance. New York: Schirmer Books, 1995. 
Freiberg, Elga. “Memory and Creativity in The Context of Ontopoiesis of Beingness: A-T. Ty-
mieniecka and A. Bergson,” in Memory in the Ontopoesis of Life, Analecta Husserliana
(The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, vol 101), 233-242. Dordrecht: Sprin-
ger Dordrecht, 2009.
Friedheim, Philip. “Rhythmic Structure in Schoenberg’s Atonal Compositions,” in Journal of the
American Musicological Society, nº 19 (1966): 59-72.
Gardner, Sebastian. Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. London: Routledge, 1999.
Gibson, James J. The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems. Boston: Houghton Miﬄin, 1966. 
Goehr, Alexander. “Schoenberg and Karl Kraus: The Idea behind the Music,” in Music Analysis
4, nº. 1/2 (1985): 59-71.
bibliography 210|
Goldstein, Jeffrey. “Emergence as a Construct: history and issues,” in Emergence Complexity and
Organization, Issue 1, nº. 1 (1999): 49-72.
Guyer, Paul. “Introduction: The starry heavens and the moral law,” in The Cambridge Companion
to Kant and Modern Philosophy, 1-27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Hall, Stuart (ed.). Cultural Representations and Signifying Practice. London: Open University Press,
1997.
Harvey, Jonathan. The Music of Stockhausen. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975. 
Hasty, Christopher. Meter as Rhythm. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Hasty, Christopher. “Segmentation and Process in Post-Tonal Music,” in Theory Spectrum 3
(1981): 54-73. 
Hasty, Christopher. “The image of Thought and Ideas of Music,” in Sounding the Virtual: Gilles
Deleuze and the theory and philosophy of music, ed. Brian Hulse, 1-22. New York: Rou-
tledge, 2016.
Henck, Herbert. Karlheinz Stockhausen’s Klavierstück X: a contribution toward understanding serial
technique: history, theory, analysis, practice, documentation. Köln: Neuland Musikverlag
Herbert Henck, 1980.
Hjelmslev, J. Prolégomènes à une théorie du langage. Paris: Minuit, 1968.
Holmes, Thom. Electronic and Experimental Music: technology, music and culture. New York: Rou-
tledge, 2012.
Hsieh, Diana Mertz. “Kant on Time.” Paper, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2004.
Hughes, Joe. Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation. London: Continuum, 2008.
Hughes, Joe. Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, a Readers Guide. London: Continuum, 2009.
Hulse, Brian (ed). Sounding the Virtual: Gilles Deleuze and the theory and philosophy of music.
 Farnham: Ashgate, 2010.
Hulse, Brian.“Thinking Musical Difference: musical theory as minor science,” in Sounding the Vir-
tual: Gilles Deleuze and the theory and philosophy of music, ed. Brian Hulse, 23-50. New
York: Routledge, 2016.
Iddon, Martin. New Music at Darmstadt: Nono, Stockhausen, Cage, and Boulez. Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Jakobson, Roman. Essais de linguistique générale. Paris: Minuit, 2003.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1952.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, uniﬁed edition, trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1996.
Kant, Immanuel. Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World,
trans. William J. Eckoff. New York: Columbia College, 1894.
Kitcher, Patricia. “Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, uniﬁed edition. Cam-
bridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996.
Korsyn, Kevin. Decentering Music: a critique of contemporary musical research. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003.
Kramer, Jonathan. The Time of Music, new Meanings, new Listening Strategies. New York: Schirmer
Books, 1988.
Kramer, Jonathan. “Moment Form in Twentieth Century Music,” in The Musical Quarterly 64, nº
bibliography 211|
2 (1978): 177-194.
Kramer, Jonathan. “New Temporalities in Music,” in Critical Inquiry 7 (1981): 539-56.
Kurth, Ernst. Selected Writings, ed. Lee A. Rothfarb. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991.
Langer, Susanne, Philosophy in a New Key. New York: New American Library, 1954.
Langer, Susanne. Feeling and Form. New York: Scribners, 1953.
Lefebvre, Henri. Space, Time and Everyday Life. New York: Continuum, 2004.
Lester, Joel. The Rhythms of Tonal Music. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986.
Ligeti, György and Rainer Wehinger. Artikulation: an aural score by Rainer Wehinger. Mainz:
Schott, 1970.
Lochhead, Judith. “The Temporal Structure of Recent Music: a phenomenological investigation.”
PhD thesis, State University of New York at Sony Brook, 1982.
London, Justin. Hearing in Time: psychological aspects of musical meter. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012.
Luce, Arthur A. Bergson’s Doctrine of Intuition: the Donnellan Lectures for 1921. London: Society
for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1922.
MacDonald, Malcolm. Schoenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
MacMahon, Melissa. “Difference, Repetition,” in Gilles Deleuze Key Concepts, 42-52. Durham,
Acumen, 2005.
Maconie, Robin. Other Planets: the music of Karlheinz Stockhausen. Oxford: Scarecrow Press, 2005. 
Maconie, Robin. The Works of Karlheinz Stockhausen. London: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Marr, David. Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing
of Visual Information. New York: Freeman & Company, 1982.
McCumber, John. Time and Philosophy: a history of continental thought. Durham: Acumen, 2011.
Messiaen, Olivier. Technique de mon langage musical, 2 vol. Paris: Alphonse Leduc, 1944.
Messiaen, Olivier. Traité de rythme, de couleur, et d’ornithologie: 1949-1992. Paris: Editions musi-
cales Alphonse Leduc, 1994. Engl. trans. Melody Baggech,  “An English Translation of
Olivier Messiaen’s Traité de Rythme, de Couleur, et D’ornithologie – Volume 1.” Doc-
toral diss., The University of Oklahoma, 1998.
Mitchell, Willian J. T. “Representation”, ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin, in Critical
Terms for Literary Study (1990): 66-79.
Morgan, Robert P. “Musical Time/Musical Space,” in Critical Inquiry, nº 6 (1980): 527-38. 
Morgan, Robert P. “Stockhausen’s Writings on Music,” in The Musical Quarterly 75, nº 4 (1991):
194-206.
Moulard-Leonard, Valentine. Bergson-Deleuze Encounters, Transcendental Experience and the
Thought of the Virtual. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008.
Moulard-Leonard, Valentine. “Henri Bergson,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed
05 July, 2017. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/bergson.
Nattiez, Jean-Jacques. Fondements d'une Senmiologie de la Musique. Paris: Union Generale d'Edi-
tions, 1975. 
Nattiez, Jean-Jacques. Music and Discourse. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990.
bibliography 212|
Perle, George. “Stockhausen and Musical Time,” in Music and Letters 41, nº 2 (1960): 204-205.
Piana, Giovanni. A Filosoﬁa da Música, trans. Antonio Angonese. Bauru: Edusc, 2001.
Prieto, Eric. “Listening In: music, mind and the modernist marrative. University of Nebraska Press,
2002. 
Prigogine, Ilya, Isabelle Stengers, and Alvin Toﬄer. Order Out of Chaos: man’s new dialogue with
nature. New York: Bantam Boos, 1984.
Raghuram, H and G. Marimuthu. “Donald Redﬁeld Griﬃn: the discovery of echolocation.” in
Resonance, Vol. 10, no. 2 (February 2005): 20–32.
Ramazzotti, Marinella. “Luciano Berio’s Sequenza III: from electronic modulation to extended
vocal technique,” in Ex-tempore. A Journal of Compositional and  Theoretical Research in
Music XV/1 (Spring-Summer, 2010): 81-96.
Reiner, Thomas. Semiotics of Musical Time. New York: Peter Lang, 2000.
Restrepo, Jorge Alejandro Flórez. “Durée and temporality: a defense of Bergson’s conception of
time,” in Discusiones Filosóﬁcas 16, nº 27 ( July – Decembre 2015): 49-61.
Ricoeur, Paul, “The Aporias of the Experience of Time: Book XI of Augustine’s Confessions,” in
Time and Narrative, vol. 1, trans. David Pellauer, 5-30. Chicago: The University of Chi-
cago Press, 1984.
Rochberg, George. The Aesthetics of Survival: a composer’s view on twentieth-century music.
 Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2004. 
Roeder, John. “Interacting Pulse Streams in Schoenberg’s Atonal Polyphony,” in Music Theory
Spectrum 16, nº 2 (1994): 231-249.
Rosen, Charles. Sonata Forms. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1984.
Rothfarb, Lee. “Introduction,” in Ernst Kurth, Selected Writings, ed. Lee A. Rothfarb, 1-33. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Rothfarb, Lee. Ernst Kurth as Theorist and Analyst. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1988.
Roupnel, Gaston. Silë. Stock, 1927.
Rowell, Lewis. “The Subconscious Language of Musical Time,” in Music Theory Spectrum 1
(1979): 96-106.
Rufer, Josef.  The Works of Arnold Schoenberg: a catalogue of his compositions, writings and paintings,
trans. Dika Newlin. London: Faber, 1962.
Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris. Chicago: Open Court,
1972.
Scherzinger, Martin. “Enforced deterritorialization, or the trouble with Musical Politics,” in Soun-
ding the Virtual: Gilles Deleuze and the Theory and Philosophy of Music, ed. Brian Hulse
and Nick Nesbitt, 103-128. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010.
Schachter, Carl. Unfoldings Essays in Schenkerian Theory and Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999.
Schoenberg Arnold. Preliminary Exercises in Counterpoint, ed. Leonard Stein. New York: St. Mar-
tin’s Press, 1964.
Schoenberg, Arnold. Structural Functions of Harmony, ed. Leonard Stein. New York: Norton,
1954.
bibliography 213|
Schoenberg, Arnold. Style and Idea: selected writings of Arnold Schoenberg. Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1984.
Schoenberg, Arnold. Theory of Harmony, trans. Roy Carter. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978.
Schoenberg, Arnold. The Musical Idea and The Logic, Technique and Art of its Presentation, ed.
 Patricia Carpenter and Severine Neff. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.
Schoenberg, Arnold. Letters, ed. Erwin Stein, trans.  Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser. London:
Faber and Faber, 1964.
Sciarrino, Salvatore. Le Figure della Musica, da Beethoven a Oggi. Milano:Ricordi, 1998.
Seincman, Eduardo. Do Tempo Musical. São Paulo: Via Lettera, 2001.
Simms, Bryan R. The Atonal Music of Arnold Schoenberg , 1908-1923. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000.
Smith, Daniel and John Protevi. “Gilles Deleuze,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Acces-
sed 07 July, 2017. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/deleuze.
Smith, F. Joseph. The Experiencing of Musical Sound: prelude for a phenomenology of music. New
York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, Inc., 1979.
Snyder, Bob. Music and Memory. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000.
Souvtchinsky. Pierre. “La notion du temps et la musique,” in Revue Musicale 20 (1939): 310-20.
Souvtchinsky, Pierre, Un siècle de musique russe (1830-1930). ed. Frank Langlois. Arles: Actes
Sud/Association Pierre Souvitchinsky, 2004. 
Spies, Claudio. “Vortrag/12 T K/Princeton,” in Perspectives of New Music 13 (1974): 58-136.
Spitzer, Michael. Metaphor and Musical Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
Stack, George J. “Review: La dialectique de la durée by Gaston Bachelard,” in Philosophische
Rundschau 22, nº 3/4 (1976): 265-271.
Stein, Leonard, ed., “Schoenberg: ﬁve statements,” in Perspectives of New Music 14 (1975): 164-
65.
Stockhausen, Karlheinz. “…How Time Passes…,” in Die Reihe 3 (1959): 10-40. 
Stockhausen, Karlheinz. “Interview with Eric Salzman,” www.stockhausen.org.   Accessed 27 July,
2017. http://www.stockhausen.org/salzman.htm.
Stockhausen, Karlheinz. “Momentform: Neue Beziehungen zwischen Aufführungsdauer, Werk-
dauer und Moment,”  in Texte zur Elektronische und Instrumentalen Musik 1 (1963):
189-210.  Cologne: DuMont Schauberg, 1963. 
Stockhausen, Karlheinz. “Structure and Experiential Time,” in Die Reihe 2 (1959): 64-74.
Stockhausen, Karlheinz. “The Concept of Unity in Electronic Music.” trans. Elaine Barkin, in
Perspectives on Contemporary Music Theory, ed. Benjamin Boretz and Edward T. Cone,
214-225. New York: Norton, 1972.
Stockhausen, Karlheinz. Stockhausen on Music: lectures and interviews, ed. Robin Maconie.
 London: Marion Boyars, 2010.
Stockhausen, Karlheinz. Texte zur Musik 1963 - 1984, vol. 3. Kürten: Stockhausen-Verlag, 1991.
Stravinsky, Igor. Poetics of Music in the Form of Six Lessons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1970.
bibliography 214|
Stumpf, Carl. Tonpsyshologie, 2 vol. Leipzig: Hirel, 1890. 
Surin, Kenneth. “Force,” in Gilles Deleuze Key Concepts, 19-30. Durham, Acumen, 2005.
Tingley, George Peter. “Metric Modulation and Elliott Carter's First String Quartet,” in Indiana
Theory Review 4, nº. 3 (Spring 1981): 1-13.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. “Toward the Reformulation of a Classic Problem: Memory in the
Ontopoiesis of Life,” in Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life, Book One, Memory in the Ge-
neration and Unfolding of Life, x-xvii. Hanover: Springer, 2009.
Webern, Anton. Der Weg Zur Neuen Musik / Der Weg zur Komposition in 12 Tönen. Vienna: Uni-
versal Edition, 1960.
Webern, Anton. O Caminho para a Música Nova, trans. Carlos Kater. São Paulo: Novas Metas,
1984.
Yeston, Maury. The Stratiﬁcation of Musical Rhythm. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
Zuckerkandl, Victor. Sound and Symbol: Music and the External World, trans. Willard R. Trask.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.
Additional sources
Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. London: Continuum, 2004. 
Alperson, Philip. “Musical Time and Music as an Art of Time,” in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Cri-
ticism 38 (1980): 407-417.
Annas, Julia. “Aristotle, Number and Time,” in The Philosophical Quarterly 25, nº 99 (1975): 97-
103.
Badiou, Alain. Deleuze, the Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchill. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2000.
Baroni, Mario, Simon Maguire and William Drabkin. “The Concept of Musical Grammar,” in
Music Analysis 2, nº 2 (1983): 175-208.
Bent, Ian. Analysis. London: The Macmillan Press, 1987. 
Bogue, Ronald. Deleuze’s Wake: tributes and tributaries. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2004.
Boretz, Benjamin. “Meta Variations: studies in the foundation of musical thought I,” Perspectives
of New Music 8 (1969): 1-74.
Boretz, Benjamin, Harold Olivier, Barney Childs and Charles Whittenberg.  “The Nature of Con-
tinuity in Music”, in Proceedings of the American Society of University Composers 6
(1971): 49-82.
Brelet, Gisèle. “Music and Silence”, in Reﬂections on Art, ed. Susanne Langer, 103-121. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. 
Cage, John. Silence. London: Calder and Boyers, 1973. 
Cage, John. “The Future of Music,” in Esthetics Contemporary, ed. Richard Kostelantez, 288-300.
Buffalo: Prometheus, 1978. 
Caplin, Willian. “Theories of Musical Rhythm in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in
The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory, ed. Thomas Christensen, 657-694.
bibliography 215|
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Carey, Susan. The Origin of Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Carter, Elliott. Collected Essays and Lectures, 1937-1995. Rochester: University of Rochester Press,
1998. 
Carter, Elliott. “Music and the Time Screen”,  in The Writings of Elliott Carter, eds. Kurt and Else
Stone, 343-65. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. 
Carter, Elliott. “The Time Dimension in Music,” in The Writings of Elliott Carter, eds. Kurt and
Else Stone, 243-47. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. 
Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1997.
Coker, Wilson. Music and Meaning. New York: Free Press, 1972. 
Cook, Nicholas. Musical Analysis and the Listener. London: Garlan Publishing, 1989. 
Covach, John. “Schoenberg and the Ocult,” in Theory and Practice: Journal of the Music Theory
Society of New York State 17 (1992): 103-118.
Cowell, Henry. New Musical Resources. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Damasio, Antonio. Decartes’ Error. London: Vintage, 2006.
Deacon, Terrence W. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. New York: Norton and
Company, 2012.Downey, John. “Texture as Psycho-Rhythmics,” in Perspectives of New
Music, nº 20 (1981): 64-648.
Dunk, John L. The Origin and Structure of Rhythm. London: James Clarke, 1952. 
Eisenbrey, Keith E. “Timeshapes,” in Perspectives of New Music 20 (1981/82): 649-650.
Elston, Arnold. “Some Rhythmic Practices in Contemporary Music,” in Musical Quarterly 42
(1956): 318-29. 
Epstein, David. “Duration,” in Beyond Orpheus. 55-98. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979. 
Epstein, David. “On Musical Continuity,” in The Study of Time, eds. J. T. Fraser, N. Lawrence and
D. Park, 180-197. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981. 
Ferraz, Silvio. Música e Repetição: aspectos da diferença na música do século XX. São Paulo: Educ,
Fapesp, 1998.
Fleming, William. “Newer Concepts of Time and Their Relation to the Temporal Arts”,  in Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 4 (1945): 101-106.
Forte, Allen. The Structure of Atonal Music. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. 
Franks, Bradley. Culture and Cognition. Hampshire: Palgrave, 2011.
Haimo, Ethan. Schoenberg’s Serial Odyssey: the evolution of his twelve-tone method, 1914-1928. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 
Hasty, Christopher. “Rhythm in Post-tonal Music: preliminary questions of duration and motion,”
in Journal of Music Theory 25,  nº 2 (1981): 183-216.
Hasty, Christopher. “On the Problem of Succession and Continuity in Twentieth-century Music,”
in Music Theory Spectrum 8 (1986): 58-74.
Helmholtz, Hermann von. On the Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music,
ed. and trans. Alexander John Ellis. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1895.
bibliography 216|
Hill, Peter (ed). The Messiaen Companion. London: Faber and Faber, 1995.
Jung, Carl G. Four Archetypes, trans. R. F. C. Hull. Abingdon: Routledge Classics, 2003.
Kohl, Jerome. “The Evolution of Macro and Microtime Relations,” in Stockhausen’s Recent
Music,” in Perspectives of New Music 22 (1983): 147-86.
Kortooms, Antonie J. M. Phenomenology of time: Edmund Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
Krebs, Harald. “Some Extensions of the Concepts of Metrical Consonance and Dissonance,” in
Journal of Music Theory, nº 31 (1987): 99–120.
Laske, Otto. “Introduction to a Generative Theory of Music,” in Sonological Reports, no. lb, (1975). 
Lerdahl and Jackendoff, “Toward a Formal Theory of Tonal Music,” in Journal of Music Theory,
vol. 21, no. 1 (1977), 111-172; 
London, Justin M. “Rhythm in Twentieth-century Theory,” in The Cambridge History of Western
music theory, 695-725. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Maniates, Maria R. “Sound, Silence, and Time: towards a fundamental ontology of music,” in
Current Musicology 3 (1966): 59-64.
Marcel, Gabriel. “Bergsonism and Music,” in Reﬂections of Art, ed. Susanne Langer, 142-151. Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. 
Messiaen, Olivier. Foreword to Quartet for the End of Time. Paris: Editions Durand, 1941.
Messiaen, Olivier. Conferénce de Bruxelles. Paris: Alphonse Leduc, 1960.
Meyer, Leonard B. Emotion and Meaning in Music. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.
Narmour, Eugene. Beyond Schenkerism: the need for alternatives in musical analysis. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1977.
Pearsall, Edward. “Interpreting Music Durationally: a set-theory approach to rhythm,” in Pers-
pectives of New Music 35, nº 1 (1997): 205-230.
Perle, George. “Pitch-Class Set Analysis: an evaluation,” in The Journal of Musicology 8, nº 2
(1990): 151-172.
Perle, George. Serial Composition and Atonality: an introduction to the music of Schoenberg , Berg
and Webern. London: Faber and Faber, 1962.
Plato. Timaues. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000.
Plato. Republic. trans. Robin Waterﬁeld. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Pousseur, Henri. “The Question of Order in New Music,” in Perspectives on Contemporary Music
Theory, ed. Benjamin Boretz and Edward T. Cone (1972): 97-115. 
Pryer, Anthony. “Nattiez’s Music and Discourse: situating the philosophy,” in Music Analysis 15,
nº 1 (1996): 101-116.
Raffman, Diana. Language, Music and Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993.
Ricoeur, Paul. Tempo e Narrativa, 3 vol. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2010. 
Rochberg, George. “The Concepts of Musical Time and Space,” in The Aesthetics of Survival, 78-
136. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984.
Rochberg, George. “The Structure of Time in Music: traditional and contemporary ramiﬁcations
bibliography 217|
and consequences,” in J. T. Fraser and N. Lawrence, ed., The Study of Time 2, 136-149.
New York: Springer-Verlag, 1975.
Rowell, Lewis. “The Creation of Audible Time,” in The Study of Time 4, ed. J. T. Fraser, N. Law-
rence, and D. Park, 198-210. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981.
Ruwet, Nicolas. “Theorie et Methodes dans les Etudes Musicales,” in Musique en Jeu, no. 17,
(1975): 11-36.
Salzer, Felix. Structural Hearing: tonal coherence in music. 2 vol. New York: Dover, 1982.
Subotnik, Rose Rosengard. Deconstructive Variations: music and reason in Western society. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
Swain, Joseph P. Musical Languages. New York: Norton and Co., 1997.
Taylor, Clifford. Musical Idea and the Design Aesthetic in Contemporary Music: a text for discerning
appraisal of musical thought in Western culture. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.
Varga, Bálint A. Conversations with Iannis Xenakis. London: Faber and Faber, 1996.
Webb, David. “Gaston Bachelard: construction and temporal discontinuity,” in Foucault’s Archaeo-
logy. Edinburg University Press, May 2013.
Welshon, Rex. Philosophy, Neuroscience and Consciousness. Durham: Acumen, 2011.
Westergaard, Peter. “Some Problems in Rhythmic Theory and Analysis,” in Perspectives of New
Music 1, nº 1 (1962): 180-191.
Whittall, Arnold. Musical Composition in the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999.
Whittall, Arnold. Music Since the First Word War. London: J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1977.




Alternative Deleuzian difference — This diﬀerence is multiple, decentering and
 complex: a creative power. It stands for an aﬃrmative, creative diﬀerence that is more compre-
hensive than the diﬀerence that only exists negatively — in opposition to the same — contrasting
the identity of the concept. 
Anti-rhythmical — Creative processes (or even features of these processes) are anti-rhyth-
mical when they do not provide (or fail in their attempt to inform) innovative, original compo-
sitional solutions. All in all, the anti-rhythmical feature is grounded on repetition and marked by
the recycling of standardized ideas or formulas. 
Characterization and routinization, notions of — Characterization is a general com-
positional notion of identity. Routinization, however, is a general compositional notion of
temporal progression that relies on the notion of characterization. This notion is linked to the
idea of future, but a dramatic future, in which one may depict a sense of order and reason, a sense
of necessity. These temporal aspects are here directly related to musical thematicism and to the
process of changing that aﬀects a theme along (variational, developing, etc.) temporal structura-
tions.
Compositional translucency — The composer as a giver and the performer (also the listener,
the analyst, etc.) as a receiver, work together within many levels of compositional translucency, a
term that stems from Bergson (See Translucent cognitive interfaces, below). It is this
translucency that may allow them to penetrate and contaminate each other’s domain of expression
and interpretation, in order to discover the expressive features through and within an interpreta-
tive act, and also to reveal the profound interpretative quality of an expressive gesture.  
Continuative musical formulae — Granted that understanding articulates while sensibility
 endures the duration of the experience, my suggestion is that we must approach music not only
as articulation — by thinking it — but also as continuity  —by sensing, living it. Moreover, I pro-
pose that we must approach music always considering how understanding and sensibility interact
creatively in their mutual rhythmicality. 
Creative antagonism — This antagonism stands for the necessary creative dialectics that
grounds a compositional process as a whole. It is a pervasive creative clash of dramatic and lyrical
forces that informs and gradually forms the musical piece and, consequently, also its representa-
tion.
Dramatic and lyrical ways of thinking — A dramatic way of thinking is related to de-
termination and coherence. It is a logical way of thinking, which produces interrelationships
among things which otherwise are not related. A lyrical way of thinking is related, in turn, to
non-determination and non-coherence. It is not necessarily logical, and accepts non-logical re-
lationships, such as metaphors, discontinuities, non-linearities and random or also chaotic
 routines.
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Duration and temporal flux — The term duration is used in a Bergsonian way referring
to a plenitude of time that is deeply dynamic and heterogeneous (that resists stratifications or
segmentations). The temporal flux is permeated by distinct moments, by instants of temporal
complexity, by particular intensifications and revolutions of the self. It stands for a complex, fluid
existential force composed of diﬀerent levels of spatialisation within the duration. The feeling
itself of the passage of time in us is motivated by this flux.
Evanescent forms — An evanescent form is a form of temporal flux. It is a fluency-form created
by the interchange of the temporal meanings conveyed by distinct rhythmic ideas. It is a form in-
terpenetrated by the continuous collaboration between musical interpretation and musical ex-
pression. This form is never fixed or given, but subtle and variable.
Expression and interpretation — Both expression and interpretation are seen as compo-
nents of a same compositional continuum. The expressive side of music is always ideally contem-
plated within a certain interpretative commitment and vice versa. Thus, expression and
interpretation are mutually implicated in forming a compositional process as a cognitive operation. 
Fold and temporal folding — A temporal fold is the condition for the manifestation of a
creative act. Here I quote Deleuze who says that “folds are in the soul and authentically exist only
in the soul. That is already true for ‘innate ideas’: they are pure virtualities, pure powers whose
act consists in habitus or arrangements (folds) in the soul, and whose completed act consists of
an inner action of the soul (an internal deployment). But this  routines is no less true for the world:
the whole world is only a virtuality that currently exists only in the folds of the soul which convey
it, the soul implementing inner pleats through which it endows itself with a representation of the
enclosed world. We are moving from inflection to inclusion in a subject, as if from the virtual to
the real, inflection defining the fold, but inclusion defining the soul or the subject, that is, what
envelops the fold, its final cause and its completed act.” See Deleuze, The Fold…, 23.
Forms (images) of temporal complexity — These forms are the substance of a musical idea,
representing the heterogeneity of its duration. They are not sounds, but what sounds in a musical
composition refer to in order to present and represent a musical idea.
Individual time and social time — The individual time is the time of the self, the time
that is independent of social conventions and preconceptions. The social time is the opposite.
It only exists in such conventions. But social time is not a time that exists outside us. It is in us
forming and influencing our individual time. In this sense, musical expression and interpretation
are creative forces directly related to such a dichotomy between that which in us represents our-
selves and what in us represents the culture we are part of.  
Layers of musical meaning — I use the term layer to indicate that the distribution of the mu-
sical idea’s complexity in memory and imagination happens in diﬀerent levels, more or less su-
perficial. This is frequently conveyed as relations between musical elements of foreground, middle
ground, and background. These levels interact as layers, simultaneously and complementarily. 
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Musicality — Musicality is a fundamental musical sense. It is ampler in scope and importance
than the auditory sense. It implicates the totality of the self, the whole set of one’s musical faculties
and abilities, including one’s musical imagination, and capacity of establishing intimate aesthetical
relations with a given musical form or sonority. 
Perfection (temporal balance as) — Perfection is given here a Platonic sense, in which balance
and proportion are eternal and, because of this temporal plenitude, intellectually and artistically
desirable. Thus, even though it rests beyond our (temporal) understanding, this plenitude, as the
formal foundation of reality,  should for many, in theory, forever inform and influence our artistic
capabilities. This way, our artistic products should, always, somehow mirror a temporal perfection:
any (human) temporal imbalance — or imperfection — should be thus tamed in favour of a su-
perior dramatic temporal balance, always to be restored.
Referential horizon — Is related to reason. Things are rationally measured and organised
only in relation to a determinate point of reference. The rational world is a referential world, be-
cause a fixed value is necessary in order to rationalise change. This fixed value is typically created
as a norm of balance that operates between the principles of regularity and irregularity.
Rhythmic idea — The term indicates a compositional force that qualifies the temporal
 complexity of a musical idea, infusing it with rhythmic nuances. The rhythmic idea may be
thought as a ‘complex-filter’ oriented to musical representation. Therefore, musical composition
is conditioned by the functional treatment of rhythmic ideas. 
Rhythmic Idea of Closed Refrain, [CRe] — A fundamental rhythmic idea that results from
the blend, the rhythmicalization, of the compositional notions of characterization, [C], and rou-
tinization, [R].
Rhythmic Idea of Closed Route, [CRo] — A fundamental rhythmic idea that results from
the blend, the rhythmicalization, of the compositional notions of non-characterization, [NC],
and routinization, [R].
Rhythmic Idea of Open Refrain, [ORe] — A fundamental rhythmic idea that results from
the blend, the rhythmicalization, of the compositional notions of characterization, [C], and non-
routinization, [NR].
Rhythmic Idea of Open Route, [ORo] — A fundamental rhythmic idea that results from the
blend, the rhythmicalization, of the compositional notions of non-characterization, [NC], and
non-routinization,  [NR].
Rhythmic Idea of Strong Asymmetrization, [SA], (appendix 1) — An intermediate
rhythmic idea that implies a strong creative impulse towards the composition of asymmetries. It
results from the blend, the rhythmicalization, of a superficial imagination quality, [SI], that priv-
ileges the manifestation of irregularity, and the rhythmic idea of closed refrain, [CRe], which is
preponderantly dramatic, temporally contractive, and oriented to the confirmation of the thematic
feature.
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Rhythmic Idea of Strong Balance, [SB], (appendix 1) — An intermediate rhythmic idea
that implies a strong creative impulse towards formal balance. It results from the blend, the rhyth-
micalization, of a deep memory quality, [DM], and the rhythmic idea of closed route, [CRo].  
Rhythmic Idea of Strong Symmetrization, [SS], (appendix 1) — An intermediate rhyth-
mic idea that implies a strong creative impulse towards the composition of symmetries. It results
from the blend, the rhythmicalization, of a superficial memory quality,  [SM], that privileges the
manifestation of regularity, and the rhythmic idea of closed refrain, [CRe], which is preponder-
antly dramatic, temporally contractive, and oriented to the confirmation of the thematic feature. 
Rhythmic Idea of Strong Unbalance, [SU], (appendix 1) — An intermediate rhythmic
idea that implies a strong creative impulse towards formal unbalance. It results from the blend,
the rhythmicalization, of a deep imagination quality, [DI], and the rhythmic idea of closed route,
[CRo].   
Rhythmic Idea of Weak Asymmetrization, [WA], (appendix 1) — An intermediate rhyth-
mic idea that implies a weak creative impulse towards the composition of asymmetries. It results
from the blend, the rhythmicalization, of a superficial imagination quality, [SI], that privileges
the manifestation of irregularity, and the rhythmic idea of open refrain, [ORe], which is prepon-
derantly lyrical, temporally expansive, and oriented to the problematization of the thematic feature.  
Rhythmic Idea of Weak Balance, [WB], (appendix 1) — An intermediate rhythmic idea
that implies a weak creative impulse towards formal balance. It results from the blend, the rhyth-
micalization, of a deep memory quality, [DM], and the rhythmic idea of open route, [ORo].  
Rhythmic Idea of Weak Symmetrization, [WS], (appendix 1) — An intermediate rhyth-
mic idea that implies a weak creative impulse towards the composition of symmetries. It results
from the blend, the rhythmicalization, of a superficial memory quality, [SM], that privileges the
manifestation of regularity, and the rhythmic idea of open refrain, [ORe], which is preponderantly
lyrical, temporally expansive, and oriented to the problematization of the thematic feature.  
Rhythmic Idea of Weak Unbalance, [WU], (appendix 1) — An intermediate rhythmic
idea that implies a weak creative impulse towards formal unbalance. It results from the blend, the
rhythmicalization, of a deep imagination quality, [DI], and the rhythmic idea of open route,
[ORo].
Rhythmicalization — Rhythmicalization is a compositional process, a creative operation, by
which means the idea is infused with levels of complexity. Distinct rhythmicalizations overlay
each other forming distinct compositional levels. Therefore, each rhythmicalization may be con-
sidered in itself a fully independent functional order. To rhythmicalize means to elaborate the
idea providing it with a characteristic temporal texture, with a form, but a form which is entirely
temporal. The external and internal temporal characteristics of this form compose its rhythm,
and the process of creation of its characteristics stands for its rhythmicalization.
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Rhythmicality — The term subsumes the total set of rhythmic conditions, functions, and fea-
tures that ground the compositional process as a whole, including the underlying creative, tem-
poral forces that support the form and the shape of a musical piece, and how the musical piece
itself is rhythmically presented and represented.
Sameness — Sameness is a concept of repetition. It refers to the repetition that manifests, as
idea, a ‘centripetal sense,’ responsible for engendering the principles of reason that subordinate
diﬀerence: identity of the concept, analogy of judgement, opposition of predicates, resemblance
of the perceived. 
Sense-continuity — This notion is related to the process of thinking which is present in the
creative flow of music composition. It includes both the immanent and the transcendental con-
ditions (and necessities) that permeate this process. 
Temporal expansion and contraction — Considered strictly from the point of view of
musical composition, a temporal expansion results from giving birth to novel compositional
strategies and, by extension, from expanding the notion of musical composition, by being musi-
cally creative; a temporal contraction results otherwise from dealing with a given common-
ality of compositional techniques already in use by others. All in all, time (time in general and
musical time) expands as concreteness and diﬀerential complexity: the more concrete and unique
the thing, in its becoming, the more expanded its time.
Temporalities — Temporalities are aspects of memory and imagination that evidence distinct
levels of functional response, or of response time, to the products of primary rhythmic ideas ac-
cording to their own levels of complexity. Temporality is here linked to the notion of temporal
resignification that occurs in a more conscious cognitive level, that of memory and imagination.
The diﬀerence between time and temporality resides, thus, in the opposition between the psy-
chophysiological nature of temporalities and the ontological nature of times. 
Temporalizations — Temporalizations are the metrical shapes that constitute the temporal
characteristics of a musical piece. They represent what is ordinarily called music forms. Forms
that may be bound to memory, as structural crystallizations of musical time, or to imagination, as
their projections.
Times — The time here referred is not the quantitative time one may measure as the seconds,
minutes, or hours in a day, etc.; but the qualitative time one may experience during the passage of
a number of seconds, minutes, hours, etc.; it is the time one diﬀerentiates as the quality of the
passage of the individual living experience, when one compares two diﬀerent periods of life, or
the diﬀerence between a pleasant and an unpleasant moment. The time here referred is hence a
qualitative time, unique to the self and which does not exist without the self. 
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Translucent cognitive interfaces — This is a Bergsonian term related to the degree of our
attention to life (while it is also related to the complexity of time in us): the more translucent the
being, the more open he is to the diversity and multiplicity of nature, to its creative evolution,
and vice versa.
Zone of projection of musical meaning — The notion of zone of meaning opposes the no-
tion of layers of musical meaning. Zone means something like a region within the individual
imagination, something like a mental panel. Since this panel receives not images but time, or better
temporal images, one may consider the zone of projection of musical meaning as something similar
to our capacity of imagining new melodies or harmonies, as something analogous to a composi-
tional inner ear.
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Appendix 1  
Second level rhythmic ideas,
short examples and commentaries
Second level rhythmic ideas
The impulse towards symmetry and asymmetry 
The impulse towards symmetry (which I suggest is oriented by a shallow memory qual-
ity) represents a faster, automatised response-time to stimuli. Following Deleuze on this
matter, this temporality exerts, for the most part, a pure genetic power which is ideally
in-formed by the ‘embodiment’  — by the soul, to say it with Deleuze  — of an all-en-
compassing vital force that makes sense of past in itself.1 By the embodiment of  the other,
in the sense of his concept of the ‘Other Person’, who however “always perceived as an
other,” is actually “the condition of all perception, for others as for ourselves”2 — the
condition of the instinct.
In it, our instinctive acts assume a novel significance: they are shallow memory impulses
emerging from the memory of the tissue, of the cell; they are, in all possible senses, our
body and also the manifold connections our body makes with other bodies, including
the whole heritage of connections accumulated along the formative eras of our species. 
According to this, its manifestation represents a confirmation of the past and an abidance
by unequivocal, mechanical routines. Of all musical temporalities, this is the less con-
scious and the most reactive. It works a sort of motoric-memory that aims at a greater
economy of attention, a more immediate, readier response to stimuli that privileges reit-
erative processes, rhythmical regularity, articulation and pattern.
The impulse towards asymmetry (otherwise oriented by a shallow imagination quality),
then, operates in a relatively slower and more aware response time. And works dialecti-
cally by opposing symmetric tendencies. It contradicts the ‘regularity of the cause’, the
norm, the rule, allowing as consequence the emergence of  the new ‘rhythmical feeling’
or sentiment, the calling of the surprise.3 In this specific sense, I argue that to be emo-
tionally charged by music always requires a contradiction, a deviation, and a destabilisa-
tion; it seems to depend on capturing the insurgent instant and using it as a platform for
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1 See Bergson’s concept of Elan Vital in Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York: Cosimo Classics,
2005).
2 DeleuzeandGuattari,WhatisPhilosophy, 18.
3 Feeling, as Damasio explains, is significative of a superior level of temporal complexity. The ‘feeling
of being’ is temporally more complex when compared with the ‘sensation of being,’ because the sen-
sation in this case compromises the self no more than in the sense of a determinate capacity, like the
capability of hearing, seeing, touching, etc., while the feeling compromises the self beyond these ca-
pabilities in the sense of ‘who is hearing,’ ‘who is seeing,’ or ‘who is touching,’ etc. It may be said that
sensation is turned to the past, because it is necessarily inscribed within a certain limited capability,
evolutionarily built, whereas feeling, in turn, is oriented to the future, as it implies the continuity of
individuality and intimacy of the one who feels what is felt. Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What
Happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness (London: Vintage, 2000).
(new) possibilities, actions, conclusions. The emotional datum seems to rest at the very
turning point between the certainty of the norm (of regularity) and the uncertainty gen-
erated by contradicting it. 
The impulse towards asymmetry is, accordingly, for the most part directed to the future,
as it is more elaborated rhythmically than the opposite impulse to symmetry: it is diﬀer-
ential, irregular, deregulatory. Symmetry and asymmetry are opposite rhythmical ten-
dencies observable, for example, between the contrasting impressions delivered by a piece
played a tempo or in tempo rubato. Actually, any direct opposition between regularity and
irregularity in music would be alike: between a straight or arch-like melodic line and a
pointillist eﬀect; or between the inner acoustic regularity of the perfect chord and the
acoustic unbalance of the diminished one, etc.
We have symmetry and memory expressed in terms of regular features; then again, we
have asymmetry and imagination in terms of irregular features created, as it were, in po-
tentially infinite interconnected plateaus of complexity on the grounds of regularity. We
order disorder by construing a causal line we ourselves can be part of; we come of age
along this line by disrupting it and making it evolve and change. 
As in a cycle, we breed order from disorder to assimilate, to accommodate, to integrate
ourselves into our vital impressions, but we also engender disorder out of order so that
we grow up by defying the conformity of an established rule. However, the second dis-
order is diﬀerent in kind, because it is, of necessity, always placed after our integration:
we always make it regular in order to experience it from inside, from a subjective point of
view. We might perceive all these things in music, even at the surface of a musical work;
everywhere, from tonal cadential principles to the dodecaphonic series, from Palestrinian
counterpoint to Messiaen’s modes of limited transposition. But what is most important
is that these matters altogether seem to bestow sense on the whole process of composing
music.
That is why I argue that asymmetries also oppose symmetries by ‘individualising’, ‘per-
sonalising’ them at a relatively deeper — and in some sense a slower, more conscious
level — within a zone of lesser embodiment that raises one’s level of awareness but still
in an unbridled, garbled way, an awareness that undulates between the mechanicalness
of reactive impulses and the relative freedom of superior capacities of greater reflective,
analytical power. 
The impulse towards balance and unbalance balance
In seeking a similar orientation, the impulse towards balance (oriented by a deep memory
quality) represents a response time tied, so to say, to the focusing of both memory and
imagination at determinate subjective coherence lines — which seems to be, precisely, that
that Schoenberg usually calls musical idea. It is connected to the equalisation of past-like
and future-like impulses, and in this vein is foremostly oriented towards ‘analytical pat-
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terns’, as it were, that is, oriented to the regularisation and normalisation of both sym-
metric and asymmetric impulses. 
I argue that this temporality always aims, dialectically, at a balance between rhythmical
regularities and irregularities, between symmetries and asymmetries, in searching for
their most meaningful intercession. For this reason, it works at a deeper, slower, somewhat
less embodied and more conscious level. Deepness means in this case a smaller sedimen-
tation and, therefore, a greater fluidity of memory that  bestows this temporality a medi-
ating, integrating capacity. All in all, the impulse towards balance is dominated by the
same need of eﬃciency and regularity previously suggested about the impulse towards
symmetry. It diﬀers, however, in that a shallow-memory impulse seems to be totally
gripped temporally by the stimulus, whereas the deep-memory one seems to be marked
by several steps of temporal complexity, of memory depth, of which the stimulus is the
least important. 
Following Bergson on this, it is enough to compare the mechanical process of memorising
a text with that of rationalising and understanding its content.4 Although both processes
are notoriously replicative, the mechanic memorisation depends on exact word se-
quences; it depends on linear actions, images and on anchoring this sequence into de-
termined ‘temporal triggers’. Understanding, rationalising, on the other hand, has multiple
entrances as it searches for the concept and the generalization beyond the order, to the
extent that in its best eﬀort of temporal condensation it empties symmetries and asym-
metries of their particular (regular and irregular) qualities, favouring generic regulating
principles applicable in analogies. In doing this, it looks for a common fact, or for a group
of common facts, in order to take them as elements for generalisations. It is thus fully ar-
ticulative and ordering, and directed to unifying factors, homogeneity, and economy, so
that it points to a complex and continuous rhythmic synthesis of past and future.
Lastly, the impulse towards unbalance (oriented by a deep imagination quality)represents
a response time related to the diversion of memory and imagination around general lines
of non-coherence (and consequently to the promotion of the present time over the past
and future ones). It seeks ‘heterogeneous syntheses’ that take irregularity as principle,
that is, the destabilising of the normalisation and articulation that are eﬀected by the im-
pulse towards balance. It is so more concerned with continuity than with musical artic-
ulation. It thus favours the conception of ‘zones of unbalance ’, and acts in a destabilising
manner: destabilising the balance between rhythmical regularities and irregularities and
promoting temporal disjunctions or disintegrations.
This temporality is thus enacted in a movement of (in)equalisation, being therefore gov-
erned by the same need of liberation and aﬃrmation experienced under the influence of
the impulse towards asymmetry, although exercising this need in a dialectical way. It is
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4 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 156.
my suggestion that this temporality always looks for uncommon features in order to make
them elements of a superior process of particularisation, directed towards diﬀerence and
heterogeneity. It denies the economy of meaning promoted by well-balanced rhythmical
designs and represents, in this sense, a process of dispersal of the experience of regularity
and irregularity that would grant the work of  deep imagination a general sense of tem-
poral amplitude, and points, in this manner, to a complex and continuous synthesis of
the present.
The second rhythmicalization process  
Considering this complex middle-ground rhythmical configuration, I introductorily pro-
pose two groups of secondary rhythmic ideas; a group in a sense more closely related to
the rhythmical elaboration of symmetric and asymmetric temporalities, specially (though
not necessarily) in the compositional context of musical microforms; and a group more
closely related to the rhythmical elaboration of balanced and unbalanced temporalities,
specially (and also not necessarily) in the compositional context of musical macroforms.
(see Fig. a1.1):










































Figure a1.1: second level rhythmic ideas emerge from the rhythmicalisation of intermediate 
temporal impulses, under the influence of grounding temporal rhythmic ideas.
Now, considering, for example, in first place the rhythmicalization eﬀected between the
temporality marked by the impulse towards symmetry (oriented by a Shallow Memory,
[SM]) and primary rhythmic ideas that are past-oriented (those of Closed Refrain, [CRe],
and of Open Refrain, [ORe]), it is my suggestion that an important rhythmical distinction
exists, that is, that [SM] resonates [CRe] and [ORe] in two diﬀerent manners: in the first
case, it promotes the emergence of  ‘strong symmetrizations’, that fix the exactness of
rhythmical regularity — exactness is desired —; whereas, in the second case, it promotes
the emergence of ‘weak symmetrizations’, that enforce a ‘mobile’ rhythmic regularity —
exactness is problematized. 
All this complex rhythmic scenario stands for a tremendous source of temporal creativity,
as it expands and contracts forms of remembrance and of forgetfulness, forms of pretence
— of imaginative intellectual play — and abandonment. In short, by means of these no-
tions, it is possible to point in a more precise way to a broad rhythmical spectrum, from
complete musical determinism up to almost complete musical unpredictability.
Short examples
The following short examples are based on the general chart above, (Fig. a1.1). They work
as an introductory demonstration of how those second level rhythmicalization operations
may be compositionally designed at a more superficial, foreground creative level.
Hence, according to that general chart:
The rhythmic idea of Strong Symmetrization, [SS], results from the rhythmical interplay
of the impulse towards symmetry, [SM], with the rhythmic idea of Closed Refrain, [CRe].
This rhythmicalization concerns, therefore, a strong bond between the compositional
processes of characterization and routinization, promoted by [CRe] and the impulse to-
wards symmetry and regularity. It thus implies the thematisation of regularity, of propor-
tional designs, (see also appendix 2).
In general, the rhythmic idea of Strong Symmetrization emphasises the regular up-keep-
ing of the past and the building of a present moment by recourse to this maintenance. It
is permeated by comprehensive rules of regularity projected on the general sense of con-
servation and routinization that frequently characterises musical thematicism. 
These aspects are observable, for example, in Mozart’s youthful piano piece, Allegro, KV
3 (1762),  specially in the obviousness of its pulse architecture, which is fully regular and
proportional, and in it reflecting the proportionality of its thematic distribution and the
length of its phrases and semi-phrases, etc. Another example, in this same vein, but from
the Baroque repertoire, is the pulse regularity in Bach’s The Well-Tempered Clavier (1722),
BWV 847, “Praeludium 2”. In this piece, the regular presentation of melodic and harmonic
rhythmic patterns provides for a general sense of temporal stability, grounded by a strong
dramaticism. It presents an ample thematic processing, particularly that of the hybrid
harmonic-melodic initial rhythmic element, upon which the becoming of the piece is
based. We find here a musical gesture that is strongly personified, characterised by a sym-
metric attitude, that endures by facing always itself, by mirroring itself in exact ways, al-
ways illuminated by the subtlety of diﬀerent harmonic and melodic colours. All in all, we
find here the eﬀect delivered by the rhythmic idea of Closed Refrain, [CRe], being mul-
tiplied by means of symmetric rhythmic operations. Furthermore, we also observe a tem-
poral influx of high recursiveness, nurtured not only by the quasi-machinal processing of
pulsation, but also by the fluency of many melodic symmetries polyphonically built be-
tween upper and lower voices: we actually observe the complementary action of two
strong regularities, a regular sequentiality and a regular simultaneity.
The applied compositional example bellow, (Fig. a1.2) is oriented by the rhythmic idea
of Strong Symmetrization, in which the rhythmic values of a series [P0] are systematically
mirrored in alternation between higher and lower registers, in simultaneity with other
two  regular compositional operations involving its inverted retrograde transposition
[RI6], firstly by thematic imitation, and then by means of regular harmonic pulsation. In
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this example, the deliberate projection of regularity of alternation in the presentation of
the series [P0], which is itself a strong impulse of routinization, is subtle but still repre-
sentative of the rhythmic idea of Strong Symmetrization. This is an important aspect of
the rhythmicalization of any musical idea: its eﬀect may be sensed in diﬀerent intensities
and at diﬀerent levels of structural complexity, and operate eventually only  in a compo-
sitional background. On the other hand, the simple symmetric design of the presentation
of the chords [RI6], from measure five onwards, is also directly influenced by this rhyth-
mic idea in the sense that all chords occupy a same metrical position, and present a same
internal distribution. 
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Figure a1.2: Compositional example oriented 
by the rhythmic idea of Strong Symmetrization.
The formal mirroring of the melodic motif in the first part of the composition, just men-
tioned, also demonstrates the same principle, which in this example is projected on the
basic shape of counterpoint, on harmonic rhythm and colour, on melodic shape and met-
ric pattern. In this vein, it is now possible to infer about the double temporal constitution
inscribed in any rhythmical complexity. On the one hand, in the perspective of its fun-
damental time, this example communicates determinability (movement) and a strong
fusion of characterization and routinization (dramatic past and future); on the other hand,
now in the perspective of an intermediate temporal complexity, that is, of its temporality,
it communicates symmetry, regularity and, recalling for a moment Bergson’s lectures on
repetition, ‘the composition of habit’.5
The rhythmic idea of Weak Symmetrization, [WS], results from another rhythmical in-
terplay, which also entails an impulse towards symmetry, [SM], but now in relation to
the rhythmic idea of Open Refrain, [ORe], which is lyrical and temporally expansive. In
5 Because “we are right when we say that habit is formed by the repetition of an eﬀort; but what would
be the use of repeating it, if the result were always to repro duce the same thing? The true eﬀect of rep-
etition is to decom pose and then to recompose, and thus appeal to the intelligence of the body.” Berg-
son, Matter and Memory, 111.
other words, while in a deeper compositional level lyricalness works in order to amplify
the past — that is, while either the figure (or gesture) becomes lyrical by means of oper-
ations of thematic expansion, or there is no figure at all —, this refusal is now restricted
to rather occasional relations, to the positivity of evanescent memories that stamp the
composition with a ‘mobile’ rhythmical regularity, (see also appendix 2).
The deeper expansive temporal force projected by [ORe] is now controlled, delimited at
the surface by a symmetric impulse. In the perspective of this particular rhythmical in-
terplay, we may now contemplate the conjoining of a tendency for thematic expansion
with a tendency for symmetric dominance, in which the rhythmical fluency of the chang-
ing thematic element that is not a free one but obeys to a gradual, sometimes almost im-
perceptible, variation. In consequence, this rhythmic idea involves a ‘suggestion of
symmetry’, an ‘a-thematisation of regularity’. 
The formal organisation of traditional minimalistic, phase music, comes to mind. A case
to the point is Steve Reich’s Piano Phase (1967), which renders a sort of ‘loose’ regularity,
a loose symmetry, as it progresses rhythmically in between a more profound sense of the-
matic annihilation, of nullification of the figure, of the identity of the musical element,
and an urgent drive for regularity that constantly breaks loose from confinement. All in
all, although constricted, this rhythmic idea operates in a lyrical way. Here the instinctive
up-keeping of pulsation, still present, is more open to variations, accepting a certain
amount of mobility and, consequently, defying recognition: in this context, a general
sense of vagueness is achieved by reiterative nuances which are constantly led to forget
past references (of regularity). 
Next, I present an applied compositional example oriented by the rhythmic idea of Weak
Symmetrization, (Fig. a1.3), in which recursive designs are manipulated by means of
slight rhythmic expansions and contractions of a pedal note within irrational rhythmic
groups. A same rhythmical gesture is systematically repeated, almost but not in the same
way. Additionally, a new layer of temporal expansion is added by means of slight changes
of pace at each measure. 
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Figure a1.3: Compositional example oriented 
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The whole rhythmical design is kept almost unchanged, even though changing indeed.
One may also observe the manifestation of this same principle of mobile symmetrization
reflected as well in the use of thematic retrogradations between the upper and bottom
voices, and in the use of rhythmical elaboration by means of proportional multiplication.
The rhythmic idea of Strong Asymmetrization, [SA], results, diﬀerently, from the rhyth-
micalization of the impulse towards asymmetry, [SI], marked by a strong sense of de-
mechanisation and de-routinisation, and the rhythmic idea of Close Refrain, [CRe],
which is dramatic, determinative. This rhythmicalization is thus permeated by a constant
compositional projection of irregularities on musical substance, by a sort of routine-irreg-
ularity that is taken as a fixed rule of asymmetry, (see also appendix 2).
Instances of the influence of this rhythmic idea are to be found in the formal organisation
of some serial music, such as in Messiaen’s Mode de Valeurs et d’Intensités (1949), in which
it is observed a ‘designed irregularity’, which is comprehensive, aesthetically controlled,
and often acts like a broken, unstable rhythmical machine. Moreover, rhythmically con-
ditioned in such manner, the variation of musical substance in this piece is constantly
projected as shifting trajectories and not as fixed images, as ‘patterns of curvatures’ or
arches of irregularity, that are projected towards the future, not into the past. Another ex-
ample in the context of atonal music is the foreground rhythmic irregularity perceived
in works such as Schoenberg´s Pierrot Lunaire, opus 11, nº. 9 (1912), which may be seen
as resulting from a particular type of distribution of accentuation in independent pulse
streams,6 which, in turn, would fluctuate independently, dissipating and condensing, so
to generate blurred textural changes.
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6 John Roeder holds that “rhythmic organisation in much of Schoenberg’s music extends and even
transcends common metrical practice. Innovation is evident especially in his middle-period works
where the texture is highly polyphonic and the often canonical voices are saturated with a few distinct
motives. Although regular pulses are fleetingly evident in these works, the surface rhythms change
rapidly and irregularly.” See John Roeder, “Interacting Pulse Streams in Schoenberg’s Atonal
Polyphony”, Music Theory Spectrum 16, no. 2 (1994): 233. 
Figure a1.4: Compositional example oriented 
by the rhythmic idea of Strong Asymmetrization.
In the example above, (Fig. a1.4), the rhythmic idea of Strong Asymmetrization is seen
projected in a short cadence, in which all rhythmic groups are systematically varied and
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The rhythmic idea of Weak Asymmetrization, [WA], also involves an impulse towards
asymmetry, marked by of a strong sense of de-mechanisation and de-routinisation, but
in the perspective of its rhythmicalization by the rhythmic idea of Open Refrain, [ORe],
lyrical and non determinative; a rhythmicalization permeated by the compositional pro-
jection of ‘mobile irregularities’ on musical substance, a sort of complex ‘anti-routine-ir-
regularity’ that a-thematises well established applied rules of irregularity, (see also
appendix 2).
appendix 1 - Second level rhythmic ideas, short examples and commentaries 235|
Figure a1.5: Compositional example oriented 
by the rhythmic idea of Weak Asymmetrization.
The example above, (Fig. a1.5), based on the previous one, is oriented by the rhythmic
idea of Weak Asymmetrization. In it, the asymmetric shape of the cadence becomes ‘mo-
bile’,  so to say,  by means of the simultaneous presentation of its retrograde version. 
We observe the influence of this rhythmic idea in the formal organisation of pieces like
Berio’s Sequenza III (1965), which is permeated by a sort of loose, ‘mobile irregularity’,
by an unfettered asymmetry, which preserves the general changing orientation of the
compositional process, though constantly reorienting the temporal flux of the piece by
means of open variations. This aspect is observed in the formal, chronometric distribution
of the irregular rhythmic impulses that form the piece. There we observe the unfolding
of a general diﬀerentiative lyrical temporal influx, marked by a constant rhythmical rota-
tion of diverse musical gestures and the consequent intensification of the often future-
bound characteristics that result from a systematic approach to rhythmical irregularity.
The influence of this rhythmic idea is also observed in a number of pieces of electronic
music, such as Stockhausen’s Gesang der Jünglinge (1956). In the context of European
works of the fifties, this piece opened  the path to a whole new metric formulation in
which harmony and melody are utterly merged metrically, not figuratively, nominally or
symbolically, but essentially. In it, many distinct spectral zones borrow their  internal or-
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developed and varied serially as time. The compositional process evolves directly from
the material, and is, more than ever before, fundamentally  lyrical, malleable, and “can,
without restrictions, undergo a whole series of transformations, and this independently
of its starting nature”.7
The rhythmic idea of Strong Balance, [SB], entails a strong impulse towards balance. Bal-
ance that is a sort of referential temporal horizon among diverse rhythmical senses de-
livered by other intermediate rhythmic ideas, for example, between the rhythmic ideas
of Strong and Weak Symmetrization, [SS-WS], Strong and Weak Asymmetrization, [SA-
WA], Strong Symmetrization and Strong Asymmetrization, [SS-SA], etc., (see also ap-
pendix 2).
It works influenced by a deep-memory impulse regulating these other senses, subjecting
them to a sort of ‘controlling, determinate, contracting balance principle’, in which the
notion of balance is imperative and comprehensive. It thus stands as a ‘dramatic balance-
axis’, deeply influenced by the rhythmic idea of Closed Route [CRo]. 
The influence of this rhythmic idea may be seen, for example, in the formal organisation
commonly established by means of axial harmonic displacements in tonal music such as,
to give an example, in Tchaikovsky’s Morgengebet, aus album für die Jungend (1878), which
is  symmetrically organised in three musical sentences, of eight measures each. The first
phrase of the first section presents a half close, achieved through the secondary harmonic
degrees. The debut tonality, G major, is therefore expanded through a B major chord, and
the second phrase of the first section increases this tonal expansion by means of four chro-
matic modulations. The next section (mm. 9-16) keeps the intense modulatory move-
ment of the previous phrase, however in a more subtle way. The middle of this section,
which is also the point of symmetry of the entire piece, is marked by a dynamic climax
that adjoins two chords under an axial relationship: C major chord (ms. 11) and F# major
sixth chord (ms. 12). The third section presents a descending motif, repeated twice se-
quentially. This is the most stable section of the entire piece. Out of its eight measures,
mostly in G major, only one measure modulates to D minor (ms. 21) — put in eﬀect by
altering the four-three chord of the 4th degree —, to return immediately to the main tonal-
ity. In this section, Tchaikovsky also uses altered chords without the aim of modulating
though (for coloristic purpose only, ms. 17 and 19).  All in all, we observe a well balanced
tonal arch that expands and contracts tonally by means of chromatic modulations. This
balance is the main compositional feature of the piece, which progresses further in terms
of harmonic displacement though never being totally free from the temporal horizon es-
tablished by the initial tonality and actually represented by the G pedal in the last mea-
sures: the whole irregular harmonic progression becomes, at last, regular by means of a
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7 Pascal Decroupet, Elena Ungeheuer and Jerome Kohl Source, “Through the Sensory Looking-Glass:
the Aesthetic and Serial Foundations of Gesang der Jünglinge,” in Perspectives of New Music 36, No. 1
(Winter, 1998), 97.
rational creative force that attracts both regularity and irregularity in order to promote
their temporal synthesis, a synthesis of tonal stability and instability, represented by the
simultaneous presentation of the G pedal and the large melodic arch performed by the
right hand.
The next example is oriented by the rhythmic idea of Strong Balance, in which two sec-
tions oriented, respectively, by the rhythmic ideas of Weak [section A] and Strong [sec-
tion B] Symmetrization alternate, (Fig. a1.6).
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Figure a1.6: Compositional example oriented 
by the rhythmic idea of Strong Balance.
Section [A] is based on the same design presented in the Fig. a1.3, in which a same gesture
is manipulated by means of additive and subtractive variations. Section [B] is based oth-
erwise on the same principle presented in the Fig. a1.2, though in a more defined way, by
means of canonic operations. The systematic alternation of these two sections imposes a
sort of two-folded gravitational centre informed by the dialectical relation which is es-
tablished by means of their repetition. Of course even though not appealing, from a com-
positional point of view, the technical recourse of sectional alternation is enough to
contextualise the general argument on temporal balance here suggested. One may easily
picture a lot of other levels of compositional complexity involving the same principle, ei-
ther homophonically or polyphonically, local or distal, projected on pitch sets or timbre
sets, or on the general organization of rhythm and meter, etc.   
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mirroring the previous ones. They are: the rhythmic idea of Weak Balance, [WB], the
rhythmic idea of Strong Unbalance, [SU], and the rhythmic idea of Weak Unbalance, [WU].
These are rhythmical ideas of extreme formal ‘volatility’, most of them usually involving
chance or extremely complex formal operations. 
The rhythmic idea of Weak Balance, [WB], entails an impulse towards balance also, done
by a deep-memory quality, which works, however, in this case, as a sort of ‘loose referen-
tial temporal horizon’ between other rhythmical senses. It works subjecting these other
senses to a sort of ‘liberating, non determinate, expanding balance principle’, in which
the notion of balance is diﬀuse and sometimes blurred, dispersive. It thus stands as an
‘lyrical balance-axis’, rooted on the rhythmic idea of Open Route, [ORo]. 
The influence of the rhythmic idea may be seen in musical pieces based on ‘variable-forms’
like, for example, Stockhausen’s Klavierstücke X (1954), which explores cluster chords
and cluster glissandi in many layers of temporal and rhythmical instability, organised ac-
cording to a rule of instability, a balance-axis of changing processes. In large part, the
compositional process of this piece is taken by a general lyrical rule of balance, as men-
tioned: a ‘mobile balance’ of mobile systems, which are statistically grouped instead of
dialectically arranged. The general impression is that of a fluid, richly expressive evolution
of changing forms and processes, which are integrated by the systematic compositional
(in this case, statistical) work on many musical dimensions.
The rhythmic idea of Strong Unbalance, [SU], entails otherwise a strong impulse towards
unbalance, by a deep imagination, which works destabilising the referential temporal
horizons that eventually were established between other intermediate rhythmical senses.
It behaves actually as a kind of anti-horizon that deregulates, subjecting these other senses
to a sort of ‘controlling, determinate, contracting unbalance principle’, in which the notion
of formal unbalance is paramount. It thus stands as a ‘dramatic unbalance-axis’, rooted
on the rhythmic idea of Closed Route, [CRo]. 
This negative referential horizon is found in many formative processes of music such as,
for example, the roving harmonies of expressionist music, or in the formal organisation
of early dodecaphonic music, such as in Schoenberg’s Suite, Opus 25 (1923), in which
the folding principle of melodic and harmonic features is in itself fundamentally linked
to this sort of unbalance-axis. There is a sameness, a ‘thematic source’, which is constantly
redone by the series in relation to its multiple possible subsets; a same set that evolves
temporally in its diverse transpositions and inversions. This process however, which is
composed by routine reiteration and evolution, does not follow a common synthetic rule,
but is actually subtracted and substituted by a negative referential horizon, by the territory
of the series, a fluid field, as it were, that reaches both the constant recurrence of the series
and its constant transformation.
The rhythmic idea of Weak Unbalance, [WU], also entails an impulse towards unbalance,
which works, however, in this case, as a sort of ‘prominent non-referential temporal hori-
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zon’ between other rhythmical senses. It works as a kind of anti-horizon that deregulates,
subjecting these other senses to a sort of ‘liberating, non determinate, expanding unbal-
ance principle’, in which the notion of unbalance is completely pervasive. It thus stands
as an ‘lyrical unbalance-axis’, rooted on the rhythmic idea of Open Route, [ORo]. This
sort of ‘negative mobile’ referential horizon, which subjects those rhythmical senses to a
sort of diﬀerential type of temporal activation, happens thus mostly by chance operations.
So, the lyrical rhythmical functionalization promoted by this rhythmic idea results in a
maximal degree of compositional mobility. 
There is evidence of this notion in the compositional techniques employed, for example,
in electroacoustic music (granular re-synthesis comes to mind) or in stochastic and spec-
tral music, music genres that easily accept a certain degree of unpredictability; all in all,
it relates to compositional processes that usually proceed by a temporal unfolding of their
materials in resultants of resultants. Influence of this notion may be found, for example,
in Ligeti’s Artikulation (1958), which consists of various types of sounds in conditions
of aggregation, joining serial, empirical and aleatoric compositional strategies, along with
technology such as sine waves, white noises, impulse generators, and filters. The unbal-
anced-axis in this case is clearly the systematic selection by chance used by Ligeti, which
works as a ‘mobile intersection’ among many genetic levels. The ‘serial entropy’ of Ar-
tikulations is systematically unbalanced, as the intersection of its many possible levels of
temporal significance (sounds, words, texts, etc.) is never perfectly determined. Thus
chance works here thus as a mobile line of reference that coordinates manifold rotations
of the series of sound matters.
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Appendix 2  
Flegetonte (2018)  
for Flute, Clarinet, Viola and Vibraphone
Compositional annotations on rhythmic ideas, 
analytical and ensemble scores
Flegetonte (2018), 
for Flute, Clarinet, Viola and Vibraphone
This piece was originally composed in 2017, as a number in the ballet Águas do Éden e do
Hades (Waters of the Eden and the Hades), premiered in 27 May of that same year, by
the Brazilian contemporary music ensemble Nova Camerata.
This is a short, applied analytical version of the piece, which was in many ways condensed
to be used in support of the general discussion on the rhythmic idea and the musical rep-
resentation of time. Many rhythmic ideas are contextually indicated in the score and listed
below, among other compositional annotations and observations. 
I - General aspects 
In Greek mythology, the river Phlegethon (Φλεγέθων, “flaming”) was one of the five rivers
in the infernal regions of the underworld, along with the rivers Styx, Lethe, Cocytus, and
Acheron; described by Plato as “a stream of fire, which flows into the depths of Tartarus.” 
The composition explores this ‘fire-flaming’ aspect in an almost descriptive way, mainly
by means of the superposition of diverse ‘axial ornamentation’ sets of an original series
[P0] and of its transposed inversion [I6] and transposed retrograde [R6] versions. I em-
ploys diverse techniques of variation, chiefly by thematic compressions and expansions,
and a systematic use of melodic interpolations and polyphonic densifications.
The version of Flegetonte here presented is composed by four main sections:
Part A - exposition (mm.1—mm.14)
Part B - interlude (mm.15—mm.21)
Part C - stretto (mm.22—mm.27)
Part D - variation (mm.28—mm.41)
In general, the piece is dominated by a steady and expressive melody, presented in the
viola, which is polyphonically accompanied by many instances of ‘flames’, that is, short
and large axial ornamentations of the series [5, 2, 9, 8, 4, 0, 3, 7, 6, 11, 10, 1]. The piece
generally explores the interpolation of [P0], [I6] and [RI6] series with neutral, symmetric
sets, like the chromatic scale, the whole-tone scale, the diminished seventh chord, and in
some instances also of major and minor triads. Part A is systematically controlled by many
thematic manipulations. Part B is a short interlude that explores variable and mass com-
position. Part C is a short imitative stretto based on some thematic forms presented in
part A. And part D is very open to variations and less controlled, both in terms of melodic
and harmonic composition. 
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Plato, Phaedo, 112e ﬀ., tr. Harold North Fowler.
II - Main compositional technique - axial ornamentation and serial interpolation
Axial ornamentations of descriptive character (flames) are oriented by the series in this
way:
In the example above, [Po,1] — prime form, first note — is treated as a referential point
[x] for two symmetric and interpolated axial operations: (i) as a fixed middle point of a
chromatic scale [-4, -3, -2, -1, x, -1, -2, -3, -4], and (ii) as a mobile middle section of [P6],
in this case as [P6,10]. In the example below, the same technique is applied, but from
[P0,2] and with the interpolation of the whole-tone scale. Similar operations are freely
devised across the piece, exploring other combinations, as for instance the ornamental
blending of the series with diminished seventh chords or diminished scales, or yet with
major and minor triads.
Other middle ground variational operations involve the alternation of linear and non-
linear (or undulatory, wavy) melodic shapes of diverse amplitudes, always developing the
‘flame’ character:
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III - Analytical score
Flegetonte explores the polyphonic superposition of dramatic and lyrical rhythmic ideas.  A
description of main temporal nuances involved in the composition of the piece is presented
as follows, next to an analytical score, always in reference to the arguments raised previously,
on the temporal complexity of the musical idea and its rhythmicalization process. 
Summary of main thematic-figural elements (whole piece):
Motive 1, [M1]: note pedal.
mm.1, fl.; mm.2, fl.; mm.3, cl.; mm.6, fl.; mm.7, cl.; mm.8, vla.; mm.9, cl.;
mm.11, fl.; mm.11, cl.; mm.14, cl.; cl.; mm.23, cl.; mm.24, vla.; mm.24, fl.;
mm.24, cl.; mm.26, cl.; mm.27, cl.; mm.28, fl.; mm.29, vib.; mm.30, cl.;
mm.31, fl.; mm.34, cl.; mm.35, vla.; mm.36, cl.; mm.38, fl.; mm.38, cl.;
mm.41, cl.
Motive 2, [M2]: axial ‘wavy’ melodic chromatic sequence + serial leap note from [R4] series.
mm.1, cl.; mm.2, fl.; mm.3, cl.; mm.4, fl.; mm.5, cl.; mm.6, fl.; mm.8, cl.;
mm.9, fl.; mm.10, cl.; mm.11, fl.; mm.12, cl.; mm.13, fl.
Motive 3, [M3]: axial ornamentation and interpolation based on [P0].
mm.1, fl.; mm.2, cl.; mm.3, fl.; mm.4, cl.; mm.5, fl.; mm.6, cl.; mm.7, cl.;
mm.7, fl.; mm.8, fl.; mm.9, cl.; mm.10, fl.; mm.11, cl.; mm.12, fl.; mm.13, cl.;
mm. 14. fl.; mm.14, cl.; mm.24, cl.; mm.25, vla.; mm.25, fl.;mm.39, fl.;
mm.40, cl.; mm.41, fl.
Motive 4, [M4]: axial ornamentation and interpolation based on [P6] and [I6].
mm.1, fl.; mm.2, cl.; mm.3, fl.; mm.4, cl.; mm.5, fl.; mm.6, cl.; mm.8, fl.; mm.9,
cl.; mm.28, fl.; mm.29, cl.; mm.30, fl.; mm.31, cl.; mm.32, fl.; mm.33, cl.;
mm.34, cl.; mm.34, cl.; mm.35, fl.; mm.36, cl.; mm.37, fl.; mm.38, cl.
Motive 5, [M5]: rhythmic cell/figure.
mm.3, fl.; mm.12, vla.; mm.22, vla.; mm.23, fl.; mm.23, vla.; mm.24, fl.;
mm.24, cl.; mm.25, vla.; mm.25, cl.; mm.26, vla.; mm.25, fl.; mm.27, fl.;
mm.27, vla.; mm.39, vla.
Motive 6, [M6]: melodic chromatic pattern.
mm.29, fl.; mm.30, cl.; mm.32, cl.; mm.32, vla.; mm.35, cl.; mm.37, cl.;
mm.38, fl.; mm.39, vib.; mm.26, vla.; mm.25, fl.; mm.27, fl.; mm.27, vla.;
mm.39, vla.
Summary of main rhythmic ideas (part A and B)
[CRe]: Closed Refrain, [CRo]: Closed Route
[ORe]: Open Refrain, [ORo]: Open Route
[SS]: Strong Symmetrization, [WS]: Weak Symmetrization
[SA]: Strong Asymmetrization, [WA]: Weak Asymmetrization
[SB]: Strong Balance, [WB]: Weak Balance
[SU]: Strong Unbalance, [WU]: Weak Unbalance
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[CRe]: 
[M1] entrance, flute, mm.1
[M4]+[M3] entrance, flute, mm.1
[M2] entrance, clarinet, mm.1
Timbral eﬀect entrance, [t1], viola, mm.1
Appoggiatura entrance, [ap], viola, mm.1
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t1], viola, mm.1
Scale section, [s], viola, mm.1
Contracted repetition of [M1], flute, mm.2
Repetition of [M2], flute, mm.2
Repetition of [M3]+[M4], clarinet, mm.2
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t1], viola, mm.2
Repetition of appoggiatura, [ap], viola, mm.2
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t1], viola, mm.2 
Timbral eﬀect entrance [t2], clarinet, mm.2
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t2], flute, mm.3
Repetition of [M1], clarinet, mm.3
Interval pedal, [P0, 1-2], viola, mm.3
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t2], viola, mm.3
Repetition of thematic variation on [M3]+[M4], clarinet, mm.4 - {M5}
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t2], clarinet, mm.5
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t2], flute, mm.6
Repetition of thematic variation on [M3]+[M4], clarinet, mm.6
Repetition of [M1], flute, mm.6
Repetition of [M1], clarinet, mm.7
Repetition of appoggiatura, [ap], viola, mm.7
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t1], viola, mm.7
Repetition of appoggiatura, [ap], clarinet, mm.7
Repetition of scale section, [s], clarinet, mm.7
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t2], clarinet, mm.8
Repetition of thematic variation on [M2], clarinet, mm.8
Repetition of [M1], clarinet, mm.9
Repetition of thematic variation, contraction of complexity, [M3]+[M4], clarinet, mm.9
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t2], flute, mm.10
Repetition of interval pedal, [P0, 1-2], viola, mm.10
Repetition of [M1], flute, mm.11
Repetition of thematic variation, expansion of articulation, [M3], clarinet, mm.11
Repetition of [M1], clarinet, mm.11
Repetition of thematic variation, contraction of variety, [M2], clarinet, mm.12
Reinforcement of [M5] as main melody, viola, mm.12
Repetition of thematic variation, expansion of length, [M3], clarinet, mm.13
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Repetition of timbral eﬀect [t1] and appoggiatura [ap], viola, mm.13
Repetition of thematic variation, expansion of articulation, [M3], flute, mm.14
Repetition of [M1], clarinet, mm.14
Repetition of timbral eﬀect, [t2], viola, mm.14
[CRo]: 
Maintenance of the rule of alternate imitation between fl. and cl., whole section A
Final cadence of section B
[ORe]: 
Cross-spectra resonance, [vibrato, vla.]-[M2, cl.], mm.1
Thematic variation, expansion of melodic shape, [M3]+[M4], flute, mm.3 - {M5}
Thematic variation, contraction of length, [M2], flute, mm.3
Thematic variation, expansion of length, [M2], flute, mm.4
Thematic variation, expansion of length, [M3]+[M4], flute, mm.5 
Thematic variation, contraction by repetition, [M2], clarinet, mm.5
Thematic variation, contraction of length, [M2], flute, mm.6
Thematic variation, contraction of complexity, [M2], clarinet, mm.7
Thematic variation, expansion of complexity, [M2], flute, mm.7
Thematic variation, contraction of complexity, [M3]+[M4], flute, mm.8
Varied repetition of [M1] as main melody, viola, mm.8
Thematic variation, expansion of variety, [M2], flute, mm.9
Thematic variation, expansion of complexity and articulation, [M3], flute, mm.10 
Thematic variation, contraction of variety, [M2], clarinet, mm.10
Thematic variation, contraction of length, [M2], flute, mm.11
Thematic variation, expansion of length, [M3], flute, mm.12
Thematic expansion, of formal importance, [M5], viola, mm.12
Thematic variation, contraction of length, [M2], flute, mm.13
Thematic variation, contraction [M3], clarinet, mm.14
[ORo]: 
Thematic/formal contrast between [M1]-[M4], flute, mm.1
Thematic/formal contrast between [M2]-[M4], clarinet, mm.2
Other thematic contrasts, whole section
Thematic/formal contrast between part A and B
[SS]: 
Regularity of duration, [M1], flute, mm.1
Regularity of melodic interval, [M3], flute, mm.1
Regularity of melodic interval, [M3], clarinet, mm.2
External thematic symmetry, [M3]+[M4], flute, mm.3
Internal thematic symmetry, [M3]+[M4], flute, mm.3
Regularity of duration, [M1], clarinet, mm.3
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External thematic symmetry, [M3]+[M4], clarinet, mm.4
Internal thematic symmetry, [M3]+[M4], clarinet, mm.4
Repetition of figure, [M2], clarinet, mm.5
Regularity of melodic interval, [M3], flute, mm.5
Regularity of melodic interval, [M3], clarinet, mm.6
Regularity of duration, [M1], flute, mm.6
Regularity of melodic interval, [M3], flute, mm.7
Regularity of duration, [M1], clarinet, mm.7
Regularity of duration, [M1], viola, mm.8
Repetition of figure, [M2], flute, mm.9
Regularity of duration, [M1], clarinet, mm.9
[WS]: 
Mobile regularity, [M2], clarinet, mm.1
Mobile regularity, [M2], flute, mm.1
Small var. of interpolation rule, whole tones replacing chromatic scale, [M3], cl., mm.2
Mobile regularity, [M2], clarinet, mm.3
Small var. of interpolation rule, [M3], clarinet., mm.6
Mobile regularity, [M2], clarinet, mm.5
Mobile regularity, [M2], flute, mm.6
Mobile regularity, [M2], flute, mm.9
Mobile regularity, [M2], clarinet, mm.10
Mobile regularity, [M2], flute, mm.11
Rubato, final cadence of section B
[SA]: 
Interpolated axial series, [M4], flute, mm.1
Interpolated axial series, [M4], clarinet, mm.2
Interpolated axial series, [M4], flute, mm.5
Interpolated axial series, [M4], clarinet, mm.6
Interpolated axial series, [M4], flute, mm.8
Interpolated mixed chords, [M3], flute, mm.10
[WA]: 
Superposition of melodic ranges and irrational rhythmical relationship between flute
and clarinet, whole piece.
Mass composition, mass composition, whole part B
Variable performing controls
[SB]: Rule of thematic alternation between flute and clarinet, whole piece.
[WB]: Compositionally irrelevant in this instrumental version.
[SU]: Serial fluidity.
[WU]: Gradual formal and thematic liquidation (part D).
[PM]: Preponderant metric image: partial metric mobility by melody
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Flegetonte, mm. 5-9 (cont.)
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Flegetonte, mm. 10-14 (cont.)
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Flegetonte, measures 15-20
Part B is fully lyrical. It opens with a repetition box characterized by strong mobility and harmonic
density. This formal transition and the overall compositional design involving a temporal structure
of mass added to variable performing controls are dominated by the rhythmic idea of open route
[ORo]. Measure 15 and 16 are thus marked by the guidance of the rhythm idea of weak asym-
metrization, while from the measure 18 onwards the composition is guided by a general dramatic
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Flegetonte, mm. 22-27 (cont.)
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Flegetonte, mm. 28-31 (cont.)
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Flegetonte, mm. 32-35 (cont.)
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Flegetonte, mm. 36-39 (cont.)
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Appendix 3  
Diagram of 
Musical Representation of Time 
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This diagram may be read as follows:
Diﬀerence in itself, a domain of pure intensities, becomes a duration in us, as experience, by reach-
ing most and first of all our sensibility. It is ‘passively seized’, so to say, from its multiplicity, to be
simultaneously placed and with no loss into a first ‘marvellous moment’ of emergence — the
Idea — which rotates and unfolds infinite times within itself, a moment that is temporally het-
erogeneous and complex, and profoundly dynamic. Pure experiential images are thus formed
and addressed to the depth of memory, resonating and amplifying the work of sensibility from
inside. On the other hand, a movement of another kind is in course within the Idea, which defines
itself through a permanent temporal contraction: many images are blended into new ones, how-
ever deprived from their real, original temporal significance. These new images are the substance
of our thoughts and understanding proper, which of course are always able to return to the depths
of the Idea, reconsidering and questioning themselves, their temporal emptness, and creating
new, risky intellectual paths, breaking the code, etc., or not; that is, they can always represent their
own temporal contraction in defiance or compliance, in response to our freedom. Thus, one may
live the domain of understanding alone or may aim to regain the domain of sensibility by means
of the Idea and the depth of memory. 
This cognitive amplitude is rhythmical, it ‘pulses’, as it were, between temporal expansions and
contractions. Now, this work of temporal expansions and contractions can be translated to the
musical realm as lyrical and dramatic, respectively. There are lyrical musical times as much as dra-
matic ones. Their diﬀerence in orientation, however, is essential, because the temporal contraction
of musical dramaticism can only exist into a process of generalisation, while the temporal expan-
sion of musical lyricalness is constantly looking for particularities. 
Now, a given image is Characterised, [C], when it faces the sign of equality by means of a dramatic
attitude, [Dr]: it is reaﬃrmed or repeated now as it was in the past and becomes increasingly con-
tracted temporally. On the other hand, the image is Non-characterised, [NC], when this repetition
is questioned by means of a lyrical attitude, [Lr]: something in it diﬀers now if compared to with
it was in the past, and stands as an expansion of its non-determination. Complementarily, a given
image is Routinized, [R], when it faces the sign of diﬀerence by means of a dramatic attitude, [Dd].
Its diﬀerential power thus becomes controlled, contracted by rules of conduct, into a given mech-
anism: the future is determined. But when this image of control is itself questioned by means of
a lyrical attitude, [Ld], it becomes Non-routinized, [NR], its diﬀerential power is liberated and
the future is non determined.
These are fundamental Musical Times. In music, [C] orients the thematic consolidation; [NC]
orients the expansion of musical thematicism; [R] orients the consolidation of variational rules;
and [NR] orients the expansion of these rules. A first rhythmicalization, [<r>], happens by means
of the blend of these temporal tendencies. The rhythmic idea of Closed Refrain, [CRe], results
from [C]<r>[R], and stands as a strong dramatic idea, in which both the past and the future are
temporally contracted. The rhythmic idea of Closed Route, [CRo], results from [NC]<r>[R], and
stands as a dramatic idea, in which the past is expanded but the future is still temporally contracted.
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The rhythmic idea of Open Refrain, [ORe], results from [C]<r>[NR], and stands as a lyrical idea,
in which the past is contracted but the future is temporally expanded. And the rhythmic idea of
Open Route, [ORo], results from [NC]<r>[NR], and stands as a strong lyrical idea, in which both
the past and the future are temporally expanded. We may now contemplate, at this point, how
time in general becomes musical: it echoes the same kind of ‘blending action’ one experiments
in the interchange and mutual collaboration of superior faculties. The rhythmicalization factor, a
kind of ‘rhythmical machine’, thus constitutes the Idea proper, its heterogeneity and complexity,
its dynamism. This rhythmical power is ‘spread’, as it were, throughout the compositional act. 
Another ‘round’ of rhythmical determinations emerges from this one, motivated by new rhyth-
mical tendencies. Shallow memories, [SM], and imaginations, [SI], operating closer to the motor
centers, regulate one’s impulses towards regularity and irregularity. Otherwise, the balance and
unbalance of these impulses are further regulated by deep and more complex memories, [DM],
and imaginations, [DI]. These are intermediate Musical Temporalities that orient the consolidation
of symmetrical and asymmetrical rhythmical designs, and also those related to the control of bal-
ance and unbalance among them. 
New rhythmic ideas emerge in a second rhythmicalization process. These are the rhythmic idea
of Strong Symmetrization, [SS]; the rhythmic idea of Weak Symmetrization, [WS]; the rhythmic
idea of Strong Asymmetrization, [SA]; the rhythmic idea of Weak Asymmetrization, [WA]; the
rhythmic idea of Strong Balance, [SB]; the rhythmic idea of Weak Balance, [WB]; the rhythmic
idea of Strong Unbalance, [SU]; and the rhythmic idea of Weak Unbalance, [WU]. They mediate
the temporal design of deeper compositional tendencies, in preparation for the presentation of
the musical idea. But which is the idea? It is not a single, blocked thing. It is composed itself by
dozens of temporal tendencies, which are always creative tendencies, and ‘perform’ simultane-
ously at diﬀerent levels of complexity, and in diﬀerent speeds. The musical idea is always ‘beyond’
the present moment of its presentation. Clearly, the composition of musical presentation is
chronological, while musical time in itself is compositional. It is constantly contracting and ex-
panding temporally as life does. 
The presentation of the musical idea works thus like a two-fold lyrical-dramatic ‘musical diagram’,
in itself temporally emptied, but arranged and formed in such a way as to be filled temporally, in
retrospect, back to its virtual origins. It is temporalized itself, so to say, by many layers and zones
of projection of musical meaning, that may be seen finally concentrated into four general metric
images, of Total metric Immobility, [TI], of Partial metric Mobility by Melody, [PM], of Partial
metric Mobility by Harmony, [PH], and of Total Mobility, [TM], in response to a third rhythmi-
calization process. 
The final representation of this process may be celebratory or transgressive, disregardful or con-
formist; in any case, it may be all these things in diﬀerent moments, in a same he piece, but also
throughout a lifetime. Thus, after all, we may conclude that the compositional process is always
anew and never totally finished, because it can always receive a new inspiration, and excite a new
temporal tendency, a new way of thinking and perceiving the world by mean of music and the
music of the world.
